COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-94161
DATE: 2020 11 13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Shahinda Lokhandwala
Applicant
- and -
Imran Khan, 9633880 Canada Inc., Zarinataj Khan and Ishaq Khan
Respondents
Sarah Boulby and Kenneth Fishman, for the Applicant
James Edney and Joseph Slavec for the Respondents Imran Khan and 9633880 Canada Inc.
George Karahotzitis and Melanie Larock for the Respondents Zarinataj and Ishaq Khan
HEARD: November 2, 2020
REASONS FOR DECISION
LEMAY J
[1] I have been case-managing this matter since late May of this year. My original reasons in this case are set out at 2020 ONSC 3209. The parties are in the process of exchanging documentation and preparing expert reports. They have been unable to agree on the scope of documentary discovery. As a result, I developed a process whereby the parties would exchange lists of documents that they were seeking from the other side. The parties would then provide their positions in chart format. The last column of the chart would be my decision on any outstanding disclosure.
[2] I have attached the completed charts to the parties’ copies of this decision. I have not included it in the reported copy, as the charts contain financial information that should remain confidential. My production orders are as set out in the chart, and below. In order to provide the parties with some context to the decisions in the chart, I will set out the background facts, the guiding principles and some observations on each category of documents.
Background Facts
a) The Parties
[3] The Applicant Shahinda Lokhandwala and the Respondent Imran Khan were married in September of 2002, and separated in September of 2018. In addition, the parents of Imran Khan, Ms. Zarinataj Khan and Mr. Ishaq Khan, are parties to this litigation. In the course of these reasons, I will refer to the parties by their first names for clarity.
[4] There are also two corporations that are part of the litigation. One is 963380 Canada Inc. (“963 Corporation”), and the other is 02932293 B.C. Ltd. (“Cellicon”).
[5] Shahinda and Imran moved to Canada in 2012, and incorporated a business selling cellphones. This company was operated as Cellicon. At the time of incorporation, Cellicon was incorporated in the name of Zarinitaj. As a result of a reorganization in 2015, Imran now owns 50% of the shares of this company. Shahinda alleges that the company is beneficially owned in equal portions by herself and Imran. Imran does not accept this position. I do not have to resolve this issue. For the purposes of my findings below, it is sufficient to identify it as an issue.
[6] In addition, Imran incorporated 963 Corporation with a business partner in 2016. This business is a purchaser, warehouser and reseller of cell phone inventory. Many of the clients of this business are Cellicon stores.
[7] For the purposes of this motion, Imran Khan’s counsel responded to the disclosure requests on behalf of all the Khans. At the hearing, Imran’s counsel Mr. Edney took the lead on submissions, and Mr. Karahotzitis, counsel for Imran and Zarinitaj generally relied on Mr. Edney’s written and oral submissions although he did provide his own oral submissions.
[8] There are issues about whether Ishaq Khan is a proper party to this action. However, those issues will be addressed once questioning is complete. For the purposes of this motion, Ishaq remains a party to the action.
b) The Business
[9] Cellicon operates a series of stores across Canada, with the bulk of them based in British Columbia and Ontario. Some of these stores are owned and operated by Cellicon directly while others are run by operators under Franchise Agreements.
[10] 963 Corporation purchases cell phone inventory and re-sells it to the operators. These sales may be mandated by the Franchise Agreements.
[11] It is common ground that both Imran and Shahinda played a role in the business prior to the parties’ separation in September of 2018. However, the relative roles that each played in the businesses is a question of significant dispute.
[12] It is clear that the businesses provided the bulk of the income for this family. In addition, there are arguments being advanced by Shahinda that she is entitled to an interest in the business given that she was involved in running the business during the parties’ marriage.
[13] It appears clear on the face of the documents that Imran has been running the business without any involvement of Shahinda since approximately November of 2018. In addition, it is clear that Shahinda is not a shareholder, officer or director in either of the Companies.
[14] However, Imran alleges that Shahinda was the one who was responsible for the creation and management of the financial records for these companies up to the date of separation. As a result, Imran states that most of the records from pre-2018 are in the possession or control of Shahinda. Shahinda, on the other hand argues that while she kept track of some elements of the business, Imran was the guiding mind behind the business. I will have more to say about this dispute shortly.
