Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: FS-20-15479
DATE: 20201130
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Aram Mohajeri., Applicant
AND:
Tanya Heidi Stroedel, Respondent
BEFORE: M. Kraft, J.
COUNSEL: Marlene Kazman and John Syrtash, for the Applicant
Richard Niman and Patricia Gordon, for the Respondent
HEARD: In writing
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
[1] This is the costs endorsement in respect of the long motion heard on October 1, 2020. The four issues to be decided on the motion were” 1) whether to order a s.30 custody and access assessment; 2) the determination of a temporary parenting schedule that was in the children’s best interests; 3) the determination of whether the respondent (“wife”) was to be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home or whether the matrimonial home ought to be listed for sale and sold; and 4) whether the applicant (“husband”) ought to pay uncharacterized child and spousal support to the wife, if so then, in what amount. Prior to the substantive issues being heard, both parties raised procedural issues seeking orders striking portions of the other party’s affidavits for various reasons. I reserved my decision on the parties’ motions.
[2] On October 27, 2020 (“the October 27th Order”), I ordered that, on a temporary “without prejudice” basis:
a. A skilled professional be appointed to conduct a custody and access assessment with an agreed-upon assessor;
b. The parties have temporary joint custody of the two children of the marriage, and thus make any major decisions about the children’s education, religion, health and extra-curricular decisions jointly;
c. The children are to reside with the wife primarily, and with the husband secondarily on alternate weekends, from Fridays, after school, to Monday morning, and every Wednesday, from after school, to Thursday morning, with parenting exchanges to take place at school when possible;
d. All of the children’s school holidays are to be shared equally by the parents;
e. Commencing November 1, 2020, the wife was and is to have temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;
f. The husband is to continue to maintain all of the expenses associated with the matrimonial home, including but not limited to, the mortgage, property insurance, property taxes, maintenance, utilities and minor repairs; and
g. Commencing October 1, 2020 and on the first day of each following month, the husband was and is to pay temporary undifferentiated child and spousal support to the wife in the sum of $7,200 a month, without prejudice to either party’s right to seek a different amount of support and/or different start date after the husband delivers his income analysis from Mr. Ranot and all financial disclosure has been exchanged.
[3] Both parties are seeking costs of the long motion.
[4] I have decided that the wife was largely successful on the long motion and is, therefore, presumptively entitled to costs, pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLRs”).
Legislative framework
[5] Subject to the provisions of an Act or the rules of court, costs are in the discretion of the court, pursuant to s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
[6] Pursuant to r. 24(10)(a) of the FLRs, the court is directed to decide the costs of a step in the case promptly after dealing with the step, in a summary manner.
[7] Modern family costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes: to indemnify successful litigants for the cost of litigation, to encourage settlements, to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants: and to ensure that cases are dealt with justly: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, 299 A.C.W.S. (3d) 770, at para. 10. The touchstone considerations of costs awards are proportionality and reasonableness: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, 17 R.F.L. (8th) 147, at para. 12 (“Beaver”).
[8] The factors to consider in setting the amount of costs are listed in r. 24(12). The court must consider the reasonableness and proportionality of the factors enumerated in the sub rules as they relate to the importance and complexity of the issues. These factors include each party’s behaviour; the time spent by each party; any written offers to settle, including those that do not meet the requirements of r. 18; any legal fees; any other expenses; and any other relevant matter.
[9] The FLRs do not explicitly provide for costs on either a partial or substantial indemnity scale. Rule 24(8) refers to “costs on a full recovery basis,” where a party has acted in bad faith. The husband is effectively seeking costs approaching full recovery. In a family law case, the court need not find “special circumstances” before ordering costs on a full recovery basis, see Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 283 O.A.C. 287. The Court has a range of costs awards open to it, from nominal to just short of full recovery.
[10] There is no general approach in family law of “close to full recovery costs”: Beaver, at para. 11. Rather, full recovery is only warranted in certain circumstances, such as bad faith under r. 24(8), or beating an offer to settle under r. 18(14): Beaver, at para. 13.
[11] Costs must always be proportional to what is at stake in the case, and to the unsuccessful party’s reasonable expectation as to what costs he/she may face, if he/she is unsuccessful. In appropriate circumstances, unreasonable behavior will result in a higher award of costs.
