Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-15-82595-00 Date: 2020-02-27 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Between: OCLAN SAINT PATRICK DARKINS, Applicant Counsel: G. Aghimien, for the Applicant

And: ANDREA E JONES, Respondent Counsel: Andrea Jones, on her own behalf

Heard: September 30, October 1 and 2, 2019

Reasons for Judgment

Trimble J.

[1] Due to the parties’ hard work with Tzimas, J. at the exit pretrial, there were only three questions to be determined on this trial. Those three questions can be broken down into the following four issues or questions:

a) Does Mr. Darkins owe Ms. Jones retroactive child support? Ms. Jones does not claim child support after December 2017. b) Who owns the matrimonial home, in what proportion, and how should it be treated for equalization purposes? c) What to do with equity withdrawals and other adjustments to the interests in the home? d) What is the equalization, and should there be a post separation accounting for Mr. Darkins’ pension?

Background

[2] The parties disagree as to when they met, but it appears to have been in the spring 2008 when Mr. Darkins came to Ms. Jones’ house with a friend named Manny to assist in finishing her basement. Someone had started, but not completed the work. Manny and Mr. Darkins finished the job. The parties became friends and later, started dating.

[3] Mr. Darkins says that in August 2008, Ms. Jones asked him to move in. He declined as it was too early in their relationship. Ms. Jones says that in March 2009, she asked the applicant to come live with her to help him because he was in significant financial strain. She says that he moved in in March 2009 and lived essentially rent free, contributing only minimally towards expenses. He says that he contributed most of his pay to the house and expenses.

[4] In 2009, Mr. Darkins was also going through the immigration process. During his immigration hearing he was asked to produce documentation which he could not produce. Accordingly, by April 2009 his application had been denied. His lawyer filed an appeal. He was at risk of being deported if his appeal were not successful or if he did not produce the documents required.

[5] The couple married on July 26, 2009. Mr. Darkins says that they married because they were in love. Ms. Jones says that the marriage was to prevent Mr. Darkins from being deported.

[6] The couple separated on or about February 1, 2014. Each accuses the other of infidelity leading to the divorce.

[7] Ultimately, it was a 4½ year marriage.

[8] There were no children of the marriage. Ms. Jones has one daughter with her previous partner. Mr. Darkins was adamant through the file that he was not the child’s natural father and insisted on a DNA test. Ms. Jones did not dispute this but agreed to the test. The DNA test excluded Mr. Darkins as the child’s father. In the end, however, Mr. Darkins did not dispute he owed child support for the child as he treated her as his child.

A Note on Evidence

[9] Mr. Darkins presented the court with the Applicant’s Document Brief. After some discussion, Ms. Jones agreed that the court could accept all the documents in that brief for the truth of their contents except for the appraisals at tabs four and five. Following a discussion with the parties and further discussions by themselves, the parties agreed that the value of the house at the date of separation was $540,000.

Credibility

[10] Much of the outcome of this dispute turns on the credibility of the parties.

[11] Any credibility assessment involves answering two questions: is the witness honest, and how accurate and reliable is his or her memory and evidence? In answering this question, I direct myself to the following considerations:

a) What is the witness’s demeanour? How did he or she give evidence? Because people react differently, and because trials are stressful events conducted in a foreign environment under unusual (from the layperson’s perspective) rules and rituals, findings of credibility should not be made on demeanour alone. b) Does the evidence make sense considering the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonable given the particular place and condition? Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.). c) Does the evidence have an internal consistency and logical flow? R. v. C.H. (1999), 182 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 32 (Nfld. C.A.). d) Is the evidence consistent with the witness’s other statements? How significant are the differences, and are they adequately explained? R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788. e) Is there independent confirming or contradicting evidence? R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531. f) Does the witness have a motivation to lie or exaggerate? The witness’s motivation to lie must be greater than his/her interest to win or lose the case. R. v. S.D. 2007 ONCA 243, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 323.

[12] In this case, I have serious concerns with Mr. Darkins’ credibility. Therefore, where his evidence conflicts with that of Ms. Jones or of other independent evidence, I prefer that evidence over Mr. Darkins’. While there are numerous problems with Mr. Darkins’ evidence that affect his credibility, three examples will illustrate:

a) Property Agreement – Ex. 1, Tab 2 (original marked Ex. 5) - The Property Agreement deals with the terms upon which Mr. Darkins became one of the registered owners of Ms. Jones’ house and what would happen to the proceeds of sale after the house was sold. Among other things, the document provided that if the property was disposed of after December 2011, the first $65,000 of equity would belong to Ms. Jones, and the balance would be divided on a 50-50 basis between the two.

