Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-577020 DATE: 2020-06-24 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: WISEAU STUDIO, LLC and TOMMY WISEAU d.b.a. WISEAU-FILMS, Plaintiffs/Defendants by Counterclaim AND: RICHARD HARPER, FERNANDO FORERO MCGRATH, MARTIN RACICOT d.b.a. ROCKAHVEN PICTURES, ROOM FULL OF SPOONS INC., PARKTOWN STUDIOS INC., RICHARD STEWART TOWNS, Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim

BEFORE: Schabas J.

COUNSEL: Daniel Brinza, for the Plaintiffs Matthew Diskin and Meredith Bacal, for the Defendants

HEARD: June 5, 2020

Reasons on Motion to Vary the Judgment

Introduction

[1] On April 23, 2020, I released Reasons for Judgment in this matter, dismissing the plaintiffs’ action and granting judgment for the defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim: Wiseau Studio, LLC et al. v. Harper et al., 2020 ONSC 2504. The plaintiffs now move for an order under Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, “to have the judgment varied on the ground of facts arising or discovered after it was made.” The motion also seeks an order issuing a letter of request to the Supreme Court of Ohio to obtain additional evidence from Brendan Gallagher.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the motion. Essentially, the plaintiffs seek to reopen the trial to call additional evidence that, in hindsight, they wished they had called at trial. All of the “new” evidence was available to the plaintiffs in advance of trial and could have been obtained with relatively modest effort. The evidence relates to issues and facts that were disclosed to the plaintiffs in advance of the trial. None of the issues on which the plaintiffs seek to lead additional evidence came as a surprise, nor was there any objection at trial about being taken by surprise or any request for an adjournment as a result. Indeed, as my Reasons for Judgment note, the direct evidence of the parties was presented by affidavit and disclosed well in advance of trial. Nor did the plaintiffs seek to re-open the case at any time between the conclusion of the trial on January 17, 2020 and the release of my Reasons for Judgment over 3 months later, on April 23, 2020.

[3] The plaintiffs fail to meet either branch of the two-part test to obtain the extraordinary remedy of reopening a case as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., 2001 SCC 59, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983 (“Sagaz”). That test asks whether the evidence would “probably have changed the result,” and whether that evidence was available in advance of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. The evidence the plaintiffs now seek to have the court consider could have been obtained before trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. And, in any event, had it been presented at trial, the evidence would not have changed the result; to the contrary, much of the relevant evidence presented on this motion is consistent with the evidence at trial, and supports my findings.

Background

[4] This matter was tried between January 6 and January 17, 2020. Judgment was reserved for just over three months, until April 23, 2020. On April 30, 2020, I received an email from counsel for the plaintiffs advising that his client had instructed him to bring a “motion for reconsideration seeking a new Judgment as justified by new developments, accurate law and a correct view of the facts.” Counsel also advised that his client had advised him “that he has some fresh evidence that came to light after the trial.” Counsel sought direction on how to proceed in light of the suspension of normal court operations due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

[5] Later the same day counsel for the defendants delivered costs submissions and a draft judgment.

[6] I instructed counsel for the plaintiffs to deliver a notice of motion, which he did on May 6, 2020. At a case conference held by telephone on May 8, following discussion with counsel, the plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to deliver motion materials by May 19, 2020, which he did, together with a revised notice of motion. Another telephone case conference was held on May 21, 2020, and a schedule was set for the exchange of further materials. The defendants filed a responding record on May 22. Factums were filed and a hearing was held, virtually, by Zoom technology, on June 5, 2020. The plaintiffs have also filed responding costs submissions.

[7] I issued written directions following the case conferences on May 8 and May 21, 2020.

The test for reconsideration

[8] This motion is brought pursuant to Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party to seek to set aside or vary an order “on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made.” The plaintiffs do not allege fraud, but rely on the second branch of new facts. The application of the Rule is discretionary and is to be exercised “sparingly and with the greatest of care so that fraud and abuse of the Court’s processes do not result”: Sagaz at para. 61.

