Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-17-0313 Date: 2020 05 29

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Between:

NICHOLAS STEELE, Applicant Counsel for Applicant: M. Kril-Mascarin (michael@makfamilylaw.ca)

And:

JOHANNE DOUCET, Respondent Counsel for Respondent: J. Nicoll (jnicoll@mcinnisandnicoll.com)

Heard: January 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14, 2020

Reasons for Judgment

Trimble J.

[1] By the second day of this trial, the parties had reduced the trial to one issue: is Mr. Steele entitled to force the sale of the couple's home at 2053 Redan Drive, Mississauga, Ontario, and to keep 50% of the equity? The parties have been joint tenants in the home since June 2009.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[2] Mr. Steele submits that he is entitled to force the sale of the home, as of right, and to keep 50% of the equity.

[3] Ms. Doucet argues that Mr. Steele is not entitled to 50% of the equity. She says that they had an arrangement whereby Mr. Steele would go on title as a joint tenant solely so they could increase the mortgage on the property by $40,000 to finance renovations to the house. Therefore, Mr. Steele holds his 50% title in trust for her. In her Amended Answer, para. 19(a), Ms. Doucet pleads that there is a purchase money resulting trust, constructive trust, or implied trust.

[4] In reply, Mr. Steele says that one cannot have a resulting trust unless the transfer to Mr. Steele of 50% interest in the property was a gift. In this case, he says that the transfer was not a gift. It was an intentional transfer as part of the integration of their personal and financial lives after they began to cohabit as a couple. Further, he paid for his 50% of the equity by assuming liability for the mortgage and by putting labour and his own money into the renovations, all of which contributed to the increased value of the property. Even if resulting trust applied, he was not unjustly enriched, and there was no juristic reason to deprive him of the benefit he received.

JOINT BOOK OF DOCUMENTS AND AGREEMENTS

[5] At the beginning of trial, the parties offered a joint book of documents. They agreed that that all documents were authentic but all were subject to proof as to the truth of their contents. Based on that agreement, I considered only those documents that were referred to during the trial.

CREDIBILITY

[6] Much of the case turns on findings of fact made based on conflicting evidence. Therefore, the witness' credibility is key. Both parties had issues with their credibility.

1. The Law on Credibility

[7] An assessment of any witness' credibility involves an assessment of: a) the witness' honesty (his belief in the truth of what he is saying), and b) the reliability of the witness' evidence (his ability to remember and testify accurately). In addressing the credibility of each of the witnesses, I directed myself to the following considerations:

a) While how a witness gives evidence is relevant, findings of credibility should not be made on the witness's demeanour alone. There may be cultural, social, ethnic, or other reasons why a specific witness may have difficulty testifying. There are too many factors that affect a witness' ability to testify comfortably to make demeanour the sole or most important factor in determining credibility.

b) Does the evidence make sense in light of the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonable given the particular place and condition?: Faryna v. Chorny, [1951] B.C.J. No. 152, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (C.A.), at para. 11.

c) Does the evidence have an internal consistency and logical flow? R. v. C.H., [1999] N.J. No. 273 182 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 32 (C.A.).

d) Is the evidence consistent with the witness' other statements? How significant are the differences and are they adequately explained?: R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788.

e) Is there independent confirming or contradicting evidence?: R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531.

f) Does the witness have a motivation to lie or exaggerate? The witness' motivation to lie must be greater than his or her interest to win or lose the case: R. v. S.D., 2007 ONCA 243, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 323.

[8] Below, I apply these factors to each of the witnesses at this trial and explain why I made the findings of fact I have made where evidence conflicts.

2. Mr. Steele

[9] The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Steele was persistent at obtaining what he wanted, often irrespective of the wants and desires of Ms. Doucet. His needs came first. I do not suggest that that Mr. Steele created circumstances to take advantage of them. In any given circumstances, however, he always pursued his interest over that of Ms. Doucet, justifying it as for the "good of the family". I offer the following examples of such behaviour:

a) When he became unemployed in 2012, he insisted on employing the services of employment counsellors to determine what employment he was suited for, rather than looking for work. He knew at the time that the family was financially stretched.

b) He insisted on attending University full time to obtain his 3-year degree, not part time as Ms. Doucet preferred for financial reasons. A year in to his course he insisted on expanding it to the 4-year degree, rather than doing the 3-year program and taking the 4th year part time while he worked, as Ms. Doucet preferred. Before he completed his 4-year program, he insisted on extending it to the Masters' program, rather than doing the Master's program part time while he worked, as Ms. Doucet preferred.

c) During his university studies from 2012 to 2017, Mr. Steele worked part time. His income, except for one year however, dropped continually. As his income dropped, his interest and activities in Lyofresh, his freeze-dried food company, increased.

d) He brought $65,000 into Lyofresh by way of grants and other funding. All of that money stayed in that venture; none was brought into the household. At the same time, he contributed less and less to household expenses, and increased those expenses by tuition, travel and education related expenses.

e) He insisted on taking a work term in Asia as part of his education, when such work terms were also available in Canada.

[10] The evidence also indicates that when it suited his position, Mr. Steele was either dishonest, or careless with the truth. In support of this finding, I offer the following examples:

a) In his sworn financial statement dated July 21, 2018(Exhibit 26), Mr. Steele reported no income for 2017 notwithstanding that he had earned $3,999 that year. At Mr. Steele's October 22, 2018 motion for spousal support, Ms. Doucet was ordered to pay spousal support based on her income, and his income of $4,000.

b) In cross-examination, Mr. Steele admitted that he made an RRSP withdrawal which he did not list in his financial statement. He admitted that he earned $54,229 in earned income that year, not $3,999. He explained that the additional $50,000 of income as the RRSP withdrawal. When he was directed to that portion of his Financial Statement where ne declared nothing under the section for RRSP withdrawals, he said that this was an oversight. For a person who practiced as a financial planner, this is a remarkable oversight.

c) During the relationship, the couple made a $10,000 investment from their joint funds in a company called "Behring Media" in which Mr. Steele's brother was involved. Mr. Steele acknowledged that this was a joint investment. He said in examination in chief that he thought that they would be lucky to receive one or two payments in return.

When Mr. Steele received the investment certificates they were in his sole name.

In cross-examination, Mr. Steele was asked what steps he took to put the certificates in both names. He equivocated. At first, he said he did not remember. Later, he said that he thought he asked Bering to put the certificates in the two names but produced no documentary support for this claim. I find that at no time did Mr. Steele attempt to correct the certificates to reflect both parties' names.

d) In May 2018, after the breakdown of the relationship, the Behring investment paid $21,000. Mr. Steele insisted that each of the parties receive $8000 and $5000 being put into the joint account to fund the fire pit for the yard, which the couple had planned.

In cross-examination, Mr. Steele was asked if Behring made a second payment. He said that it made a further $14,000 payment shortly before the trial. He told no one about this payment, kept it, and used it to pay his lawyer.

Mr. Steele knew that the investment was a joint investment and that half of it belonged to Ms. Doucet. Yet, he continued to live in the home after July 2017, but did not contributed to household expenses in any significant way after 2012. Instead, he kept the money. Had he not been cross-examined on this issue, no one would have known about the second payment and his use of it.

e) In 2015, Mr. Steele wanted to replace his car. It was old and mechanically unreliable. He was driving daily from the home to York University's Keele Street campus and needed a reliable car. He had almost no income at that time.

Ms. Doucet suggested that he repair his car or purchase an older, used car. Mr. Steele insisted on a new car. Ms. Doucet took advantage of an auto purchase arrangement that her Employer (FedEx) had with Nissan to purchase the new car for Mr. Steele. Further, she advanced $20,000 of her money toward its purchase. Both parties understood it would be a joint asset.

When the car arrived, Ms. Doucet told Mr. Steele that they would pick up the car together so it could be registered in both names. Mr. Doucet did not wait. He retrieved the car himself and had it registered in his name, alone. He only agreed at trial that he owed Ms. Doucet $10,000 as her half of the joint asset's value.

In cross-examination on why title was placed in his name, alone, he said "it just happened". He did not think it was important at the time. Again, this is a remarkable answer from someone who practiced as a financial planner.

[11] Often, Mr. Steele's evidence was given in order to create an impression which was not borne out by other evidence. In support of this conclusion I offer the following examples:

a) Mr. Steele said in his examination for chief that he moved to Toronto as part of a plan arranged with Ms. Doucet aimed at ultimately cohabiting with her. He said that after three months of living with a friend they decided to move in together.

He confirmed in cross-examination, however that she did not ask him to move to Toronto. That was solely his decision.

b) He testified that when they began to cohabit in October 2007, it was part of their joint decision to live together. He rejected the suggestion that he was merely a tenant, at least at the beginning. Instead, he said that it was all part of their plan to pool their resources and integrate their lives. In my view he intended to leave the impression that the arrangement was one of cohabitation as opposed space sharing.

During his cross-examination, he said that there was no lease defining his relationship as a tenant. However, he admitted that the initial arrangement had a defined economic component of expense sharing. He agreed to pay $500 a month toward the common expenses. He did this for only a couple of months, following which they "exchanged IOUs" in terms of each paying for certain things for the house.

When he described their relationship, Mr. Steele frequently used phrases such as "integration of finances", "pooling resources", and "complete integration of finances" to describe a relationship in which he made all decisions on investments and Ms. Doucet ran the monthly expenses. He intended to leave the impression that there was a mutual intention to completely meld their financial affairs.

