BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: FC-12-064-01

DATE: 20200612

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Connie McMaster-Pereira

Applicant

– and –

Michael Pereira

Respondent

Paul Daffern and Marta Ross, Counsel for the Applicant

Natasha Razack, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: November 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and December 2, 2019 and by written submissions

Reasons for Judgment

DOUGLAS J.

Overview and Background

[1] This matter came before me by way of trial of the parties’ respective motions to change regarding child support and parenting time.

[2] The parties were married September 1, 2001 and separated in June 2011 (although the respondent alleges reconciliation from May 2015 to November 26, 2015). They are the parents of Deanna (DOB April 4, 2001), Claudia (DOB November 27, 2003), Taylor (DOB July 22, 2005) and Cruz (DOB September 11, 2011).

[3] There is a final order in place, dated July 26, 2013. It addresses issues of support, custody and access.

[4] The applicant mother’s Motion to Change, commenced July 12, 2017, seeks retroactive increase in child support commencing April 1, 2014. She alleges the respondent father’s income is $250,000/year.

[5] In his Response to Motion to Change, sworn September 9, 2017, the respondent father seeks dismissal of the applicant mother’s Motion to Change, and orders that the respondent father pick up the children Claudia Pereira, Taylor Pereira and Cruz Pereira every alternate week from Sunday at 7pm to Sunday at 7pm, and that he have access with Deanna Pereira in accordance with Deanna’s discretion.

[6] In his Response to Motion to Change the respondent deposes his total income was as follows:

(a) $33,994.54 for “this year” (being 2017);

(a) $44,490 for “last year” (being 2016); and

(b) $42,782 for “the year before that” (being 2015).

[7] He submitted that based on his annual income the table amount of support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines for four children is $807 per month.

[8] There are several businesses referenced in these Reasons. They are:

a. Pereira Trucking Limited (hereinafter “PTL”), a dump truck business through which the respondent has provided haulage services. He is the officer/director;

b. J.C.L. Concrete Pumping Limited (hereinafter “JCL”), a source of income for the respondent via PTL;

c. J.C.L.II, a company associated with JCL;

d. Five Star Protection (hereinafter “FSP”), an unincorporated business through which the respondent provided management services;

e. Premier Concrete Pumping, the respondent’s employer commencing September 23, 2019 (hereinafter “PCP”);

f. Orangeville Concrete Pumping Service Ltd. (affiliated with PCP); and,

g. 2657322 Ontario Limited, a company incorporated by the respondent in 2018.

[9] During the trial evidence was received from the following witnesses (in addition to the parties themselves):

a. Emma Galloway, an assistant office manager at an accounting firm. She testified regarding some lifestyle evidence found on the internet;

b. Cindy Lou McGoldrick, the real estate lawyer who handled the purchase of the 28 Lloyd Cook property;

c. Nick Ippolito, chief building official for the Township of Springwater, who testified regarding a “pool house” at 28 Lloyd Cook;

d. Lori Quinlan, qualified as an expert in bookkeeping, who testified regarding her calculations of the respondent’s spending in 2015 to 2019;

e. Eric Duiker, owner of Orangeville Concrete Pumping Service Ltd.;

f. Bryce Miller, a process server who unsuccessfully attempted to serve Natasha Hanley and Pedro Pereira;

g. Laura Sciacca, an owner of JCL;

h. Edward Nagel, qualified as an expert regarding income analysis;

i. Philip Sliskovic, one of the respondent’s racing associates; and,

j. Jerry Mitrovic, one of the respondent’s racing associates

[10] Within the context of determination of changes in circumstances, the following issues are to be decided:

(a) The income of the respondent father;

(b) The amount of child support payable; and

The Final Order of July 26, 2013

[11] The final order at the heart of these proceedings is dated July 26, 2013 (hereinafter “the order”). It is based upon the parties’ minutes of settlement from May 2013. The salient provisions are as follows:

a. The parties shall have joint custody of the four children

of the marriage, namely:

Deanna Pereira born April 4, 2001;

Claudia Pereira born November 27, 2003;

Taylor Pereira born July 22, 2005; and

Cruz Pereira born September 11, 2011

b. The children shall reside primarily with the applicant mother…

d. The children shall have regular access with the respondent father…

2(a) For the purposes of calculating the respondent father’s child and spousal support obligations, the respondent father’s income shall be imputed at $109,000 per annum and the applicant mother’s income shall be imputed at $6,000 per annum.

2(b) Commencing June 1, 2013 the respondent father shall commence paying the applicant mother monthly support in the amount of $3,000. This amount does not include any amount for s.7 or add on expenses.

2(c) Upon Deanna turning 18 years old, the respondent father’s support obligations shall decrease by $750 per month. Upon each child turning 18 thereafter the respondent’s support obligations shall decrease by $750 per month…the respondent father shall continue to pay basic and add on child support for the children that remain dependants of the parties based on his then current income.

2(e) As the respondent father’s support obligations are based on an accepted imputed income of $109,000 for the respondent father, his support liability will not increase above $3,000 per month unless the applicant mother can demonstrate a positive material change in the respondent’s income or the respondent father fails to make the payments of $3,000 per month

2(f) The respondent father shall contribute to the children’s s. 7 expenses at a rate of 50%, but he shall only have to make such contributions if his consent to same is obtained in advance with such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The respondent father may be required to contribute more than 50% if the applicant mother is able to prove that the respondent father has had a material improvement in his circumstances.

2(g) The respondent father shall be responsible for 50% of the children’s net expenses relating to post secondary education expenses, including tuition, books, rent or residency fees, meal plans and or reasonable allowance for food expenses. The respondent father shall pay up to 50% of the children’s net post secondary school expenses after taking into account any other monies or benefits the children receive, including financial contributions from their grandparents or in the form of their earnings, scholarships or bursaries (if any) and or student loans or grants.

2(i) The respondent father shall maintain the children on his extended health and dental benefits available to him through his current employment. The respondent father shall maintain the applicant mother on his extended health and dental benefits for so long as she is eligible for such benefits.

4(d) For as long as child support is to be paid, the payor and recipient, if applicable must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year within 30 days of the anniversary of this order, in accordance with s. 24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines

[12] It should be noted that while the order provides for payment of $3,000 per month, it does not specify whether it is to be child or spousal support. In fact, there is no reference to spousal support in the order, except in the title “Parties’ Incomes, Child Support, Spousal Support and s.7 Expenses”, under which the support provisions appear, but no reference to “spousal support” is made.

[13] In the Minutes of Settlement (Exhibit 25, upon which the order is based) there is reference to the $3,000 per month including $637/month in spousal support but to be characterized as child support.

[14] It therefore appears to have been the joint intention of the parties that periodic payments due the applicant under the order are to be characterized as child support.

Procedural History of These Proceedings

[15] At the DRO conference on September 29, 2017 the Dispute Resolution Officer noted: “disclosure of income of Dad is critical”.

[16] The parties entered into a consent order on September 29, 2017 which provided on a temporary basis that the order of July 26, 2013 remain in place except as follows:

(a) Commencing October 13, 2017 respondent father shall pick up Claudia, Taylor and Cruz from the applicant mother’s home every other weekend at 8pm until Sunday at 5pm;

(b) The applicant mother shall pick up the children from the respondent’s home at 5pm;

[17] At case conference on February 13, 2018 the respondent father’s access schedule was further modified. The court ordered:

(a) The respondent shall advise as to his position with respect to disclosure of redacted credit card statements for his personal and Pereira Trucking credit cards covering the period from July 1, 2014 to the present no later than February 20, 2018;

(b) The applicant shall complete a corporate search of J.C.L. Pumping to determine the company’s shareholders no later than February 27, 2018;

(c) The respondent shall complete a corporate search of 2073103 Ontario Limited to determine the company’s shareholders no later than February 27, 2018.

[18] At settlement conference on July 18, 2018, pursuant to temporary without prejudice minutes of settlement, the court ordered:

The respondent father to have access to Deanna, Claudia, Taylor and Cruz alternating weekends on Fridays from 8pm to Tuesdays between 8am and 8:30am commencing July 20, 2018, until August 24, 2018.
The respondent shall make best efforts to serve and file the following documents on the applicant no later than August 21, 2018:

(a) Mortgage application for 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West and a recent mortgage statement for the 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West property;

(b) Personal credit card statements from 2014 to date;

(d) Bank statements for Pereira Trucking and Five Star from 2014 to date;

(e) Request letter from J.C.L. Concrete and response from J.C.L. Concrete regarding disclosure of J.C.L. Concrete Company credit cards;

(f) Pereira Trucking credit card statements from 2014 to date;

(g) Credit Bureau report for the respondent.

[19] At settlement conference on October 9, 2018 McCarthy J., ordered on consent as follows:

(a) The respondent father shall request within five days copies of all documentation relating to accounts, RRSPs, mutual funds from BMO, CIBC and London Life and B2B from 2015 to present;

(b) The issues of child support and s. 7 expenses shall proceed to a trial scheduling conference on February 28, 2019 (the issue of access as well if not decided by way of summary judgment);

(c) The respondent shall provide notice of assessment for 2017 forthwith as well as tax returns and notices of assessment from 2015 to present for the businesses Pereira Trucking Services and Five Star, bank statements for Five Star September to December 2016.

[20] On November 26, 2018, following the respondent father’s motion for summary judgment, MacPherson J., made a final order providing as follows:

(a) Commencing January 4, 2019, the children Deanna, Claudia, Taylor and Cruz shall have parenting time with each parent on an alternating weekly basis;

(b) The parenting time that Cruz will enjoy with each parent is a triable issue and shall proceed to trial.

[21] On February 28, 2019 the parties attended a trial scheduling conference before McCarthy J., who identified the issues for trial as:

(a) The income of the respondent father;

(b) The amount of child support; and

[22] McCarthy J. also ordered that the parties shall comply with disclosure orders previously given.

[23] On consent on May 7, 2019 Boswell J. ordered as follows:

Commencing April 12, 2019 and every alternate week thereafter Cruz shall have access with the respondent father from 8pm on Fridays to Tuesdays after school up until May 24, 2019 after which date Cruz’s access shall transition to parenting time with each parent mirroring that of his sister’s Deanna, Claudia and Taylor pursuant to the order of MacPherson J., dated November 26, 2019.

Legal Context

[24] The order was made in the context of divorce proceedings; therefore, s.17 of the Divorce Act is engaged in relation to the motions to change before me.

[25] Section 17 of the Divorce Act provides as follows:

17 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively,

(a) a support order or any provision thereof on

application by either or both former spouses;

(4) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a child support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change of circumstances as provided for in the applicable guidelines has occurred since the making of the child support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order.

(6.1) A court making a variation order in respect of a child

support order shall do so in accordance with the applicable

guidelines.

[26] Section 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines (hereinafter “the CSG”) provides as follows:

For the purposes of subsection 17(4) of the Act, any one of the following constitutes a change of circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order in respect of a child support order:

(a) in the case where the amount of child support includes a determination made in accordance with the applicable table, any change in circumstances that would result in a different child support order or any provision thereof;

(b) in the case where the amount of child support does not include a determination made in accordance with a table, any change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either spouse or of any child who is entitled to support; and

(c) in the case of an order made before May 1, 1997, the coming into force of section 15.1 of the Act, enacted by section 2 of chapter 1 of the Statutes of Canada, (1997).

[27] Section 15 of the CSG provides as follows:

15 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a spouse’s annual income is

determined by the court in accordance with sections 16 to

(2) Where both spouses agree in writing on the annual income

of a spouse, the court may consider that amount to be the

spouse’s income for the purposes of these Guidelines if the

court thinks that the amount is reasonable having regard to

the income information provided under section 21.

[28] Section 16 of the CSG provides as follows:

16 Subject to sections 17 to 20, a spouse’s annual income is

determined using the sources of income set out under the

heading “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by

the Canada Revenue Agency and is adjusted in accordance

with Schedule III.

[29] Section 17 of the CSG provides:

17 (1) If the court is of the opinion that the determination of a

spouse’s annual income under section 16 would not be the

fairest determination of that income, the court may have

regard to the spouse’s income over the last three years and

determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of

any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a

non-recurring amount during those years.