[15] Finally, each side attaches some blame to the other side for not disclosing documents earlier and for delaying the action. In particular, the Khans state that Shahinda failed to provide proper disclosure in December of 2019, and took inconsistent positions in a disclosure motion that was brought back then. The matter is now being case-managed, and disclosure is being addressed as part of the case management process. As a result, it is not necessary (at least for these reasons) to assign blame to anyone for delaying the process.
c) The Procedure
[16] As I have noted, I am case-managing this matter. Disclosure has been a hard-fought issue between the parties. As a result, I set out a procedure where each side was to provide their disclosure requests to the other side in chart format. Each side was then required to respond to the disclosure requests in the same chart.
[17] The end result was a chart that indicates the position of the parties on a series of disclosure requests. The parties were able to work their way to a consent on most (but not all) of the disclosure issues. The consent items are noted on the chart.
[18] I have been left to determine the outstanding issues in respect of a few items of disclosure. In the sections that follow, I will address some basic principles and then deal with the disclosure requests from each side.
Basic Principles
[19] Some basic principles underlie all family law disclosure motions. First, as in all disclosure proceedings, the principles of relevance and proportionality must be considered. As noted by Rogers J. in Chernyakhovsky v. Chernyakhovsky 2005 CarswellOnt 942, 2005 CanLII 6048 at para 8:
The courts must, however, be clear that the disclosure process cannot be used to cause delay or to reap tactical advantage. The court must consider the burden certain disclosure requests bring for the disclosing party. Is the probative value of the sought-after disclosure so great in relation to the difficulty of obtaining the disclosure that said disclosure would be ordered and sanctions imposed for failure to comply? How does the disclosure request fit into the overall context of the case? Is the issue for which disclosure is requested a central issue in the case? Or is it peripheral? Does the cost of obtaining the disclosure outweigh the value of the issue in the case? Is there a more expeditious and cheaper way of getting the same information? As the case develops, is the disclosure still related to an important issue in the case? As always, the court must balance these competing interests to ensure fairness
[20] Similarly, disclosure requests should not put an undue and unnecessary burden on a party. Jakubouwski v. Kopac 2014 ONSC 6592. However, the Court must also be cognizant of the interests of the requesting party. Consideration must be given to whether it would be unfair for the requesting party to go to trial without the information Burton v. Burton 2016 ONSC 62 at para 41.
[21] That being said, judges at all levels of the Courts in Ontario have emphasized, repeatedly, that early and full financial disclosure is a fundamental tenant of family law. This financial disclosure provides the factual foundation for the resolution of the financial issues in family law. See Roberts v. Roberts 2015 ONCA 450 and Manchanda v. Thethi 2016 ONSC 3776.
[22] Finally, the disclosure requests that are being considered must be weighed against the factual and legal issues in dispute. In that regard, I note two points:
a) Where a party is self-employed, or a shareholder in a company, their income tax returns will generally not be sufficient to establish income, or the value of the business. Blaney v. Blaney 2012 ONSC 1777 at para 5 and Marcoccia v. Marcoccia 2009 ONCA 162 at para. 10.
b) The obligation to produce sufficient information to satisfy a Court as to the value of assets and the quantum of annual income rests with the party whose assets and income are called into question. Blaney, supra at para. 5.
[23] With these overarching principles in mind, I turn to the requests made by each party.
The Disclosure Requests Made by the Applicant
[24] These are set out in Schedule “A”. At this point, the outstanding items are portions of items 8-9, 11-13, 16-21, 22, 25, 31, 32, 35 and 36. The following overarching issues present themselves:
a) Whether disclosure should be ordered back to the beginning of 2014?
b) Whether disclosure should be ongoing past March of 2020?
c) What should the Court do about the allegations respecting business records from pre-2018?
[25] In addition to these three overarching principles, there are some specific issues that I will address at the end of this analysis.
a) Should Disclosure be Ordered Back to the Beginning of 2014?
[26] Counsel for the Applicant seeks disclosure of a number of business records back to the beginning of 2014. This information is sought on the basis that the Applicant’s expert requires this information to provide a value for the business.
[27] The Applicant’s expert, Mr. Steve Ranot, swore an Affidavit in response to this motion. In that Affidavit, he sets out the following explanation for seeking information back to the beginning of 2014:
With respect to Mr. [Imran] Khan’s interests in [Cellicon], we see that the company has a December 31st year end and is profitable. In general, we value profitable operating companies on an earnings approach and look at the companies’ maintainable earnings for the five years up to and including the valuation date. In this case, the valuation date falls in the ninth month of 2018, so we requested financial information for 2014 to 2018, the five years up to and including the valuation date.