In fact, if they did not have a complete integration of financial affairs. It appears that the "complete integration of finances" existed only when it suited Mr. Steele. For example:

(i) Mr. Steele had a company called Lyofresh which he maintained completely separate from the family's finances. He said that Ms. Doucet wanted nothing to do with that company. Beginning shortly before separation in July 2017, Mr. Steele began receiving grants and other funds for the company, which totaled $65,000 in 2017. Notwithstanding that Mr. Steele continued to live in the house, had virtually no income, and continued to benefit from Ms. Doucet paying the majority of family expenses, he contributed none of the $65,000 toward the family's expenses. Until his evidence at trial, he had not disclosed this income.

(ii) He kept the second Behring Media payment of $14,000, notwithstanding that he continued to live in the house, had virtually no income, and continued to benefit from Ms. Doucet's paying for most of the family's expenses. He contributed none of the $14,000 toward the family's expenses and had no intention of doing so. He used it to pay his lawyer.

(iii) He registered his replacement used car in his own name notwithstanding it was a joint family investment and notwithstanding that Ms. Doucet wanted it registered in both of their names.

c) At several points in his evidence Mr. Steele referred to gifts he of money that he received from his parents which he says he contributed to the joint expenses. He said that these gifts totaled $5,000 to $10,000 per year. This evidence was not supported by reference to a specific bank deposit or transfer nor did he call either of his parents to give evidence.

d) Mr. Doucet stated that he made several large deposits to the joint account totaling approximately $27,000. He said that these were payments he made toward the equity of the home as of 2009. They were all placed in the joint account.

Mr. Steele admitted, however, that he never told Ms. Doucet that these payments were made in order to purchase 50% of the equity in the home at the time his name was added to title, nor did he tell her to put that money in her own account. Further, at no point other than these large individual transfers, did Mr. Steele come close to paying one third of the household expenses. I conclude, therefore, that the lump-sum payments were top up payments toward his share of expenses, and not payments towards the existing equity as of June 2009.

e) He provided a spreadsheet (Exhibit 5) in which he said he summarized in the first four pages all transfers that he made toward family expenses from his Laurentian Bank account, which is counsel totaled at $138,632.26. He was asked if this was correct. His response was that it "sounds correct". At Exhibit 6, is his spreadsheet of cash and check deposits to the joint account made by automated bank machine, totaling $153,321.65. I have little faith in these summaries. I identified errors in them. They are also incomplete as they did not show who withdrew money from the joint account.

f) Mr. Doucet spoke at length about the renovation work that he did at the house. His evidence left the impression that he was intimately involved in the planning and designing, and did a large amount of the work, himself.

In my view, this evidence was intended to create the impression of a contribution that was in excess of his actual contribution. For example, he was asked when he began discussing renovations. He said that the discussions began within months of his moving in when the couple "discussed moving our lives forward together", and "how to build a better life together".

The only evidence of specific work that Mr. Steele did was to pull up tile that was used as a windowsill the living and dining room, tear out the living room built-in wall unit, and tear some drywall in the basement after there was a burst pipe. As I explain later, I find that most of the renovation work of significance was done by Ms. Doucet's father and his helpers. Mr. Steele acted as a helper in those renovations. Otherwise, the work he did was ordinary maintenance work that any homeowner would do.

g) Mr. Steele's evidence about the discussion with Ms. Doucet about adding his name to title to the property was general, vague, and, given in a manner designed to leave the impression that Ms. Doucet intended to give him greater interest in the property than she may have intended. I deal with this, further, when I address the question of the agreement between the parties regarding title, later in these reasons.

In cross-examination, he conceded that there was no discussion in 2005 and 2006 about his going on title. He conceded that any discussions in 2007 and 2008 were limited to discussions about integration of their finances, generally, and could not point to any specific discussion of title to the home, or time of such discussions. When he was asked whether those discussions ever included the ownership of the house, he said that he didn't remember. He conceded that the discussions about his going on title arose with at the time they discussed extending the mortgage in 2009.

h) In his examination in chief, Mr. Steele said that when a) he decided to enter his 3 year Disaster Management program at York University, b) when he decided to extend it from a 3 to a 4 your program, and c) when he decided to extend it to a Master's program, he did so to increase his earning potential for the benefit of the family, and that Ms. Doucet was fully supportive of his decision.

He conceded in cross-examination, however, that Ms. Doucet was "less than enthusiastic" about his becoming a full-time student and the extension of his program at two instances. He all but conceded that her preference was that he do his education part time so he could work and contribute to the family finances.

i) Mr. Steele spoke about his company, Lyofresh. During the latter part of his undergraduate year, stretching into his master's degree year, he tried to build his company. He received $65,000 in loans and grants and prizes and put that money into the company. He did not use it is personal income to be placed into the joint account. He did not say this was a mutual decision. He said that Ms. Doucet wanted nothing to do with this venture. He never made disclosure concerning the $65,000 Lyofresh earned until just before trial.

In my view, Mr. Steele intended to leave the impression that he, alone, put a great deal of work into this company, to better the family financially. His evidence was vague, however. He conceded that Ms. Doucet set up meetings with contacts that were useful to Mr. Steele and his company and attending those meetings with him. When it was suggested to him that Ms. Doucet, in fact, was involved in Lyofresh to some extent, he said that she was not, and then volunteered that he had supported her in her cookie business as a reciprocal support. That he supported her in a venture of hers, does not alter that she was active to a certain extent in his business.

j) Mr. Steele said that after the relationship broke down, Ms. Doucet canceled his line of credit and cut him off access to the family finances. All he had was income as a teaching assistant from part-time work at York University and at a job in Burlington. He said that she did this to financially starve him. She even cut off his car insurance and his access to her workplace extended benefits package. He said that he had job offers internationally and domestically that he could not accept because he did not have any money from the house to permit him to take those jobs. The impression he intended to leave was that he was financially hobbled by Ms. Doucet's intentional activities.

Mr. Steele produced no evidence of these job opportunities he missed.

In cross-examination, Mr. Steele conceded that he was not without resources in 2017. He had declared income in 2017 of $16,000 and had $14,000 in his bank account. He had $65,000 in funds that went into Lyofresh, a large part of which came into his hands in 2017. While he said that his use of the $65,000 was limited by those who supplied the money, he never established this fact independently.

In any event, while Ms. Doucet may have closed one joint line of credit, he had another joint line of credit which he closed without telling her. Further, he closed Ms. Doucet's credit card on his account.

Further, in in cross-examination on the FedEx benefit package (which was never put into evidence) he conceded that the couple were never married, and, at the time of the separation, they were not cohabiting as common-law spouses. He was asked if he agreed, that his coverage ceased as of that time because he no longer met the policy definition of "spouse". His lawyer objected to the question.

k) During the period before the separation in July 2017 in which Mr. Steele said the relationship was in irretrievable decline, he asked Ms. Doucet to agree to a line of credit of $270,000 which was secured against the home, "just in case". The line of credit was obtained. He terminated the relationship 5 months before he completed his master's degree. This was the line of credit Ms. Doucet closed.

l) From July to December 2017, Mr Steele did not contribute to the family or household expenses, notwithstanding that he continued to live in the house and earned income that year of $15,788. From November 2017 until well into 2018, Mr. Steele did not look for work. Instead, he did not contribute to the family or household expenses, notwithstanding that he continued to live in the house and he reported that Lyofresh realized $65,000 in income. His offers to assist with household expenses only came after he became employed in 2018 by the Red Cross.

Mr. Steele says that he attempted to make payments toward the expenses in April 2019 and again in July 2019 (see exhibits 19 and 54 respectively).

I conclude that Mr. Steele's offers to pay something toward expenses were made for the purpose of improving his position at trial. The first offer was made just before the May, 2019 in which this trial as to be heard, and the second after the close of the sitting and after the parties were told this case would be on in the January, 2020 trial sitting. By April 2019, Mr. Steele had been working for some time for the Red Cross, full-time. At any point after he began working he could have made deposits to the joint account, at any time.

3. Ms. Doucet

[12] The evidence establishes that to the extent that Mr. Steele was persistent in pursuing his interests over Ms. Doucet's, Ms. Doucet was passive, acquiescing to his demands. While she may have made most of the concessions, she did so voluntarily.

[13] Ms. Doucet has her own credibility issues. Consider the following examples:

a) Ms. Doucet said that the commencement of cross-examination that she never had any intention to give Mr. Steele any interest in the property nor did she think that he had any interest in the property.

On cross-examination, however, she agreed that it was not fair that Mr. Steele would get no portion of the home. When asked what proportion of the home Mr. Steele was entitled to, she preferred to let the court decide that issue. Further, in Exhibit 51 paragraph 8, she said she wanted to purchase Mr. Steele's interest once the court has determined what that interest was.

Further, the transfer documents clearly show Mr. Steele is a joint tenant. As I indicate later in these reasons, I conclude that Ms. Doucet did intend to give Mr. Steele an interest in the property.

b) Ms. Doucet said that she and Mr. Steele agreed that they would share expenses. Her evidence concerning the amount Mr. Steele would pay differed. At one point she that she said he would pay one third of family expenses, and at another time, 50% of the expenses. She conceded, however, that after the joint account was created, because his income was lower than hers, his contributions to family expenses would be proportional.

Ms. Doucet's evidence in chief was that the financial agreement with Mr. Steele was one of the expense sharing. However, in cross-examination she admitted that by pooling resources the parties could save money, go on trips, and renovate the house, all things she could not do on her own.