(2) Where a spouse has incurred a non-recurring capital or

business investment loss, the court may, if it is of the

opinion that the determination of the spouse’s annual income

under section 16 would not provide the fairest determination

of the annual income, choose not to apply sections 6 and 7 of

Schedule III, and adjust the amount of the loss, including

related expenses and carrying charges and interest expenses,

to arrive at such amount as the court considers appropriate.

[30] Section 18 of the CSG provides as follows:

18 (1) Where a spouse is a shareholder, director or officer of a corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the spouse’s annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the spouse’s annual income to include

(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or

(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporation’s pre-tax income.

(2) In determining the pre-tax income of a corporation for the purposes of subsection (1), all amounts paid by the corporation as salaries, wages or management fees, or other payments or benefits, to or on behalf of persons with whom the corporation does not deal at arm’s length must be added to the pre-tax income, unless the spouse establishes that the payments were reasonable in the circumstances.

[31] Section 19 of the CSG provides as follows:

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) The spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse;

(b) the spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax;

income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada;

(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would

affect the level of child support to be determined under these Guidelines;

(e) the spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income;

(f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

(g) the spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;

(h) the spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and

(i) the spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(g), the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act

[32] Section 20 of the CSG only applies to non-residents of Canada and thus has no relevance to these proceedings.

[33] The order refers to s. 24.1 of the “Child Support Guidelines”. The Federal CSG do not include a s. 24.1. I presume that the parties were referring to s. 24.1 of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines which provides as follows:

24.1 (1) Every person whose income or other financial information

is used to determine the amount of an order for the support

of a child shall, no later than 30 days after the anniversary

of the date on which the order was made in every year in

which the child is a child within the meaning of this

Regulation, provide every party to the order with the

following, unless the parties have agreed otherwise:

For the most recent taxation year, a copy of the person’s,

i. personal income tax return, including any

materials that were filed with the return, and

ii. notice of assessment and, if any, notice of

reassessment.

As applicable, any current information in writing about,

i. the status and amount of any expenses included in the order pursuant to subsection 7 (1), and

ii. any loan, scholarship or bursaries the child has

received or will receive in the coming year that

affect or will affect the expenses referred to in

subparagraph i.

(2) If the person has not received his or her notice of

assessment or notice of reassessment for the most recent

taxation year by the date referred to in subsection (1), the

person shall provide every party to the order with a copy

of the notice as soon as possible after the person receives

the notice.

(3) If the address at which a party receives documents

changes, the party shall, at least 30 days before the next

anniversary of the date on which the order was made, give

written notice of his or her updated address information to

every person required to provide documents and

information under subsection (1).

(4) If a person required to provide a document or information

under this section fails to do so, a court may, on

application by the party who did not receive the document

or information, make one or more of the following orders:

An order finding the person to be in contempt of court.
An order awarding costs in favour of the applicant up

to an amount that fully compensates the applicant for

all costs incurred in the proceedings.

An order requiring the person to provide the document

or information to,

i. the court,

ii. the applicant, and

iii. any other party to whom the person did not provide the document or information when required to do so.

[34] The court must satisfy itself that a change in circumstances has occurred since the making of the final order. (See Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152 at para. 23).

[35] The onus of proof that a change in circumstances has occurred is on the applicant and the standard of proof is on balance of probabilities. (See Willick v. Willick, 1994 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670 at para. 99).

[36] A party seeking retroactive child support must provide evidence that the child suffered from a lack of financial support during the period in question. Ability to pay as well as need must be considered by the trial judge in the exercise of his or her discretion. (See Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731 at para. 53).

[37] The court must balance a payor’s interest in certainty with the need for fairness and flexibility. (See S(DB) v. G(SR), 2006 SCC 37, 2006 S.C.C. 37 at paras. 43 and 133).

[38] Factors to consider when determining whether retroactive support is appropriate include any reasonable excuse for why support is not sought earlier, conduct of the payor parent, circumstances of the child and hardship occasioned by a retroactive award. (See S(DB) above).

[39] The date of effective notice given to a payor parent is generally the date to which the award should be retroactive. (See S(DB) above).

[40] Effective notice refers to any indication by the recipient that the current agreed upon amount of support needs to be readjusted. (See S(DB)) above.

[41] A failure to automatically increase support does not necessarily equate to blameworthy conduct, which requires a conscious choice to ignore parental support options. (See Rosenberg v. Gold, 2016 ONCA 565 at paras. 68 and 69).

[42] Hardships suffered by a recipient parent forced to make additional financial sacrifices are irrelevant in determining whether retroactive support should be owed to a child. (See S(DB) above).

[43] Regarding imputing income:

(a) A court cannot arbitrarily impute income to a party. The court requires a factual basis and the evidence for the amount requested to be imputed;

(b) The onus to establish an evidentiary basis to impute income to a party is on the party requesting the imputation of income;

(c) The decision by the court to impute income is discretionary. A court may decide to not impute income where the payor establishes a reasonable explanation for his or her situation. (See Drygala above, Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322 at paras. 27 and 28 and Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500 at paras. 71 and 96).

[44] Non-disclosure of financial information alone is insufficient to warrant an imputation of income to a party. The court must proceed cautiously in making a decision about imputation in the case of non-disclosure. (See EDA v. MAA, 2014 BCSC 1084 at para. 230).

[45] The purpose of the Guidelines is to ensure children continue the benefits from the financial means of both spouses after separation, using an objective, efficient and consistent method to establish a fair amount of support. (See Charrone v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719 at para. 52).

[46] The court must follow s. 9 of the Guidelines to determine child support and shared custody arrangements. The court should demand information from the parties with respect to increased costs of shared parenting by way of financial statements and/or children’s expenses. (See Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63 at paras. 49 and 57).

[47] A step-by-step approach to calculating child support in shared parenting arrangements involves the following:

(i) Determine the incomes of the parties;

(ii) Determine the simple set-off amount of child support. The court will depart from the set-off amount or make adjustments to it if it is inappropriate in light of the factors considered under s. 9(b) and 9(c);

(iii) Review child expense budgets, considering both fixed and variable costs

and the contributions of the parties relative to their ability to pay; and

(iv) Assess each parent’s ability to assume any increased costs of shared

custody by considering income levels, disparity in incomes and the assets

and liabilities or net worth of each party. (See Contino above).

[48] For purposes of carrying out a s. 9 analysis, the court must consider the net disposable income of both parents and adjusted household income as well as any increased costs of shared parenting to determine a fair amount of child support payable. (See Prevost v. Prevost, 2017 ONSC 5827 at para. 165 and Dagg v. Chenier, 2014 ONSC 336 at paras. 56 to 58).

[49] Section 14 of the Child Support Guidelines is critical to the issue of whether a change in circumstances has occurred. A change in the payor’s income would satisfy the threshold test. (See Rolson v. Clyde, 2007 ONSC 3642 at para. 182).

[50] Where a support payor is less than frank about his financial circumstances the court may draw adverse inferences and impute income. (See Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 25981 (ONSC)).

[51] Where a support payor engages in tactics to conceal income and or engages in tactics to make obtaining proper disclosure expensive and difficult, the court may impute income under s. 19(1) of the Child Support Guidelines. Proper disclosure entails providing backup documents for all expenses and locating and producing documents necessary to determine proper support. Children are the real victims of any marriage breakdown and their right to proper support should not be subject to game playing by their parents. In response, the court may impute income including averaging income over several tax years and grossing up income to determine the pre-tax income required to pay for the payor’s lifestyle. (See Sarafinchin v. Sarafinchin, 2000 22639 (ONSC)).

[52] In imputing income to a support payor, the main factors to be considered are the payor’s age, education, skills, health, number of hours worked and the hourly rate the payor could reasonably earn. Previous income is also a consideration. (See Sullivan v. Mahoney, 2018 ONSC 7211 at para. 25).

Issue #1: What is the Respondent’s income?

[53] This is by far the most significant issue in dispute between the parties. It consumed the vast majority of time in presentation of evidence.

[54] There are several elements of the evidence relating to the respondent’s income that merit attention before embarking upon a year by year analysis.

Credibility and Reliability

[55] The applicant gave me little cause for concern as to either her credibility or the reliability of her evidence. She struck me as someone endeavouring to tell the truth as best she could, without overstating the strength of her recollection. I ascribe considerable weight to her evidence accordingly.

[56] By way of contrast, there are many reasons to be concerned regarding the evidence pertaining to the respondent’s income. These reasons include the quality of the respondent’s own testimony: he was at times non-responsive, evasive, contradictory of his own testimony and that of his own witnesses, confused regarding his own accounts and ill-informed of his own personal finances. For example:

(i) He protested he was “unable” to secure information from the bank regarding his “frozen” account and from his accountant (to whom he owed money for services performed), without offering any satisfactory explanation for why he did not subpoena the records and witnesses;

(ii) Within a span of minutes, he testified both that he “did not really record” his cash income, and: “I did record the cash work”;

(iii) Regarding cash income, he testified that he “never checked to see if it was in his tax return”, demonstrating a concerning degree of carelessness regarding his representations to the Canada Revenue Agency;

(iv) He testified that he sold his 1968 Camaro chassis to Phil Sliskovic and received $60,000 in cash in exchange in the summer of 2016, none of which was deposited in any bank account. While the $60,000 may not represent income, the respondent’s readiness to engage in large cash transactions without leaving a banking footprint, coupled with his practice of receiving undeclared cash income, encourages me to be very cautious in relying upon his bank statements as being fully reflective of his income and spending, or in relying upon his financial statements as being accurately reflective of his assets and debts;

(v) None of his several financial statements sworn in these proceedings disclosed significant benefits received from J.C.L., including fuel for his vehicles, automobile insurance, maintenance expenses, etc.;

(vi) Regarding Natasha Hanley, his “girlfriend” at times, he testified that they had recently separated, that she had taken his Mercedes Benz motor vehicle and that he did not know where either Ms. Hanley or the vehicle were at the time of trial. He further testified that he had not reported this apparent theft of his motor vehicle to the police. This evidence, taken as a whole, defies common sense.

(vii) Although he was in a relationship with Ms. Hanley in 2015, he testified that he could not say what she was doing for employment at the time. Again, this evidence defies common sense;

(viii) In a striking but altogether fair submission, counsel for the respondent

“submits that neither of his personal or corporate tax returns nor his financial statements for Pereira Trucking are reliable and that these documents cannot be relied upon to determine his income for child support purposes.”

(ix) Laurie Sciacca (of JCL) received a letter from the respondent’s counsel asking for documents. She gave the letter to the respondent who told her that he would “take care of it”. She also testified that had the respondent asked for backup documentation with respect to the expenses paid by J.C.L. for the respondent’s benefit, she would have provided it. Exhibit 78 is a letter from Ms. Sciacca to the respondent’s counsel dated August 17, 2018 in which she acknowledges a request for credit card statements relating to the respondent’s access to credit card as an employee of J.C.L. Concrete Pumping Ltd. Her response: “Unfortunately, we are unable to provide these statements as they contain confidential information on purchases made only for our company needs.” Ms. Sciacca testified that she showed this letter to the respondent but he said: “You don’t need to send it…just send a letter saying that you can’t provide it.” The respondent testified: “I disagree with her regarding whether I told her not to provide the credit card statements.” He did not provide more detail;

(x) When asked in cross-examination why he did not disclose the other benefits of his employment by J.C.L., including the truck, the contra account, the fuel, the maintenance of the vehicles, vehicle insurance, in his financial statements, he testified: “I must have read it wrong.” He confirmed that he had never disclosed these additional benefits from his employer in his financial statements. This demonstrates carelessness, at best, on the part of the respondent in giving sworn evidence;

(xi) The respondent retained Mr. Edward Nagel to prepare an analysis of his income for 2016 and 2017. He testified that he gave Mr. Nagel “all of his paperwork regarding his taxes, etc”. Mr. Nagel testified that the respondent in fact did not give him everything that he had requested and ultimately Mr. Nagel withdrew his opinion regarding the respondent’s income due to concerns regarding undisclosed details of the respondent’s benefits received from J.C.L. which undermined the reliability of his analysis;

