COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-3262-00
DATE: 20200928
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Wescom Solutions Inc.
Dylan Cox, for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
Nadia Minetto aka Nadia Arsenault
Eric Yip aka Sam Yip aka Samuel Yip aka Samson Yip aka Samsun Man Chun Yip, GF International
Gabriel Kit Chun Fung, Plus One Solutions
John Doe #1, John Doe #2
No one appearing for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: September 14-15, 2020
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MANDHANE J.
OVERVIEW
[1] The plaintiff, Wescom Solutions Inc. (“Wescom”), brings an action in tort against the defendant, Sam Yip (also known as Eric Yip, among other aliases), seeking, amongst other things, damages totaling over $2 million.
[2] Wescom’s claim against Mr. Yip arises out of his involvement in a scheme where millions of dollars of Wescom funds were spent, without its knowledge or authorization, to purchase Apple products that were then sold to third parties for cash.
[3] There were three parties to this scheme: Nadia Minetto, Wescom’s former accounting manager; Gabriel Fung, doing business as Plus One Solutions, a sole proprietorship; and Sam Yip, who received the Apple products, delivered them to Mr. Fung and sold some of them to third parties.
[4] On October 31, 2014, Ms. Minetto consented to judgment and was found liable for damages in the amount of $6,831,834.17, prejudgment interest in the amount of $125,099.75.
[5] In 2016, after a trial, Mr. Fung and Plus One Solutions were found jointly and severally liable for damages in the amount of $5,094,647.72, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $280,103.81. The Court also ordered Mr. Fung to pay costs in the amount of $179,504.99, including all fees, disbursements and HST.
[6] The Court also granted Mr. Fung’s cross-claim against Ms. Minetto and found her liable to pay Mr. Fung damages in the amount of $5,094,647.72, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $280,103.31.
[7] Wescom now seeks judgment against Mr. Yip based on the tort of conversion. It seeks damages in the amount of $2,709,852.12, prejudgment interest, costs, as well as extension of the Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip.
[8] In his Statement of Defence and Cross-Claim dated September 6, 2014, Mr. Yip denied liability. He also cross-claimed against Ms. Minetto and Mr. Fung, pursuant to the Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.1.
RESULT
[9] For reasons that follow, I find that Mr. Yip is liable for damages in the amount of $2,709,852.12. Wescom is also entitled to prejudgment interest and costs. I am also prepared to extend the Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip for a period of six months to assist the plaintiff to enforce this judgment.
[10] While I dismiss Mr. Yip’s cross-claim against Mr. Fung, I find in Mr. Yip’s favour in relation to his cross-claim against Ms. Minetto.
FACTS
[11] Wescom is a software company head quartered in Mississauga.
[12] Between 2011 and June 2014, Ms. Minetto, an accounting manager, used millions of dollars of Wescom funds to purchase Apple products that were eventually sold to third parties.
[13] Ms. Minetto actively manipulated Wescom’s books and records to conceal her fraudulent activities by making it appear as though other employees were making the purchases.
[14] After purchasing Apple products on her American Express corporate credit card, Ms. Minetto would enter the expense under different employees’ names in Wescom’s accounting software program, NetSuite. She would then arrange for Wescom to pay off the credit card balances from its CIBC corporate bank account.
[15] Sometime in 2013, after connecting with Ms. Minetto on Kijiji, Mr. Fung began purchasing Apple products from Ms. Minetto to sell online and through his retail store, Plus One Solutions. All transactions between Ms. Minetto and Mr. Fung, and between Mr. Fung and his customers, were conducted in cash. No HST was remitted and no invoices or receipts were received or provided.
[16] In 2013, the co-defendant Mr. Yip, who was a business acquaintance and friend of Mr. Fung, leased a virtual office at 15 Allstate Parkway in Markham (“virtual office”), in part, to receive Ms. Minetto’s shipments from Apple. For the most part, Mr. Yip paid the nominal rent for the virtual office.
[17] Mr. Fung and Ms. Minetto arranged to ship the Apple products to the virtual office as this would reduce the need for the two parties to meet in person.
[18] Between April 2013 and June 2014, Ms. Minetto ordered millions of dollars of Apple products that were shipped directly to the virtual office operated by Mr. Yip.
