COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-4625

DATE: 2020 08 25

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

RE: JULIE DALY, Moving Party/Applicant

AND:

NYX TANNERY LTD. and CITY OF MISSISSAUGA, Respondents

BEFORE: TRIMBLE J.

COUNSEL: Julie Daly, self-represented, galatian328@gmail.com

Glenn Grenier, for Responding party NYX TANNERY LTD., glenn.grenier@mcmillan.ca

No one appearing for the City of Mississauga

HEARD: August 21, 2020

ENDORSEMENT

The Motion

[1] Ms. Daly brings this motion to discard the timetable set by Emery, J. in his endorsement of 13 February 2020.

[2] Emery, J. ordered that NYX’s motion for costs against Ms. Daly arising from her abandoning this Application be heard on 25 November 2020. He timetabled the delivery of materials for that hearing. He also held that Ms. Daly could bring a motion under Rule 38.08(3) for “the court to order otherwise” with

respect to Ms. Daly’s obligation to pay costs for her abandoned Application provided the motion was heard by 4 September 2020.

[3] At the hearing before me, Ms. Daly clarified that she wanted to have her Rule 38.08 (3) motion heard on 25 November, 2020 for the long motion and that NYX’s cost motion should be heard on a long motion appointment after that. She did not specify a date for that motion.

[4] Ms. Daly confirmed that her submissions would take 20 minutes. Mr.

Grenier did not confirm a time. He said that he would need an hour. The motion consumed 3 ¼ hours.

Result

[5] For the reasons, below, Ms. Daly’s motion is dismissed. The dates and timetable set by Emery, J. of 13 February remain in effect.

Procedural Background

[6] Ms. Daley rents 51 Tannery Street in Mississauga. NYX is the owner who seeks to develop three contiguous parcels of land, including 51 Tannery. On 15 July 2019, NYX served its notice to vacate on Ms. Daly.

This Application

[7] On November 12, 2019, Ms. Daly commenced this Application which was returnable 20 December 2019. It contained many different grounds for relief, in

the main, aimed at attacking the City’s demolition permits, and stopping NYX from evicting her. Ms. Daly did not name NYX as a party although NYX had an existing proceeding before the Landlord and Tenant Board to evict her.

Appearance before Doi, J.

[8] On December 13, 2019, NYX served a motion in this Application to be added as a party, returnable on December 20, 2020, the date Ms. Daly selected for the return of her Application.

[9] On 20 December 2019 both motions came before Doi, J. Ms. Daly sought an adjournment of both motions based on her medical conditions, disability, and need for accommodation. The transcript from that hearing indicates that she raised before Doi, J., the same conditions and disability she raised at this hearing. She did not, at that time, have the three reports from her doctor.

[10] Doi, J. Fixed a long motion date of 12 August 2020 for the Application and timetabled the delivery of materials. He fixed 14 January 2024 for NYX’s motion to be added as a party in order to allow Ms. Daly time to prepare and submit her responding materials. Doi, J. urged Ms. Daly to seek the advice of counsel, to familiarize herself with the Rules, and to follow them. He advised her that every step in litigation carries potential adverse cost consequences to the parties so that she could consider that risk in her decision-making from the outset.

Appearance before Coroza, J.

[11] NYX’s motion to add itself to the application came before Coroza, J. on 14 January 2020. On 9 January Ms. Daly filed a 58 page responding Record and, on 10 January filed an amended Notice of Application which deleted much of the relief she sought against NYX, originally, but added other relief which affected NYX’s interest.

[12] On 14 January, Ms. Daly sought an adjournment of the motion from Coroza, J. The transcript of that attendance indicates that she sought the adjournment based on the same medical, disability, and accommodation issues that she argued before this court, although she did not appear to have any medical reports. Coroza, J. denied Ms. Daly’s adjournment request and added NYX as a party. In his endorsement, Coroza, J. also cautioned Ms. Daly to follow the Rules. He advised her that if she withdrew the Application as she mentioned, she might trigger cost consequences.