(xii) The respondent asserted under oath that he did not know anything about the minutes of settlement from May of 2013 which formed the foundation of the order. In cross-examination he acknowledged that he had signed the document about which he had earlier testified under oath he knew nothing. Again, at best, the respondent must be seen as a careless witness;

(xiii) In cross-examination the respondent was twice asked if he had asked Mr. Nagel to do a review of income for Five Star. Twice he was non-responsive;

(xiv) When asked in cross-examination why he did not disclose in his financial statement his ownership in the 1968 Camaro chassis, he testified that he did not do so because “it’s a race car and there was no bill of sale.” This leads one to wonder what other assets the respondent might own regarding which he has no bill of sale and therefore feels no obligation of disclosure;

(xv) Mr. Nagel concluded that the respondent’s personal income tax returns, his corporate income tax returns and his business financial statements were not reliable;

(xvi) The respondent could not explain why, in relation to the purchase of the 28 Lloyd Cook property in Mississauga, the mortgage document itself confirmed his obligation was $2,829 per month while, according to his financial statements, he claims to be paying $849 per week, or almost $3,700 per month, while at the same time asserting that he cannot manage to meet his debt obligations;

(xvii) In relation to his new employment with Premier Concrete Pumping (which commenced September 23, 2019) and the affiliated company of Orangeville Concrete Pumping, Mr. Eric Duiker, owner of OCP, testified that the respondent was one of several buyers of OCP. The respondent neither confirmed nor denied this assertion, claiming there is a non-disclosure agreement that prevents him from disclosing his interest, if any;

(xviii) Despite professing a struggle to meet his financial obligations, while on a trip to Las Vegas in relation to a concrete-related conference, he expended $4,600 on clothing. He indicated that the clothes were for himself, his children and Ms. Hanley;

(xix) During cross-examination the respondent revealed his mindset when it comes to disclosure: “If there’s no paper, technically I don’t have to admit I owned it…”

(xx) During cross-examination he asserted at least seven times: “you’d have to ask my accountant” in deflecting questions put to him about his finances. This is the same accountant he failed to subpoena to present evidence at trial.

[57] As a result of the concerns summarized above regarding the respondent’s evidence, I will generally accord greater weight to that of the applicant where there is contradiction, unless there is documentary or other reliable evidence to support the respondent’s position. I treat the respondent’s evidence with considerable caution and accord it reduced weight to reflect the foregoing concerns.

Expert Evidence

[58] While Mr. Nagel, the respondent’s own expert, withdrew his opinion regarding the respondent’s income in 2016 and 2017 (the only years for which he was retained to provide an opinion) he nevertheless provided some useful information.

[59] Mr. Nagel understood, based on information provided both by respondent’s counsel and the respondent himself, that the respondent is the director/officer of PTL, a dump truck business through which respondent provides haulage services. The respondent, through PTL, was at the time of the report in February of 2019, performing work for JCL, which Mr. Nagel understood to be the respondent’s primary source of income. He noted that on JCL’s website the respondent was indicated to be a “manager” of JCL. Mr. Nagel also understood that the respondent operated FSP, an unincorporated business, through which the respondent provided management services primarily to JCL. He understood that FSP was discontinued in August 2016.

[60] Mr. Nagel had been advised by the respondent that historically J.C.L. issued cheques payable to PTL and FSP which represented most of the income earned by the respondent. He had been further advised by the respondent that he structured his payments from J.C.L. to PTL and FSP in order to mitigate his tax obligations.

[61] Mr. Nagel concluded that as the financial records prepared by the respondent’s accountant were not reliable, the most objective approach to calculate the respondent’s Guidelines incomes would be to analyze all the inflows and outflows of funds during the relevant periods, an approach commonly referred to as a “source and use of funds” analysis.

[62] Upon doing so, Mr. Nagel concluded that in 2016 the respondent’s total of funds received from various sources was $176,234.08 and his total “uses” of funds (i.e. funds out) was $196,576.03 for a net shortfall of $20,341.95. Mr. Nagel found that of the $176,234.08 of sourced funds, $51,423.70 came from unknown sources.

[63] For 2017 the total of funds received was $157,421.70. The total of “used” funds was $157,545.89, for a shortfall of $124.19. Mr. Nagel found that of the sourced funds of $157,421.70, $39,528 was from unknown sources.

[64] Mr. Nagel testified that this was a “very objective” analysis. He was confident that there had been no “double counting”.

[65] Mr. Nagel concluded that the respondent had significant cash income which was greater than the amount of cash that the respondent claimed he had received. I note that in the respondent’s May 6, 2019 financial statement he claimed that his cash income was $1,200 per month ($14,400/year). I am satisfied that Mr. Nagel was of the view that the respondent’s cash income was significantly more than he was disclosing in his financial statements.

[66] Due to failings in the respondent’s disclosure, the analysis by Mr. Nagel summarized above necessarily excluded consideration of the benefits conferred upon the respondent through his association with J.C.L. in the form of vehicles, vehicle expenses, expense reimbursements and contra in respect of the Mercedes Benz vehicle. It is also unclear whether Mr. Nagel’s analysis has captured other possible components of the respondent’s income, as noted below.

[67] Nevertheless, I will consider Mr. Nagel’s evidence where and as appropriate.

Use of JCL Truck

[68] In respect of his employment relationship with J.C.L., it was eventually acknowledged that the respondent had the use of a vehicle, a benefit he had not earlier disclosed.

[69] In fact, the respondent signed the purchase agreement for the GMC Denali truck. The truck cost $76,539.60 after a discount of $11,030. The monthly payments were $1,065.05. It appears ownership was registered to JCL.

[70] The respondent did not disclose any portion of the cost of operating this truck as an employment benefit in any of his financial statements. The respondent did not provide any evidence of what it cost J.C.L. to insure this truck.

[71] Ms. Sciacca estimated that the cost of insuring the truck was at least $2,000 per year. She confirmed that the respondent had not asked her to provide this information. Ms. Sciacca also indicated that she could not estimate how much fuel the respondent used for personal reasons and was paid for by J.C.L. This was because J.C.L. has a diesel fuel tank at its yard and the respondent filled his truck from this tank frequently and whenever he wanted to, without paying for the fuel.

[72] The respondent admitted that he usually filled his truck’s diesel tank at J.C.L.’s pump and that he would occasionally use his J.C.L. credit card to buy fuel elsewhere. Therefore, the only evidence he could provide on what fuel he used was for fuel he purchased away from J.C.L. The respondent admitted he used the Denali truck to commute to and from his home to J.C.L.’s place of business in Etobicoke as often as 6 days per week.

[73] The applicant submits that adverse inferences must be drawn from the respondent’s evidentiary failures in relation to this issue. I agree, to the extent such inferences can be reasonably drawn from the available evidence.

[74] The applicant submits that one of the adverse inferences I should draw is that the truck was used at least 75% of the time for personal use, given the respondent’s failure to maintain logs to indicate how many kilometers he drove for work and how many kilometers he drove for personal use.

[75] The respondent testified that he used the truck 80% for business and 20% for personal use. I do accept the respondent’s evidence that there was a considerable amount of driving associated with his employment, including travel to Niagara Falls, Kingston and points between. I would nevertheless conclude that the business component of his use of the Denali truck was no greater than 50% by way of adverse inference.

[76] Ms. Sciacca testified as to the cost of the truck being approximately $1,000 per month to run. In addition, she testified the insurance was approximately $2,500 to $3,000 per year. Including gasoline and maintenance, the total cost of the truck was approximately $2,000 per month.

[77] Given a personal use component of 50%, for the period the respondent had the benefit of this vehicle, I would ascribe additional annual income to the respondent as follows: 50% x $2,000 x 12 months = $12,000 per year.

[78] No money was changing hands in respect of this vehicle. As a result, it is unlikely that this benefit was captured by the analyses of Mr. Nagel and Ms. Quinlan.

[79] This amount must be grossed up and attributed to the respondent for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 until September 21, 2019 when his employment with JCL ended.

Mercedes Benz motor vehicle

[80] Ms. Sciacca testified that in 2011 the respondent selected a Mercedes Benz GL550 motor vehicle for her to purchase. The bill of sale dated October 31, 2011 was signed by the respondent. The purchase price was $128,885.44. A deposit of $20,000 was provided at the time of delivery. The balance of $108,885.44 was financed over 5 years with payments of $1,594.27 per month.

[81] Ms. Sciacca testified that after approximately a year, it became clear that her children became motion-sick in the vehicle. The respondent agreed to purchase the vehicle from her. He was “paying” Ms. Sciacca $1,100 per month, set-off against his overtime work on behalf of J.C.L.

[82] According to the respondent’s evidence the vehicle was delivered to Ms. Sciacca in 2012 which means that it would have come into his possession and use in 2013 (a year later).

[83] Ms. Sciacca testified that ownership resided in her until early September 2019 when the respondent asked her, weeks before he quit his work with J.C.L., to transfer ownership to him and she did so.

[84] The respondent did not disclose any ownership interest in this vehicle in any of its financial statements filed in this proceeding. He says he did not do so as it was not in his name.

[85] I note that the respondent has not produced any evidence as to the beneficiary of the insurance pertaining to this vehicle.

[86] I also note the respondent’s perception, confirmed in his evidence, that without a document confirming ownership, he need not declare ownership of an asset.

[87] In the circumstances described in part above I find that the respondent was at all times material to this proceeding the beneficial owner of this vehicle. Commencing in 2013 he had the sole beneficial use of the vehicle. He was paying Ms. Sciacca for it by way of set-off against his income. I conclude it most likely he did not take formal ownership in an effort to conceal this asset from the applicant’s gaze and, ultimately, the court’s scrutiny.

[88] The applicant submits that the full amount of $128,944 paid for the Mercedes should be imputed as income to the respondent for the value of the vehicle and that this amount should be grossed up by 50% to calculate the pre-tax value of this benefit that should have been declared as income by the respondent (i.e. $128,944 x 1.5 = $193,416); therefore, it is submitted, the total value of this benefit was $193,416. The applicant proposes this amount be imputed to the respondent at the rate of $38,683 per year for the period 2014 to 2018.

[89] I am satisfied on the evidence that Ms. Sciacca was the intended initial owner of this vehicle. She had its use for a year. The applicant has not accommodated for this in her submission.

[90] The respondent submits that there should be an inclusion of $1,100 per month in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 in accordance with the testimony of Ms. Sciacca who testified that the respondent paid her the equivalent of $1,100 per month starting in 2013 for over 4 years in banked hours in exchange for the vehicle.

[91] I found Ms. Sciacca’s evidence for the most part to be credible and reliable, despite her long-term and close relationship with the respondent. She demonstrated a readiness to disclose information that was contrary to the interests of the respondent.

[92] The respondent was imprecise in his evidence as to when in 2013 he took possession of this vehicle. For all I know it was in December of 2013; thus, 4 years from December 2013 would consume virtually all of 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. Given that this was information that the respondent could have provided but did not, I draw an adverse inference that he received possession of the vehicle in December 2013.

[93] No money was changing hands in respect of this vehicle. As a result, it is unlikely that this benefit was captured by the analyses of Mr. Nagel and Ms. Quinlan.

[94] In my view the proper measure of the benefit to the respondent is $1,100 per month ($13,200/year) credited by Ms. Sciacca against the respondent’s obligation in respect of this vehicle for a period of 48 months from December 2013. The respondent was not taxed on these amounts and thus it is appropriate to gross-up.

Respondent’s Use of J.C.L. Credit Card

[95] The applicant submits that in determining the respondent’s income for support purposes an account must be made for the respondent’s use of a J.C.L. credit card during the term of his employment by J.C.L.

[96] The respondent concedes the point and would add $9,000 to his income in 2018 in respect of his personal use of the J.C.L. credit card. It is submitted on his behalf that there would be no other accounting in this regard.

[97] Responding to a subpoena from the applicant, Ms. Sciacca provided J.C.L. credit card statements for the period August 25, 2018 to August 26, 2019 (Exhibit 50). She testified these were all the statements for that credit card that she was able to locate and bring to court as evidence. There were no statements for this credit card for the period January 1, 2014 to August 25, 2018, a period during which the respondent had access to and the use of this card.