Ms. Doucet testified in chief that the arrangement with Mr. Steele, originally, was that he would pay $500 a month in rent, that he paid that for two or three months, and thereafter, the $500 was dealt with by a will by way of an IOU system. However, she never declared on their income tax forms any payments from Mr. Steele as rent.

c) Ms. Doucet resisted the suggestion that she and Mr. Steele intended to merge their finances or planned that he would receive 50% of everything. However, her FedEx pension plan statement identifies Mr. Steele as a 75% beneficiary of that asset. She admitted that he was a 50% beneficiary of her RRSPs, as well.

d) Mr. Steele raised the allegation that Ms. Doucet placed hidden cameras in the basement of the house to film his activities. His living area was in the basement. She admitted that she placed two hidden cameras in common areas of the basement (one in the hall trained on the door to the outside, and the other trained on the common areas of the basement) for safety reasons. She said that she came home one day and found that the outside door to the basement was not closed. She also saw that Mr. Steele's bedroom door was not closed. It was always closed. She was concerned that an intruder had been in the house.

Ms. Doucet's explanation seemed strained. In any event, she was also aware that Mr. Steele's twin brother, Mark, had a key to the house, and a more logical explanation for the cameras was that she wanted to monitor Mr. Steele's activities.

e) Mr. Steele raised the allegation that Ms. Doucet was withholding his mail. Both parties indicated that there was a common mailbox. Mr. Doucet became concerned that he did not received mailed payments from donors to Lyofresh who said that they had made payments. One day, Mr. Steele photographed the contents of the mailbox which included mail for him. He then waited. Ms. Doucet never provided to him the mail that was addressed to him that day. Those photographs were not produced at trial although email confirming the reissuing of checks was produced. In response, Ms. Doucet says she always placed Mr. Steele's mail on the table for him to collect.

I conclude that Ms. Doucet did not deliver the mail referred to in Exhibit 15, 16, and 17. There is no evidence, however, that she appropriated the money by cashing the checks.

4. Weighing Credibility of the Parties

[14] On balance, I prefer the evidence of Ms. Doucet over Mr. Steele, and where their evidence conflicts, I do not accept Mr. Steele's evidence unless supported by other independent evidence. Mr. Steele's credibility issues go directly to his honesty. He contorted evidence to deliberately create an impression that was not supported by the evidence. He pursued his interest at all times, over the interests of others, including during his evidence at trial. He kept money that was not his to keep and would never have acknowledged the fact but for being asked about it in cross-examination. He withheld disclosure about money Lyofresh received until asked about it at trial. The issues with Ms. Doucet's evidence are less serious.

5. Other Witnesses

[15] In addition to the parties, I also heard from Gilles Doucet (Ms. Doucet's father), Mark Steele (Mr. Steele's brother) and James McKay (the lawyer that handled the 2009 mortgage extension and transfer of title in June 2009).

[16] Mark Steele's evidence was generally supportive of his brother's. He said that the parties always presented themselves as a couple. They appeared to be doing everything together. Both were involved in the discussions about the renovations and the work during execution. He said that while Mr. Steele was not a professional contractor he did plastering, painting, plumbing, wiring, and other work around the house. All the renovations seem to be a joint project, contributed to equally according to their abilities. Mr. Steele appeared to be involved with Ms. Doucet's daughter, as a father would.

[17] I found the evidence of Mark Steele relatively unhelpful for a several reasons:

a) His evidence was "impression", or conclusion from his observations.

b) Mark Steele's ability to form his impressions was limited. He was busy with his own family (he had a spouse and two children), his own home, and his startup business, Behring Media. He admitted that his time at the parties' home was limited to time on weekends and the odd evening.

c) He used the same, or markedly similar turns of phrase that Mr. Steele used, such as the parties appeared to have "fully integrated their lives together" and were "a fully integrated couple". This raises a concern about Mr. Steele's impartiality and the extent to which he and his brother discussed Mark Steele's evidence or the influence that Mr. Steele had on Mark Steele.

d) Mark Steele admitted that most of his information other than what he saw, came from Mr. Steele. Since the couple separated, has seen Ms. Doucet three times, maximum, and only briefly each time.

e) He admitted that he knew nothing, directly, about the couple's investments or the extent to which they had integrated their financial situation.

[18] Gilles Doucet testified, for the most part, about the renovations that the couple did to the home. Mr. Doucet has been in the home renovation business for 28 years, specializing in bathrooms and basement renovations. I found Mr. Doucet a reliable, straightforward witness. He withstood cross-examination. I have no reason to doubt Mr. Doucet's evidence.

[19] Mr. Doucet testified that he was involved in three renovations at the home: the kitchen renovation in 2009, a further kitchen renovation in 2010, and a basement renovation in 2011. He also remembers replacing all of the windows and exterior doors to the house, clearing out an old tree stump, and repairing water damage to the basement when the outside tap froze. In all these renovations, he provided his work for free. He had the help, usually, of one of his employees. The parties paid for the work done by Mr. Doucet's employees, and for all materials, which Mr. Doucet charged at cost.

[20] Mr. Doucet said that Mr. Steele helped him from time to time, but provided limited, general labor to assist Mr. Doucet and his employees. For example, Mr. Steele helped by picking up mill work and supplies, helped to install crown molding and baseboards, helped insert and then held windows in place so Mr Doucet could install them, and did general cleanup work.

[21] Mr. Doucet, in cross-examination, said that with respect to the basement renovations, Mr. Steele did not help. He did help remove the tree and the stump.

[22] I accept Mr. Doucet's evidence that Mr. Steele's participation in the renovations with which Mr. Doucet was involved, was limited, both in its extent, and the skills required. Based on Mr. Doucet's and Mr. Steele's evidence, I conclude that Mr. Steele did work around the house that any homeowner would do. With respect to the renovations, I find that Mr. Steele's participation was limited both in time and scope. He assisted Mr. Doucet, from time to time, and only in unskilled ways.

FACTS

[23] Having made the necessary findings of credibility, I turn to the facts. Where there was a difference between the parties as to the facts, I have outlined their respective positions and evidence, and made my findings of fact.

The Basics

[24] The parties began living together in October 2007 and separated on July 25, 2017. They had no children together, although Ms. Doucet had a daughter from her previous marriage which ended a few years before the couple began to cohabit. Since July 25, 2017, the couple has lived separate and apart, in the home.

The Beginning

[25] Mr. Steele and Ms. Doucet met at a wedding in 2005. At that time, Mr. Steele lived in Montreal, and Ms. Doucet in Mississauga at the Redan Drive property. Mr. Steele was keen on pursuing a relationship with Ms. Doucet. While Ms. Doucet was interested in Mr. Steele, she was less sanguine about a relationship, having just cone through a divorce.

[26] Mr. Steele obtained Ms. Doucet's contact information from someone involved in the wedding and pursued her. Over the next two years, their trans-provincial relationship grew, with one travelling to the other's city. Their time together was dictated by when Ms. Doucet's daughter would be with her father. Ms. Doucet was still reticent about the relationship. She did not want it to appear to her daughter that she was keen to re-partner, yet, she still saw Mr. Steele whenever Sabine was with her father.

Mr. Steele Moves from Montreal to Mississauga

[27] In 2007, Ms. Steele was the sole owner of the Redan Drive property. At the end of her marriage to her husband in 2006, she bought his interest in the property for $84,000.00, extending the mortgage to the fullest extent in order to do so.

[28] In mid-2007, Mr. Steele moved to Mississauga. He said it was a mutual decision as the relationship was progressing. Ms. Doucet said that it was Mr. Steele's decision to move to Mississauga. She did not want him to move on her account. Mr. Steele began living with a friend. I find it was his decision to move from Montreal. She neither encouraged nor discouraged it.

Mr. Steele Moves in with Ms. Doucet

[29] When Mr. Steele moved to Ontario, he began living with a friend in Etobicoke. By October 2007, Mr. Steele's friend asked Mr. Steele to move out. He suggested to Ms. Doucet that he move in with her. She eventually agreed, since they were a couple, but she required that he pay $500 per month, which she referred to "rent", which she said reflected 1/3 the increased expenses of living together.

[30] I find that their relationship was not one of mere landlord and tenant, although Ms. Doucet and Mr. Steele agreed that he would carry one third of the increased household expenses.

[31] This arrangement did not last long. Mr. Steele did not make the regular payments such the couple went to what the both described as an "IOU arrangement', whereby each took care of certain expenses as they could, hoping it would all work out, eventually.

[32] Eventually, the couple opened joint chequing and savings accounts into which they deposited funds and from which all household expenses were paid. Ms. Doucet deposited her ex-husband's child support payments into the joint account and the child's expenses were paid out of it as well. Ms. Doucet continued to pay the mortgage from her sole account until June 2009.

[33] Mr. Steele said that each of them deposited almost all his or her income into the joint account, and that account was used almost exclusively for all the family's expenses. Mr. Steele produced a summary of deposits he made to the joint account from his two personal accounts from 2007 onward, as well as his ATM deposits, as well as partial bank account records to support his summary.

[34] I do not accept that Mr. Steele's deposit summary and evidence based on it. I find that these summaries are self-serving and incomplete. I noted some errors in them. It is unclear whether the summary shows all of Mr. Steele's income was deposited. More significant is the fact that the summaries do not show who took money out and what the purpose of the withdrawals were. To the extent that they are complete, the summaries only tell half the story.

[35] During the relationship, both parties shared equally in the household chores. Mr. Steele became like a father to Sabine.

[36] For the whole of their relationship, Mr. Steele, on average, earned approximately half the annual income that Ms. Doucet earned, or one third of the household income.

[37] Mr. Steele managed financial investments like RRSP's (because of his background as a financial planner with Laurentian Bank). Ms. Doucet managed the monthly accounts and expenses. Mr. Steele had access to the spreadsheets that Ms. Doucet maintained for the monthly expenses. He often accessed them, and often left comments on them.