[19] Ms. Minetto would notify Mr. Fung when shipments were expected by forwarding him Apple’s automated email shipment notifications. Mr. Fung, in turn, would notify Mr. Yip about expected shipments by forwarding him Ms. Minetto’s emails.
[20] Mr. Yip would retrieve the shipments from the virtual office and deliver them to Mr. Fung at Plus One Solutions. A few days after receiving the Apple products, Mr. Fung would pay Ms. Minetto in cash.
[21] Mr. Yip’s dealings were exclusively through Mr. Fung. Mr. Yip never met Ms. Minetto and he never paid her any funds directly or indirectly.
[22] In addition to receiving the shipments at the virtual office, Mr. Yip would sometimes assist Mr. Fung in selling the Apple products that the latter obtained from Ms. Minetto. Mr. Yip would identify a third-party buyer online, obtain the Apple product(s) from Mr. Fung, sell the product(s) to the third party and then split the proceeds with Mr. Fung. Some of these buyers were in Canada while others were in Hong Kong. Again, all transactions between Mr. Yip and Mr. Fung, and between Mr. Yip and third-party buyers, were conducted in cash, no HST was remitted, and no invoices or receipts were provided.
[23] In total, Mr. Yip received Apple products valued at $2,758,277.60 (excluding HST) at the virtual office.
[24] In May 2014, Wescom hired Kristine Percy, who later became its Director of Finance, to implement new month-end procedures. In June 2014, Ms. Percy noticed anomalies in certain employee expense accounts. After making inquiries and seeking supporting documentation, Ms. Percy discovered that expenses for Apple products allocated to certain employees did not match those employees’ credit card statements. She further discovered that Ms. Minetto was making large purchases from Apple that were not authorized by Wescom. Finally, she was able to confirm that Wescom had indeed paid off the balances on Ms. Minetto’s corporate credit card from its bank account. Ms. Percy reported her findings to management.
[25] On July 14, 2014, Wescom terminated Ms. Minetto. As she was escorted out of the building, Ms. Minetto admitted that she had been buying large amounts of Apple products and selling them online.
[26] Through a forensic investigation, Wescom found emails wherein Mr. Fung placed orders with Ms. Minetto for large quantities of Apple products. Wescom also discovered that, between 2013 and 2014, a large volume of the Apple products purchased by Ms. Minetto were being shipped directly to “Eric Yip” at the virtual office. Mr. Yip admitted under oath that “Eric Yip” was an alias he used for the purpose of receiving deliveries at the virtual office.
[27] After commencing this action, and pursuant to an Anton Piller order granted by this court, Wescom seized some Apple products at the virtual office and at Plus One Solutions. Wescom returned these items to Apple and received a credit in the amount of $48,425.48 (excluding HST).
THE PROCEEDINGS
[28] In July 2014, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants, seeking, amongst other things, general damages in the amount of $7 million, a Mareva injunction and an Anton Piller order.
[29] By way of order dated July 17, 2014, Donohue J. granted Wescom a Mareva injunction in relation to Ms. Minetto. He also granted the Anton Piller order in relation to Plus One Solutions and the virtual office held in Mr. Yip’s name.
[30] On July 21, 2014, Ricchetti J. granted Wescom’s Mareva injunction in relation to Mr. Fung and Mr. Yip. He also granted an Anton Piller order in relation to Mr. Fung and Mr. Yips’ places of residence. These orders were subsequently extended by the Court such that they expired on October 28, 2014.
[31] On October 24, 2014, Emery J. continued the Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip until trial. In so doing, Justice Emery relied on the fact that, “on the evening that the [Anton Piller] orders were being executed at Mr. Fung’s store, Plus One, Mr. Yip picked up a bag containing $80,000 in cash that he said belonged to him. He later returned it to Mr. Fung and Mr. Fung’s lawyer turned the cash over to the independent solicitors, recognizing it was from sales of Minetto’s products.”
[32] On October 31, 2014, Ms. Minetto consented to judgment against her in the amount of $6,831,834.17.