[28] There is no issue that documentation is required to be disclosed for the three years prior to 2018. This is because section 21 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines would require production of this information in any event. As a result, the only issue in dispute between the parties is whether the documentation relating to Cellicon should be disclosed for the calendar year 2014.
[29] The Khans resist this request on the basis that it is up to the Court (and not the expert) to say what should or should not be disclosed, and on the principle of proportionality. They argue that this request is disproportionate.
[30] I agree with the Khans that the ultimate decision of what should be produced is the Court’s and not an expert’s. However, the Courts have also clearly stated that it is not up to the other side to say what a party’s expert should or should not receive. See Air Canada v. WestJet Airlines Ltd. (2006) 29 C.P.C. (6th) 209 (S.C.J.).
[31] In this case, the expert has provided an explanation for why he needs the information. It goes to his valuation of the business. The valuation of the business is relevant for three reasons. First, a trust claim has been made over the business. Second, in any event, it is quite possible that a portion of the business will wind up in Imran’s net family property calculation. Finally, there is no real dispute that this business produces the bulk of the family’s income. In my view, this information is arguably relevant.
[32] This brings me to the issue of proportionality. Given that the parties have agreed on production back to 2015, it is difficult to see how this request is not proportional. The amounts in issue in this action are very significant. Support alone is, at the moment, set in an amount of several hundred thousand dollars a year, and the matrimonial home was worth in excess of $2 million. In addition, the Khans are claiming a misappropriation of funds in the amount of approximately $1 million. The work required to produce one more year’s business records is not onerous when compared to either the amounts in dispute or the complexity of the issues that the parties have raised.
[33] As a result, the Respondents are all, to the extent that the records are in their possession control or power, obligated to produce the financial records for Cellicon for 2014 that have been produced for the other years.
b) Post March 2020 Disclosure
[34] At the conclusion of the oral hearing, I made a ruling that the Respondents must disclose certain records sought for the period after March 2020. Some additional context is necessary to understand the reasons for the order, and the fact that it was made so quickly.
[35] Interim spousal and child support was ordered to be paid by Bielby J. back on June 17th, 2019. That order required payment of spousal support in the sum of $12,000.00 and child support in the amount of $7,177.00. Payments were made until March of 2020. Very little has been paid since that time.
[36] As a result, I ordered that payments up to September of 2020 be made out of the proceeds from the matrimonial home. These payments have now been made. However, Imran Khan is bringing a motion returnable on December 7th, 2020 to have the spousal and child support amounts substantially reduced because he claims that the global pandemic has significantly affected the business’s revenue.
[37] Given this pending motion, it is clear that documentation relating to the income and expenses of Cellicon from March of 2020 to the present is relevant. If I understood the arguments, Imran’s counsel seemed to be suggesting that the Court could simply accept Imran’s word that his income had been significantly reduced as a result of the pandemic.
[38] I make no comment on whether the Court would accept that evidence as sufficient, as it is possible that I will be called upon to decide that issue in the motion on interim support next month. However, as a preliminary matter, Shahinda is entitled to production so she can test Imran’s assertions about the financial health of the business.
[39] In any event, however, the documentation that Shahinda is seeking is relevant to the question of the value of Cellicon. The value of Cellicon is a central issue in this case, as it may affect both Imran’s income, and any trust remedy that Shahinda is pursuing.
[40] As a result, the documentation sought from March, 2020 forward is to be produced. Given the pending motion on December 7th, 2020, this documentation is to be produced forthwith, which is part of why I made the order at the conclusion of the hearing.
c) The Pre-Separation Documentation
[41] Shahinda has requested the production of a number of records, including records in the possession of the accountant for Cellicon. The Khans resist this production in part because they allege that the records are all in Shahinda’s possession, because she was the bookkeeper until she was locked out of the business in November of 2018. The Khans argue that they do not have the information for the period prior to November 6th, 2018
[42] There are three problems with the Khans’ position that documents should not be produced because they are allegedly in Shahinda’s possession:
a) Deciding that production orders should only be made against one party or the other would be deciding who had the records. I do not have the factual record to make that determination. The easiest way to address this issue is to direct that both parties produce the documents in their possession. The question of whether a party has not disclosed everything can be addressed through questioning or at trial.
b) Even if one side has the records, the other side may have copies of those records and the copies may have different notations on them. As a result, the records need to be produced by both sides even if both sides have them, as there may be material differences in the records each side has.
c) Finally, the accountants will have a significant amount of records going back for a number of years that may relate to those questions. Those records are in the “control or power” of Zarinitaj and Imran as the owners of the corporation. As I will set out more fully below, I am directing the Khans to take significant steps to obtain the financial records from the accountants.