Renovations to the Property

[38] Beginning in 2008 or 2009 the parties began discussing renovating the house. At first, they explored tearing down the house and building anew. They consulted builders and looked at plans. Rebuilding, however, was too expensive, so they decided to renovate the existing house, either all at once, or in stages. They decided to renovate in stages.

Mr. Steele Becomes a Joint Tenant in the Property on June 11, 2009 - What was the Agreement?

[39] Their decision to renovate was driven largely by finances, which led, ultimately, to Mr. Steele being placed on title as joint tenant. The reason Mr. Steele was added to title in June 2009 depends on which party one believes.

[40] Ms. Doucet testified that she had extended herself financially to buy out her ex-husband's interest in the house in 2006 so that their young daughter would have the stability of living in the same home. In addition, she wanted to create financial security for she and the child. Therefore, Ms. Doucet was aware that on her income she could not extend the mortgage further to finance the renovations. She told Mr. Steele this. Notwithstanding the couple's savings, additional financing would be required to pay for the renovations. According to Ms. Doucet, she knew that the bank would require Mr. Steele’s name on the mortgage and title. Mr. Steele was placed on title only for the purpose of obtaining additional financing.

[41] Mr. MacKay, the solicitor on the transaction, confirmed that the lender required Mr. Steele to be on title and on the mortgage obligation.

[42] Mr. Steele testified that in his discussions with Ms. Doucet, they agreed that since he was going to be on risk for the whole of the mortgage (not just for the increased amount) he should also be on title equally with her. He also said that he was putting significant money and effort into the house to improve its value. Further, he placed the decision to add him to title in a larger context - that of merging and integrating their finances.

[43] What legal advice the couple received at the time of the transaction is unclear.

[44] Mr. MacKay said that he was retained by the couple and the mortgagee to discharge the existing mortgage, register the new mortgage, and transfer title from Ms. Doucet, alone, to the couple as joint tenants. He said that he had no independent recollection of events other than as contained in the file. His standard practice, however, was that he would have explained the different options for taking title and the nature and implications of each, including joint tenancy. He would have referred each of the parties to independent counsel.

[45] Mr. Steele remembers this advice being given; Ms. Doucet said that it was not.

[46] I found Mr. MacKay's evidence unhelpful. He had no independent recollection of events aside from his file. His file contained no check list of things to be done, no notes of meetings or telephone calls. His reporting letter dealt with the mortgage, alone. There is no reporting letter with respect to title. Documents were changed without explanation. Most significant, there was no certificate in the file indicating that either had be told to obtain independent legal advice, taken it, or declined it. I found that much of Mr. MacKay's evidence, based on his standard practice, lacked substantiation by documents one would normally see to support that practice were missing from his file such as those relating to independent legal advice.

[47] Ms. Doucet advised at trial that she had commenced proceedings against Mr. MacKay, but that these proceedings were dormant.

[48] In light of these proceedings against Mr. MacKay, I want to make clear that my comments, above, are not intended to be binding between the parties (or either of them) and Mr. MacKay. I say this for the following reasons:

1. Mr. MacKay is not a party to this action.

2. Notwithstanding that there is an action pending against him, the pleadings were not in front of me.

3. Had Mr. MacKay requested to have his own counsel present while he gave evidence, I would have granted that request.

4. What the standard of care is for him in 2009 in circumstances like these was not before me, nor the question of whether he breached that standard of care.

[49] With respect to what advice the parties received, therefore, I am left to rely on their own evidence. I cannot determine which party to believe on this issue.

[50] As I explain later, I find that the agreement that the parties reached in June 2009 with respect to title to the property was that Ms. Doucet would keep the equity in the property up to June 11, 2009, and that they would share in any equity acquired after that time.

[51] The June 2009 mortgage increased the obligation by $40,000.00, which was put into the parties' joint account.

Mr. Steele's Lump Sum Payments

[52] Mr. Steele said that after he was put on title, he made four substantial payments to Ms. Doucet in exchange for 50% interest in the property, including the pre-June 2009 equity: $10,900 on July 8, 2008, $8,000 on May 20, 2009, $5,000 on August 27, 2009, and $3,700 on September 30, 2009. Ms. Doucet agrees that Mr. Steele put those sums into the joint account, but denies that they were for the purchase of his claimed 50% interest. As I explain elsewhere, I find that none of these payments were made to acquire the pre-June 2009 equity in the home.

Mr. Steele's Sweat Equity Contribution

[53] Together, the parties worked on the renovation designs, obtained quotes and commenced the renovations in phases. The most significant phase occurred in 2009 when they remodeled the kitchen and second floor bathroom, installed new flooring throughout, and converted a sun room into a dining room. A later phase involved finishing the basement by installing a bedroom, sitting area and bathroom, and finishing the laundry area.

[54] Who did what work, and the extent of that work, depends on which one of the parties' evidence one accepts.

[55] Ms. Doucet said that most of the work was done by her father, a contractor, and his workers. The couple paid the workers' wages and paid her father for supplies, at cost. His labour was a gift. The couple did some work as they were able, recognizing that they both had full time jobs. Most of their work involved rough tear-out, cleaning, and picking up materials. Ms. Doucet's evidence left the impression that while Mr. Steele did more work in the renovations than she, his work was still very limited.

[56] Mr. Steele's evidence was that his sweat equity contribution was quite substantial, thereby adding to the value of the property substantially. He said that he did significant tear-out, built a fireplace mantle, replaced flooring, installed trim, plastered, and painted. Mr. Steele estimated that the value of the renovations was approximately $150,000, although he was not qualified (nor did he seek to be able) to give this opinion.

[57] Mr. Steele also said that he did general maintenance and repairs around the property.

[58] I accept Ms. Doucet's and her father's evidence and find that the overwhelming majority of the renovation work was done by Ms. Doucet's father and his workers. Mr. Steele's work contribution to the renovations was limited to tearing out, cleaning and other minor work. Ms. Doucet conceded that he did a good job of building the fireplace mantle.

[59] Absent evidence from an expert, it is impossible to tell the extent to which Mr. Steele's own efforts in the renovation work contributed to increasing the value of the property. No expert evidence was called.

Mr. Steele Returns to School

[60] This issue was contentious. Mr. Steele raised it as an example of his commitment to bettering the family circumstances, and his contribution to the joint family venture. Ms. Doucet raised it as an example of how Mr. Steele was unjustly enriched by the union, and how he reduced his contribution to the joint family venture.

[61] In 2012, Mr. Steele was terminated from his job as a commodity trader.

[62] Mr. Steele testified that the couple, together, discussed Mr. Steele's employment prospects, and decided, together, that Mr. Steele should return to school, thereby improving those employment prospects for the benefit of the family. This discussion included the negative impact his return to school would have on the family's finances in the short term. Mr. Steele said that Ms. Doucet fully supported his return to school. Ms. Doucet said that she wanted Mr. Steele to keep working and study part time, but he persisted, and she acquiesced.

[63] Mr. Steele registered at York University's Keele Street campus in Toronto, in a three-year Bachelor of Arts in Disaster Management.

[64] At some point during his BA studies, Mr. Steele spoke to Ms. Doucet about extending the degree to a four-year degree, which he said would increase his employment and income prospects. He conceded that Ms. Doucet was "less than enthusiastic" about this but continued to support him. Ms. Doucet said that she wanted him to complete the three-year program, and then work and take the fourth year part time. She said that he persisted, and she acquiesced.

[65] Before Mr. Steele finished his fourth year, he was offered a scholarship to do his Master of Arts in Disaster Management, which would add another year to his studies. He said that he discussed this with Ms. Doucet and explained that it would help his employment and income potential. He says that Ms. Doucet agreed that this was a wonderful opportunity for him and supported him in it. Ms. Doucet said, again, that she wanted him to complete the four-year program, go to work, and take the MA part time. Again, she said that he persisted, and she acquiesced

[66] I accept Ms. Doucet's version of events. I accept that he was not sanguine about the length of time Mr. Steele would be in school. I accept that they both understood, implicitly, that during that time, Ms. Doucet would pay almost all of the family’s expenses and she would forego any continuing education available to her, in favour of Mr. Steele completing his degree. Nevertheless, whatever Ms. Doucet's reservations were about Mr. Steele's education choice, she still accepted them, even if grudgingly. In other words, whatever bargain she thought he had with Mr. Steele in 2012 about carrying household expenses, she agreed to change that bargain when she agreed that he could return to school and then altered that timetable subsequently.

Gifts from Mr. Steele's Parents and His Contribution to the House While at School

[67] Mr. Steele testified that once he returned to school, he continued to work part time and deposit all his money into the joint account, deposited gifts from his parents each year to the same account totaling $5,000 to $10,000, and assumed more of the household chores as he had more time to do them.

[68] I only accept the last of these propositions.

[69] As I have indicated, I do not accept Mr. Steele's evidence unless it is supported by other independent evidence. There is no independent evidence to support that he received money gifts from the parents or that he deposited them into the joint account.

[70] With respect to his financial contribution, it is also clear that, aside from a modest increase in income in 2014 over 2013, Mr. Steele's income dropped from $40,264 in 2012 to $15,788 in 2017. At the same time, the family's expenses increased to the extent of his tuition, books, daily travel and parking costs, and other education related expenses. While there was no evidence as to the extent of these expenses, given his full-time enrolment in York University, one wonders whether, economically, Mr. Steele had not become a net drain on the family finances.

[71] While I accept that Mr. Steele probably increased his contribution to household chores, that increase, too, was limited because of his increased efforts with Lyofresh. He said that his efforts in Lyofresh increased during his time at university.