[98] Ms. Sciacca testified that she would have provided these records to the respondent if he had asked her to provide them at an earlier date, but he did not make that request. Indeed, she testified, as indicated above, that the respondent had specifically directed her not to provide the documents requested by his own solicitor and she responded by way of letter dated August 17, 2018 (referenced above and Exhibit 78).

[99] Regarding the practice with respect to processing the respondent’s use of this card, Ms. Sciacca indicated that she relied on the respondent to indicate what expenses were his personal expenses. She further testified that she did not question expenses for restaurant meals that the respondent claimed were business expenses.

[100] The Exhibit 50 credit card statements for the period August 23, 2018 to August 23, 2019 indicate a total of $72,508.27 was incurred by way of expenditures over those 12 months, for an average of $6,042 per month.

[101] Neither Ms. Sciacca nor the respondent gave careful or precise evidence as to calculation of the personal expenses incurred by the respondent on the J.C.L. credit card.

[102] It appears that the practice was for the respondent to identify which expenses were his and matters would be accounted for accordingly.

[103] Ms. Sciacca confirmed that the respondent’s expenses were indicated by “M.P.”, a check-mark or by being highlighted.

[104] The total personal expenditures by the respondent over the above 12-month period is $18,648, measured against total purchases of $62,008. The total personal expenditures represent 30% of the total purchases, averaging $1,554 per month.

[105] The respondent has not provided full disclosure of all his personal expenses in this regard. In fact, he has actively discouraged Ms. Sciacca from sharing that relevant information, even with his own counsel. I would draw the adverse inference that had he or Ms. Sciacca done so the information would not have been supportive of his position on this issue.

[106] I am also not satisfied, given the respondent’s evidentiary frailties outlined above, that the respondent could be trusted to identify all personal expenditures recorded in any of the J.C.L. credit card statements.

[107] Given the respondent’s shortcomings in evidence I would enhance the monthly average of $1,554 by 25% to $1,942 per month, or $23,304 per year (subject to gross-up for taxes).

[108] I would also in these circumstances treat this amount as indicative of the respondent’s JCL benefits that have not been accounted for the period January 1, 2014 to August 25, 2018, a period during which the respondent had access to and the use of this card, but for which the respondent has failed (or actively discouraged others) to provide evidence.

[109] As no money was changing hands in respect of this issue, it is unlikely that this benefit was captured by the analyses of Mr. Nagel and Ms. Quinlan.

[110] Therefore, for the period January 2014 through December 2018 I would add to the respondent’s income $23,304 per year (subject to gross-up) and $1942 per month for the period January 1, 2019 through August 31, 2019 for support purposes.

[111] For the incomplete month of September 2019, I would add the sum of 75% of the monthly amount of $1,942, or $1,456.

Cash Income

[112] The respondent testified that on average he earned cash income of approximately $1,200 per month. That equates with $14,400 per year, an amount that the respondent admits ought to be added to his income each year subject to gross up and accounting for an incomplete year in 2019 (with his employment at J.C.L. ending in mid-September).

[113] For the reasons indicated above, the respondent’s evidence regarding his cash income is simply not credible. He has deliberately withheld information from the applicant, his own expert and the court. He has directed others to withhold information as well. He has demonstrated a readiness to engage in cash transactions without leaving a banking footprint. This pattern of conduct does not create a foundation of credibility regarding his evidence on this issue.

[114] In his financial statement sworn September 9, 2017, the respondent put his cash income at $1,500 per month ($18,000/year). He has not explained the difference in his sworn evidence.

[115] I would draw the adverse inference that the respondent has understated his cash income by at least 40%; therefore, I would increase his estimate of $18,000 to $25,200 per year.

[116] However, I am not confident that all this income has escaped inclusion in the analyses of Mr. Nagel and Ms. Quinlan. To account for this, I would reduce the amount unaccounted for by 50% to $12,600 per year in the years where reliance is placed upon these analyses.

Natasha Hanley

[117] The evidence supports the conclusion that the respondent was income-splitting with Natasha Hanley.

[118] Ms. Hanley was paid a salary by J.C.L. for part of 2017, all of 2018 and part of 2019.

[119] Ms. Sciacca confirmed that she had never seen Ms. Hanley at the office despite Ms. Hanley’s designation as “office administrator”, a position given Ms. Hanley at the respondent’s request.

[120] The respondent testified that Ms. Hanley was “picking up cheques” from customers; however, Ms. Hanley was not called as a witness by the respondent to confirm this assertion. The respondent claimed that he did not know where she was. As noted above, I do not believe the respondent’s assertion in this regard.

[121] Laurie Sciacca, a long-time friend of the respondent and shareholder of J.C.L., testified that the respondent asked her to put his girlfriend Natasha Hanley on the payroll. She complied, describing her position as “Office Administrator”. Despite this designation, Ms. Hanley was never in the office. She understood that Ms. Hanley was picking up cheques from customers. Ms. Hanley was paid approximately $40,000 in this regard.

[122] Ms. Sciacca confirmed the following monies paid to Ms. Hanley by J.C.L:

(a) 2017 - $25,920

(b) 2018 - $40,597

[123] I would impute all the above income to the respondent in the above years in the amounts indicated. As it appears these monies were subject to taxes I would not gross-up.

Lifestyle

[124] There are many components of the respondent’s lifestyle that support the applicant’s submission that his actual income is significantly greater than that which he has been willing to concede. Some of the evidence is compelling, some less so.

[125] Such evidence includes the following:

a. Two residences:

i. It appears likely the respondent maintained two residences up to at least September 2017 (being Unit 3803, 225 Webb Drive, Mississauga and 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West, Springwater Township).

ii. The respondent gave evidence that he first moved into Webb Drive in 2011 but he maintained that he lived there until approximately mid-2015.

iii. In summer of 2015 the applicant and respondent reconciled for a period of months. At the same time, the respondent purchased 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West where the parties cohabited until November 2015.

iv. I accept the applicant’s evidence that the respondent continued his relationship with Ms. Hanley, most likely during the parties’ reconciliation given that although the respondent was frequently staying at the applicant’s home in Spring and early Summer of 2015, he was also staying elsewhere frequently. It is likely that he was staying at the Webb Drive property. Ms. Hanley moved into 28 Lloyd Cook with the respondent very soon after the parties finally separated in November of 2015.

b. Hanley property:

i. The respondent admitted in cross-examination that Ms. Hanley had purchased a property in Creemore, Ontario that was registered solely in her name.

ii. The respondent was asked how Ms. Hanley could afford to buy this property when she had no income and was allegedly collecting employment insurance benefits after J.C.L. had laid her off. The respondent claimed he did not know how she came up with the money to buy the property and maintained that he did not inquire. The respondent denied having provided funds to Ms. Hanley to finance this purchase.

iii. There is evidence to support the assertion that the respondent transferred significant monies to Ms. Hanley. Ms. Hanley’s redacted bank statements were produced by the respondent in an effort to prove that she was contributing to his household expenses (see Exhibit 49). This evidence suggests that Ms. Hanley was paying Enbridge gas bills for three different properties.

iv. I do not find this evidence particularly compelling.

c. Porsche:

i. A process server who attended the respondent’s property to serve him noted the presence in his garage of a Porsche automobile. The only evidence of ownership is that of the respondent himself who indicated that his brother Pedro was the owner and he was simply storing the vehicle for his brother.

ii. Despite the suspicious circumstances, I am not prepared to conclude that the Porsche automobile was necessarily owned by the respondent beneficially. Suspicion does not equate with proof on a balance of probabilities. I therefore do not consider this component of the evidence in determination of the respondent’s income.

d. Rolex watches:

i. The respondent claimed that he paid $5,000 for a Rolex Submariner watch. He says that the one that he bought for Ms. Hanley was a “fake” for which he paid $500.

ii. Even taking the respondent’s evidence at face value, which I struggle to do, an expenditure of $5,000 for a wrist watch is hardly the kind of transaction one would associate with a person of relatively modest means, claiming to struggle in meeting his financial obligations.

iii. I note that the respondent did not produce any evidence of the actual purchase cost of the watches.

iv. Despite some evidence that such a watch might be worth $12,000 to $49,000 Canadian, I am not prepared to make that finding on the evidence before me nor am I prepared to attribute any particular amount to the respondent by way of income in this regard. This evidence, while suggestive, is not sufficiently compelling.

e. Renovations:

i. The applicant submits that additional income should be imputed to the respondent because of the amounts he paid to purchase and/or renovate the property in Creemore that Natasha Hanley has registered in her name.

ii. I am not satisfied that any monies expended by the respondent in this regard have not already been accounted for.

f. Cane Corso dog:

i. The applicant submits that additional income should be imputed to the respondent because of the extravagant amounts paid for his Cane Corso dog and the monies he spent on this pet including $110 steaks as food for the dog and invisible fencing.

ii. Again, while this evidence is consistent with the lifestyle of someone with access to significant disposable income, I am not satisfied that any additional income need be added to the respondent in this regard.

g. Purchase of Lloyd Cook property:

i. When the respondent applied for a $700,000 mortgage to purchase 28 Lloyd Cook, he indicated he would be making a down payment of $175,000 toward the purchase price of $875,000. The respondent has not identified the source of that money.

ii. In the related mortgage application, the document references the respondent’s assets totalling $966,000, including a $300,000 drag racing car, a $115,000 Mercedes Benz and a restored 1968 Camaro worth $100,000. None of these vehicles was disclosed in any of the respondent’s financial statements.

iii. The respondent in his evidence indicated the information in the mortgage application did not originate with him and that it was not accurate. He maintained that the mortgage broker filled in the information. The respondent did not call the mortgage broker to explain this. I also note that the mortgage application has not been fully produced. No signature page has been disclosed by the respondent.

iv. I draw the adverse inference that had the respondent produced the entire mortgage application, it would not have been supportive of his position.

h. Racing hobby:

i. There was considerable evidence of the respondent’s historical involvement in drag racing, including travel, hotel accommodations, food and drink for his support team and so on.

ii. I am satisfied that this undertaking would necessarily involve significant expense.

iii. Otherwise, I do not take this evidence as indicative of anything in particular other than the likelihood that the respondent is significantly understating his income in his financial statements sworn in these proceedings and in his income tax returns, at least in the years to which this evidence relates.

[126] I do not propose to impute any additional income to the respondent on account of the lifestyle evidence summarized in part above. I will however consider this evidence in my overall analysis of the respondent’s income below.

Respondent’s 2014 Income

[127] It is necessary to establish findings as to the respondent’s income since July 26, 2013 in order to determine whether there has been a change in circumstances within the meaning of s. 14 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and s.17(4) of the Divorce Act. Such findings are also necessary to determine issues of child support entitlement.

[128] The following documentary evidence is available regarding the respondent’s 2014 income:

(a) 2014 Notice of Reassessment (Exhibit “69”) showing line 150 total income of $42,782;

(b) Statement of Business or Professional Activities (Exhibit “70”) for the period January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014, showing respondent as 100% owner of Five Star Protection, main product or service is “construction”, and gross sales $90,385 less GST/HST of $10,398.27 resulting in adjusted gross sales of $79,986.73. After deducting total business expenses of $38,025.98, net income before adjustments is stated to be $41,960.75.

[129] For the reasons noted above, I find these documents unreliable as confirmation of the respondent’s income in 2014.

[130] The applicant submits that the respondent’s income in 2014 should be calculated as follows:

(a) $601,088 from PTL;

(b) $90,385 from FSP;

(d) $38,683 contra for the Mercedes Benz;

(e) $108,762 from personal use of J.C.L. credit card

Total - $867,674

[131] The respondent submits that the respondent’s income should be treated as $308,628. This is calculated as follows:

(a) J.C.L. - $84,002;

(b) J.C.L. Truck - $24,000;

(d) Self employment income (net) from payors other than J.C.L. - $156,441;

(e) Cash income (subject to gross up) - $14,400

Total - $308,628 (after gross-up)

[132] Thus, the respondent concedes that his income must be enhanced to reflect benefits received in respect of the provision of the JCL truck and the Mercedes Benz.

[133] In calculating the $156,441 the respondent relies upon Exhibit 42, being a series of cheques from other payors.

[134] I note that while the respondent’s 2014 Notice of Reassessment was produced (showing gross business income of $79,986, net business income of $41,960 and line 150 total income of $42,782), the respondent failed to produce his complete personal income tax return.