[43] I should explain both the reasons for that last ruling and my expectations going forward, as the Khans were firmly opposed to it. I start with the Khan’s assertion that these records might be privileged. There are two answers to that assertion. First, if these records are privileged, then it is the client’s privilege to waive, and not the accountant’s. As a result, even if the Khans were able to claim privilege over these records, they would have to accept the adverse inference that might be drawn from a failure to produce these records. Second, I was not provided with any cases that support the Khan’s assertion of privilege over the accounting records and I am not aware of a privilege that would attach to accounting records in a dispute such as this one.
[44] Further, as I understood the submissions, the Khans are also raising an issue that these records belong to the accountant and not the company. This is an argument that the accountants may wish to advance. It may be grounds for the Court to decide not to produce them, but the accountant is entitled to notice before the Court makes a final determination.
[45] I should also address the issue of proportionality, as the Khans argue that this disclosure would not be proportionate. There is clearly going to be some work involved in completing this task. However, at this point the documents in the accountant’s possession are central to several key allegations in this case, including but not limited to the question of the extent of Shahinda’s involvement in the preparation of accounting and bookkeeping records. Given the significant allegations that have been made in this case and the significant amount of money in dispute, the request is proportional.
[46] My finding on proportionality is also informed by the high likelihood that the accountant will have kept a file or files separately on these companies, and the records will all be in one place. That will make production easier.
[47] Given all of the foregoing, I am of the view that the contents of those records are likely relevant. The only people who have control or power over those records involved in this litigation are the directors, officers and shareholders of the company. As a result, I am ordering Cellicon and its officers and directors to do the following:
a) Provide any and all of the requested financial disclosure in their possession, power or control going back to the beginning of 2014.
b) Write to the accountants (both present and past) and ask for the production of the communications between the company and the accountants as well as any other records in the accountant’s possession relating to the income, expenses and dividends of the business. This letter is to be written within three (3) business days of the release of these reasons.
c) Provide the response from the accountants forthwith upon its receipt to both my judicial assistant and to Shahinda’s counsel.
[48] In the event that the accountant alleges privilege over the records or some other claim to preclude the disclosure of the records, then I will address this through a third-party records motion. In order to succeed on that motion, it appears to me that the accountant would have to demonstrate that the records sought were his property and not the property of the client, and that disclosure was not warranted.
[49] I should also be clear about my expectations in terms of the accounting and bookkeeping records more generally. ALL parties are expected to produce any and all accounting records in their possession forthwith. It is not an answer to this directive for the Khans to assert that they don’t have any records because Shahinda was the bookkeeper. Similarly, it is not an answer for Shahinda to assert that she has no records because she was locked out of the business. Any party who claims to have provided all of the records in their possession while gaps still remain in the records must also provide a sworn Affidavit to that effect forthwith. These Affidavits can be used at trial if the accounting records disclose different facts.
[50] This brings me to Shahinda’s request that the accountants for the business be required to discuss the financial affairs of the business with her expert. I am rejecting that request for three reasons:
a) An oral discussion between the accountant on one side and the expert on the other side could create a collateral credibility dispute. This type of dispute is to be discouraged.
b) I have ordered significant additional disclosure, and have put in place a process for the disclosure of most of the records in the possession of the accountants.
c) In any event, I have pointed out the provisions of Rule 1(7.2)(k) of the Family Law Rules to the parties. It is likely that the experts retained by each side are going to have some significant discussions between now and trial. That process will ensure that any ambiguities or difficulties in the evidence are fully explored by each side.
[51] Any issues with respect to the sufficiency of the expert’s information can be re-addressed after the disclosure and questioning is completed.
d) Other Issues
[52] For the most part, the directions I have provided should be sufficient to understand the disposition of the items in the chart. There are a couple of single items that I should deal with.
Item #25- Commercial Leases
[53] The Khans take the position that these leases all contain a confidentiality clause. As a result, the Khans are not prepared to produce copies of these leases. Instead, the Khans suggest that the leases be reviewed in person but not copied by Shahinda’s counsel and Shahinda’s expert.
[54] Counsel for Shahinda argues that, by permitting inspection of the lease agreements, the Khans have agreed that they are relevant. I accept this assertion. I am also of the view that the lease agreements are relevant for two further reasons:
a) They are clearly relevant to Imran’s claim that he cannot afford to pay any support payments, as the lease agreements will show whether there were any options to defer and/or avoid payments as a result of the pandemic.
b) They will also be relevant to the calculation of the income, liabilities and ongoing value of the business.