Lyofresh

[72] Mr. Steele had a company called Lyofresh. Through Lyofresh, Mr. Steele hoped to develop a method of freeze-drying food. He originally tried to develop the machinery to do so, himself. He did not have the skills to do so. He hired an engineer and made him a shareholder.

[73] Mr. Steele said that he maintained Lyofresh completely separate from the family expenses. Ms. Doucet wanted it that way. She wanted nothing to do with Lyofresh.

[74] I do not accept Mr. Steele’s position. As I have already found, Ms. Doucet was involved, although not heavily, in Lyofresh, and supported Mr. Steele in this venture. Ms. Doucet did not want family funds used in developing Lyofresh. However, she assisted Mr. Steele with Lyofresh by setting up appointments with people she knew so that he could pitch his ideas, and participating in those meetings with Mr. Steele.

[75] At the same time as his income dropped between 2012 and 2018, Mr. Steele spent increasing time working on Lyofresh at the expense of his other out-of-school activities, including his part time employment. He said that he began spending every spare moment on Lyofresh. Notwithstanding that Ms. Doucet was unhappy about this, he said that she knew it was happening, knew he was trying to make Lyofresh succeed, and helped him to do so.

[76] Beginning shortly before separation in July 2017, Mr. Steele said that he began receiving grants and other funds for the company, which totaled $65,000 by 2017. Notwithstanding that Mr. Steele continued to live in the house, had little income, and continued to benefit from Ms. Doucet paying almost all of family's expenses, he contributed none of the $65,000 toward the family's expenses. Indeed, until the eve of trial, he had not disclosed this income. He intentionally withheld this information.

[77] I will return to Lyofresh.

The End of the Relationship

[78] The relationship ended on 25 July 2017 when Mr. Steele told Ms. Doucet that he believed it was over. They had been having difficulty. They tried counselling, but it ended after two sessions. Why the sessions failed is irrelevant.

[79] Since separation, the parties have lived in the house, but separately. It is common ground that Mr. Steele has contributed nothing toward the household expenses since separation. Ms. Doucet has paid them all. Mr. Steele obtained fully time work with the Red Cross in March 2019, earning $64,000 per year. Since then, he made two offers to contribute toward expenses, but as I explain elsewhere in these Reasons, this was done for litigation optics purposes. He made offers but no contributions, notwithstanding he could have put money into the joint account at any time.

ANALYSIS

1. Partition Act, RSO 1990, c. P-4

[80] Both parties hold title to the property as joint tenants. As a joint tenant, Mr. Steele has the right to apply for the sale of that land under section 3 of the Partition Act, RSO 1990, c. P-4.

[81] Under the Partition Act, a joint tenant has the prima facie right to an order for the partition or sale of lands held with another joint tenant. The other joint tenant has a corresponding obligation to permit that sale. These have been described in the case law as fundamental rights flowing from joint tenancy.

[82] The court is required to compel a sale of jointly held land if no sufficient reason can be shown why such an order should not be made. Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances. The onus to show that circumstances are present that require the Court to exercise its discretion to refuse an application for sale rests with the party opposing the application. That party must show the court that there is sufficient reason, recognized in law, why in order for sale should not be made: see Afolabi v. Fala, 2014 ONSC 1713, at paras. 25 to 29.

[83] The circumstances for the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse sale are malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct on the part of the person seeking the sale: see Silva v. Silva (1990), 1 O.R. (3D) 436 (C.A.). The court must exercise its discretion having regard to those particular facts and circumstances: see Davis v. Davis, [1954] O.R. 23 (C.A.). In family law cases, however, an order under the Partition Act should not be made until any dispute related to the property has first been determined: see Maskewycz v. Maskewycz (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 713 (C.A.).

[84] In this case, Mr. Steele's request for sale must await the determination of Ms. Doucet's resulting trust defence. If Ms. Doucet is correct in that Mr. Steele holds any part of his interest in trust for Ms. Doucet, then that question must be determined, first, within particular facts and circumstances of this case.

2. Resulting Trust

[85] Ms. Doucet, in advancing her resulting trust argument, relies on Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 and its progeny. Her success depends on the answers to the following questions:

a) Was Ms. Doucet's transfer of 50% of title to the home to Mr. Steele in June 2009, gratuitous? If the transfer, or any part of it, was a gift then one proceeds with the resulting trust analysis under Kerr.

b) Did Mr. Steele receive a benefit?

c) Did Ms. Doucet suffer a corresponding deprivation?

d) Is there any juristic reason why Mr. Doucet should be deprived of or allowed to keep the benefit?

a) Was Ms. Doucet's transfer of 50% of title into the home to Mr. Steele as joint tenant gratuitous?

[86] In any resulting trust case, the court must determine, first, whether title was transferred to the recipient gratuitously. If so, a resulting trust is presumed to arise such that the transferee holds title in trust for the transferor. To rebut the presumption, the recipient must establish that the transfer was, in fact, a gift. The law presumes bargains, not gifts: see Kerr, at paragraph 16 to 19.

[87] Whether the transfer is a gift depends on the intention of the transferor at the time of the transfer. The trial judge starts with the applicable presumption and then weighs all of the evidence in an attempt to ascertain, on the balance of probabilities, "the transferor's actual intention": see Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, at paras. 43 to 44; Kerr, at para. 18.

[88] If the recipient paid consideration, there is no gift. The amount of the consideration or the fact that the other party may have contributed more, is irrelevant. Whether consideration was paid, and not the amount, is the test: see Carroll v. Garnett, 2016 ONSC 2863, at para. 55.

[89] In this case, Mr. Steele says that Ms. Doucet transferred to him 50% of the title in the home, as a joint tenant, for consideration. That consideration comprises a) liability for the mortgage, b) extensive work he did in renovations, c) for lump sums that he paid in 2008 in 2009 totaling $27,650, and d) money he contributed to the common expenses of the house including the mortgage.

[90] Further, Mr. Steele says that Ms. Doucet intended to provide for his future security by making him a joint tenant in the house. She intended to provide security for her daughter by making the daughter beneficiary on all other assets such as pensions and RRSPs. Ms. Doucet knew that she was transferring a full 50% to Mr. Steele and intended to do so. He argues that while Ms. Doucet's intention changed after separation, it is the intention at the time of the transfer that counts: see Johnston v. Song, 2018 ONSC 1005, at para. 27 to 28.

[91] Ms. Doucet says that she put Mr. Steele on title solely to obtain an extension of the mortgage by $40,000 in order to fund house renovations that the couple decided were necessary. She says that she was a single mother who extended herself financially, to the maximum, to buy out her ex-husband's share in the matrimonial home following the end of that marriage. She did this to provide security for she and her daughter. It makes no sense that she would give approximately half of the $114,000 in equity in the home as of June 2009 to Mr. Steele.

[92] Ms. Doucet says that she offered Mr. Steele the opportunity to purchase her half of the equity in the home as of June 2009, at that time, which he declined to do as he did not have sufficient funds.

[93] Both parties' arguments are based on the premise that the whole of the 50% joint tenant interest was transferred to Mr. Steele in June 2009, either in trust, or for consideration.

[94] Whatever the agreement was, it was oral. The evidence of the agreement is the transfer of the title, and the evidence of the parties.

[95] On what basis was the transfer made?

[96] For the reasons that follow, the evidence persuades me on the balance of probabilities that the parties’ intention in June 2009 was that Ms. Doucet would retain any equity that existed in the property at that time Mr. Steele went on title, and that they would share equally only in the increase in the equity thereafter.

[97] With this finding, the onus shifts to Mr. Steele to establish that his 50% interest in the equity as of June 2009 was intended as a gift, thereby eliminating the presumption of resulting trust. It was his firm position, however, that no part of his 50% interest in title was a gift to him, and that he paid for his interest.

[98] Based on Mr. Steele’s position, therefore, I find that the $113,957.00 in equity in the house as of June 11, 2009 was never intended by either of the parties to be Mr. Steele's property, and specifically, both intended that it would remain Ms. Doucet’s property. Therefore, a resulting trust arises with respect to Mr. Steele's 50% of this equity in the house as of June 11, 2002 of $113,957.00. Mr. Steele, by taking on the mortgage liability, paid consideration for his 50% of the equity in the home accruing only after June 11, 2009.

[99] The agreement between Mr. Steele and Ms. Doucet was oral.

[100] When dealing with oral contracts, the Court of Appeal set out four criteria to be met: (i) it is necessary to distill from the words and actions of the parties, at the time the contract was entered into, what they intended; (ii) evidence of the parties' subjective intentions has no independent place in determining the terms of their bargain; (iii) the test of what the parties agreed to requires an objective determination; and (iv) the contract must include the requisite elements of offer, acceptance and consideration (citations omitted): S&J Gareri Trucking Ltd. v. Onyx Corporation, 2016 ONCA 505 at para. 7.

[101] I find that on June 11, 2009, when Mr. Steele was registered on title as a joint tenant, the parties intended that Ms. Doucet would retain the equity in the home at the time of the transfer, and that the parties would only share equally in any accrual of equity in the property thereafter.

[102] I make this finding for several reasons. First, this agreement is reflected in Mr. Steele's evidence at trial. In his examination in chief on January 7, 2020, Mr. Steele said (emphasis is mine):

Q. Okay. And, and then, ultimately, what was decided on in terms of what was going to be done with the Redan Drive property.

A. Well, at the time, we had -- you know, we had some concerns about the affordability of being able to do a full knock down and rebuild, on whether we were -- we might be stretching ourselves too thin in terms of the carrying costs of, of that kind of house. And, and, and so, there was also some uncertainty at the time, we were just still kind of in a recession. So, there was some financial, like some macro-economic uncertainty, I'd, I'd, I'd kind of say and then we decided that the more prudent course of action would be to, to focus on a smaller scope of renovation, which is still a large scope for what we want to do, but -- on the current house. So, instead of knocking down we decided to, like, kind of extensive renovations, 'cause that was a more affordable options and we could still get a lot of the features we wanted out of our kind of -- our future home for....