[9] The considerations that apply to such motions were recently summarized by this Court in Scott v. McGrail, 2018 ONSC 720 at para. 21, citing Gravely J. in Qit Fer & Titane Inc. v. Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 165 (Ont. Gen. Div.), as follows:

(a) Until judgment has been entered, a trial judge has a discretion to reopen the trial and hear fresh evidence; (b) In exercising such discretion the judge should be guided by the twofold test: that the evidence would probably have changed the result at trial and it could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence; (c) Where justice demands it and particularly where fraud is involved or the court may have been deliberately misled, a judge is justified in departing from the diligence requirement in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice; (d) The power should be exercised sparingly. The court should discourage unwarranted attempts to bring forward evidence available at the trial to disturb the basis of a judgment delivered or to permit a litigant after discovering the effect of a judgment to re-establish a broken-down case with the aid of further proof; and (e) Once a litigant has obtained a judgment, he is entitled not to be deprived of it without very solid grounds.

[10] The stringency of the test has been noted in many cases. In Mehedi v. 2057161 Ontario Inc., 2015 ONCA 670, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 374, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the principles, quoting its earlier decision in Tsaoussis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Baetz (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 257, at paras. 41 and 44. As Lauwers J.A. noted, at para. 13 of Mehedi:

[T]he onus is on the moving party to show that all the circumstances ‘justify making an exception to the fundamental rule that final judgments are exactly that, final.’ In particular, the moving party must show that the new evidence could not have been put forward by the exercise of reasonable diligence at the original proceedings. The court will go on to evaluate “other factors such as the cogency of the new evidence, any delay in moving to set aside the previous judgment, any difficulty in re-litigating the issues and any prejudice to other parties or persons who may have acted in reliance on the judgment.”

[11] I apply these principles below. In particular, I consider the two-part test summarized above and applied by the Supreme Court in Sagaz, at paras. 20, 64 and 65, a case like this one in which the Reasons for Judgment had been released but a formal judgment had not yet been issued and entered:

(1) Would the evidence, if presented at trial, probably have changed the result? and (2) Could the evidence have been obtained before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence?

The plaintiffs’ new evidence and the issues raised

[12] The plaintiffs delivered affidavits from the plaintiff Tommy Wiseau (“Wiseau”), Greg Sestero (“Sestero”), Jeanne Marie Spicuzza (“Spicuzza”), Shari Grewal (“Grewal”) and Brendan M. Gallagher (“Gallagher”) of Gravitas Ventures LLC (“Gravitas”). I note at the outset that Wiseau, Spicuzza and Grewal all testified at trial. Although the affidavits are not sworn, counsel for the defendants takes no issue with that technical deficiency. Under the circumstances prevailing with the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of formal swearing of affidavits is not surprising.

[13] The evidence addresses four topics: (1) the potential distribution agreement with Gravitas; (2) the contents of an interview given by the defendant Richard Harper (“Harper”) in early 2018; (3) contacts made by counsel for the defendants with the plaintiffs’ witnesses; and (4) evidence from Greg Sestero.

The Gravitas evidence

[14] Shari Grewal, who testified for the plaintiffs at the trial, signed an affidavit on this motion dated May 15, 2020, indicating that on April 30, 2020, one week after my Reasons for Judgment had been released, she contacted an individual at Gravitas, Lindsay Moffat, a Senior Business Affairs Manager, and apparently advised her that “Gravitas had been named in a lawsuit by way of an unsigned sales rep/distribution agreement.”

[15] Ms. Moffat was unaware of the litigation and, according to Grewal, said that while she recalled hearing about Room Full of Spoons – the documentary at issue in the trial - “it was not something they were moving forward with due to ‘so many issues.’” The gist of the discussion, as conveyed by Grewal, was that Moffat took issue with the suggestion that Room Full of Spoons would have made $1.2M, which presumably was a figure given to her by Grewal, based on the evidence of Doug Bania at trial who gave a conservative estimate of $1.1M. Grewal also asked Moffat if she recalled “John or Jon Spencer working there,” which Moffat did not. Although Grewal’s affidavit does not say so, she made this inquiry because Spicuzza, who attended the entire trial, and counsel for the plaintiffs believed they had heard Spencer’s name mentioned by Harper in cross-examination as his contact person at Gravitas. The naming of someone named “John or Jon Spencer,” it was asserted, took the plaintiffs by surprise at trial. Moffat then referred Grewal to the top executive in the Business Affairs office of Gravitas, Brendan Gallagher, Executive Vice-President and General Counsel of Gravitas.