[135] Exhibit 70 is the respondent’s statement of business or professional activities for 2014 in relation to FSP. This document is the source of the figures for the respondent’s reported gross business income and net business income. He deducted $38,025 from his gross profit. He has not provided any proof of the expenses.

[136] The applicant references FSP’s statement of business income for 2014 (Exhibit 70) and the statement therein of gross sales in the amount of $90,385 before deduction of HST of $10,398. The sum of $90,385 is combined by the applicant with the PTL balance sheet for 2014 gross profit of $601,088 for a total of $691,473.

[137] In making this submission, the applicant does not account for any of the claimed expenses of $581,051 in 2014 in respect of PTL. These expenses include $189,076 for “subcontractors” and $336,003 for “vehicle expense”.

[138] As a result of the significant shortcomings in the respondent’s evidence regarding his income, the applicant engaged the assistance of Lori Quinlan, a bookkeeper, to assist in interpreting the respondent’s disclosure. She was qualified as an expert in bookkeeping, tax preparation, identifying whether expenses claimed are proper business or personal expenses and in calculation of the gross-up on income. She was not qualified to express an opinion as to the respondent’s income.

[139] One of the frailties associated with Ms. Quinlan’s evidence is the possibility of “double counting”. In cross-examination she fairly conceded that she had not made adjustments for possible double counting (for example, monies being deposited into one account, being withdrawn and deposited into another account).

[140] Ms. Quinlan was unable to provide evidence as to what amounts might have been unaccounted for by the respondent for 2014 largely due to incomplete disclosure from the respondent.

[141] The respondent’s 2014 total operating expenses were $581,051 measured against gross profit of $601,088 or 96%. The applicant would have me ignore all of these expenses. Certainly, the respondent has failed in his duty to explain and prove these expenses. He has not provided complete disclosure to anyone regarding his 2014 income. But I cannot escape the reality that, despite his disclosure failures, businesses incur expenses to generate income.

[142] Drawing an inference against the interests of the respondent, I find that his expenses were no more than 60% of his gross profit (that is, $360,652) resulting in net income of $240,435 from PTL.

[143] Regarding his FSP income I would apply the same approach, for the same reasons. The expenses he has claimed amount to $38,025, 60% of which is $22,815. His gross sales through FSP in 2014 totalled $90,385. I would not deduct HST of $10,398 as the evidence does not support a conclusion that the respondent has ever made any remittances in this regard.

[144] Therefore, $90,385 less $22,815 is $67,570 from FSP.

[145] For 2014 I would add additional monies as above in respect of the truck provided by J.C.L., the Mercedes Benz and the cash income ($25,200 as above given no reliance upon source and use of funds analyses), plus use of the JCL credit card.

[146] Therefore, I calculate total income in 2014 as follows:

(a) PTL $240,435

(b) FSP $67,570

(d) Mercedes Benz $13,200 (subject to gross-up)

(e) Use of JCL credit card $23,304 (subject to gross-up)

(f) Cash $25,200 (subject to gross up)

Total: $454,037 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate)

Respondent’s 2015 Income

[147] The following documentary evidence is available with respect to the respondent’s 2015 income:

(a) 2015 Notice of Assessment (Exhibit “66”) showing line 150 total income of $44,490;

(b) Statement of Business or Professional Activities for business name Five Star Protection, showing respondent as 100% owner, main product or service “construction”, for the period January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015, gross sales of $92,868.50, less GST/HST of $10,683.99, resulting in adjusted gross sales of $82,184.51. After deducting total business expenses of $37,750, net income stated to be $44,434.51;

[148] For the reasons noted above I find this documentary evidence unreliable in confirming the respondent’s income in 2015.

[149] At page 40 of her written submissions, the applicant submits that the respondent’s income is at least $655,663 calculated as follows:

(a) PTL $285,983

(b) FSP $92,868

(d) Cash for real estate purchase $20,610

(e) Personal use of JCL truck $28,756

(f) Contra for Mercedes Benz $38,683

(g) Contra for personal purchases on J.C.L. credit card $108,762

Total: $655,663

[150] At paragraph 192 of her submissions the applicant asks that $183,236.04 (grossed-up to $274,854.06) be imputed to the respondent’s income. This is the total sum apparently emanating from the respondent’s resources in relation to the purchase of the Lloyd Cook property (confusingly, this sum is not added to the calculation of the $655,663 above). When combined with Ms. Quinlan calculation of the respondent’s total spending in 2015 (grossed-up to $831,000 by Ms. Quinlan), the applicant arrives at the figure $1,105,854.06, before accounting for the contra amounts.

[151] The respondent submits that his total income for support purposes in 2015 was $287,503 calculated as follows:

(a) J.C.L. $111,814;

(b) J.C.L. truck $24,000;

(d) Self employment income (net) (cheques from other payors, see

Exhibit 42) $107,502;

(e) Cash income (subject to gross up) $14,440

Total - $287,503 (after gross-up)

[152] The respondent’s 2015 assessment (Exhibit 66) shows gross business income of $82,184, net business income of $43,068 and line 150 total income of $44,490.

[153] Exhibit 68 is the respondent’s statement of business or professional activities in respect of FSP for the 2015 income tax year. It shows gross sales of $92,868, GST/HST of $10,683 resulting in adjusted gross sales of $82,184. From that he deducted $37,750 in expenses resulting in net income of $44,434.

[154] For the reasons outlined above regarding 2014, I would again allow 60% of the expenses claimed and deduct none of the HST. Doing so results in net income of $70,218 in relation to FSP.

[155] The PTL balance sheet at April 30, 2015 shows total sales revenue of $285,983 against total expenses of $297,150 (including “subcontractors” of $87,148 and “vehicle expense” of $159,743).

[156] Again, I would allow 60% of the claimed expenses in the amount of $178,290 resulting in net income of $107,693 in relation to PTL.

[157] Ms. Quinlan calculated that the respondent spent $422,869 in 2015 equating, after gross-up, to $831,000 in before-tax income (see Exhibit 47). I’ve already noted some frailties in this evidence given the possibility of double-counting. I also note her calculation for this year is dramatically higher than in all the other years for which she has prepared calculations ($193,590 in 2016, $167,917 in 2017, $127,565 in 2018 and $228,801 in 2019, all before gross-up). Her calculation in 2015 appears to be an outlier. I find it unreliable.

[158] I am not satisfied that the $80,000 received by the respondent in 2015 from JCLII should be imputed to him as income. It appears he provided funds by way of investment and the payment evidenced by Exhibit 3 was a return of the investment.

[159] As noted above, the respondent provided funds to Ms. McGoldrick in association with the purchase of the 28 Lloyd Cook property totalling $183,236.04; however, I am not satisfied that these monies did not derive from monies that will otherwise be accounted for in my calculation below, or from assets on hand that may not have been fully disclosed. While I appreciate the respondent bears the burden of full disclosure and he has clearly not discharged his burden diligently, any adverse inferences I draw therefrom must nevertheless be reasonably rooted in the available evidence. The applicant’s submission in this regard requires elements of speculation and such is not the correct foundation for an adverse inference.

[160] I would therefore calculate the respondent’s 2015 income as follows:

(a) PTL $107,693

(b) FSP $70,218

(d) Personal use of J.C.L. truck (subject to gross-up) $12,000

(e) Mercedes Benz (subject to gross-up) $13,200

(f) Personal us of J.C.L card (subject to gross-up) $23,304

(g) Cash (subject to gross-up) $25,200

Total: $322,940 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate program)

Respondent’s 2016 income

[161] The applicant submits that the respondent’s income in 2016 was $516,199; however, the calculation set out in her submissions comes to $462,184, calculated as follows:

(a) PTL (see Exhibit 47) $285,983

(b) Personal use of JCL truck $28,756

(d) Personal use of JCL credit card $108,762

Total - $462,184 before gross-up

[162] The respondent submits that his income in 2016 was $211,126 calculated as follows:

a. JCL $115,634

b. JCL truck $24,000

c. Mercedes Benz $13,200

d. Self-employment income $30,328

e. Cash $14,400

Total - $211,126 after gross-up

[163] Exhibit 47 is Ms. Quinlan’s summary of yearly spending and financial statements. She calculated $193,590 in spending, which she grossed-up to $340,000. I repeat my concern that there may be double-counting.

[164] Mr. Nagel did have some observations regarding the respondent’s income in 2016 that are instructive, short of his withdrawn opinion as to the respondent’s income in 2016.

[165] Mr. Nagel is of the view, as a result of undisclosed components of the respondent’s income, that his formulated opinion as to the respondent’s income in 2016 ($126,000) would be understated. Therefore, Mr. Nagel’s conclusions may be viewed as a “floor” in determining the respondent’s income in 2016.

[166] Even the respondent is submitting an income well in excess of this “floor”.

[167] Importantly with respect to Mr. Nagel’s analysis is that he was confident that there was no double-counting.

[168] Mr. Nagel concluded that in 2016 a total of $196,576 was spent by the respondent, compared with $176,234 going in to his accounts (see Exhibit 100). In coming to this conclusion, he was only accounting for two sources, being Five Star and Pereira Trucking. He did not account for cash income, personal use of vehicles, personal expenses being covered, and so on. Mr. Nagel did not offer an opinion on how much this figure should be grossed up to calculate the pre-tax dollar value.

[169] I find it fair and reasonable to use Mr. Nagel’s figure of $196,576 as the less imperfect measure of the respondent’s income from FSP and PTL.

[170] This figure must however be supplemented with additional sums as below to address income not accounted for by Mr. Nagel. As I am relying upon Mr. Nagel’s analysis, I will impute an additional $12,600 for cash income for the reasons set out above.

[171] Therefore, I would calculate the respondent’s 2016 income as follows:

(a) PTL and FSP income (subject to gross-up) $196,576

(b) Personal use of J.C.L. truck (subject to gross-up) $12,000

(d) Use of J.C.L. card (subject to gross-up) $23,304

(e) Cash income (subject to gross-up) $12,600

Total: $478,562 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate)

Respondent’s 2017 Income

[172] The applicant submits that the respondent’s income in 2017 for support purposes is $487,121 calculated as follows:

(a) “Nagel number grossed-up by 50%” $285,000

(b) JCL monies paid to Natasha Hanley $25,920

(d) Mercedes Benz $38,683

(e) Use of JCL card $108,762

Total - $487,121

[173] The respondent submits that his income in 2017 was $166,671 calculated as follows:

(a) JCL $115,981

(b) Use of JCL truck (subject to gross-up) $24,000

(d) No self employment income cheques from other payors

(e) Cash income (subject to gross up) $14,400

Total - $166,671 after DivorceMate gross-up

[174] In his analysis Mr. Nagel concluded that in 2017 the respondent made total expenditures of funds out of his accounts in the amount of $157,545, measured against total funds in of $157,421.70 for a shortfall of $124.19. The “Nagel number” referenced above is presumably the figure of $157,545. Grossed-up by 50% the figure increases to $236,317. It appears to be an error in the applicant’s submissions calculated above to have used the figure of $285,000 in this regard.

[175] Mr. Nagel did not attempt to gross up his number.

[176] Ms. Quinlan found the higher number of $167,917, which she grossed up to $285,000 utilizing an online payroll deduction calculator.

[177] There is rightly some inherent scepticism associated with online calculators where I am left in the dark as to the precise calculations undertaken by an unfamiliar and untested program; accordingly, I ascribe reduced weight to Ms. Quinlan’s opinion in this regard.

[178] I prefer to use Mr. Nagel’s starting pre gross-up figure of $157,545 as Mr. Nagel’s analysis was less susceptible to double-counting when compared to Ms. Quinlan’s analysis. This figure can be grossed-up by the DivorceMate program, a tried and trusted family law tool.

[179] As to Ms. Hanley’s JCL income in 2017 ($25,920), I would attribute all to the respondent as it appears to have been an income-splitting scheme. The respondent did not produce Ms. Hanley as a witness. I do not accept his assertions that he does not know where she is.

[180] For the reasons set out above, I would again add $12,600 for cash income as I am not confident that the respondent deposited this income such that a banking footprint would be left. Thus, it is not likely to have been captured by the Nagel calculation.