Q. Okay and who made that decision?

A. We both made that decision. So, yeah, this is over the course of, you know, several months of, of, of looking at what the options are, trying to figure out what our budgets could be and, and, and just discussing it together.

Q. And around that time did you have discussions with Ms. Doucet about being a joint -- becoming a joint owner of the property?

A. Yeah.

THE COURT: That's kind of leading.

MR. KRIL-MASCARIN: Q. Did you discuss your ownership of the property with, with Ms. Doucet?

A. Yeah, absolute (sic). We, we had several discussions on, on what -- how we can proceed, moving forward. We both thought that it was a good idea that I get on title and then I become -- and I can share in, in the increase of value over time. I was paying, I was paying into this house. I was fully participating in, in maintaining it. We were both -- put significant amount of money in there. And, and, you know, we, we both thought that it would be a good idea in case that, you know, if we were both going to be on the mortgage, that I should be on the title, as well as her. And, and it's like for a variety of reasons. Like, we, we did look at what happens if somebody, one of us died. That was one of the things we discussed. We talked about going to get wills drawn up. Ultimately, we didn't -- decide not to do that or we just -- it wasn't a priority at the time that we had discussed it. But, you know, we thought it was be prudent if I was on, on the title in the case that I died, then Johanne would've gotten the whole house and, and subsequently, as well, the other -- it, it works both ways, as well. It would've been fair.

Q. So, you said you talked about getting wills drawn up. Did you talk about what those wills would reflect?

A. Well, they would reflect the whole of our -- like, we, we were looking at the whole of our financial situation. So that included the, you know, life insurance. That included the retirement savings. That included the house. So, it was more of an overview of all of what our finances are and why it'd be important to protect our, ourselves for that.

Q. Well, what wills usually say is what happens upon someone's death. So, what would've happened, on the basis of your conversations, what would've happened? What would these wills have said would happen in the event that one of you passed away?

A Well, what I can remember from those discussions is that Johanne wanted to make sure that Sabrine's(ph) taken, taken care of, so there was life insurance policies that she had for that. She wanted to ensure that her retirement savings also passed on to Sabrine(ph) and then for the house, I could get the house. And at the time, you know, that seemed like a reasonable thing to do.

Q. Okay. And, and the discussions with respect to your ownership in that house, what was the result of those discussions?

A. Well, the result of the discussions, when we decided to, to go forward with the renovations, we did -- well, we had been pooling some -- our money together and saving up for several months prior to that before we decided to move forward with, with the renovations of, of our home. So, by that time we had a bunch of savings, we had -- we decided to refinance on the house and, and also to, to get me onto the title of the house in order to protect, protect myself.

Q. And was there any agreement that you would be less than a 50-percent owner in the property?

A. I think we, we both saw that we, we should benefit equally from the increase in, in the property value. I had, you know, I had made significant payments into our joint accounts with that in mind.

Q. And do you recall any discussions between you and Ms. Doucet that Ms. Doucet would be retaining the equity that existed at the time that the property was transferred?

A. I don't, I don't remember any discussions about that. We talked about a lot of different options at that point, like I said, but I don't remember any -- there was never any time where she says I -- no, I don't remember that.

Q. And what was your expectation? Did you -- what was your expectation in terms of your ownership in the property after title was transferred?

A. Well, I was all in on this, so I, I, I saw myself as an equal partner with Johanne. And so....

Q. Specifically, with respect to the property, your ownership in the property, what was your expectation?

A. My expectation was that I would, I would profit from the increase in value over time, just as she would.

Q. I'm, I'm asking in terms of percentage wise. What, in terms of ownership of the property, what was your expectation?

A. Oh, half, half, absolutely. Like, I, I was on the hook for half of the mortgage.

Q. Right. And so, so -- would, would you have taken on half of the mortgage, liability, if you were not going to be an equal owner of the property?

A. No, I don't think that would've been -- it would've been a very big risk.

[103] Mr. Steele was asked twice about what interest he acquired in the house in June 2009. Twice he said that he acquired a share in the increased equity in the house after he went on title, which he later clarified to be 50%.

[104] Second, it is logical that Mr. Steele should be on title if he was on risk for the mortgage.

[105] Third, the agreement, and other evidence, is consistent with Ms. Doucet's evidence that she intended to provide for her daughter if Ms. Doucet died, but also that she wanted to provide security for Mr. Steele. To the same extent, this evidence is inconsistent with Mr. Steele’s evidence that the parties agreed that in the event of Ms. Doucet’s death, he would be looked after as he would receive the whole house, and her daughter would be looked after as she would receive Ms. Doucet’s pension and RRSP’s.

[106] Ms. Doucet's FedEx pension plan statement identified Mr. Steele as a 75% beneficiary of that asset. Further Ms. Doucet admitted that Mr. Steele was a 50% beneficiary of her RRSPs.

[107] Fourth, that Ms. Doucet would keep the pre-June 2009 equity is consistent with Mr. Steele's admissions on cross-examination.

[108] What about the four deposits Mr. Steele said that he made into the joint account as consideration for the equity in the house as of June 2009: namely deposits made on July 8, 2008 of $10,900, May 20, 2009 of $8,000; August 27, 2009 of $5,000; and September 30, 2009 of $3,750? Mr. Steele said that he would not have made these payments had he not received 50% of the existing equity as of June 2009.

[109] I do not accept Mr. Steele's evidence. With respect to the July 8, 2008 payment, it was made 11 months before Mr. Steele was added to title. Mr. Steele admitted in cross-examination that there was no discussion up to and including in 2008 about his going on title. With respect to all four payments, Mr. Steele agreed that he made no suggestion at the time that the money was paid that it was paid on account of his purchase of the pre-June 2009 equity, and/or that for this reason, Ms. Doucet should not comingle it with the funds in the joint account that was used for household expenses. I conclude that these payments were part of Mr. Steele's irregular (both in timing and amount) contributions to the joint account for household purposes that was part of their pre-June 2009 expense sharing agreement.

b) Was Mr. Steele Enriched by Ms. Doucet - Did He Receive a Benefit?

[110] The Supreme Court tells us that, having found that it was the common intention of the parties that at least part of the equity transfer was not a gift for which no consideration was given, the analysis becomes one not of resulting trust but of unjust enrichment: see Kerr, at para. 15, and 24 to 29. Therefore, the analysis turns on three questions: Was Mr. Steele enriched?; Did Ms. Doucet suffer a corresponding deprivation?; and Is there any juristic reason that Mr. Steele should not keep the enrichment he received?

[111] Whether there was enrichment of one and corresponding deprivation of the other is a purely economic question. Moral and policy questions are relevant at the juristic reason stage only: see Kerr, at para 37. Even if there was a mutual conferral of benefits between the couple, this is not to be considered at this stage of the analysis. It is considered at the juristic reason or remedy stage: Granger v. Granger, 2016 ONCA 945, 133 O.R. (3d) 641, at paras. 38-42; Kerr, at paras. 109-115.

[112] In order to prove enrichment, Ms. Doucet must prove that she gave something to Mr. Steele, which he received and retained, albeit not necessarily permanently. Mr. Steele must have been enriched and that enrichment can be restored to Ms. Doucet by money: see Kerr, at para. 38.

[113] Ms. Doucet has made out the fact that Mr. Steele has been enriched to the extent of a 50% interest in the equity that existed in the house as of June, 2009, and by the $65,000 that Lyofresh received.

c) Did Ms. Doucet suffer a corresponding deprivation?

[114] With respect to the corresponding deprivation, Ms. Doucet must establish not only that Mr. Steele was enriched, but that his enrichment corresponds to a deprivation that she has suffered: see Kerr, at para. 39.

[115] In giving Mr. Steele status as joint tenant, Ms. Doucet has established that she has suffered deprivation to the extent of 50% of the equity in the property as of June 2009, and that her deprivation corresponds exactly to the enrichment of Mr. Steele. Further, Ms. Doucet has established that suffered a corresponding privation in that a) she used her contacts to set up meetings with Mr. Steele and others who might be of benefit to Lyofresh and attended those meetings, and b) she supported Mr. Steele throughout his work on Lyofresh, to the extent that he did not work and did not look for work during this time, leaving her to pay all expenses.

d) Is there any juristic reason why Mr. Doucet should be deprived of or allowed to keep the benefit?

[116] A juristic reason to deny recovery refers to the absence of a reason in law or justice for Mr. Steele's retention of the benefit, making the retention unjust in the circumstances: see Kerr, at para 40.

[117] A juristic reason to deny recovery may be the intention to make a gift, a contract, or circumstances where the enrichment of Mr. Steele at Ms. Doucet's expense is required by law, for example, where a statute denies recovery. The court has resisted a purely categorical approach to unjust enrichment claims. The list of juristic reasons is not closed. It may include the legitimate expectations of the parties and the parties right to alter their affairs by way of contract: see Kerr at para. 40 to 41, and Peele, at p. 803.

[118] The analysis of the absence of a juristic reason involves two steps. First, the court must consider the established categories of juristic reasons such as a contract or the intention to make a gift. Second, if the juristic stage of analysis falls outside of the existing categories, one proceeds to determine the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations to assess whether recovery should be denied; see Kerr at para. 43; Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 SCR 629, at paras. 44-46.