Mr. Darkins agreed that the purpose of the agreement was to ensure that Ms. Jones recovered her deposit for the home if the home sold. His evidence, however was inconsistent with respect to the amount he thought Ms. Jones would recover. At one point he said that Ms. Jones told him that she would get the first $15,000. Later he said that Ms. Jones said that she would get the first $50,000. He denied that she ever said that she would get the first $65,000.

Second, in his examination in chief, Mr. Darkins said that Ms. Jones told him to sign the agreement. He says that he signed it but did not read it.

Most significant, however, when Mr. Darkins was cross-examined on the Property Agreement, he insisted that the document that he signed provided that Ms. Jones would receive the first $50,000 from the eventual sale from the house not $65,000 as stated in the document. He was shown the original agreement (Ex. 5). He agreed that he had a distinctive signature which would be difficult to forge. He agreed only that the signature on the original agreement “looks like” his and “resembled” his. He would not admit that it was his. He insisted that this was not the agreement he signed. The court asked him if he was taking the position that Exhibit 5 was a fraudulent document. He answered “yes”.

Mr. Darkins did not provide a speck of evidence in support of his allegation of fraud.

b) 2013 mortgage and transfer by the couple to Ms. Jones, alone – In 2013, Ms. Jones renewed the mortgage. At the same time, the property was transferred to Ms. Jones, solely. She said that this was done at the insistence of the new mortgagee. Mr. Darkins says that while he knew the mortgage had to be renewed and he had to sign some documents, he simply signed what she gave him, without reading it, and that he signed the documents at the home. He denied signing in front of a lawyer.

The documents are clear that on January 11, 2013 the couple transferred the home to Ms. Jones, alone. While transfer documents were not entered at trial, a spousal consent to the electronic registration of the charge was produced. That document bears the signature which purports to be Mr. Darkins. It is strikingly similar to the signature on the Property Agreement and on his driver’s licence, the latter of which he admitted was his signature.

As with the signature on the Property Agreement, he would not admit that the signature on the spousal consent was his. He said, simply, that it “looks like it”. The lawyer who handled the transaction signed as a witness. Mr. Darkins flatly denied that lawyer’s signature as witness on the spousal consent was familiar to the signature of the lawyer in other places on other documents involved in the transaction.

Mr. Darkins makes the veiled accusation that Ms. Jones created another fraudulent document. He did not provide a speck of evidence with respect to the alleged fraud.

c) In his Financial Statement sworn on August 20, 2019 (or anywhere else), Mr. Darkins listed no pension assets. His paystub for the period ending January 7, 2012 indicated certain deductions under the heading “other”, one of which was called “EER PP”. He admitted in cross examination that this was a pension into which he had been paying since 2012. The value of that pension as of December 31, 2013 was $6,471.60.

This is no lapse of memory or honest mistake, since he transferred the money to another vehicle shortly before trial.

[13] Ms. Jones is not entirely free from credibility problems. Those problems, however, are less serious than Mr. Darkins’ credibility problems because Ms. Jones credibility problems do not go directly to her honesty. For example:

a) notwithstanding that she relies on the property agreement, she extended the mortgage on January 11, 2013, receiving a further approximately $35,000. She couldn’t account for that sum other than to say it was needed to pay the expenses of “life”. b) On June 9, 2014, four months after the relationship ended, she gave a second mortgage, realizing $23,500 from the equity. Mr. Darkins agreed in cross examination and in reply that he was aware that the second mortgage was taken out and why it was needed. Ms. Andre explained that she paid for credit cards of joint debt but admitted that she realized $16,120.33 after those payments. She said that she paid $3,000 to Mr. Darkins’ immigration lawyers, on an outstanding account of the time of $7,000. She does not have the receipt. The balance of the money she kept ($13,200) and did not account for. c) On June 7, 2019, Ms. Jones gave another second mortgage for $85,000. No abstract of title was provided so it is unclear whether the $85,000 second mortgage in 2019 was used to pay off what remained of the second mortgage in June taken out in June 2014. Ms. Jones indicates, however, that she kept the proceeds of the June 2019 second mortgage.

Issue 1: Child Support

[14] Ms. Jones has a daughter, Brittany (dob June 27, 2000), from a previous marriage. In the trial, Ms. Jones sought child support up to the end of December 2017 when Brittany went to live with a neighbour.

[15] Mr. Darkins conceded at trial that he owes child support for Brittany, whom he treated as a daughter.

[16] It is agreed that after separation on February 14, 2014, Brittany lived with Mr. Darkins from October 20, 2014 to January 2015 (3 months). From separation to October 24, 2014 (8 months) and February 2015 to October 2017 (32 months), Brittany lived with Ms. Jones. From November 2017 to February 2018 (4 months), Brittany lived with a neighbor, during which time, Ms. Jones paid the neighbour $260 per month.