[33] After a four-day trial, on August 28, 2018, Emery J. found Mr. Fung and Plus One jointly and severally liable for damages in the amount of $5,094,674.72. The Court also granted Mr. Fung’s cross-claim against Ms. Minetto and found her liable to pay Mr. Fung damages in the amount of $5,094,674.72.
[34] Wescom is now proceeding solely against Mr. Yip. It seeks damages in the amount of $2,709,852.12, prejudgment interest, costs, as well as extension of the Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip. Mr. Yip cross-claims for the same amount against Ms. Minetto and Mr. Fung.
[35] The trial proceeded before me from September 14-15, 2020. Wescom called three witnesses: Brian David King (a private investigator who assisted in locating Mr. Yip for the purposes of service), Ms. Percy and Mr. Fung. Wescom also sought to admit certain transcripts, business records and electronic records.
[36] Mr. Yip is now living in Hong Kong. He was not present at trial and did not defend the action. I am satisfied that Mr. Yip was properly served with the trial record and was aware of these proceedings. Pursuant to Rule 52.01(2)(a) and (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, the trial proceeded in Mr. Yip’s absence.
ANALYSIS
Evidentiary Issues
[37] Wescom relied on a number of documents to prove its case. Some of these documents raised evidentiary issues that required rulings from this court.
[38] First, Wescom sought to tender into evidence read-ins from a transcript of Mr. Yip’s July 28, 2014 examination under oath. Rule 31.11 was not applicable because the July 28, 2014 examination was not an examination for discovery. Rather, it was an examination conducted pursuant to Ricchetti J.’s July 21, 2014 order, which allowed Wescom to examine Mr. Yip under oath on his sworn statement describing his assets. I admitted this evidence on the basis that it was an admission against interest made by a party, under oath, and on a collateral issue to the current proceeding [See Tipping v. Hornby, 1960 CanLII 825 (BC SC), 1960 CarswellBC 57, 32 W.W.R. 287 (B.C.S.C.)].
[39] Second, Wescom relied on the following business records that I determined were admissible pursuant to ss. 35 and/or s. 34.1 of the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23:
• Apple invoices issued for products purchased by Ms. Minetto and shipped to Mr. Yip at the virtual address between April 15, 2013 and July 9, 2014;
• Ms. Minetto’s corporate credit card transaction details obtained directly from American Express;
• Ms. Minetto’s corporate credit card online payment details obtained directly from American Express; and
• Wescom’s monthly CIBC bank account statements showing payments to American Express for the period covering April 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014.
[40] Finally, Wescom sought to admit an excel spreadsheet prepared by Ms. Percy and containing data downloaded from its accounting software, NetSuite. Mr. Percy, who was a witness at trial, effectively explained the significance of the spreadsheet. Essentially, the information in the spreadsheet establishes that Ms. Minetto purchased Apple products on her corporate credit card, allocated the charges to various employees using NetSuite accounting software and then arranged to pay off the credit card balances, in full, from Wescom’s CIBC Bank Account.
[41] To determine if electronically stored information should be admitted, a court first must consider the purpose for which the information is being tendered. If it is tendered for the truth of its contents, and it has been recorded by a person not made available for cross-examination, the information is hearsay and it will only be admissible if it falls within an established hearsay exception [See R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 34-36, 56].
[42] The spreadsheet contains some of Ms. Minetto’s entries to Wescom’s accounting books (via NetSuite) that show payments to American Express. The evidence that Wescom tenders for the truth of its contents is limited to the rows showing payment on Ms. Minetto’s credit card and, within these rows, the columns that show the date and amount of the payments (“the NetSuite Data”).
[43] I accept that the NetSuite Data falls within the scope of s. 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act. Ms. Percy’s evidence is that the NetSuite Data is a contemporaneous payment record that Ms. Minetto made in the usual and ordinary course of Wescom’s business.
[44] I also find that the NetSuite Data is reliable. Ms. Percy’s testified that she was able to match each individual transaction recorded by Ms. Minetto in the NetSuite Data with corresponding American Express transaction records. She was also able to match each withdrawal of funds recorded by Ms. Minetto in the NetSuite Data (to pay off the American Express credit card balances) with a withdrawal listed in Wescom’s CIBC bank statements. Indeed, the correspondence between the various numbers was striking.