[119] The existence of mutual benefits conferred between the parties can be taken account into account at the juristic reason stage of the analysis, but only to the extent it provides relevant evidence of the existence of a juristic reason for the enrichment. Otherwise, the mutual exchange of benefit should be taken into account at the defense and or remedy stage: see Kerr at para. 116. Generally, however, the existence of mutual benefits will not be considered at the juristic stage of the analysis: see Kerr at para. 124.

[120] If Ms. Doucet shows that there is no juristic reason for the benefit conveyed to remain with Mr. Steele, based on the established categories of juristic reasons, she has made out a prima facie case of unjust enrichment. The burden then shifts to Mr. Steele to establish that there is another reason to deny the relief. In determining if another reason has been established, the court should look at all the circumstances of the transaction, having regard to the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations: Kerr, at para. 43.

[121] I deal first, with the pre-June 11, 2009 equity in the home.

[122] In this case, a juristic reason for requiring Mr. Steele to return to Ms. Doucet the 50% of the pre-June 2009 equity in the home that Mr. Steele has by virtue of his joint tenancy is the agreement between them with respect to the pre-June, 2009 equity. With this finding, the onus shifts to Mr. Steele to establish a juristic reason to keep the enrichment.

[123] Mr. Steele argues that the legitimate expectations of the parties in that Ms. Doucet intended to make him a 50% titleholder in the home by making them a joint tenant. I have already concluded, however, differently.

[124] The legitimate expectations of the parties must be determined from the evidence at the time the agreement was entered into.

[125] Mr. Steele also argues that this case is similar enough to Brunsdon v. Ulch, 2019 ONSC 4142 (SCJ), that I should follow that decision. He also argues that I should follow the example of the court in Botelho v. Tajti, 2019 ONSC 7271. Both are distinguishable.

[126] In Brunsdon, the parties cohabited in a common-law relationship for seven years. The man owned the home. The home underwent three significant renovations. The woman invested money into the property that she received from the breakdown of her previous marriage. The woman was made a joint tenant. At breakdown of the relationship, the man moved for partition and sale, and a declaration that he was entitled 50% of the equity.

[127] The court held that the man had contributed his equity at the beginning of the relationship, and cash in the monthly mortgage throughout the relationship. He also provided labour to all of the projects undertaken in renovation. The court determined that the parties' reasonable expectation was that they would each on half of the property and there was no juristic reason to return any benefit given by the wife. The court granted the application for partition and sale with the net proceeds being divided equally.

[128] In determining the parties' joint expectation, the court gave significant weight to the evidence of the lawyer who completed the transfer, finding that the lawyer was direct and professional in getting his evidence and, in some cases, had notes to rely upon. The court found that there is no reason to disbelieve the lawyer's version of events. He had notes of his meeting. The court accepted that the lawyer told the woman that there ought to be a cohabitation agreement between she and the man in order to protect her more significant financial investment in the property and told the woman to obtain a valuation of the property before the renovations and again following the renovations. He also told her to speak to the man in order to come up with an agreement on percentage ownership. The woman did none of these things. Further, the court found that the lawyer explained the differences between ownership as joint tenants and as tenants in common. The Court also found that the lawyer told the parties that each would own 50% of the property unless a different ownership percentage was identified in the transfer documentation. There was no such different description.

[129] In this case, I did not find Mr. MacKay's evidence of assistance and I was unable to conclude what advice he gave the parties or either of them.

[130] In Botehlo, the couple bought a house as joint tenants and then separated. The applicant made a claim in unjust enrichment on the basis that he contributed far more than the respondent to the costs of the home including the mortgage, property tax, and utilities.

[131] Justice Woollcombe held that the applicant and the respondent made an agreement that they would share household expenses in order to pay down the mortgage and acquire equity in the home. While the applicant paid things like the mortgage, respondent made many payments for many other things including food and utilities from her a and resources and accounts.

[132] Her Honour rejected the argument that it should weigh enrichment based on disproportionate contributions by the parties. She found that the parties both contributed to the household expenses as they were able to, given their incomes. Her Honour found that there was no evidence that the parties ever discussed the idea that they would apportion the cost of the home in a completely equal basis. Their agreement was that they would pay what they could from the money they earned, and this is precisely what they did. This was a reasonable and fair way to organize their affairs and any minor enrichment of the respondent and corresponding deprivation of the applicant because of a greater contribution by the latter did not create anything unjust.

[133] Both this case and Brunsdon address the question of the whole of the equity of the house. In this case, I've already determined that there was an agreement that reserved the pre-June 2009 equity to Ms. Doucet. That defines the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time.

[134] With respect to the juristic analysis, both parties argued the mutual benefits each conferred on the other to establish, on Mr. Steele's part a 50-50 allocation of the property, and on Ms. Doucet's part to deny Mr. Steele any part of the equity.

[135] Setting aside the pre-June 2009 equity, I am persuaded by the decision in Botehlo. In this case, as in Botehlo, there was no evidence that the parties agreed, once and for all, that each would share in a specific ratio of household expenses or that in the event of separation each would benefit in a certain percentage share of assets. On the evidence before me, the parties' relationship was economically fluid, changing as the circumstances of the couple changed (usually those of Mr. Steele). On the evidence before me it appears that the arrangement was that the parties would contribute as they could to the relationship. The natural expectation would have been that they share in the increase in their wealth, equally.

[136] With respect to the equity accrued since June 2009 I do not find that the mutual benefits conferred analysis assists with respect to whether there is juristic reason to permit Mr. Steele to keep (or not) his 50% of the post June 2009 equity. He is entitled to that equity.

[137] I now turn to Lyofresh.

[138] As indicated above, Mr. Steele admitted that he brought $65,000 of income into Lyofresh, the company he controlled. He said that all but about $1,000.00 of that income came into Lyofresh after separation. He conceded that in 2017, his earnings only covered his education and personal expense, and that he contributed little, if at all, to family expenses. He said that most of his work on Lyofresh was done in 2017 when he worked almost exclusively on it.

[139] Mr. Steele admitted that he did not disclose Lyofresh’s income until just before trial. He explained that he could not use that income outside of Lyofresh.

[140] Since Mr. Steele produced no independent evidence of when Lyofresh received payments and of any restriction on the use of the funds, I do not accept his oral evidence. He justifies not using any part of that money to help with family expenses by saying that Lyofresh was an independent entity of which Ms. Doucet wanted no part, and which stood outside the parties' 'fully integrated' finances.

[141] I find that Mr. Steele intentionally withheld from Ms. Doucet information that Lyofresh received any funds because the relationship was ending and because he did not want to face a demand by Ms. Doucet that she should share in the money Lyofresh received. I have already stated that Lyofresh was not entirely outside the joint family venture. It was part of it. Ms. Doucet provided contacts for Mr. Steele to pursue with respect to developing the company and went to meetings with those contacts. Indeed, Mr. Steele said that he was developing Lyofresh for the benefit of the family. During Mr. Steele’s most intensive period of work on Lyofresh, in 2017, he admits he contributed little, if anything, to the family unit.

[142] There is a juristic reason to not permit Mr. Steele to keep the benefit of the money that came into Lyofresh. He acted deceitfully by not declaring the money Lyofresh received to Ms. Doucet, just as he did with respect to the second payment by Behring Media. He should not be permitted to benefit from this deceit. To the extent of the money Lyofresh received, Mr. Steele was enriched, and Ms. Doucet was deprived. He was the controlling mind of Lyofresh. He chose to withhold information about Lyofresh’s economic circumstances. He chose to leave that money in the company, and not to pay himself for the large amount of work he was doing in trying to develop the company. He chose not to discuss these circumstances with Ms. Doucet.

Remedy

1. The Parties Positions

[143] In Kerr, the court held that, as a rule, if unjust enrichment is found, the remedy lay not in imposing an ownership obligation, but in making a monetary award.

[144] At paragraphs 80 through 100 of Kerr, the court held that the monetary remedy for unjust enrichment is not restricted to an award based on a fee for services approach. Unjust enrichment is most realistically characterized as arising where one party retains a disproportionate share of assets resulting from a joint family venture, and where a monetary award is appropriate, it should be calculated on the basis of the share of those assets proportionate to the parties' contributions. In order to do this, the proponent must show that there was in fact a joint family venture, and that there is a link between his or her contributions to it and the commission of assets and/or wealth. Whether there is a joint family venture, is a question of fact to be assessed having regard to such factors as mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family. This determination is not made based on a minute examination of the give and take of family life. Rather it is made on the reason exercise of judgment in light of all of the evidence: see Kerr at para. 102.

[145] In this case, Mr. Steele reviews all the parties' contributions to the family and submits that it is still appropriate to apportion the equity in the house equally between them. His contributions include the fact that put significant labour into the renovations of the house and was intimately involved in the planning of the renovations. He put almost his entire income into the joint account for the family's benefit. He returned to school in order to improve his earning potential for the benefit of the family unit. He managed both parties' RRSP and pension assets to maximize the return for both of them. The pair had entirely emerged their financial affairs.

[146] Mr. Steele concedes that his cash contributions toward the family unit declined along with his income and that by 2017 he was not contributing. However, this was done with Ms. Doucet's agreement, and, in the long run, for the benefit of the family unit. As his work demands decreased, his work around the house increased as he had more time to do household chores.

[147] Ms. Doucet performed a detailed analysis of each party's contribution to the house and the family. She argued that Mr. Steele has received more than a proportionate share of family assets since:

a) she paid all of the household expenses while he took his BA and then MA;

b) he was able to place significant amounts placed into his RRSP,

c) he eliminated his indebtedness and incur any further indebtedness notwithstanding that he returned to school;

d) he was relieved of the normal costs of daily living;

e) he received $12,000 on account of spousal support;

f) he was allowed to attempt to develop Lyofresh, although unsuccessfully;

g) he was a beneficiary of Ms. Doucet's LTD and health benefits from her employment.