Who was Successful on the Motion?
[12] The wife, in my view, was more successful than was the husband on the long motion. In particular, the wife was successful in obtaining a temporary order that provides her with a parenting schedule where the children reside with her primarily, amounting to them being with her nine nights out of fourteen ordinarily. She was also successful in obtaining temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and a temporary order for uncharacterized support in the sum of $7,200 a month, along with an order that the husband pay the ongoing expenses of the matrimonial home. The husband was, however, successful on the single issue of obtaining an order for a s.30 assessment. However, the husband’s choice of assessor was not ordered. The order for joint custody is neutral to both parties since neither party specifically sought decision-making authority. Similarly, the orders striking paragraphs from the other party’s affidavits was neutral to both parties, as orders in this regard were made against both parties. Therefore, although success was divided, the extent to which the wife was successful on the motion entitles her to an order for costs, although the amount of the order will take into consideration the success of the husband on the assessment issue.
Factors to be considered in setting the amount of Costs
[13] In Sims-Howarth v Bilcliffe, 2000 22584 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 330 (S.C.J.), Aston J. held that the two traditional scales of costs are no longer an appropriate way to quantify costs under the FLRs. He stated that, having determined that one party is liable to pay costs, the court must fix the amount at some figure between a nominal sum and full recovery, having regard to the factors set out in Rule 24, without any assumptions about categories of costs. This characterization of costs under the FLRs was approved of by the Ontario Court of Appeal in C.A.M. v D.M., 2003 18880 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 3707 (C.A.), at para. 42.
[14] The husband is seeking costs on a “partial indemnity” scale in the amount of $15,812.66, inclusive of HST and disbursements.
[15] The wife is seeking costs either on a “full indemnity” scale in the sum of $38,425 or on a “partial indemnity” scale in the sum of $25,360.
Importance and Complexity of the Issues
[16] The motion was of significant importance to both parties. The majority of the time on the hearing was spent addressing the residential schedule for the children. In particular, the husband filed eight third-party collateral affidavits in support of his motion for an equal-time-sharing parenting schedule. Additionally, he filed three affidavits in his name alone in support of the motion. The parenting schedule was an extremely important matter to the husband, as he maintained that he was equally as involved with the children as was the wife and, strategically, he would not leave the matrimonial home because the wife would not agree to an equal-time-sharing residential schedule for the children. This was the case, despite having free accommodation available to him at his parent’s home around the corner from the parties’ matrimonial home. This long motion was important to the husband and involved complex issues, which resulted in an order for a “s.30 assessment”.
[17] The residential schedule was also an equally important matter for the wife. She filed three affidavits in support of her positions in the long motion. The situation in the matrimonial home was no longer tenable and, unlike the husband, she did not have alternative accommodation available for herself and the children, nor did she have sufficient income to rent such accommodation. Further, the husband wanted to maintain the support arrangement where he paid the sum of $5,000 a month on an uncharacterized basis. The husband, however, did not provide the court with sufficient income disclosure to make an income determination. The husband had retained a chartered business valuator to prepare an income report but it had not yet been prepared. The wife required ongoing child and spousal support, and sought an order requiring the husband to continue to pay all of the expenses associated with the matrimonial home, in addition to, paying uncharacterized support in the sum of $10,000 a month.
[18] I have considered the factors set out in Rule 24 (12) of the FLRs, which reads as follows:
24(12) In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,
(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) each party’s behaviour;
(ii) the time spent by each party;
(iii) any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18;
(iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates;
(v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates;
any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter. O. Reg. 298/18, s.14.