Appearance before Emery, J.

[13] On 15 January 2020, Ms. Daly abandoned the Application. Predictably, NYX brought a motion for costs which was before Emery, J. on 13 February 2020.

[14] It appears that Emery, J., motivated by Ms. Daly’s submissions concerning her health conditions and need for accommodation (the same health conditions argued before this court), scheduled the costs motion for a long motion

on 25 November 25, 2020 (a delay of nine months) and set a generous timetable which reflected a balance of the interests of the parties. In addition, Emery, J. set 4 September 2020 (a delay of seven months) as the date by which Ms. Daly had to have heard any motion under Rule 38.08(3) for “the court to order otherwise” with respect to Ms. Daly’s obligation to pay costs to NYX.

[15] Emery, J., too, advised Ms. Daly that she had to read, comprehend and follow the Rules of Civil Procedure, and, given the timelines he imposed, to start preparing her motion materials immediately.

Request for and Urgent Motion

[16] On 29 July 2020, 5 ½ months into the delay Emery, J. set for the Rule 38 motion, Ms. Daly emailed NYX’s counsel, insisting that her Rule 38.08 (3) motion should be heard in person and on a long motion date. She said that she would look into motion dates with the court.

[17] NYX’s counsel did not respond immediately. On 4 August 2020, Ms. Daly emailed the court, without copying opposing counsel, and told the court that she had not received any reply from counsel “after sending him an email for his available dates.”

[18] The latter statement is not true. On 29 July she did not ask NYX’s counsel for his available dates for a motion.

[19] On 6 August, NYX’s lawyer responded by email to Ms. Daly’s 29 July email, unaware of Ms. Daly’s 4 August email to the Court. He insisted that Emery, J.,’s timetable be followed, that Ms. Daly was not entitled to insist on in person hearing (and provided case law to that effect), and told her that she had been warned by the court to follow and comply with the Rules. In her reply of the same date, Ms. Daly argued that the rules governing virtual hearings did not take into account her medical conditions and disabilities that required accommodations, or her poor technology. She did not ask counsel to provide his available dates.

[20] On 13 August 2020, Ms. Daly wrote to the court , again without copying NYX’s lawyer, and asked for an urgent motion. In her letter to the court, she began by listing the reasons why she could not bring her Rule 38.08(3), adding:

“Numerous inquiries prior to and after July 29, 2020 led SCJ staff to tell the applicant to email opposing counsel to canvas motion dates. Email correspondence was sent to Glenn Grenier, counsel for NYX, about prejudicial impact of Covid – 19, problems with equipment, anxiety about the right to be heard being lost virtually and problems with the applicant bringing her rule 38.08 motion before September 4, 2020. Mr. Grenier refused to amend as the applicant understood and did not provide any available dates. …” (Emphasis added)

[21] Ms. Daly also insisted that her motion required a long date which had to occur before 25 November, hence her request for an urgent motion.

[22] Ms. Daly’s statement that NYX’s counsel did not provide his available motion dates is not correct. She never asked him to do so.

[23] Ms. Daly provided no explanation, either at the time, or at this hearing, why she did not copy NYX’s counsel with her emails to the court, especially the email seeking the urgent motion.

[24] On 14 August 2020, Tzimas, J. Issued her endorsement re an urgent motion, the first sentence of the second paragraph of which said:

“Given the history of this matter and Ms. Daly’s indication that the respondent’s counsel has not responded to her attempts to confer with him to set a motion date, Ms. Daly’s motion is to be scheduled for August 21, 2020 at 2 PM.” (Emphasis added).

The Hearing of This Motion

NYX’s Preliminary Objection

[25] NYX argued that Tzimas, J.’s ex parte order permitted Ms. Daly to bring her motion under rule 38.08 (3), not a motion to adjourn the time by which that motion had to be brought. I dismissed this objection. The two-page letter to the court, while not specifically requesting an appointment to argue for a new timetable, implicitly asked for that relief.