[148] On the other hand, Ms. Doucet argues that he contributed only one third of the value of family expenses (setting aside tuition and his education related expenses). She paid the mortgage and is responsible for any increase the equity. She did not take courses available through her employer to increase her earning potential, deferring to Mr. Steele and his education.

[149] Further, well she financed and supported Mr. Steele through his education, which he said was for the good of the family, the union ended immediately before that benefit was realized. Therefore, she has been deprived of that benefit, having made the sacrifice to obtain it.

[150] Ultimately, she concludes that Mr. Steele has been adequately compensated for his contributions to the joint family venture, without any interest in the property.

[151] Alternately, Ms. Doucet says that she should keep one third of the equity in the house since that was the amount of equity when Mr. Steele was added to title in June 2009. The balance should be split equally, reducing Mr. Steele's share for a number of expenses or other items. The equity in the house as of March, 2019 (the date of the last appraisal) is $712,123 ($885,000 minus outstanding mortgage of $172,877). Therefore Mr. Steele's maximum entitlement is $237,374.33, less further deductions as follows:

a) 50% of the carrying costs of the house from August 2017 up to and including January 2020 of $46,500 ($3100/month x 30 months = $93,000 ÷ 2);

b) $7000 for her 50% share of the Berhing media second investment return (which he conceded he owes her);

c) $10,000 for her share of Mr. Steele's new car (which he conceded he owed her); and

d) compensation for the loss of 50% of Mr. Steele's after-tax, post-graduation income, for five years, of $120,000, in which she would have shared had they stayed together.

[152] With respect to the pre-June 2009 equity, in this case, the parties' intention, as I have found it, governs. Ms. Doucet is entitled to $113,957.00 as the pre-June 11, 2009 equity in the house.

[153] Ms. Doucet's analysis of the joint family venture is exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada warned should not occur. She engages in a minute examination of the give-and-take of daily life, when it is nearly impossible to engage in a specific and minute weighing of the benefits conferred within a relationship: see Kerr at para. 95 and 102. She engages in the dueling quantum meruit claims the court specifically warns against: see Kerr at para. 48.

[154] Looking at the matter broadly and giving effect to the intentions of the parties, with the exception of the pre-June 11, 2009 equity in the home and the Lyofresh income, I do not find that, based on the joint family venture analysis, Mr. Steele has been unjustly enriched. I find applicable here the logic of Woolcombe, J., at para. 29 of Botehlo, where she says:

In this case, I find that there is no evidence that the parties ever agreed to, or even discussed the idea that they would apportion the costs of the home on a completely equal basis. Nor is there any evidence of an agreement that, were they to separate, they would go back and ensure that each had contributed to the joint expenses that enabled them to accumulate equity in the home equally. Their agreement was that each would pay what they could from the money each had. And this is precisely what they did. In these circumstances, when they chose to order their affairs in a reasonable and fair manner, if there was any minor enrichment of the respondent and corresponding deprivation of the applicant because he contributed more than she did towards building the equity in the home, there is nothing unjust about it.

[155] In this case, as indicated, the parties had an agreement at the outset, in which Mr. Steele was expected to contribute one third of household expenses. That changed when they went to an "IOU" arrangement. The agreement changed again from time to time, as Mr. Steele's fortunes changed. To say now that his 50% share in the post June 2009 equity of the home should be altered to reflect his proportionate financial contribution is inconsistent with their agreement.

[156] I was given no authority to support the proposition that Mr. Steele's 50% share in the post June 2009 equity should be reduced by the benefit of his increased income that Ms. Doucet was deprived of when the relationship ended just before Mr. Steele secured a job in his new field.

[157] Mr. Steele has been unjustly enriched insofar as Lyofresh received $65,000 and he did not devote any of that money to the family's use. He controlled the corporation and, hence, the application of those funds. He deceitfully withheld from Ms. Doucet the fact that Lyofresh received money during the relationship, or afterward but while he was still living expense free in the home while she paid most, if not all family expenses in 2017 and 2018. Mr. Steele's deceit is a juristic reason why he should not keep that benefit.

[158] Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's approach of the reasoned exercise of judgment in light of all of the evidence (see Kerr at para. 102), I set the value of the unjust enrichment at $10,000.00. In other words, Mr. Steele's equity shall be reduced by $10,000.00. I shall address this again, shortly.

2. Can Mr. Steele Force a Sale of the House?

[159] Yes. Mr. Steele is registered on title and is entitled to force the sale under the Partition Act, subject to adjustments in his equity as determined in the family proceeding.

3. Can Ms. Doucet force Mr. Steele to sell to her?

[160] No. There is no power in this court to order that one party be given a right of first refusal with respect to matrimonial property sold as that would amount to a forced sale of the jointly owned property by one party to another without the benefit of fair market value: see Miller v. Hawryn, 2010 ONSC 6094, at para. 25; Buttar v. Buttar, 2013 ONSC 517, at paras 63 to 66.

[161] The parties are free, however, to negotiate a resolution to their dispute. I encourage the parties to attempt to resolve this matter, with the assistance of these Reasons, without resorting to a forced sale, since, based on his evidence at trial (and notwithstanding his pleading) it appears that Mr. Steele is looking for a buyout. My fervent hope is that the parties can resolve this question, even if it requires an up to date appraiser to fix the value of the house as of the date of these reasons.

4. Terms of the Forced Sale?

[162] If the parties cannot resolve their dispute with the assistance of these reasons within 30 days of the release of these Reasons, the house shall be sold forthwith.

[163] The evidence in this trial convinces me that the parties will not likely agree on any aspect of the listing and sale of the property. Given my credibility findings, there is a high likelihood that Mr. Steele will attempt to maximize these circumstances to his benefit. Therefore, the sale of the house will be on the following terms:

a) Ms. Doucet, having a greater interest in the equity in house than Mr. Steele, will control the listing and sale of the house.

b) In order to give effect to her control of the listing and sale of the house, Ms. Doucet shall have the power to sign all documents on Mr. Steele's behalf that are necessary to list and sell the house.

c) Mr. Steele will cooperate to the fullest in listing and selling the property.

5. Distribution of the Net Proceeds of the Sale

Entitlement to Equity and Adjustments

[164] The net proceeds of the sale shall be held in trust by the solicitor handling the sale. The solicitor shall distribute the proceeds on the following basis:

a) Ms. Doucet shall receive the first $113,957.00.

b) The remaining net proceeds shall be distributed equally, subject to the following amounts which will be deducted from Mr. Steele's share and added to Ms. Doucet's share:

(i) The amount necessary to repay the Line of Credit secured against the property. At trial, it was estimated that this amount would be $35,000.00.

(ii) $7,000.00 to reflect the amount Mr. Steele conceded he owes Ms. Doucet for 50% of the Behring Media second payment.

(iii) $10,000.00 to reflect 50% of the value of Mr. Steele's car, and

(iv) $10,000.00 representing the adjustment in equity to reflect the unjust enrichment of Mr. Steele with respect to Lyofresh's income.

Adjustments for Carrying Costs Consequent to Ownership and Consumable Expenses

[165] Mr. Steele has lived in the home since separation on July 25, 2017, without contribution toward any of the carrying costs consequent to ownership and consumable expenses. Ms. Doucet paid those. He owes her for his share of those costs.

[166] Carrying costs consequent to ownership are those costs necessary to protect the equity; namely mortgage payments, property tax, home insurance, and expenses for capital repairs or improvements.

[167] As a home owner with a 50% interest in the post June 2009 equity, Mr. Steele must reimburse Ms. Doucet for 50% of the carrying costs consequent on ownership, as follows:

a) $31,099.41 for Mr. Steele's 50% share of mortgage payments from date of separation to May 25, 2020;

b) an additional amount to represent Mr. Steele's 50% share of mortgage payments from May 25, 2020 to the date of sale.

c) $6,607.76 for Mr. Steele's 50% share of property tax payments from date of separation to May 25, 2020;

d) an additional amount to represent Mr. Steele's 50% share of property tax payments from May 25, 2020 to date of the sale.

e) $1,795.36 for Mr. Steele's 50% share of home insurance payments from date of separation to May 25, 2020;

f) an additional amount to represent Mr. Steele's 50% share of home insurance payments from May 25, 2020 to date of the sale.

[168] Mr. Steele has lived in the home since July 25, 2017, consuming his share of consumable expenses. Those are expenses incurred by those living in the house which are not incurred to protect the equity. These include the cost of electricity, water, gas, and furnace, water heater or other such equipment rental fees.

[169] Three people lived in the house: Mr. Steele, Ms. Doucet, and Ms. Doucet. It is only reasonable that he reimburses Ms. Doucet for 1/3rd of those expenses as follows:

a) $11,616.78 for Mr. Steele's 1/3rd share of consumables from date of separation to May 25, 2020;

b) an addition amount to represent Mr. Steele's share of consumable expenses from May 25, 2020 to date of the sale at $341.67 per month.

Enforceability of these Reasons

[170] During the Covid-19 pandemic, the parties are reminded that these reasons are effective and enforceable immediately, notwithstanding that a formal order is not taken out.

Costs

[171] If the parties cannot agree as to who pays whom costs and in what amount, I shall decide the matter in writing. Submissions are limited to 5 double spaced, type written pages, excluding Bills of Costs and offers. Mr. Steele's are to be served and filed by 4 pm, 31 July 2020, and Ms. Doucet's by 4 pm, 31 August 2020. There will be no right of reply.

Trimble J.

Released: May 29, 2020