[19] The husband’s position is that there was divided success on the motions, and he achieved a slightly better outcome than did the wife for the following reasons:
a. In terms of the procedural motion to strike certain paragraphs of the wife’s affidavit, the husband was successful in having an exhibit struck from one of the wife’s affidavit that was a pleading from another court matter between the husband and his former wife. The husband claims that it was unreasonable and/or bad faith for the wife to have included information in her affidavit that was based on unsworn, untrue and hearsay statements;
b. The husband sought a “s.30 custody and access assessment” by Dr. Ray Morris and the court ordered a custody and access assessment but not that it be conducted by Dr. Ray Morris but by an assessor that is agreeable to both parties;
c. While the court did not grant the husband an equal time-sharing parenting schedule as he sought, the husband obtained a parenting schedule that granted him five nights out of fourteen which the court stated was the children’s “secondary residence”;
d. While the court did not grant the husband’s relief to have the matrimonial home listed for sale and sold, leave was provided for the husband to seek this relief at a later date on certain conditions; and
e. The husband was ordered to pay uncharacterized child and support of $7,200 a month which he claims is closer to the relief he sought of $5,000 a month as compared with the relief sought by the wife which was $10,000 a month.
[20] By contrast the wife seeks costs of the long motions on the following basis:
a. She was granted primary residence of the children such that the children are to reside with her nine nights out of fourteen;
b. She was granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial hone and the home was not ordered sold;
c. Portions of both parties’ affidavit materials were struck; and
d. She was granted temporary uncharacterized child and spousal support payments from the husband in the sum of $7,200 a month and the husband was ordered to continue to pay all expenses associated with the matrimonial home pending the delivery of the husband’s expert’s income report without prejudice to each party’s right to seek support in a different amount and a different start date.
[21] Although success was divided, in that the husband obtained an order for a “s.30 assessment” the wife, in my view, had more success on the long motion.
Each Party’s Behaviour
[22] Rule 24(4) of the FLRs explicitly authorizes the use of costs orders to express the court’s disapproval of a litigant’s unreasonable conduct. It provides as follows:
24(4) Despite sub-rule (1) [which provides that a successful party is presumed to be entitled to the costs of a motion], a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.
[23] Further, Rule 24(5) provides criteria for determining the reasonableness of a party's behaviour. It provides as follows:
DECISION ON REASONABLENESS
(5) In deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine,
(a) the party's behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;
(b) the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and
(c) any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.
[24] As well, Rule r.24(12)(a)(i) requires the court to consider each party’s behaviour in setting the amount of costs.
[25] The wife takes the position that the husband’s conduct was unreasonable in that he insisted on proceeding with the motion to determine his temporary; temporary, “without prejudice” support obligation, despite the fact that he had not met his financial disclosure obligation by determining his income for support purposes and, more particularly, his income analysis had not been completed. Further, the wife claims that, in refusing to move out of the matrimonial home as he had earlier agreed to do, the husband forced her to bring a motion for exclusive possessions.
[26] In addition, the wife submits that the husband behaved unreasonably by filing a large number of affidavits from employees and friends in his attempt to counter her claim that he is an angry, rage-filled person. These third-party affidavits were filed by employees of the husband or his friends who had very little, if any, direct knowledge of the husband’s behaviour with the wife and children and, most importantly, the actual extent and nature of his parenting role with the children. I found the eight third-party affidavits to be self-serving and unhelpful. Addressing these various affidavits had resulted in the wife having to incur unnecessary and disproportionate fees.
[27] The Court can order costs on a higher scale to express disapproval of unreasonable conduct: Mullin v. Sherlock 2018 ONSC 6933. Put another way, the amount of costs ordered may be higher where a party has had to incur unnecessary added expense due to the other party’s unreasonable conduct.
[28] Further, rule 24(8) of the FLRs provides as follows:
(8) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 24 (8).
[29] In considering each party’s behaviour, the husband’s failure to move out of the matrimonial home despite his having available accommodation around the corner from the matrimonial home with his parents undoubtedly caused the wife and, as a result, children, additional stress and was unreasonable in the circumstances. The husband was aware that the situation in the home was not tenable but refused to move out because he did not want to lose ground in the parenting dispute.
[30] This is not a case where the wife could have moved out of the home just as easily as the husband could. Sometimes, refusing to move out of the home solely to maintain an even playing field in the parenting dispute is simply not in the children’s best interests. This is true in cases where the stress and tension in the home is inordinate and the circumstances are bound to deteriorate for the children during the course of the determination of the dispute between the parents. Here, the husband had suitable accommodation nearby where he could reside for the foreseeable future and the children were welcome. The only issue to be considered ought to have been the amount of time and schedule under which the children would reside with each parent on a temporary or temporary-temporary basis. The husband had been prepared to move to his parents but then changed his position, which was not reasonable in the circumstances. In my view, given the issues relating to the children, the husband staying at his parents for the time being with the children according to a reasonable scheduled was not unfair and would not prejudice him in a “s.30 assessment”.