Ms. Daly’s preliminary objection

[26] Ms. Daly’s raised the primary objection that she was prejudiced by the limits on the size of documents that could be submitted under the Chief Justice’s Consolidated Notice to the Profession, Litigants, Accused Persons, Public and the Media Re: Expanded Operations of Ontario Superior Court of Justice, effective May 19, 2020, found at https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-[and-](http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-)

orders-covid-19/consolidated-notice/, as supplemented by Notice to the

Profession – Central West Region (Effective May 19, 2020), found at https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/notices-and-orders-covid-19/notice-

cw/%E2%80%8E#Urgent_Civil_Matters. She argued that the limit on the size of

PDF documents that could be submitted prejudiced her because she suffers from a psychosocial disability which affects her cognitive function. Further, she complained that NXY’s materials in response to the motion exceeded those limits.

[27] Since this objection appeared to be part of Ms. Daly’s argument on the merits I asked her to save the objection and deal with it as part of her submissions on the motion.

[28] In any event, I would have dismissed that objection. Ms. Daley has no compunction about contacting the Court to obtain dates or adjournments. She never contacted the Court to seek relief from the size of PDF documents.

Position of the parties

[29] Ms. Daly says that she requires the Court to set aside the dates and timelines in Emery, J.’s 13 February 2020 Endorsement because:

1. She is an unemployed, self represented litigant.

2. She has significant, potentially life threatening health conditions that require significant accommodation, and her conditions are exacerbated by the aggressive, intimidating pressure tactics employed by NYX. Those tactics include NYX’s harassment and refusal to accommodate Ms. Daly’s disabilities, increasing burdens

on her, demoralizing current tenants and chasing away potential tenants, all of which was done with the specific design to force her to vacate the house. She says that these tactics violated the Human Rights Code, her Charter rights, and NYX’s obligations as a landlord.

3. Her doctors have verified that she can only work on one issue at a time and requires a lot of time to prepare for each one, working at her won speed. Deadlines negatively affect her conditions.

4. She does not have resources to respond to NYX’s costs motion and was forced to spend scarce money in fixing her computer when it broke down and had to be fixed, and when she purchased a reconditioned one which did not work.

5. The steps necessary for the Rule 38.08(3) motion were not spelled out in Emery, J.’s endorsement, therefore Ms. Daly was barred from taking those necessary steps.

6. She received confusing information from the Court’s website and various voicemails about motions and motion dates.

7. The Court’s and the economy’s shut down during the Covid-19 Pandemic prevented her from bringing her motions because she did not have the wherewithal to make electronic filing due her technology limitations and inability to have them fixed. She says that she has been severely compromised in her ability to finish and serve her rule

38.08 motion after March 16, 2020 as a result of her poor equipment, court closures, court backlogs, lack of available motion dates, lack of access to a commissioner for taking oaths, lack of access to photocopying and other administrative support, and ongoing prejudice caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the court system.

[30] NYX responds with two arguments.

1. Ms. Daly obtained an ex party order based on misrepresentations that she had demanded from NYX’s solicitor his availability for a motion, but that he did not give his available dates. Tzimas, J., relying on those

misrepresentations, fixed the motion for 21 August. Since Ms. Daly did make not make full and fair disclosure of the factual basis for her request for an urgent motion, Tzimas’ J.’s order should be set aside and Emery, J.’s timetable should stand. In any event, Ms. Daly ought to have copied NYX’s counsel with the emails to and from the Court.

2. Second, on the merits, Ms. Daly’s motion must be dismissed as she has failed to meet her onus by failing to lead evidence to show that she took reasonable steps a) to bring her Rule 38.08 motion by 4 September 2020 as ordered, or b) to meet the timetable for the costs motion of 25 November 2020.

Analysis

A Self Represented Litigant

[31] Ms. Daly presents herself to this court as an unsophisticated, self represented litigant with few resources, but with significant medical conditions which require significant accommodation, who is beset by the complexities of litigation which her landlord, with significant economic resources, is intent on using to drive her out of her home. This is a fundamental component of her request for varying or vacating the timelines as set by Emery, J.