[55] Having determined that the leases are relevant, I then have to consider whether the Khan’s proposal for having Ms. Boulby and her expert review them is sufficient. In my view, it is not for the following reasons:
a) We are in the midst of a global pandemic. As a result, additional personal exposures for Ms. Boulby and her expert should be avoided if possible. Offering to permit the personal inspection of documents only increases the potential COVID-19 exposures.
b) Seeing, but not being able to copy, relevant documents will make it more difficult for Ms. Boulby and the expert to prepare for trial.
c) Not having a copy of the leases will make the trial much more difficult to conduct if either party seeks to rely on the terms of the leases. For example, it occurs to me that the trial judge will not be able to mark the expert’s notes about what are in the leases as an exhibit. If the leases are relevant at trial, they will have to be the exhibit.
[56] I also reject the assertion of Imran’s counsel that these leases can wait until after questioning to be disclosed for three reasons:
a) The parties are planning to proceed to trial in May of next year. There is not going to be a lot of time after the first round of questioning is completed.
b) The parties are engaged in case management, and a goal of case management is to streamline the disclosure of documents and the discovery process. Disclosing the leases after questioning is a clear route to requiring two rounds of questioning, which is counterproductive.
c) The leases appear to be relevant to the question of whether the interim spousal and child support payments should be reduced or eliminated because of Cellicon’s alleged business problems. As a result, one party or the other may wish to rely on the leases at the motion next month
[57] As a result, copies of the leases should be produced, subject only to any claim that a third party may make about their disclosure. It is possible that a third party landlord may have an interest in this issue, and I would not want to preclude them from advancing that argument. Therefore, I am providing the following directions with respect to the leases:
a) Shahinda, her lawyers and her expert will provide a confidentiality agreement in which they agree to keep the terms of the leases confidential and use them only for the purposes of litigation. In this regard, confidential means not disclosed to any third parties, and only disclosed in open Court to the extent necessary. This confidentiality agreement is to be provided as soon as possible.
b) Within three (3) business days of the receipt of the confidentiality agreement, the Khans are to provide that confidentiality agreement to all of the landlords and advise the landlords that, by my order, the landlords have seven (7) calendar days to object to the production of the lease in writing, with a copy of the objection and the reasons for it to be sent by the landlord directly to Ms. Boulby.
c) If there are no objections received in writing, then the Khans are to produce copies of the leases no more than seven (7) calendar days after the period for objections passes.
d) If there are objections, then a third party records motion with the objecting landlords will be scheduled forthwith and my assistant may be contacted in that regard. The landlords will be required to participate in the motion and may, if unsuccessful, be required to pay costs.
Item #36- Other Disclosure
[58] On the chart, the last item is for all businesses owned by Imran including, but not limited to Cellicon and 963 Corporation. The Applicant is seeking all information relating to income, including documentation in support of the income amounts.
[59] This request is a very broad request. However, much of the information sought by Shahinda with this request appears to be covered by requests #31 and #32, as they deal with the business bank accounts for Cellicon for the period from March to December of 2020.
[60] That being said, counsel for Imran is correct when he observes that this request is overly broad and vague. However, there is a portion of the request that is relevant. Specifically, the question of income for Imran is going to be a key issue in this trial
[61] Therefore, I am of the view that at this stage some additional production is required as follows:
a) Any sources of income for 2020 for Cellicon and/or Imran that have not been disclosed are to be disclosed including what the source is and what the amount of the income is.
b) Documentation on Imran’s expenses for 2020, to the extent that it is available and has not already been produced through another request, is also to be disclosed. In that respect, I would expect at least Imran’s bank account and credit card statements to be produced
[62] Any other documentation in this regard can wait until after questioning is completed and we have a clearer picture of what might be outstanding.
Non-Chart Issue- Additional Bank Account
[63] In the materials that have already been produced, there are a series of bank statements from TD bank. Those statements are for different accounts than the ones that Cellicon or Imran holds.
[64] Shahinda is requesting the necessary releases to confirm with TD directly that these accounts do not relate to Imran Khan in particular. This appears to me to be an entirely reasonable request.
[65] I believe that this is proceeding on consent. If there are issues with this request, then I may be spoken to.