[31] I also note that the wife acted reasonably in having made an order to settle on August 26, 2020 and a further offer to settle on September 30th, 2020, after the husband made an offer on September 10th, 2020. Her offers were not unreasonable. In view of the above, the wife is also entitled to costs pursuant to Rules 24(5) and 24(6).
Offers to Settle
[32] Pursuant to Rule 24(12)(a)(iii), I turn to each party’s written offers to settle.
[33] The husband made an offer to settle on September 10, 2020 (“September 10th offer”), as follows:
a. The matrimonial home will be listed for sale by September 18, 2020 with realtor Janie Sarner. The parties will accept the realtor’s recommendations as to listing price, sale price, closing date and any other incidental terms;
b. He will continue paying the carrying costs of the matrimonial home including mortgage, property taxes, insurance and utilities until it is sold.
c. He will provide a without prejudice interim interim payment to the wife in the sum of $5,000 a month which uncharacterized, which payments will not be deductible to the husband or taxable in the hands of the wife until further agreement or court order;
d. The issue of the children’s parenting will be determined by way of a motion after the parties have a case conference. Commencing September 11th, 2020, the children will reside equally with both parents pursuant to a 2-2-5-5- schedule, such that the children will reside with the husband on alternate weekends from Friday after school to Monday mornings and on Wednesdays, from after school to Friday mornings;
e. The husband will vacate the matrimonial home by September 11, 2020 and the wife shall have exclusive possession of the home until closing.
[34] The husband’s offer to settle was open for acceptance until September 29, 2020, the initial date for the hearing of the long motion.
[35] The wife made two offers to settle. The first offer to settle was dated August 26, 2020 (“August 26th offer”). It proposed the following:
a. She shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;
b. The children shall have their primary residence with the wife and that commencing September 7, 2020, the husband shall have parenting time with the children on alternate weeks from Friday after school to Sunday, at 5:00 p.m. and every Wednesdays from after school until 8:00 p.m.;
c. The husband shall make all payments related to the matrimonial home, including the mortgage, property taxes, property insurance and utility payments;
d. The husband shall pay interim interim uncharacterized support to the respondent in the sum of $6,000 a month.
[36] On September 30, 2020, the wife made a second offer to settle the long motion which was severable (“September 30th offer”). Parts 1 and 4 could be accepted alone, or in connection with any other part; however, parts 2 and 3 had to be accepted together. The September 30th offer provided as follows:
a. Part 1: Commencing September 30, 2020, the husband shall have parenting time with the children on alternate weekends from Friday, after school to Sundays, at 6:30 p.m.; and every Wednesday, from after-school to Thursday morning;
b. Part 2: Effective October 1, 2020, at 3:00 pm., the wife shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;
c. Part 3: The husband shall maintain all payments associated with the matrimonial home, including the mortgage, property taxes, property insurance and any other carrying costs; and commencing October 1, 2020, the husband shall pay uncharacterized, without prejudice support to the respondent in the sum of $7,500 per month; and
d. Part 4: The parties shall jointly commission a s.30 custody and access assessment with a mutually-agreeable assessor with the applicant bearing the cost of the assessment.