[32] I do not accept Ms. Daly’s self-characterization for the following reasons, I find that she is an experienced self-represented litigant:

1. Coroza, J. commented that she was articulate and intelligent. I agree. In the motion before me, she showed she showed a fluidity and familiarity with her material and was articulate in argument.

2. She is a licensed paralegal, although, apparently, has not practised in the area.

3. She unsuccessfully opposed NYX’s redevelopment application at a public meeting held by the City of Mississauga.

4. She unsuccessfully brought an Application to have 51 Tannery declared a heritage property in an effort to prevent demolition of the building.

5. Her understanding of the landlord’s demolition permits is sophisticated; namely, that they were issued prematurely and are based on misrepresentations or omissions by the landlord. Therefore, NYX’s Notice of Eviction based on those demolition permits, is without merit.

6. She responded to NYX’s proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board, as a self represented litigant, and was successful in having those proceedings adjourned three times because of her medical conditions and need for accommodation. That proceeding is still adjourned.

7. As a licensed paralegal, she is, or should be aware of contracts, leases, their importance, and the importance of reading them. It appears that her lease for 51 Tannery restricts its use to “Single Family Residence”. Ms. Daly, however, sublets portions of the building to others. Indeed, part of the complaint she has against the city and the landlord is that their tactics have scared away existing tenants as well as new tenants, all part of their plan to drive her out. Ms. Daly has been cited by the City of Mississauga for running an illegal rooming house.

8. As a self represented litigant, she has brought three Human Rights Tribunal proceedings against the landlord and others arising from the circumstances surrounding her home, all of which appear to be ongoing.

9. As a self represented litigant, she has brought an action under the Simplified Rules against the Province of Ontario and the Landlord and Tenant Board, Court file CV-17–5117, for violation of her Human Rights Code and Charter rights relating to various court and tribunal proceedings.

Tzimas, J.’s Ex Parte Order

[33] Rule 39.01(6) sayss that on an application or motion made without notice the moving party must make full and fair disclosure of all material facts relevant to the Court’s consideration of the relief sought. Failure to do so is sufficient grounds for setting aside any order obtained on the motion or application.

[34] In Chitel v. Rothbart (1992), 39 O.R. (ed) 513, paragraph 30, the Court of Appeal held that if there is less than full and accurate disclosure in a material way, or if there is a misleading of the court on material facts in the original application, the court “… will not exercise its discretion in favour of the [moving party] and continue the injunction”.

[35] The reason for this rule is that there are dangers in the court making orders against an absent party based solely on the story told by the moving party (see: U.S. v. Friedland [1996] O.J. NO. 4399 (Ont. Gen Div.), paragraph 28; and

K.A. v. Mitchell et al., 2013 ONSC 4051, at paragraph 17).

[36] In determining that the misrepresentation or nondisclosure is material, the question is not whether the order should or should not have been made; rather,

it is whether the omitted disclosure might have had an impact on the decision that was made (see: Mitchell, supra, paragraph 20).

[37] Although Rule 39.01(6) allows the court to set aside an order obtained ex parte where there is a material misrepresentation or the failure to make full and fair disclosure of a material fact, the Rule does not mandate this result. Jurisprudence says that the ex parte order will usually be set aside, unless the court, in its discretion, permits the order to stand where, on all the circumstances it is appropriate (see: Mitchell, supra, at paragraph 19 to 21).

[38] In this case, Ms. Daly never asked NYX’s lawyer to give her his available dates for a motion. The emails indicate that she told him that she was looking to the court to provide those dates. In her request to the court for motion date, however, Ms. Daly said that she needed the court’s assistance because NYX’s lawyer would not provide his available dates for a motion. Ms. Daly’s statement to the court with respect to NYX’s solicitor’s failure to provide dates is not true.