[16] Grewal sent an email to Gallagher which, according to her affidavit, “asked him if he was aware that Gravitas’ unsigned offer agreement to ‘Room Full of Spoons’ was used as evidence and further used to evaluate the value of ‘Room Full of Spoons’ that damages were being awarded of over $1 million, and asked if he or anyone at Gravitas had been notified of their unsigned agreement being used.”

[17] Grewal then describes at some length a telephone conversation she had with Gallagher on May 5, 2020. According to Grewal, Gallagher said that Room Full of Spoons “was filled with legal problems.” He is reported to have said that there were no plans for a theatrical release of the documentary. He also made negative comments about the decision and damages award, and the evidence of Doug Bania (with whom Gallagher appeared to be familiar, saying he “should have known better”), presumably based on information Grewal provided him in the call. On the other hand, Gallagher confirmed to Grewal that “E&O was not the issue,” which is inconsistent with Grewal’s evidence at trial suggesting that the documentary could not be insured.

[18] Grewal referred Gallagher to plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Brinza, and she had no further communication with him.

[19] Tommy Wiseau’s affidavit, dated May 18, 2020, indicates that he also spoke to Gallagher, although he gives no date or time. He notes that at some point Mr. Brinza provided Gallagher with a copy of the Reasons for Judgment and the draft distribution agreement. According to Wiseau, Gallagher confirmed to Wiseau that “Gravitas decided not to have further discussions with the Defendants in light of the various legal issues surrounding the film” but that the injunction issued by Diamond J. in June 2017 “was not a factor” (see Reasons for Judgment at paras. 8-11). Wiseau also states that Gallagher told him that Gravitas “never intended a major theatrical release” of Room Full of Spoons and “would never be expected to achieve gross revenues of over 1 million U.S. dollars.” Gallagher also did not know of any Gravitas employee named John Spencer.

[20] Wiseau’s affidavit attaches an email dated May 18, 2020 sent by Gallagher to Mr. Brinza, in which he states:

Gravitas had no binding contract for the documentary Room Full of Spoons. We ultimately decided not to have further discussions with the filmmakers in light of the various legal issues surrounding the film. However, we did not plan a major theatrical for the film, especially not one that would gross over 1 million dollars at [sic] domestically.

[21] According to Wiseau’s affidavit, Gallagher said that corporate policy prevented him from providing an affidavit, but that he was willing to testify if Wiseau obtained “an order from a U.S. Court (issued on the basis of a letter of request from an Ontario Court).” However, Gallagher did in fact sign an affidavit on May 19, 2020. It simply repeats the points made in his email to Mr. Brinza. It does not mention the injunction, let alone say it was “not a factor”, nor does it say he is unable or unwilling to give evidence in the absence of a court order. Further, Gallagher prefaces his statements by saying that Wiseau told him that at the trial the defendants alleged that they “had a Distribution Agreement” with Gravitas, which is not correct. The defendants only stated that they had a draft, unsigned distribution agreement with Gravitas, which is made out clearly in the evidence and was not contradicted by Mr. Gallagher.

[22] This new evidence does not meet the test for reconsideration or the reopening of a trial.

[23] First, the plaintiffs give no explanation as to why they did not present this evidence from Gravitas at the trial, which was obtained through a few telephone calls following the release of my Reasons. None of the evidence led by the defendants about the Gravitas deal – which was never presented as a concluded agreement, as Wiseau apparently told Gallagher – could have come as a surprise to the plaintiffs, nor was there any suggestion of being surprised at trial.

[24] The defendants have filed evidence on this motion showing that the potential Gravitas deal was disclosed to the plaintiffs in the defendants’ evidence in support of lifting the injunction in 2017, and was referred to by Koehnen J. in his Reasons vacating the injunction: Wiseau Studio et al. v. Richard Harper, 2017 ONSC 6535 at para. 148. It was also referred to in the statement of defence filed in 2017.