[37] It is clear from the offers to settle that the terms of the wife’s September 30th offer to settle are substantially closer to the October 27th Order that I made than was the husband’s September 10th offer, as follows:
a. The October 27th Order did not include a term that the matrimonial home be listed for sale and sold. Neither of the wife’s August 26th offer and September 30th offers contained proposals to list the home. By contrast, the husband’s September 10th offer contained a term that the home was to be listed for sale and sole immediately;
b. The October 27th order provided for the wife to have temporary-temporary without prejudice exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Both of the wife’s August 26th and September 30th offers contained a term providing that she would have exclusive possession of the home. By contrast, the husband’s September 10th offer tied an order for exclusive possession to an imminent listing of it for sale and sold and only if all other terms of the husband’s September 10th offer were agreeable;
c. The October 27th order requires the husband to pay all of the household-related expenses. Both parties’ offers to settle made this same proposal;
d. The October 27th order requires the husband to pay the wife $7,200 a month in uncharacterized support. The wife’s September 30th offer proposed that the husband pay $7,500 a month as uncharacterized support. The wife’s August 26th offer proposed that the husband pay $6,000 a month as uncharacterized support. By contrast, in his offer, the husband proposed that he pay $5,000 a month as uncharacterized support;
e. The October 27th order grants the wife primary residence of the children. The wife’s two offers to settle included the same proposal. The husband’s offer to settle, by contrast, proposed an equal-time-sharing residency schedule;
f. The October 27th, order, provides that the children are to reside with the husband on alternate weekends and Wednesdays overnight. The wife’s offers to settle proposed a residency schedule that included alternate weekends with a Sunday night return and weekly Wednesday dinners. Although the wife’s offers did not contemplate an alternate Sunday overnight and a weekly Wednesday overnight, the October 27th Order is still closer to the wife’s proposed offers when compared with the husband’s offer to settle, which proposes an equal-time sharing schedule; and
g. The October 27th Order requires that a “s.30 custody and assessment” take place and, also provides that, if the parties cannot agree on an assessor, I will make the determination. The wife’s September 30th offer includes an identical term. The wife’s August 26th offer and the husband’s September 10th offer are silent on this issue.
[38] I have considered the parties’ respective offers in the context of their relative success or lack of success on the long motion.
[39] The husband submits that the wife’s August 26th offer did not meet or exceed the terms of the October 27th Order, since her offer respecting a temporary parenting plan was that he have alternate weekends, with a Sunday return time, and not a Monday morning drop-off at school; and her offer also proposed that the husband have Wednesday dinner visits, which would not include a Wednesday overnight. While this is correct, the October 27th Order was closer to the wife’s proposed schedule than it was to the husband’s equal-time-sharing schedule.
[40] The husband further submits that the wife’s September 30th offer did not meet the terms of the October 27th order for the same reasons as are set out in paragraph 37 as it related to the residential schedule and that in terms of the choice of the assessor for the s.30 assessment, the wife’s offer had proposed that she choose two assessors from whom I can choose, if the parties cannot agree and the October 27th Order provides that, if the parties cannot agree, then they can make written submissions about their respective choice of assessor, from which I will choose.
[41] While the wife’s September 30th offer does not exceed the terms of the October 27th Order in any respect, of the offers to settle made by both parties, it was far more in line with the Court order that resulted from the motion than the husband’s September 10th offer was.
Time properly spent on the case and any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates, etc.
[42] The wife’s lawyer, Mr. Niman, was called to the Bar in Ontario in 2011. He has practiced law for 9 years. Mr. Niman was assisted by Ms. Gordon, who was called to the Bar in 2015 (5 years’ experience), and by Ms. Bergeron-Warren, a law clerk. The hourly rate for Mr. Niman is $425.00; for Ms. Gordon is $390.00; and for Ms. Bergeron-Warren, is $225.00.
[43] Mr. Niman spent 35.6 hours on the long motion; and Ms. Gordon spent 60.4 hours. Based on the submissions made at the hearing, and the significant material submitted, I find that the time spent by the wife’s lawyers was reasonable and proportionate to the issues at stake on the long motion, particularly given that the wife was not in control of the information relating to the husband’s income and also had to respond to not only the three affidavits filed by the husband but the eight affidavits filed by the third-party collaterals on his behalf.
[44] The wife’s total fees, inclusive of disbursements and HST, came to $38,425. She is seeking costs either on a “full indemnity” scale or on a “partial indemnity” scale, which amounts to 66% of her actual fees, amounting to $25,360.55. As set out in this Endorsement, the two traditional scale of costs are no longer an appropriate way to quantify costs under the FLRs.