[39] Based on the totality of the evidence before me and the submissions of Ms. Daly and NYX’s lawyer I conclude the following:

1. Ms. Daly knew when she told the court that NYX’s solicitor would not give his available dates for motion, that this statement was not correct.

2. Ms. Daly did not serve NYX’s solicitor with her request for an emergency motion notwithstanding that at the same time she was

discussing the motion to alter Emery, J.’s timetable at approximately the same time.

3. Ms. Daly’s failure to copy NYX’s lawyer with her correspondence with the Court requesting urgent motion was intentional. She was frustrated in her dealings with NYX’s counsel. He would not agree to alter Emery J’s timetable nor to discuss the subject. He did not accept her reasons for requiring such an adjournment.

[40] In granting Ms. Daly’s ex parte request for an urgent motion and in setting the 21 August motion date, it is obvious that Tzimas, J. relied on Ms. Daly’s untrue statement that NYX’s counsel would not provide available dates for a motion.

What remedy should I apply?

[41] Whether I permit the ex parte order to stand and proceed with the motion to alter Emery, J’s timetable or set aside the ex parte order leaving Emery, J’s endorsement and his timetable to stand, is a matter of judicial discretion.

[42] The appropriate remedy, in this case, is to vacate Tzimas J.’s order.

[43] Ms. Daly’s failure to make full and fair disclosure in her ex parte request for an emergency motion was no mistake, omission, or mischaracterization of what occurred in the email exchange with NYX’s lawyer. Her statement that NYX’s lawyer would not provide his available dates for motion, upon which Tzimas, J. relied, was intentionally false.

[44] When I reviewed with Ms. Daly, during argument, the emails she wrote to the solicitor and to the court, she did not deny that she wrote them or what she said in them. Instead, she defended what she said on the basis that NYX’s lawyer would not discuss or exceed to her request for a new timetable. Further, she said that NYX’s lawyer repeatedly brought motions against her leaving her very little time to reply given her medical challenges and need for accommodation.

[45] Ms. Daly mischaracterizes the facts. Based on the Record, NYX brought only two motions: the first to add itself as a party to her later abandoned Application, and the second to assert his client’s right to costs after Ms. Daly abandoned her Application. That claim for costs had to be it asserted within 30 days of Ms. Daly’s abandoning her Application.

[46] This is not an appropriate case to permit the ex parte order to stand. It was obtained on the basis of a clearly false statement, on which the court relied.

[47] Ms. Daly’s motion to amend or vary Emery, J.’s timetable set in his endorsement of 13 February 2020, therefore, is dismissed. The timetable set by Emery, J. continues in full force and effect.

The Motion On its Merits

[48] In the event that I am incorrect with respect to vacating Tzimas, J.’s ex parte order, I would have dismissed Ms. Daly’s motion to amend Emery, J.’s timetable on its merits.

[49] Ms. Daly’s request to alter Emery, J.’s timetable is, in part, a request for an adjournment, and, in part, a request to amend his order.

[50] To the extent that this motion is a request for an adjournment, a judge hearing the proceeding enjoys a wide latitude in deciding whether to grant an adjournment of that proceeding. In exercising the discretion, however, the judge at the proceeding must balance the interests of the plaintiff, of the defendant, and of the administration of justice in the orderly proceeding of civil proceedings on their merits (see: Khimji v. Dhanani (2004), 2004 CanLII 12037 (C.A.).

[51] To the factors involved in the balancing the Court of Appeal referred to, I add one more factor - the interests of other litigants in the system.

[52] The Superior Court in Brampton is the busiest courthouse in the country.

Resources are fixed, yet with a rapidly growing population in Peel Region, the demand for those fixed resources grows rapidly. The Covid-19 pandemic has put in crisis what was already a difficult environment for those seeking access to justice. Accordingly, the court must, as part of its balancing of interests in considering a request for an adjournment, consider the effect of adjourning any one case on the availability of court resources for other litigants.