[17] By interim order dated December 18, 2015, Mr. Darkins was ordered to pay child support of $415 monthly, effective January 1, 2016, based on his income of $46,000.00. He paid two months of support. The issue of retroactive child support was adjourned.

[18] On March 31, 2016, Braid J. heard the retroactive child support motion. She ordered, on an interim basis:

1. Evidence conflicted on whether he paid child support in 2014. This had to be determined at trial.
2. He owed child support for 11 months in 2015 of $240 per month based on his income of $29,394, for a 2015 total of $2,640.

[19] At the June 26, 2018 Trial Management Conference, Tzimas, J. indicated that the support issues concerned March 2016 to December 2017. Tzimas, J. did not address the 2014 period. I assume that this issue remains, as Braid J., identified it.

[20] Ms. Jones says that Mr. Darkins paid only two months of support under the December 2015 order, or $830. Mr. Darkins said he paid regularly, at $100 to $200 per month in cash.

[21] For the reasons stated above, I do not accept Mr. Darkins’ evidence. In addition, there is no bank record or other document supporting these alleged payments.

[22] Based on the scarce evidence at trial, Mr. Darkins’ stated incomes (from his T1, T4, or assessments) were as follows:

Year	Amount	Source	Working
2012	$40,755	T1	Colourtech
2013			Colourtech
2014	$43,290	T1	Colourtech
2015	$29,543	Assm’t	Self Emp’d
2016	$11,300	T1
2017	$12,385	T1

[23] There was little evidence about Mr. Darkins’ income and wages at the trial. He submitted that I should take it directly from his financial records for the purposes of calculating support. Ms. Jones said that Mr. Darkins always made good money while at Colourtech. It was only after the marriage ended that he left Colourtech and became self-employed. Inferentially, she says that Mr. Darkins left employment to defeat claims for support.

[24] There is no evidence to support Ms. Jones’ inferential position that Mr. Darkins left employment in order to defeat his obligations to her or the child. I have some concern, however, that Mr. Darkins’ income as a self-employed individual is less than half of the minimum wage. He is no explanation for his inability to earn reasonable income at a time when support is actively being sought against them and, granted under two orders. For the years of 2016 at 2017, there is no reason why he should not have made approximately minimum wage. For those two years I impute income of $25,000.

[25] Based on the foregoing, the following are my findings as to Mr. Darkins’ income and the support owing:

Year	Income	Monthly c/s owing	Yearly c/s owing	C/s paid	Net c/s owing
2014	$43,290	398	3184 [1]	0	3184
2015	$29,543	252	2772 [2]	0	2772
2016	$25,000	199	2338 [3]	0	2338
2017	$25,000	199	1990 [4]	0	1990
2018	$25,000	108 [5]	216 [6]

Total c/s owing by Mr. Darkins: $10,500 - $830 = $9,670

Issue 2: The Matrimonial Home

Facts

[26] Originally, 12 Hellman Rd. in Brampton was purchased by Peter Jones, Ms. Jones’ brother. She says that Peter was a bare trustee for her. She paid the down payment and the monthly instalments. It was placed in Peter’s name because she did not qualify for a mortgage. Transfer from the developer to Peter Jones occurred on March 26, 2008, the cost was $361,051.43. The Bank of Nova Scotia took a mortgage for $389,901.36. Ms. Jones used the difference to finish the basement to create an apartment to generate income.

[27] On December 20, 2011, Peter Jones transferred the home to the parties, and the parties gave a mortgage of $395,920. Ms. Jones says that Peter Jones had to transfer the property because he was having marital difficulties. Ms. Jones was afraid that if his brother and sister-in-law separated, Peter would have to declare the Hellman Avenue as an asset on his financial statement. Ms. Jones said that the Hellman Avenue property was transferred to her and Mr. Darkins jointly, because her income and or credit was not adequate to obtain financing on her own.

[28] Mr. Darkins takes no issue with the foregoing.

[29] On December 18, 2011, Ms. Jones says that the parties entered into a Property Agreement (Exhibit 1, tab 2) that addressed ownership of the property once it was transferred to the two of them, jointly. The Agreement says that the property was owned by Ms. Jones prior to marriage. The parties agreed that as of December 21, 2011, Mr. Darkins would be added to title and the mortgage of the property as a part owner. It was also agreed by both parties that as of December 2011 the established appraised value of the property is $490,000. In the event that the property was disposed of after December 2011, the parties agree that the first $65,000 of equity should go to Ms. Jones and any equity thereafter would be divided equally between the parties. The agreement was silent with respect to what would happen if the parties separated or divorced.