The Disclosure Requests Made by the Respondent
[66] I understand that the outstanding items on the list of disclosure requested of Shahinda are items 20, 21, 29, 30 and 42. I understood that, based on the arguments at the hearing, the parties were able to proceed on consent with respect to items 29 and 30. If I am wrong in that regard, I may be spoken to.
Item #20 Promissory Notes
[67] Shahinda has a series of promissory notes totaling approximately $1 million that she has produced in this action. The Khans are alleging that Shahinda improperly diverted funds from Cellicon in the time period leading up to November 5th, 2018. As a result, they are seeking additional details on the notes. In particular, they are seeking the electronic copies of all of the notes, along with the intact metadata for these notes.
[68] I understood that this request was proceeding on consent. To the extent that it is not, the request for the electronic notes and the related intact metadata is a reasonable request and I am ordering it.
[69] I also understood that there may have been an issue about the records from Shahinda’s law firm. If that remains an issue, counsel are to advise and I may be spoken to about it.
Item #21- Records On Account of Shahinda’s Corporation
[70] Shahinda is a part owner of a company that operated five (5) different Cellicon stores in Quebec. The Khans claim that she is a 75% shareholder in the business, while Shahinda states that she only owns 50% of the business. Either way, the business records from this business are relevant to this action, and I understand that no one disputes their relevance.
[71] Some of these records have already been produced. I understand that the accountant in Quebec has been contacted, and has agreed to produce additional documentation as long as Shahinda pays his outstanding invoice. That invoice is to be paid forthwith by Shahinda, and the additional documentation provided by the accountant is to be produced forthwith upon receipt. Any deficiencies in that documentation can be addressed once it is received.
Item #42- Accounting of All Personal Expenses Paid by Cellicon
[72] The dispute over this item is, in part, rooted over the parties larger dispute over who has the accounting records. I have already resolved that dispute above by directing each side to produce the records in their possession, control or power, and by directing the Khans to write to the accountants and obtain other records.
[73] I see two parts to this request. First, an itemization by Shahinda of the types of expenses that she believed the business paid on their behalf. Second, a review of the documentation for a line-by-line list of each expense actually paid. The first request, a general categorization of the items paid by the business, is a reasonable request and is to be provided by Shahinda.
[74] This brings me to the second request. To the extent that the Khans are seeking to have Shahinda go through records that everyone has and provide them with a summary of amounts and calculations of specific bills that have been paid, that request is denied. The calculation of amounts, and the organization and presentation of the evidence is something that should be done by each side.
Conclusion
[75] For the foregoing reasons, the Applicant is ordered to produce the documents as set out in Schedule “A” of these reasons. The Respondent is ordered to produce the documents as set out in Schedule “B” of these reasons. I have also signed the previously agreed-to consent Order, which is attached at the conclusion of these reasons.
[76] Given that the parties are moving towards questioning, the production is to be completed as soon as possible. I have put some time limits on specific items, but am not going to put a time limit on all of the disclosure I have ordered except to observe that I would expect the parties to move as promptly as possible.
[77] Given the scope and breadth of the issues in this case, it is possible that I have missed an issue or misstated something that was discussed in our hearing on November 2nd, 2020. To that end, the parties may advise me of any items that I have missed or misunderstood within seven (7) calendar days of today’s date and I will amend the Orders as necessary. This directive does not apply to either the accounting records or the leases. Those orders are final as of the release of the decision.
[78] The parties are encouraged to agree on the costs of this motion, especially since most of the production requests were resolved on consent. If the parties are unable to agree on costs, then costs submissions are due as follows:
a) Each party that is seeking costs shall have ten (10) calendar days from the release of these reasons to provide their costs submissions. Those submissions will be no longer than three (3) single-spaced pages, exclusive of bills of costs, case-law and offers to settle.
b) Each party may then file within seven (7) calendar days thereafter reply submissions that are no longer than two (2) single-spaced pages, exclusive of case-law bills of costs and offers to settle.
c) Costs submissions are to be filed with the Court office through the electronic portal. A copy of those costs submissions is to be provided by e-mail to my judicial assistant.
[79] Finally, I should thank counsel for their efforts to streamline this process. It made my task much easier and I appreciate the work and the collaboration that went into preparing for this motion from all sides.
LEMAY J
Released: November 13, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-94161
DATE: 2020 11 13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Shahinda Lokhandwala
Applicant
- and -
Imran Khan, 9633880 Canada Inc., Zarinataj Khan and Ishaq Khan
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEMAY J
Released: November 13, 2020