[45] Given that the Netsuite Data is an electronic record, pursuant to s. 34.1 of the Ontario Evidence Act, before it can be admitted it must be authenticated and the best evidence rule must be satisfied. To authenticate an electronic record, the party tendering it must provide “evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is what the person claims it to be.” Based on the evidence of Ms. Percy, I am satisfied that the spreadsheet contains the data she says that it does. Her evidence is sufficient for authentication purposes (See R. v. Oland, 2015 NBQB 245, 446 NBR (2d) 224).
[46] Subsection 34.1(5.1) of the Ontario Evidence Act outlines how the best evidence rule is satisfied in relation to electronic records, stating that “the integrity of an electronic document may be proved with evidence of the integrity of the electronic records system by or in which the data was recorded or stored.” Again, Ms. Percy’s evidence was that she was responsible for synthesizing the data in the excel spreadsheet and that she was not aware of any problems with the NetSuite system. The best evidence rule is therefore satisfied. On this basis, I find that the NetSuite Data is admissible for the truth of its contents.
Tort of Conversion
[47] The only cause of action pursued by Wescom in this proceeding relates to the tort of conversion.
[48] Conversion is a tort of strict liability that is established whenever one party wrongfully interferes with property owned by another. Wrongful interferences are proven whenever the tortfeasor commits an act inconsistent with the other party’s right to possess the property, such as receiving, taking, selling, using, or destroying the property, without permission. The tort is one of strict liability and, accordingly, it is no defence that the wrongful act was committed in all innocence [See Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1996 CanLII 149 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 463, at paras. 30-32].
[49] The "intent" to deny the plaintiff's title or possessory interest has been given broad meaning. While selling the property will be the most compelling evidence of intention, intention will also be proven where someone receives or disposes of a chattel without satisfying himself of its title [see Battleford's Credit Union LTD. v. Korpam Tractor and Tarts Ltd., 1983 CanLII 2375 (SK QB), [1983] S.J. No. 675 (QB), 28 Sask.R. 215 (Q.B.) at para. 9].
[50] As Fridman points out in his seminal text, "In case after case the innocence of the defendant in accepting money or goods has been held to be irrelevant to liability. His good faith is immaterial. His lack of knowledge of the rights of the plaintiff has not assisted him to escape liability" [Fridman, Gerald H.L. et al., The Law of Torts in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2010)].
[51] In Westboro Flooring and Decor Inc. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2004 CanLII 59980 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 723, [2004] O.J. No. 2464, the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that all that is required regarding intent is the defendant acts in a manner that is inconsistent with the owner's title or possessory right, and any blameworthy conduct beyond that is not essential (at paras. 14 - 16, per Simmons J.A.).
[52] Based on the foregoing, to succeed in its claim for conversion, Wescom must show that:
(1) Wescom had a right to possess identifiable and specific property (namely, the Apple products);
(2) Mr. Yip wrongfully interfered with Wescom’s right to possess the Apple products by receiving, delivering, and selling the Apple products without Wescom’s permission; and
(3) Through his actions, Mr. Yip denied or negated Wescom’s property interest in the Apple products.
[53] This three-part test is satisfied. Wescom argues and I accept that it had a possessory interest in the Apple products at issue because they were purchased by its employee, using a corporate credit card, and paid for using its funds.
[54] The second part of the test is also satisfied on the basis that Mr. Yip received the products, transferred them to Mr. Fung, and occasionally sold them, all without Wescom’s permission. Indeed, Mr. Yip made no inquiries to determine whether he had a right to possess the millions of dollars of originally-packaged Apple products that were sent to him by a complete stranger.
[55] In Wymor Construction Inc. v. Gray, 2012 ONSC 5022, at para 19, Aitken J. found that the defendant’s mere possession of funds belonging to the plaintiff, without the plaintiff’s permission and without any other legal entitlement, amounted to conversion. In this case, beyond simply possessing the Apple products, Mr. Yip admitted to transferring the Apple products to Mr. Fung and occasionally selling them on Mr. Fung’s behalf. Mr. Yip’s actions clearly constituted wrongful interference with Wescom’s property.