[45] In his Costs Submissions, the husband submits that the wife’s fees are “outrageous for a motion scheduled for a half-day and are beyond what is fair and reasonable in fixing costs with a view to balancing compensation with access to justice”. In particular the husband points to a docket on September 15th, 2020, which indicates that Ms. Gordon billed 12.2 hours of her time to draft an affidavit for the wife. The husband also claims that there was time billed in connection with the drafting of costs submissions, which were prepared for costs submissions relating to two case conferences before Diamond, J., and therefore ought not to form part of the fees associated with the long motion before me.
[46] Ms. Kazman was called to the Bar in Ontario in 1993. She has practiced law for 27 years. Ms. Kazman was assisted by Mr. Syrtash, who was called to the Bar in 1981 (39 years’ experience) and by Ms. He, who was called to the Bar in 2020 (1 years’ experience). Ms. Kazman spent 40.7 hours on the long motion; Mr. Syrtash spent 11.5 hours; and Ms. He spent 1.0 hours
[47] The hourly rate for Ms. Kazman is $425; for Mr. Syrtash is $500.00 and for Ms. He is $165.00. Thus, the hourly rates charged for counsel for both parties were not materially different
[48] The husband did not indicate what he had been charged in full for the work performed on the long motion. Instead, the husband’s Bill of Costs indicates that he is seeking costs on a “partial indemnity” scale, in the total sum of $15,812.66, inclusive of HST. However, he does not indicate how he arrived at the amount.
[49] The wife submits that “the husband appears to have intentionally omitted or underreported time on the motions to artificially decrease the total of his Bill of Costs”. For example, the wife points out that the husband’s Bill of Costs does not include any time for the initial drafting of the eight third-party collateral affidavits; the initial drafting of the husband’s Notice of Motion or for the initial drafting of his nine-page Factum.
[50] While the wife’s fees appear to be substantially higher that the husband’s fees, I do not accept with the husband’s submission that the wife’s costs of the long motion “outrageous”. While the husband’s Reply Costs Submissions suggest that the long motion was a half-day, both parties’ Bills of Costs reflect that the long motion was argued over an entire day namely - a seven-hour period - which time included the procedural issues raised by both parties, which the Court dealt with in advance of the hearing of the parties’ substantive motions. Further, the long motion involved the delivery of substantial material. As well, the wife did not have the benefit of having full access to all of the information that would better assist her to deal with the issue of the husband’s income for support purposes.
[51] The costs that the wife incurred are reasonable in the circumstances of this case. They are proportional to what was at stake and to the husband’s reasonable expectation as to what costs he might face, if he was unsuccessful. The husband’s fees and disbursements were purportedly much less than the wife’s were and there was no response in the husband’s Reply Costs Submissions to the wife’s assertion that the husband’s Bill of Costs did not include time his counsel spent. In any event, even if a party’s costs excess those that the other party incurred, this does not in and of itself result in a reduction of the amount of costs the party incurred; it is one factor only to be considered.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[52] Keeping in mind the importance and complexity of the long motion, and the extent of the wife’s success on the motion; the reasonableness and proportionality of the work performed by the wife’s counsel; the reasonable rates charged; the fact that the husband should have expected to pay costs, if the wife both succeeded in obtaining an order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and primary residence of the children; the applicant’s greater success on the parenting scheduled but keeping in mind that it was ordered on temporary-temporary, “without prejudice” basis and the husband had success in his request that a “s.30 assessment” be ordered; the temporary-temporary “without prejudice” support ordered; and also considering that this costs order should, to a degree, recognize that the husband acted unreasonably when he refused to vacate the matrimonial home until the parties’ parenting plan for the children was determined when he had available to him accommodation, at no charge to him, which would be suitable for him and the children when in his care, pending the determination of a final parenting plan and that the husband succeeded in striking out certain paragraphs and an Exhibit from the wife’s affidavits filed in support of the long motion, an order that the husband pay approximately 50% of the costs that the applicant incurred on the motion represents a reasonable and fair contribution to the costs she incurred on the motion, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, or $19,200, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.
[53] Accordingly, this Court orders that the applicant, Aram Mohajeri, shall pay costs of the long motion to the respondent, Tanya Stroedel, in the amount of $19,200, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.
M. Kraft, J.
Date Released: November 30, 2020