[53] With respect to extending timelines set out in orders, the jurisprudence says that courts should avoid fixing rules or guidelines for when an extension should be refused. Instead, the court should decide each case on its facts,

focusing on whether the opposing party is prejudiced by the delay (see: Chiarelli

v. Weins, 2000 CanLII 3904 (C.A.).

[54] Ms. Daly asks the court to exercise its discretion under Rule 3.02 to relieve against a previous order and adjust judicially imposed timelines. Rules 1.04, and 2.01 allow a court to extend time if the extension will secure a just, cost effective, and efficient determination of the case.

[55] Ms. Daly has the onus in this motion. She can discharge it by bringing forward persuasive evidence that shows that changing Emery, J’s timelines is fair and just, reflects the appropriate balance between the parties’ interests, and is not prejudicial to the other parties.

[56] Ms. Daly argues that she has significant barriers which limit her ability to respond to court processes. She argues that the most significant factor that affects her is the additional challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of her ability to access computer repair services, her Notary Public for commissioning her affidavits, court filing procedures, and her ability to earn income. In other words, she argues that her medical challenges which require significant accommodations, act independently and that the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates those difficulties. Putting it another way, the inference is that but for the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic shut down of the Court and the economy, she could have met the timetable and dates Emery, J. imposed.

[57] Based on her position that her failure to meet her obligations under Emery, J.’s Endorsement was based on the effect of the Covid-19 pandemnic shut downs on top of her other challenges, Ms. Daly must convince the court that her inability to meet the timelines set by Emery, J, has been frustrated or prevented for COVID-19 related reasons. The evidence must show that those reasons warrant a legitimate exemption from compliance with the order and are not just an excuse.

[58] In Lima v. Ventura (Estate of), 2020 ONSC 3278, Emery, J. said that the factors the court should consider include:

a) The steps not taken were necessary to carry out the terms of any order, and no other alternative to taking those steps would have served that purpose;

b) The steps were not taken because of the moving party’s inability to access business, professional or institutional offices physically or electronically because of COVID-19 protocols;

c) An extension of time would not be contrary to any law, or the rights of other person under an order of any court;

d) A reasonable explanation is provided for not taking the required steps, or why it was difficult or impossible to comply with the order for COVID-19 related reasons;

e) The moving party has made best efforts to comply with the order, and all other terms of the order that were not impeded by the COVID-19 protocols have been met; and

f) The moving party has acted in good faith.

[59] Ms. Daly has failed to provide any evidence that she has made good faith, best efforts to comply with the timeline set out by Emery, J. Emery, J, told Ms. Daly at the hearing on 13 February 2020 that she could begin working on her

response to NYX’s cost motion immediately since she already had NYX’s motion material. In her affidavit, Ms. Daly explained her difficulties in preparing for court processes. She did not, however, provide any evidence of any work that she had done to comply with the deadlines. She produced no drafts or partial drafts of any notice of motion, factum, or affidavit she was working on with respect to her rule

38.08 (3) motion or in response to NYX’s cost motion.

[60] Ms. Daly, beginning at paragraph 43 of her affidavit, says that the nature of her disabilities are such that she must do legal work in stages, addressing one matter at a time, slowly, and with breaks as needed because her disability symptoms are aggravated by stress and the harassment imposed upon her. She says that her health consequences are worse because she was carrying on other legal proceedings in addition to this one, all of which contribute to the illness that she will suffer if the timelines are not amended.

[61] In support of her illnesses and the accommodations necessitated by her illnesses, Ms. Daly provided three letters her family doctor, Dr. Kapoor. I do not accept that Dr. Kapoor’s evidence justifies Ms. Daly doing nothing to try to meet the timelines imposed by Emery, J’s endorsement.

[62] The only specific medical condition that Dr. Kapoor opines that Ms. Daly suffers from is post herpetic nerve pain and a number of skin disorders which have not resolved, but which are aggravated by stress. He refers to unspecified

surgery. He recommends that Ms. Daly should have long periods of time to permit her ongoing skin conditions to resolve. He says that she needs some accommodations with additional flexibility and additional time due to her medical conditions. Finally, Dr. Kapoor says that Ms. Daly should not be penalized or forced take on a hearing or preparation until she is medically well.