[25] Further, the defendants disclosed their documents to the plaintiffs’ former counsel in July 2019, which included correspondence with the Gravitas employee with whom they had been negotiating the deal, Josh Spector (“Spector”), not John Spencer. Spector was also the person at Gravitas who informed the defendants that Gravitas could not go forward with the distribution deal while the documentary was mired in legal troubles. Indeed, at the hearing of this motion Mr. Brinza advised the court that he had recently contacted the lawyer who acted for the plaintiffs in the summer of 2019 who told Mr. Brinza that he had attempted to reach Mr. Spector at Gravitas at the time, but that Spector had left the company. Mr. Brinza conceded that at trial he may have misheard Harper’s reference to Spector as John Spencer, and did not press the suggestion that the plaintiffs had been taken by surprise by Harper’s mention in cross-examination of who he had been in contact with at Gravitas.

[26] The defendants’ expert, Doug Bania, also referred to the Gravitas deal, and even the plaintiffs’ witnesses addressed Gravitas in their evidence. If the plaintiffs had wanted to challenge the defendants’ expectation that they would have had an agreement with Gravitas but for the injunction and law suit, or challenge how much the documentary might have made through its distribution by Gravitas, they had ample notice of those issues and time to attempt to obtain such evidence from Gravitas well in advance of trial. In short, the evidence from Gravitas evidence could have been obtained before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

[27] Second, the evidence presented does not satisfy me that the result would “probably” be different.

[28] Gallagher makes two points in his affidavit, neither of which support a conclusion that my decision would “probably be different.” His first point is that legal issues led to the end of the discussions between Gravitas and the defendants. This is entirely consistent with the defendants’ evidence led at trial, that the legal action brought by Wiseau stopped the discussions with Gravitas and therefore blocked the release of the documentary. Although Wiseau asserts in his affidavit that Gallagher said the injunction was not a factor, Gallagher says no such thing. Rather, the email correspondence with Spector, produced by the defendants, confirms that the lawsuit was what caused Gravitas to back off. As Spector wrote to Harper and the defendant Richard Towns on June 21, 2017:

Gravitas would love to be your distributor, but we’re not able to get involved in the legal battle. Once you get that resolved, please let me know and hopefully we can still move forward with a deal.

[29] Gallagher’s second point, that Gravitas “did not plan a major theatrical release” that would have made over $1M (which is different from Grewal’s statement that it did not plan any theatrical release), is not surprising given that the negotiations and plans for Room Full of Spoons occurred well before the release, and great success, of The Disaster Artist, in late 2017 and early 2018. In short, Gallagher’s evidence does not credibly challenge the expert opinion evidence of Doug Bania which considered the potential impact of The Disaster Artist, a fact that is not addressed by Gallagher at all.

[30] Further, on a motion of this kind, which seeks the extraordinary relief of reopening a concluded case, the “cogency” of the evidence is a relevant consideration: Mehedi at para. 13. I can give no weight to the hearsay evidence of Wiseau and Grewal as to what Gallagher or Moffat told them on the phone. There is no affidavit from Moffat, and only a very short affidavit from Gallagher, the presentation of which is inconsistent with Wiseau’s statement that Gallagher could not provide an affidavit without a court order. Gallagher and Moffat seemed to have been informed of facts by Grewal and Wiseau which are not disclosed and may have been quite selective or misleading. For example, Grewal told Moffat that Gravitas was “named” in a lawsuit. It seems to have been suggested to both Moffat and Gallagher that the defendants had a firm agreement with Gravitas, which was not the evidence, or my conclusion. There is no indication that Bania’s analysis and the impact of The Disaster Artist on it was disclosed to either Moffat or Gallagher. Wiseau has an interest in the outcome and I have already found Grewal to be biased in his favour. In short, the new evidence, such as it is, is weak and lacks cogency.

The Harper interview

[31] Spicuzza’s affidavit on this motion states that on May 6, 2020, two weeks after my Reasons for Judgment were released, she was “browsing the social media platform Facebook for content pertaining to Tommy Wiseau and the motion picture known as ‘The Room,’” and found a “Facebook Live chat video” that had an interview with the defendant Richard Harper, lasting just under one hour. Although the affidavit does not say so, the interview was conducted in early 2018, after the release of The Disaster Artist, but before the Academy Awards which I understand were held in early March 2018.