[181] I would therefore calculate the respondent’s income in 2017 as follows:

(a) Nagle figure (subject to gross-up) $157,545

(a) J.C.L. monies to Natasha Hanley $25,920

(b) Use of J.C.L. truck (subject to gross-up) $12,000

(d) Use of JCL card (subject to gross-up) $23,304

(e) Cash (subject to gross-up) $12,600

Total: $442,337 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate)

Respondent’s 2018 Income

[182] The applicant submits that the respondent’s income for support purposes in 2018 is $415,798 calculated as follows:

(a) Quinlan calculation (see Exhibit 47) $199,000

(b) J.C.L. monies to Natasha Hanley (see Exhibit 24) $40,597

(d) Mercedes Benz (subject to gross-up) $38,683

(e) Use of J.C.L. card (subject to gross-up) $108,762

Total - $415,798

[183] The respondent submits that his income for support purposes in 2018 is $196,180, calculated as follows:

a. JCL $107,821

b. JCL III $27,685

c. Use of JCL truck (subject to gross-up) $24,000

d. Use of JCL credit card (subject to gross-up) $9,000

e. Cash (subject to gross-up) $14,400

Total after gross-up $196,180

[184] In 2018 there is no opinion or analysis by Mr. Nagel. In the absence of this evidence, the evidence of Ms. Quinlan is deserving of relatively greater weight, particularly when weighed against the respondent’s evidence.

[185] Ms. Quinlan calculated expenditures of $127,565 which she grossed up to $199,000. I would use the figure of $127,565 less 10% (that is, $114,808) due to some frailties in her evidence with respect to the possibility of double counting. As before, I prefer to have the DivorceMate program calculate the gross-up.

[186] For the reasons noted above, I would impute the salary paid by J.C.L to Ms. Hanley entirely to the respondent.

[187] As before, additional income for use of the JCL truck and credit card must be accounted for.

[188] The Mercedes Benz is no longer a component after 2017.

[189] Cash income needs to be accounted for, as before.

[190] I would therefore calculate the respondent’s 2018 income as follows:

(a) Quinlan figure less 10% (subject to gross-up) $114,808

(b) JCL monies paid to Natasha Hanley $40,597

(d) Use of J.C.L. credit card (subject to gross-up) $23,304

(e) Cash income (subject to gross-up) $12,600

Total: $345,848 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate)

Respondent’s 2019 Income

[191] The applicant submits that the respondent’s income in 2019 is $571,895 calculated as follows:

(a) Quinlan calculation (Exhibit 47) $390,000

(b) Premier/Orangeville salary, 14.5 weeks $50,199

(d) Use of J.C.L. truck for nine months $21,567

(e) Use of J.C.L. card for nine months $81,572

(f) Cash admitted in May 6, 2019 Financial Statement $14,400

(g) J.C.L monies paid to Natasha Hanley $3,024

Total $571,895

[192] The respondent submits that his income in 2019 is $141,541 calculated as follows:

(a) JCL $49,416

(b) Use of JCL truck (subject to gross-up) $18,000

(d) Use of Ram truck for 4 mos (subject to gross-up) $6,580

(e) Cash income for 9 months with J.C.L (subject to gross-up) $10,800

Total before gross-up $141,541.

[193] Again, there is no calculation by Mr. Nagel with respect to 2019.

[194] Ms. Quinlan determined that the respondent spent at least $228,801 in 2019. She grossed this sum up to the pre-tax equivalent of $390,000. I prefer to use the figure $228,801 less 10% (that is, $205,920) to reflect the possibility of double-counting. As before, I will use the DivorceMate program to determine the grossed-up value of this figure.

[195] The respondent changed jobs effective September 23, 2019. He began receiving a salary of $180,000 per year starting that day (i.e. $3,462 per week). As there are 14.5 weeks from September 23, 2019 to December 31, 2019, there is income of $50,199 attributable to this time frame (i.e. 14.5 x $3,462 = $50,199). However, I am not convinced this amount has not been captured in Ms. Quinlan’s calculation. I will therefore not include it.

[196] The respondent had the use of the J.C.L truck up to September 21, 2019 when he quit his job at J.C.L. I would impute to him 72% of the full annual value of $12,000 applied in previous years. That amounts to $8,640.

[197] PCP has also provided a truck to the respondent for his use.

[198] Mr. Duiker gave evidence that the respondent was provided an employment benefit of the use of a new 2019 Ram 2500 Laramie diesel pickup truck that cost $98,736 to purchase (bill of sale is Exhibit 44). The monthly payments in Exhibit 44 are $1,645 per month.

[199] Mr. Duiker also testified that the cost of the truck insurance and other costs of operating the vehicle including fuel are not paid by the respondent.

[200] Full disclosure of the value of this benefit was not provided by the respondent.

[201] I am satisfied that the respondent uses the vehicle for both personal and work purposes. He has not provided evidence of log entries to assist in calculating personal versus business use in this regard.

[202] The applicant submits that the full monthly costs should be fixed at two times the cost of the monthly finance payments of $1,645, or $3,290, at least 75% of which should be considered the personal use portion. The only evidence I have relating to the cost of insuring such a vehicle is that of Ms. Sciacca regarding the JCL truck. She put the expense at $2,500 to $3,000 per year. I would set the cost at $2,750/year (or $229/month) accordingly, absent better proof from the respondent.

[203] Thus, the total cost is $1,645 + $229 = $1,874/month.

[204] As above for the previous vehicle, I would attribute 50% to personal use.

[205] The benefit to the respondent is therefore 50% of $1,874 or $937/month. This amounts to $11,244 per year.

[206] It is appropriate that the respondent be attributed the benefit of the use of the J.C.L. credit card for nine months. I have no evidence of a similar contra arrangement with the respondent’s current employer.

[207] An additional amount should be added for cash income. Given the respondent’s evidentiary failings and demonstrated readiness to withhold full disclosure and actively deceive the applicant and the court, I would conclude he likely still has a cash income component that remains undisclosed and undeclared. He has demonstrated through his inaccurate financial statements that his sworn evidence cannot be trusted. Therefore, when he testified that he does not have any cash income after September 21, 2019, I do not believe him.

[208] Therefore, I would calculate the respondent’s income in 2019 as follows:

(a) Quinlan calculation (subject to gross-up) $205,920

(b) Premiere/Orangeville salary, 14.5 weeks ($50,199) nil

(d) Use of J.C.L. truck for nine months $8,640

(e) Use of J.C.L. card until Sept. 21, 2019 (72% of $23,304) $16,779

(f) Cash (subject to gross-up) $12,600

(g) J.C.L. monies paid to Natasha Hanley in 2019 $3,024

Total: $457,631 after gross-up (calculated with DivorceMate)

Conclusion re Respondent’s Income

[209] I would therefore summarize my findings as to the respondent’s income for the period 2014 to 2019 as follows:

(a) 2014 $454,037

(b) 2015 $322,940

(d) 2017 $442,337

(e) 2018 $345,848

(f) 2019 $457,631

[210] For the period after commencing his new employment in September 2019, I would impute the same rate of income as before. In his evidence he said he changed jobs to PCP because he “wanted a T4 job”. He says his income is now $180,000 per year. He has not satisfactorily explained why he would leave an employment/self-employment arrangement that was generating a very generous income, in favour of one generating much reduced income.

[211] Where the court is of the opinion that the determination of income under s.16 of the CSG would not be the fairest determination of that income, s.17 permits me to have regard to the respondent’s income over the prior 3 years to determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of non-recurring amounts.

[212] The findings above result in sometimes dramatically fluctuating incomes from year to year. I find it fair and reasonable to soften the impact of these fluctuations by using average figures. I will not use the income figure found in the 2013 order as I am not satisfied it was a fair reflection of the respondent’s income, particularly when compared to the income findings in the years thereafter.

[213] Therefore, I will use the following figures for the respondent’s income for purposes of calculating child support:

a. 2014 $454,037 (unchanged from above)

b. 2015 $388,488 (average of $454,037 and $322,940)

c. 2016 $418,513 (average of $454,037, $322,940 and $478,562)

d. 2017 $414,613 (average of $322,940, $478,562 and $442,337)

e. 2018 $422,249 (average of $478,562, $442,337 and $345,848)

f. 2019 $415,272 (average of $442,337, $345,848 and $457,631)

g. 2020 $415,272 (same as 2019)

[214] I am attaching to these Reasons as a Schedule a series of SupportMate calculations to assist the reader in understanding how I arrived at the income figures referenced above.

Applicant’s Income for Support Purposes

[215] The applicant submits that her income history is uncomplicated and straightforward. She relies upon her line 150 total income in the following income tax years as follows:

(a) 2014 - $33,086

(b) 2015 - $33,359

(d) 2017 - $30,409

(e) 2018 - $37,988

[216] The respondent’s written submissions do not directly address the issue of the applicant’s income; however, in the applicant’s DivorceMate calculations he references the following incomes for the applicant in the following years:

(a) 2014 - $33,086

(b) 2015 - $33,359

(d) 2017 - $22,355

(e) 2018 - $22,355

(f) 2019 - $37,388

[217] It is unclear to me whether it was an error on the part of the respondent to submit that in 2017 and 2018 the applicant’s income was in both cases identical to her income in 2016. I am proceeding on the assumption that this was an error and I will be utilizing the incomes submitted by the applicant for these years.

[218] The parties are agreed regarding the applicant’s income in 2014, 2015 and 2016.

[219] The applicant has not submitted her Income Tax Return for 2019, and indeed she was not required to have done so by the close of evidence.

[220] For 2019, the applicant testified that she changed jobs as of July 2, 2019 when she started working at Royal Victoria Hospital in Barrie after she left her employment at Victoria Village Nursing Home (see Exhibit 16). Exhibit 16 is a paystub which indicates that between July 2, 2019 and November 10, 2019 the applicant had gross earnings of $22,102, based upon an hourly wage of $23.50 per hour.

[221] The applicant provided further evidence of her income in 2019 in the form of her Record of Employment from Victoria Village (attached to her Financial Statement, Exhibit 15). The Record of Employment confirms that from January 2019 until July 3, 2019 she earned $21,816 from Victoria Village.

[222] Exhibit 16 also showed that from her total gross earnings to that date of $23,102 the applicant was required to pay union dues and other before tax deductions of $1,286. In his submissions the respondent did not take issue with this and I therefore accept that this deduction must be accounted for in determining the applicant’s income for support purposes.

[223] The period from July 2, 2019 to November 10, 2019 is 131 days, thus, over that span of time the applicant earned at a rate of approximately $176 per day (i.e. $23,102 / 131 = $176).

[224] Over the same period, the applicant had deductions of $9.81 per day ($1,286 / 131).

[225] Thus, the applicant averaged $166 per day (i.e. $176 - $9.81).

[226] The balance of 2019 represents 51 days. At an average of $166 per day, this results in an additional $8,466 in income attributable to the applicant in 2019.

[227] I would therefore calculate the applicant’s income in 2019 as follows:

$21,816 + $23,102 - $1,286 + $8,466 = $52,098

[228] Averaging $166 per day over the course of a year extrapolates to $60,590.

[229] I would therefore make the following findings regarding the applicant’s income for support purposes:

(a) 2014 - $33,086

(b) 2015 - $33,359

(d) 2017 - $30,409

(e) 2018 - $37,988

(f) 2019 – $52,098

(g) 2020 - $60,590

Care and Control History

[230] The July 26, 2013 order was predicated upon the children residing primarily with the applicant mother.

[231] On November 26, 2018 the court ordered on a final basis that commencing January 4, 2019 all four children would commence residence with the parties on an alternating weekly basis, subject to the issue of parenting time regarding Cruz would be an issue for trial.

[232] On May 7, 2019, based upon Minutes of Settlement dated April 15, 2019, the court ordered on a final basis that starting April 12, 2019 and every alternate week thereafter, Cruz would have access with the respondent father from Friday evenings to Tuesday evenings after school until May 24, 2019, after which his access would “transition to parenting time with each parent mirroring that of his sisters Deanna, Claudia and Taylor.”

[233] In calculating retroactive support and support arrears, the applicant submits that support be fixed based upon all four children residing primarily with the applicant up to January 1, 2019 when the three teenaged daughters of the parties began living with the parties on an equally shared basis, with the child Cruz continuing to live primarily with the applicant until May 2019 when he began a week-about schedule.