[63] Dr. Kapoor’s notes, however, do not provide a clear description of the medical conditions from which Ms. Daly suffers and how they affect her ability to respond to legal process. They do not say that she suffers from any mental, cognitive, or psychological impairment, other than the stress that arises from her medical conditions and multiple legal processes in which she is involved. None of Dr. Kaploor’s three letters indicate that she suffers from a psychosocial disability as Ms. Daly argued. None of Dr. Kapoor’s three letters indicate what he knew about the legal proceedings that were extant at the time or what those processes required her to do, if anything, at any given time.

[64] Ms. Daly argued that the cumulative effect of her medical and psychosocial disabilities and the accommodations that they require, the timelines imposed by Emery, J.’s endorsement, the Covid-19 challenges such as the closure of the courts and the unavailability of necessary services to her to prepare her court materials, have unfairly reduced her access to justice, which is a violation of her Charter rights and her rights under the Ontario Human Rights Code.

[65] I disagree.

[66] Ms. Daly has had remarkable access to justice.

1. She has responded to the Landlord and Tenant Board proceedings against her. She has been successful in having that proceeding adjourned three times.

2. She successfully brought three applications in the Human Rights Tribunal arising from or related to her dispute with NYX.

3. She brought this Application which he later abandoned. She has had 4 appearances on that matter since she brought it.

4. She also brought an action under the Simplified Procedure against the Province and other government agencies alleging Human Rights Code and Charter breaches all originating from circumstances concerning NYX’s eviction proceedings.

5. Further, Ms. Daly said that she is in a dispute over her late father’s Will, which will be coming to litigation soon.

[67] It is true that the Covid-19 pandemic has affected her ability to access not only the courts, but tribunals, and services in the community such as her notary to commission her affidavits. To the extent that she has not been able to access court services, Ms. Daly’s access to Justice has been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but no more so than any other litigant.

[68] Ms. Daly says that her physical, mental, and psychosocial disabilities have created a great deal of stress. She requires significant accommodations and the failure to provide them is a denial of her right to have equal access to justice. It appears from her argument that among the “accommodations” that she says

are her right is the right to obtain delays and adjournments when she finds it difficult to meet Rule and court imposed deadlines.

[69] In part, she has difficulty meeting deadlines, and suffers from stress, because of the multiplicity of proceedings she has commenced, in addition to the one against her by NYX. It is a situation of her own making. She has the right to bring any proceedings she desires. Once she brings them, and asks that the Courts commit public money and limited court resources to the adjudication of her disputes, she has an obligation to herself, her opponents, the Court and the public, move her actions along, diligently.

[70] Further she argues that the government of Ontario suspended the running of all timelines. This included the timelines imposed by Emery, J.

[71] Ms. Daly is mistaken with respect to the suspension of timelines. The Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, 2020, and O. Reg. 73/20, section 3, on which Ms. Daly relies, applies only to “[a]ny provision of any statute, regulation, rule, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario establishing any period of time within which any step must be taken in any proceeding in Ontario….” The Act and regulation do not apply to time lines set by a judge in the exercise of his or her discretion.

[72] Finally, this matter concerns NYX’s entitlement to costs, which was adjourned, at Ms. Daly’s request, by Emery, J. in February of this year. The terms

of the adjournment were generous, giving Ms. Daly 9 months to respond to NYX’s costs motion, and 7 months to prepare her Rule 38.08(3) motion. This timeline balanced the interests of the parties and the public.

TRIMBLE J.

Date: August 25, 2020

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-4625

DATE: 2020 08 25

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JULIE DALY

AND:

NYX TANNERY LTD. and CITY OF MISSISSAUGA

Applicant

Respondents

ENDORSEMENT

Trimble J.

Released: August 25, 2020