[56] Third, Mr. Yip’s actions clearly negated Wescom’s interest in the Apple products insofar as the iPhone and iPads at issue were subsequently sold to innocent third parties for value, and never recovered by Wescom.
[57] Since conversion is a strict liability tort, it does not matter whether Mr. Yip knew that the Apple products were Wescom’s property or even whether he knew that there were obtained illegally by Ms. Minetto (see Northstar Leasing Corp. v. Two Ten Spruce Corp., [2007] O.J. No. 1068, 2007 CanLII 8929 (ON SC)).
[58] In sum, I find that Mr. Yip committed the tort of conversion in relation to the Apple products shipped to him at the virtual address by Ms. Minetto between 2013 and 2014.
Damages
[59] In Northstar, at paras. 17-18, Belobaba J. found that the plaintiff was entitled to damages equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the time of the conversion. I agree that this is an appropriate and fair way to calculate damages in relation to conversion.
[60] Based on the evidence before me, I find that the total value of the Apple products shipped to Mr. Yip was $3,116,853.70, including HST. However, I understand that Wescom was able to recover and return some Apple products, totalling $54,720.79. Finally, I understand that Wescom received an HST credit in the amount of $48,425.48. Therefore, the total value of the Apple products at the time of conversion was $2,709.852.12.
[61] Wescom is also entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to ss.127-128 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. Based on the submissions of counsel and the evidence before me, I find that the applicable prejudgment interest on the Apple products purchased between April 16, 2013 and July 10, 2004 (excluding HST and the credit from Apple) amounts to $232,263.13.
Crossclaim
[62] After completion of the trial but before releasing my decision, I asked Wescom to provide written submissions regarding Mr. Yip’s cross-claims against Ms. Minetto and Mr. Fung. I have reviewed these submissions in detail.
[63] Because Mr. Yip did not defend the matter at trial, Wescom asks that I dismiss his cross-claim pursuant to Rule 52.01(2), which states:
(2) Where an action is called for trial and a party fails to attend, the trial judge may,
(a) proceed with the trial in the absence of the party;
(b) where the plaintiff attends and the defendant fails to attend, dismiss the counterclaim, if any, and allow the plaintiff to prove the claim;
(c) where the defendant attends and the plaintiff fails to attend, dismiss the action and allow the defendant to provide the counterclaim, if any; and
(d) make such other order as is just.
[64] As noted above, pursuant to Rule 51.02(2)(a) and (b), the trial proceeded in the absence of the Mr. Yip. However, Rule 51.02(2)(b) does not apply in relation in the scenario before me insofar as it addresses counterclaims rather than crossclaims.
[65] Wescom relies on Rule 51.02(2)(d) and Dhatt v. Beer, 2020 ONSC 2729. In Dhatt v. Beer, the plaintiffs sued for specific performance of an agreement to purchase a home. The defendants denied any binding agreement and brought a third-party claim against their real estate brokers. While the defendants initially attended at trial, at some point they stopped attending and Brown J. continue continued in their absence. Relying on Rule 51.01(2)(d), she dismissed the defendant’s third-party claim on the basis that there was no evidence proffered in support of it.
[66] I agree with Brown J. that, despite his non-attendance at trial, Mr. Yip must prove the allegations underlying his cross-claim on a balance of probabilities.
[67] Wescom argues that Mr. Yip has not done so because he has not proven that:
• The co-defendants engaged in fraudulent business activity;
• They knew or ought to have known that such activities exposed Mr. Yip to potential liability; and
• They failed to advise Mr. Yip that the Apple products shipped to the virtual office were paid for via Ms. Minetto’s unauthorized use of her corporate credit card.
[68] Clearly, the co-defendants were engaged in fraudulent activity; there are judgments against them. I also find that, at the very least, both co-defendants ought to have known that asking Mr. Yip to receive the Apple products would expose him to potential liability.
[69] The heart of the issue is whether the co-defendants failed to advise Mr. Yip that the goods being shipped to him were in fact stolen. In relation to Ms. Minetto, given that she and Mr. Yip never met, I find that she did not advise him that the Apple products were stolen. On this basis, Mr. Yip’s cross-claim against Ms. Minetto is granted.