[234] The applicant also askes that the eldest child Deanna be treated as continuing dependency upon the parties even though she turned 18 in April 2019 and she is currently only attending secondary school part-time.

[235] There was no dispute between the parties that Deanna needs to improve some of her grades so that she may successfully gain admission to a post-secondary school in the Fall of 2020.

[236] The respondent admitted at trial that he knew that Deanna had poor grades in some of her subjects when she graduated from high school and that she has a learning disability.

[237] The respondent was asked in cross-examination whether he was prepared to support Deanna in her effort to gain admission to a post-secondary school and he responded, “We’ll see”.

[238] The respondent admitted that Deanna stopped living with him approximately one month after January 1, 2019 and that by February 1, 2019 she was living full-time with the applicant mother again and was no longer attending the respondent’s house to stay overnight except occasionally.

[239] The applicant submits that Deanna should be supported by the respondent at least until the end of Summer 2020 so that she can upgrade her high school grades and that the support should continue if Deanna is admitted to attend a post-secondary educational institution in September 2020.

[240] The respondent submits that three of the children started a week-about care and control schedule on January 4, 2019 and that all four children were on the week-about schedule as of May 24, 2019; however, the respondent made no submissions in respect of the change in Deanna’s parenting schedule.

[241] The applicant’s submissions are consistent with the evidence before me and accordingly I would make the following findings in this regard (dates rounded to nearest month for ease of accounting):

(a) Until January 1, 2019 the children resided primarily with the applicant mother;

(b) For the period January 1, 2019 to January 31, 2019, the three oldest children resided with the parties on an equally shared basis and Cruz resided primarily with the applicant mother;

(c) For the period February 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019, Deanna and Cruz were residing primarily with the applicant while Claudia and Taylor resided equally with the parties;

(d) Commencing June 1, 2019 Claudia, Taylor and Cruz have resided equally with the parties and Deanna has resided primarily with the applicant.

Has There Been a Change in Circumstances?

[242] Upon review of the forgoing, there have been several obvious changes in circumstances, both in respect of care and control of the children and in respect of the parties’ respective incomes. Indeed, the respondent, in his submissions, concedes there have been changes in circumstances regarding the parties’ respective incomes (going forward at least) and regarding the care and control of the children.

[243] Given my income findings for the respondent there can be no avoiding the conclusion that there have been changes in circumstances commencing 2014 that would justify examination of child support change.

[244] I have no hesitation in concluding that there have been changes in circumstances, within the meaning of s.17(4) of the Divorce Act and s.14 of the CSG, that justify considering changes to the order of July 26, 2013.

For Whom is Child Support Payable?

[245] The respondent has raised in his evidence and his submissions an issue regarding whether child support is payable for Deanna.

[246] The order provides at paragraph II(c):

Upon Deanna turning 18 years old, the respondent father’s support obligation shall decrease by $750 per month. Upon each child turning 18 thereafter the respondent’s support obligation shall decrease by $750 per month, for example by Claudia’s 18th birthday the respondent father’s support obligation will be reduced to $1,500 per month. The respondent father shall continue to pay basic and add-on child support for the children that remain dependents of the parties based upon his then current income.

[247] The respondent submits that the applicant has not asked for a change to this provision of the order and that there is no child support payable for Deanna after April 4, 2019 when she turned 18. He reduced his payments accordingly in April 2019.

[248] The applicant submits Deanna remains dependent and child support should continue.

[249] The applicant’s Motion to Change does not specifically state she is seeking a change to paragraph II(c) of the order.

[250] Under the Divorce Act parents are liable to support “children of the marriage”.

[251] A “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act is one who is under the age of majority, or, if the age of majority or over, under the charge of their parents but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life.

[252] Under the CSG, where a child is the age of majority or over, the amount of child support is the amount payable for a child under the age of majority or, if the court considers that approach inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each parent to contribute to the support of the child.

[253] The evidence confirms that while Deanna’s school attendance has not been consistent, she is coping with a learning disability which obviously influences her ability to focus on academic pursuits. In any event, it is clear that Deanna is not in a financial position to support herself or, in the words of the Divorce Act, to withdraw from parental control. I find that she remains dependent upon the parties and is unable to withdraw from parental control.

[254] Paragraph II(c) of the order creates some confusion. It appears to require a reduction of support for any child merely upon attaining the age of 18 years, regardless of whether they still qualify as a “child of the marriage”. The order goes on however to require that “basic and add-on” support continue for “dependent” children (by “basic” I am presuming the intention to refer to base support determined pursuant to s.3 of the CSG, and by “add-on” I am presuming the intention to refer to special and extraordinary expenses under s.7 of the CSG).

[255] Thus, a child such as Deanna, who is the age of majority and unable to withdraw from parental control, is both disentitled and entitled to support under paragraph II(c) of the order. It is difficult to imagine that it was the intention of the parties, or the court, to have created an internally contradictory provision such as this.

[256] It is trite to say that child support is the right of the child.

[257] In these circumstances I would not give such effect to the order as would result in termination of support for a child who remains a “child of the marriage”.

[258] I therefore conclude that support for Deanna should continue after April 4, 2019 when she turned 18, and that she remains a “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act. I find no basis to conclude that the amount payable under s.3 of the CSG is inappropriate in respect of Deanna.

Section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines

[259] Given the varying degrees of shared parenting since January 2019, consideration of an analysis pursuant to the principles enunciated in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63, [2005] S.C.J. No. 65 (S.C.C.)) is required.

[260] The s.9 factors to be considered are:

a. Amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses (s.9(a));

b. Increased costs of shared custody arrangements (s.9(b)); and,

c. The condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought (s.9(c)).

[261] The following principles emerge from Contino in relation to a s.9 analysis:

a. Section 9(a) requires the court to consider the parties’ respective financial situations. It does not include a conclusive formula. A simple set-off of amounts payable by the parties per the Tables can be a starting point for a s.9 analysis.

b. Section 9(b) recognizes that the total cost of raising children in shared custodial situations may be greater that sole custodial situations. So, all the payor’s costs should be considered. This means the court will examine the budgets and actual expenditures of both parents in addressing the needs of the children to determine whether shared custody has resulted in global increased costs.

c. Section 9(c) vests in the court a broad discretion for conducting an analysis of the resources and needs of the parties and the children. The analysis is to remain contextual and focused on the facts of each case. Considerations include the actual spending pattern of the parties, the ability of each parent to bear increased costs and the standard of living for the children in each household.

[262] The simple set-off component of this analysis is summarized in the DivorceMate calculations attached to these Reasons.

[263] The applicant’s evidence touched upon the subject of increased costs associated with shared custody, but it was vague and imprecise. The respondent referred to Exhibit 92, being a comparison of his “variable” and “non-variable” expenses both before and after shared parenting began. As I indicated above, in the absence of corroborating evidence I treat the respondent’s evidence with considerable caution; as a result, I attach little weight to the respondent’s evidence in this regard.

[264] The respondent’s evidence did not support a conclusion that his expenses had significantly increased due to the increased time caring for the children, as opposed to other factors.

[265] In submissions the respondent does not identify a clear position as to what I should do with his evidence on increased expenses, beyond considering it in rejection of the applicant’s claim for child support in excess of $2,637 per month.

[266] Overall, I found the evidence too vague and imprecise to permit a meaningful s.9 analysis.

[267] As a result, I would approach calculation of child support on a simple set-off basis.

Child Support Potentially Payable

[268] There are four timeframes to consider regarding payment of child support under the CSG. They are:

a. August 1, 2014 (date of applicant’s claim for retroactivity) to December 31, 2018, during which all four children resided primarily with the applicant;

b. January 1, 2019 to January 31, 2019 during which the three oldest children resided equally with the parties while Cruz resided primarily with the applicant;

c. February 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019 during which Deanna and Cruz resided primarily with the applicant while Claudia and Taylor resided equally with the parties; and,

d. June 1, 2019 and ongoing, during which Deanna has resided primarily with the applicant while the remaining children have resided equally with the parties.

[269] I intend to refer to DivorceMate calculations based upon the income and care and control findings made above, for these four timeframes.

[270] The attached DivorceMate calculations indicate child support payable by the respondent on the incomes found above pursuant to s.3 of the CSG as follows:

a. August 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014 $8,514/month

b. January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015 $7,347/month

c. January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016 $7,882/month

d. January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017 $7,864/month

e. January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 $7,999/month

f. January 1, 2019 to January 31, 2019 $6,855/month

g. February 1, 2019 to May 31, 2019 $7,085/month

h. June 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019 $6,855/month

i. January 1, 2020 through June 30, 2020 $6,671/month

[271] As the respondent’s income is greater than $150,000, I must consider s.4 of the CSG.

[272] Section 4 directs determination of the amount payable pursuant to s.3 unless the court finds the amount so determined to be “inappropriate”.

[273] The word “inappropriate” is broadly defined to mean “unsuitable” rather than simply “inadequate”. There is a presumption in favour of the Table amounts, but courts do have discretion to both increase and reduce the amount of child support prescribed by the Tables in cases where the payor’s annual income exceeds $150,000. The objectives of predictability, consistency and efficiency must be balanced against those of fairness, flexibility and recognition of the actual “condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the children”. Courts have the discretion to remedy situations where Table amounts are so in excess of the children’s reasonable needs as to no longer qualify as child support. The sheer size of a Table amount does not render it prima facie inappropriate; however, a party seeking a deviation from the Table amounts must rely upon clear and compelling evidence for departure from the Table figures (see Francis v. Baker, 1999 659 (SCC), [1999] S.C.J. No. 52 (S.C.C.)).

[274] A family’s lifestyle and pattern of expenditure are relevant and important considerations in determining appropriateness under s.4. They will be relevant both in determining whether the Table amount is inappropriate and, if so, what amount is appropriate having regard to the children’s condition and needs (see R. v. R., 2002 41875 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 1095 ONCA).

[275] The parties have not referred to s.4 of the CSG in their submissions. I therefore presume there is no dispute that child support should be determined pursuant to s.3 and that it is not inappropriate to do so.

[276] Had the parties made submissions on this issue, I would not have concluded it was inappropriate to calculate child support under s.3 (subject to s.16), given the presumption in favour of so calculating support, and the absence of compelling evidence that doing so was unsuitable.

Should the Applicant be Limited to Child Support Based on Respondent’s Income of $250,000?

[277] In her Motion to Change the applicant seeks to impute income of $250,000 to the respondent.

[278] As noted above the applicant urges findings well in excess of the $250,000 claimed. She argues that the respondent has deceived her as to his real level of income and has provided late and incomplete disclosure. He should not be able to benefit from his misdeeds, she says.

[279] In his submissions the respondent asks me to find income in 2014 and 2015 in excess of $250,000 (that is, $308,628 and $287,503 respectively). In all remaining years he submits income levels lower than $250,000.

[280] The respondent has not attended diligently to his disclosure obligations. He did not provide annual disclosure following the order. The disclosure he eventually provided was incomplete and inaccurate. He encouraged a third party to withhold relevant information. He concealed his ownership of assets in the names of others. He enhanced his income through income-splitting and payment of personal expenses by his employer. His own retained expert confirmed the respondent’s failure to provide requested and required disclosure. That same expert was compelled to withdraw his opinion regarding the respondent’s income due to shortcomings and inconsistencies in the respondent’s disclosure.

[281] The law does not entitle such a litigant to succeed just because the recipient of the falsehoods has not ferreted them out (see Virc v. Blair, 2017 ONCA 394).

[282] In these circumstances it is difficult to conclude that the applicant should be held to her original claim of $250,000 per year income for the respondent, predicated as it was upon incomplete and inaccurate disclosure from the respondent. Furthermore, timely amendment to the Motion to Change was precluded by the respondent’s ongoing disclosure failings.

[283] I would also conclude that the respondent must be presumed to know the true level of his own income.

[284] Therefore, no unfairness would be occasioned by permitting the applicant to pursue income findings for the respondent in excess of her original claim of $250,000 per year, particularly where the respondent has himself submitted income findings in excess of the $250,000 originally claimed.

Retroactivity

[285] The applicant seeks retroactive increase in child support commencing August 1, 2014.