[32] Spicuzza asserts in her affidavit that Harper said he was “happy” that Room Full of Spoons was not released in June 2017, and that it was “better timing” to release it after the Oscars in order to capitalize on the success of The Disaster Artist. She notes a number of other things Harper said in the interview, such as Wiseau’s unhappiness with the documentary, his request that it “be sixty (60) percent more positive,” and that Wiseau wanted Harper to “pay for a license.”

[33] The plaintiffs submit that Harper’s comment about the “better timing” is something new and inconsistent with the defendants’ position at trial, and which the court should have regard to in reconsidering its decision.

[34] I disagree. Spicuzza’s observations do not raise any new issues and are consistent with the evidence, and my findings.

[35] First, there is no indication that this interview has not been available on Facebook since it occurred in 2018, or even an indication that Spicuzza had difficulty finding it. There is no evidence that this interview could not have been found by Wiseau, Spicuzza or anyone else on the plaintiffs’ side exercising reasonable diligence by “browsing social media.”

[36] Second, having read the transcript of the Facebook interview, Harper’s statement is not inconsistent with his evidence at trial, nor does it cast a new or different light on the evidence presented at trial such that my decision on the merits or on the quantum of damages would “probably” have been different.

[37] What Harper said in the interview was that “had we released the movie when we wanted to -- we originally wanted to release it in June and when we started getting all of these court documents, all this legal nonsense, then, you know, the timing wouldn't be as perfect as it is now because The Disaster Artist is out, it's very successful, it might get nominated and stuff, so the timing is kind of better for us to release the movie now, you know?” This does not put the evidence in a new light; rather it is consistent with the evidence at trial. Bania’s expert opinion supporting the damage award was based on the “buzz” from The Disaster Artist, on which Room Full of Spoons would have benefitted. Regardless of whether Room Full of Spoons was first released in June 2017, Bania’s point is that the documentary would have benefitted from the success of The Disaster Artist if it would have been available to the public at the time when The Disaster Artist was released and experiencing great popularity. The injunction and lawsuit prevented that. Harper’s comments in the Facebook video would have done nothing to alter the original result on this point.

Contacts with the plaintiffs’ witnesses

[38] The affidavits of Spicuzza and Grewal indicate that just prior to the trial they received phone calls from Meredith Bacal, one of the counsel for the defendants. They also include evidence that Ms. Bacal called Chloe Sosa-Sims, who had provided an affidavit for the plaintiffs at trial but then decided she did not wish to testify and her affidavit was not relied on by the plaintiffs.

[39] Although the plaintiffs’ motion materials suggested that the contact with the witnesses was improper and might have amounted to “witness tampering,” at the hearing of the motion Mr. Brinza wisely did not press this point.

[40] Grewal’s evidence is simply that she received a call on New Year’s Eve, 2019, a few days before the trial, from “a female attorney from Canada” asking if she intended to appear at the trial. Grewal confirmed that fact and that was the end of the call.

[41] Spicuzza did not know of any calls at all until she listened to a voice message on February 8, 2020 that had been left on December 31, 2019. The transcription of the call made by Spicuzza shows that Ms. Bacal identified herself as a lawyer for the defendants, and asked Spicuzza if she would call her, and went on to say that, if they didn’t connect, then Ms. Bacal looked forward to seeing her at the trial. Spicuzza apparently did not tell anyone about this voice message until she spoke to Mr. Brinza a few months later on May 7, 2020, two weeks after my Reasons for Judgment were released.

[42] On May 7, 2020, Spicuzza also spoke to Grewal, who told her of the call she had received on December 31, 2020. Spicuzza also obtained an email from Sosa-Sims confirming that she too had received a call from “the lawyer on the opposing side,” Meredith Bacal, on December 31, 2019.