[70] Granting the cross-claim against Ms. Minetto is “just” within the meaning of Rule 51.01(2)(d). After a contested trial, Mr. Fung’s cross-claim against Ms. Minetto was granted, even though he played a more significant role in the overall scheme than Mr. Yip.
[71] Mr. Yip is entitled to damages payable by Ms. Minetto in the amount of $232,263.13.
[72] In relation to Mr. Fung, there was insufficient evidence before me to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Fung kept Mr. Yip in the dark about the true nature of the scheme. This is especially the case insofar as Mr. Yip sometimes sold the Apple products for Mr. Fung. Mr. Yip’s cross-claim against Mr. Fung is dismissed.
[73] Wescom did not make any submissions regarding joint and several liability and I make no findings in that regard. However, I note that the Supreme Court of Canada in Ratych v. Bloomer, 1990 CanLII 97 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 940, confirmed that there is a general principle against double recovery, stating:
The general principles underlying our system of damages suggest that a plaintiff should receive full and fair compensation, calculated to place him or her in the same position as he or she would have been had the tort not been committed, in so far as this can be achieved by a monetary award. This principle suggests that in calculating damages under the pecuniary heads, the measure of the damages should be the plaintiff's actual loss. It is implicit in this that the plaintiff should not recover unless he can demonstrate a loss, and then only to the extent of that loss. Double recovery violates this principle.
In this case, given that Ms. Minetto was found liable for the full amount of damages, I find that Wescom cannot recover in excess of that total amount as between the three co-defendants, Ms. Minetto, Mr. Fung and Mr. Yip.
Mareva Injunction
[74] Finally, Wescom seeks a six-month extension of the Mareva injunction to restrain Mr. Yip from dissipating assets pending execution of this judgment.
[75] The jurisprudence supporting the availability of a post-judgment Mareva injunction was canvassed by Diamond J. in Coast to Coast against Cancer v. Sokolowski, 2016 ONSC 170. In summary, where the requirements for the injunction are met, a Mareva injunction will be available as an aid to execution following judgment.
[76] In this case, Wescom already satisfied the requirements for a Mareva injunction when it obtained previous orders from this court. I note that, in extending the order against Mr. Yip to trial, Justice Emery placed significant weight on Mr. Yip’s attempt to abscond with funds that belonged to Wescom.
[77] In granting judgment against Mr. Yip, I made additional findings of fact that raise serious concerns that he may try to dissipate or remove assets from Ontario, and which weigh in favour of extending the Mareva injunction. Mr. Yip is no longer resident in Ontario and has largely ignored this proceeding.
[78] The Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip is extended for a period of six months from the date of release of these reasons, without prejudice to Wescom’s right to bring a motion for a further extension.
COSTS
[79] Pursuant to s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, Wescom is entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.
[80] Based on these factors set out in Rule 57.01 and counsel’s submissions, I find Wescom’s Bill of Costs reasonable in light of the complexity of the evidentiary issues, the necessity to retain forensic accounting experts, the apportionment of costs between the co-defendants, and Mr. Yip’s failure to attend at trial.
[81] Costs are payable in the amount of $120,000, including all fees, disbursements and applicable HST.
CONCLUSION
[82] Mr. Yip is liable to Wescom for damages in the amount of $2,709,852.12, prejudgment interest in the amount of $232,263.13, and costs in the amount of $120,000.00.
[83] The Mareva injunction against Mr. Yip is extended for a period of 6 months from the date of the release of this judgment.
[84] Ms. Minetto is liable to Mr. Yip for damages in the amount of $2,709,852.12, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $232,263.13.
[85] While each of the co-defendants has been found liable to Wescom for damages in relation to the fraudulent scheme, Wescom cannot, as between the three co-defendants, recover an amount in damages that exceeds $6,831,834.17.
Mandhane J.
Released: September 28, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-3262-00
DATE: 20200928
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Wescom Solutions Inc.
Plaintiff
- and -
Nadia Minetto aka Nadia Arsenault
Eric Yip aka Sam Yip aka Samuel Yip aka Samson Yip aka Samsun Man Chun Yip, GF International
Gabriel Kit Chun Fung, Plus One Solutions
John Doe #1, John Doe #2
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mandhane J.
Released: September 28, 2020