[286] The respondent submits that if it is determined that a period of retroactivity is warranted, such should start from commencement of this Motion to Change (July 12, 2017), or, at the earliest, “when the applicant made her first ever request for financial disclosure on July 16, 2016”.

[287] This issue is illuminated by the principles set out in S.(D.B.) v. G.(S.R.), 2006 SCC 37, [2006] S.C.J. No.37 (S.C.C.):

a. A payor parent who diligently pays child support ordered by a court must be presumed to have fulfilled his or her support obligations;

b. However, the payor is not absolved of the responsibility of continually ensuring the children are receiving an appropriate amount of support;

c. In considering a claim for retroactive child support the court should consider the following non-decisive factors:

i. Reasonable excuse for why increase was not sought earlier;

ii. Conduct of the payor parent;

iii. Circumstances of the children;

iv. Hardship occasioned by a retroactive award.

d. In determining the amount of a retroactive award, the court must decide the date to which the award should be retroactive and the amount of support that would adequately quantify the payor’s deficient obligations during that time;

e. Usually, a payor’s interest in certainty will be reasonable up to the point when the recipient broaches the subject, up to 3 years in the past.

f. To avoid having the presumptive date of retroactivity set prior to the date of effective notice, the payor must act responsibly by disclosing the change in circumstances. Failure to do so may constitute blameworthy conduct.

g. Not disclosing a material change in circumstances is, in itself, blameworthy conduct. A payor should not be permitted to profit from his or her wrongdoing.

h. In setting the amount, blind adherence to the CSG is not required. Undue hardship under s.10 may be considered. The time period that the retroactive award captures may also be adjusted to yield a fair result.

[288] As to whether it is appropriate to make a retroactive award increasing child support, I consider the factors in S.(D.B.) outlined above:

a. Regarding whether there is any reasonable excuse for why increased support was not sought earlier, there is the issue of disclosure required by the order. That order, at paragraph IV(d), required each party “if applicable, to provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year, within 30 days of [July 23] in accordance with s.24.1 of the Child Support Guidelines”. Section 24.1 refers to most recent personal income tax returns, attachments thereto, notices of assessment and reassessment and details of s.7 expenses. Neither party fully complied with this provision prior to commencement of the Motion to Change; however, until January 2019 (with the changes in care in control of the children), only the respondent’s income disclosure was material. As the respondent failed to discharge his obligations in this regard, I find there is a reasonable excuse for the applicant to have delayed in pursuing an increase. It is also clear the respondent has not been open and transparent regarding his income. I would not fault the applicant for delays in these circumstances.

b. As to the respondent’s conduct, I find his failure to provide disclosure as ordered is clearly blameworthy. A payor parent who knowingly diminishes his or her child support (including a failure to make reasonable upward adjustments in support where warranted) should not be allowed to profit from such conduct (see D.(B.S.), at paras. 105-107). The July 26, 2013 order is predicated upon respondent’s income of $109,000. For every year that followed, even the respondent has submitted his income was significantly higher, ranging from a low of $141,541 in 2019 to a high of $308,628 in 2014. As he was the person best positioned to fully understand his income history, he must have known that he was significantly underpaying child support for his children.

c. The children’s circumstances as described in evidence do not suggest they have been deprived as a result of the respondent’s failure to pay increased support; however, this appears due in large part to the applicant’s readiness to incur debt rather than deprive the children of access to activities. The evidence also supports the conclusion that the children enjoyed a markedly higher standard of living while in the respondent’s care, compared to that of the applicant.

d. The respondent’s protests as to any hardship (outside s.10 of the CSG) that would be visited upon him by a retroactive award lack the support of credible and reliable evidence regarding his actual financial circumstances. My findings above regarding his income are consistent with a payor of substantial means.

[289] Balancing the foregoing considerations, I conclude that doing so favours making a retroactive award.

[290] The next issue is the appropriate date of retroactivity.

[291] I find the appropriate date of retroactivity to be August 1, 2016, being the first day of the first month following formal notice to the respondent. Before that date he is presumed to have fulfilled his support obligations; thereafter, his interest in financial certainty regarding his support payments was no longer reasonable. The applicant’s notice to the respondent arrived one year prior to commencement of her Motion to Change, well within the three-year time limit referenced in S.(D.B.).

[292] There is no basis for me to consider “undue hardship” under s.10 of the CSG, as urged by the respondent. Section 10 predicates an award of child support (in an amount other than as directed by the CSG) upon an “application” by either spouse. There is no reference to s. 10 or “undue hardship” in the respondent’s Response to Motion to Change. Therefore, the respondent has not made application for this relief. Given the income findings as above for the respondent, it is difficult to envision a path to success for him on this issue in any event.

[293] Pursuant to the order the respondent was to pay child support for 4 children in the amount of $3,000 per month. He did so until Deanna turned 18 on April 4, 2019; thereafter, he paid $2,250 per month. The Family Responsibility Office will have the most reliable records as to amounts actually paid and I would defer to those records. My purpose here is to develop a rough picture of the respondent’s retroactive liability.

[294] I would calculate the amount owing by the respondent due to retroactivity as follows:

Period

Payable

Paid

Difference Owing

Aug 1 – Dec 31/16

5 x $7882 = $39410

5 x $3000 = $15000

$24,410

Jan 1 – Dec 31/17

12 x $7864 = $94380

12 x $3000 = $36000

$58,380

Jan 1 – Dec 31/18

12 x $7999 = $95988

12 x $3000 = $36000

$59,988

Jan 1 – 31/19

1 x $6855

1 x $3000

$3,855

Feb 1 – May 31/19

4 x $7085 = $28340

3 x $3000 +

1 x $2250 = $11250

$17,090

June 1/19 – Dec 31/19

7 x $6855 = $47985

7 x $2250 = $15750

$32,235

Jan 1/20 – June 30/20

6 x $6671 = $40026

6 x $2250 = $13500

$26,526

[295] The total difference owing is $222,484.

[296] I must consider the impact of this burden upon the respondent. I have found he had substantial income in each year following the order. While payment of the sum of $222,484 will impose an additional financial burden upon the respondent, if stretched over a period of 5 years I am confident, with his significant income, he can manage the required payments (amounting to $3,708/month). I also note that I am not confident I have the full picture as to the respondent’s asset holdings. With his demonstrated readiness to withhold evidence regarding his finances, it is more likely than not that there are assets yet to be revealed. Thus, the potential impact of this retroactive order may be blunted.

Section 7 Expenses

[297] The parties’ respective draft orders do not dramatically differ from one another regarding the orders sought going forward regarding s. 7 expenses.

[298] Section 7(2) of the CSG provides that the guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense under s.7(1) in that “the expense is shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense the contribution, if any, from the child.”

[299] With the income findings above, and based upon the most recent calculation attached hereto, the parties’ proportionate shares are currently 13% for the applicant and 87% for the respondent.

[300] There will be an order as below accordingly.

Parenting Time re Cruz

[301] In her draft order the applicant proposes that the parties share custody of Cruz on a 50/50 basis.

[302] The respondent’s draft order is silent on this issue.

[303] As noted above, the order of November 28, 2018 already addresses, on a final basis, the week-about parenting schedule for the children, subject to trial determination regarding Cruz. As noted above, all of Claudia, Taylor and Cruz have been adhering to the week-about schedule since June 1, 2019. There appears to be no dispute that this schedule should continue.

[304] Deanna is an adult child of the marriage. It is not appropriate for me to direct where she should live. It is a fact that she is currently residing with the applicant and this fact has been accounted for in determination of child support.

Security for Support

[305] The applicant seeks security for retroactive child support and costs, by way of a charge against the respondent’s interest in 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West, Minesing, Ontario and any other assets he owns, including any interest in Premier/Orangeville Concrete Pumping and the Mercedes Benz motor vehicle.

[306] The respondent does not directly confront this issue in his submissions. Opposition is presumed.

[307] In making a child support order, s.12 of the CSG permits me to require that the amount payable “be paid and secured in the manner specified in the order”. Thus, considerable latitude is granted in crafting appropriate security.

[308] Security for support may be appropriate where a payor was self-employed, hoarded large amounts of cash and failed to disclose sources of funds (see Brown v. Brown, 2004 12750 (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 2519, 6 R.F.L. (6th) 43 (Ont.S.C.J.)). While the evidence does not support the conclusion that the respondent “hoarded large amounts of cash”, it is clear he did have significant undeclared cash income and other undisclosed sources of income and benefits.

[309] There are reasons to be concerned about the respondent’s intentions regarding satisfaction of the child support obligations I am imposing upon him. He has demonstrated he cannot be trusted to ensure his children receive the child support to which they are entitled. He did this by failing to pay support at a level commensurate with his actual income. He actively concealed sources of income by failing to disclose personal expenses paid by his income sources. He concealed his beneficial ownership of the Mercedes Benz vehicle. He encouraged Ms. Sciacca to withhold relevant disclosure from his own lawyer.

[310] In short, the respondent cannot be trusted to fulfil his obligations to the children.

[311] The order below is appropriate in the circumstances.

Interest

[312] The applicant seeks an award of pre-judgment interest on the retroactive award. Section 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that “A person who is entitled to an order for the payment of money is entitled to claim and have included in the order an award of interest thereon at the prejudgment interest rate...”; thus, the statute contemplates a claim for pre-judgment interest being put before the court. Unfortunately, there is no such claim before me. I dismiss this request accordingly.

[313] Post-judgment interest is sought, but is again not claimed. Section 129(1) of the Courts of Justice Act provides “Money owing under an order…bears interest at the post-judgment interest rate, calculated from the date of the order.” In contrast to the provision for pre-judgment interest, there is no requirement of a claim. I would therefore order as below.

Conclusion

[314] For the foregoing reasons, judgment to issue as follows:

a. The parties shall continue to equally share parenting time regarding the child Cruz Pereira (DOB September 11, 2011) on a week-about basis with exchanges taking place as agreed from time to time.

b. Commencing July 1, 2020, the respondent shall pay set-off child support for the children Deanna Pereira (DOB April 4, 2001), Claudia Pereira (DOB November 27, 2003), Taylor Pereira (DOB July 22, 2005) and Cruz Pereira (DOB September 11, 2011) in the amount of $6,671 per month, based upon income of $415,272/year for the respondent and $60,590 for the applicant.

c. The parties shall proportionately share the children’s reasonable and necessary special and extraordinary expenses for the children. The obligation to contribute shall be subject to agreement in advance, but agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld. A child’s reasonable and necessary post-secondary education expenses shall be deemed to be subject to proportionate sharing between the parties, subject to reasonable contribution from the child. The parties’ proportionate shares are:

i. Applicant 13%

ii. Respondent 87%

d. The respondent shall pay retroactive child support to the applicant in the amount of $222,484 at the rate of at least $3,708 per month, commencing July 1, 2020.

e. The respondent’s child support obligations shall be secured by charges against his interests in 28 Lloyd Cook Drive West, Minesing, Ontario, and any interest in corporations of which he is a shareholder (including Pereira Trucking Limited, Premier Concrete Pumping, Orangeville Concrete Pumping Service Ltd. and 2657322 Ontario Limited).

f. The parties shall exchange complete copies of their respective income tax returns and attachments by July 1 each year. They shall exchange complete copies of their respective Notices of Assessment and Reassessment forthwith upon receipt.

g. Support Deduction Order to issue.

h. Any errors in my calculations may be addressed in costs submissions.

i. If unable to agree on costs, the parties shall provide submissions in writing through my assistant at Barrie, restricted to 3 pages excluding Offers and Bills of Costs, as follows:

i. Applicant, by June 26, 2020;

ii. Respondent, by July 10, 2020;

iii. Applicant in reply, if desired, by July 17, 2020.

DOUGLAS J.

Released: June 12, 2020

McMaster-Pereira v. Pereira, 2020 ONSC 3682

Case Summary

BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: FC-12-064-01

Reasons for Judgment

Overview and Background

Legal Context

Issue #1: What is the Respondent’s income?

Mercedes Benz motor vehicle

Should the Applicant be Limited to Child Support Based on Respondent’s Income of $250,000?

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Expert Witnesses

Issues

Statutory Provisions 15

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 3