[43] There is no property in a witness, and Ms. Bacal did nothing wrong by attempting to contact three people who had signed affidavits and were expected to testify at the trial. The evidence from the voice message left for Spicuzza is that she clearly identified herself as counsel for the defendants. There is no evidence that she misled, intimidated or otherwise acted unprofessionally in her conversations with Grewal and Sosa-Sims, or in her voice message to Spicuzza; quite the contrary. And in oral argument Mr. Brinza indicated he had spoken to Sosa-Sims who confirmed that Ms. Bacal’s call had no influence on her decision not to testify; rather, she was concerned that her evidence would be public. The allegations of improper conduct against Ms. Bacal are unfounded and are not a basis for reconsidering my decision or reopening the trial.

Greg Sestero’s evidence

[44] Of even less merit is the evidence of Greg Sestero, who did not testify at the trial. Much of his affidavit rehashes facts that came out at the trial. What seems to have upset Sestero and motivated him to participate in this motion is that he was told of allegations supposedly made by counsel for the defendants at the trial that implicated Sestero in Wiseau’s misconduct.

[45] One allegation is that Sestero, Wiseau and James Franco, may have conspired together to delay the release of Room Full of Spoons so that it did not get released before The Disaster Artist. Sestero strongly disputes this allegation, but it is not relevant to the motion.

[46] Aside from the fact that Sestero is not a party to the action, I made no finding that he engaged in such a conspiracy, nor do I recall the defendants suggesting there was a “conspiracy.” I did say at paragraph 233 of my Reasons that “one might reasonably infer that The Disaster Artist was behind the injunction application,” and stated at paragraph 244 that “the plaintiffs were concerned with protecting and maximizing the value of The Disaster Artist, in which the plaintiffs have a financial interest.” However, as Grewal testified, as I noted at paragraph 108 of my Reasons, “the makers of The Disaster Artist would likely do ‘anything’ to stop the release of Room Full of Spoons in advance of the release of The Disaster Artist.” But there was no mention of Sestero or of any conspiracy, nor did my Reasons for Judgment, including my damages analysis, depend on any such finding. In short, if Wiseau’s intention is to now have Sestero attempt to dispel the motivation of protecting The Disaster Artist, Sestero’s evidence is not relevant or cogent evidence that would “probably” result in a different decision, or a different damage award.

[47] In addition, although Sestero says he was difficult to reach for the past six months as he was “shooting on location in the Arizona desert, etc.,” this issue ought to have been anticipated and there is no explanation why Sestero could not have been available to give this evidence at trial, the date for which had been set some six months in advance.

[48] Sestero also complains that an allegation was made by defendants’ counsel at trial that he “stole” the idea for his book, The Disaster Artist, from the defendants after hearing of their plan to make a documentary. Sestero includes evidence in his affidavit that shows that the idea for his book preceded any contact with the defendants. I made no reference to that allegation in my Reasons for Judgment, and question why Sestero and Wiseau would even want to lend it any credence by responding to it. There was no evidence supporting such an allegation and it is in any event irrelevant to the action, and the motion.

Conclusion

[49] Mr. Brinza, perhaps seeing the challenges he faced on the motion, urged me to keep in mind the ultimate goal of ensuring that a just result is obtained, which he said ought to override the expectation of finality where there is a concern that a judgment has been obtained on misleading evidence. Mr. Brinza is correct that I should have regard to that goal; however, nothing presented on this motion suggests that my Reasons for Judgment were based on misleading evidence or that there is any other reason to reconsider my decision or reopen the trial. Rather, this motion raises the same concerns referred to by Koehnen J. prior to trial, that the plaintiffs seek to delay justice for the defendants at every turn.

[50] Once again, Wiseau also complains of the Ontario justice system being unfair to him as “an American citizen doing litigation in a foreign and unfamiliar jurisdiction.” This claim, and other criticisms of the Ontario courts was made by Wiseau in advance of trial and also at the outset of the trial. However, Wiseau chose to bring this action in Ontario, and no doubt was quite content with our system of justice when he obtained his ex parte injunction. I am not aware of any way in which he has been treated differently than if he were a resident of Ontario or a citizen of Canada.

[51] In my view, this motion has no merit and is yet another tactical attempt by Wiseau to delay and obstruct the release of Room Full of Spoons. This, together with the unfounded allegations of impropriety against counsel for the defendants justifies costs on a substantial indemnity basis, though not for the sum requested by the defendants, which I find excessive. I fix costs of the motion at $20,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Schabas J. Date: 2020-06-24