[30] Mr. Darkins says that he was told to sign a paper in order to obtain the mortgage and put them on title. He says that Ms. Jones said to him that the amount that she would be entitled to for any split in the equity was $15,000, and later $50,000 not $65,000. He also said that the Agreement was a forgery.

[31] For the reasons I have already expressed, I do not accept Mr. Darkins’ evidence. I find the Property Agreement which was entered as Exhibit 5 in its original, bears his signature. He is bound by that agreement. I find that he agreed that if the house was sold, the first $65,000 of equity would go to Ms. Jones and then any equity thereafter would be divided on a net basis at 50-50 between them.

[32] On January 11, 2013, the property was transferred from Ms. Jones and Mr. Darkins jointly to Ms. Jones, solely. Ms. Jones testified that the lender would not advance funds to Mr. Darkins because of his poor credit. Ms. Jones also gave a first mortgage to Home Trust for $427,000, the proceeds of which were used to discharge the original first mortgage from December 2011. The couple realized a $31,000 payment out of the equity which, Ms. Jones says, was used for family expenses.

[33] Mr. Darkins says that he was aware that a new mortgage had to be taken out and that he had to sign documents with respect to that mortgage. He agreed that the balance of the equity that they received was used to discharge family related expenses. However, he denies that he agreed to transfer title. He says that because he knew that the mortgage had to be renewed, he signed documents that Ms. Jones gave him while at the home one day. He did not read those documents. He denied that he went to the lawyer’s office and sign them in front of a lawyer.

[34] For the reasons already stated, I do not accept Mr. Darkins’ evidence. The registered transfer documents are clear that on January 11, 2013 the couple transferred the home to Ms. Jones, alone. Complete transfer documents are not available. However, a spousal consent to the electronic registration of the charge was produced. That document bears the signature which purports to be Mr. Darkins. It is strikingly similar to the signature on the Property Agreement. As with the Property Agreement, Mr. Darkins would not admit the signature was his. He simply said that it “looks like it”. The lawyer who handled the transaction signed as a witness. That signature is strikingly familiar to the signature of the lawyer who signed as a witness other documents involved in the transaction.

[35] As with the Property Agreement, Mr. Darkins makes the veiled accusation that Ms. Jones created a fraudulent document with respect to the 2013 transfer of ownership from the couple to Ms. Jones, solely. In addition, his veiled accusation is also that the lawyer signed as a witness when he did not, in fact, witness Mr. Darkins signing the document. He did not provide a speck of evidence with respect to the alleged fraud by either Ms. Jones or on the part of the lawyer.

[36] I find that in January 2013, Mr. Darkins was aware that the couple was transferring the property from joint ownership to Ms. Jones’ sole ownership in order to pay family debt.

[37] In February 2014, the couple separated.

[38] On June 9, 2014 Ms. Jones gave a second mortgage for $23,500 which she says paid off joint credit card debts of $3,779.67 as shown by the trust statement from the law firm at Exhibit 1, tab one, page 21. Ms. Jones says, and I accept, that she used another $3,000 as a payment towards Mr. Jones’ outstanding $7,000 lawyers bill incurred with respect to his immigration application. That means that she kept $13,120.33. She says, and I accept, that she used this money to pay off family debts.

[39] On June 7, 2019, Ms. Jones gave another second mortgage, this time in the amount of $85,000. She does not indicate what she did with that money.

Ownership of the Home?

[40] The Hellman Drive property was the matrimonial home from 2009, onward. Until December 20, 2011, Ms. Jones was the sole owner of the property. From December 20, 2011 until January 11, 2013, the property was held jointly. After January 11, 2013 the property was held by Ms. Jones, solely.

[41] There was a great deal of evidence by each party as to what each said each and the other contributed to the maintenance of and repairs to the property. Presumably, this was in support of each’s view that the contribution by each to the property determined his or her ownership. Mr. Darkins argued that he is entitled to 50% of the home. Ms. Jones said he is entitled to 30 to 35% of the value of the home.

[42] The Property Agreement dated December 18, 2011, however, controls the interests of the parties in the matrimonial home. Therefore, the matrimonial home must be dealt with separately from net family property for equalization purposes.

What does the Property Agreement do?

[43] On its face, Mr. Darkins became a co-owner of the home as of December 20, 2011. The Property Agreement was amended on January 11, 2013 when the parties agreed that Mr. Darkins would no longer be an owner.

[44] Therefore, from December 2011 to January 2013, Mr. Darkins was a title holder with all the interest and rights of a title holder. The events of January 11, 2013 amended the agreement to the extent that Mr. Darkins ceased being a title holder. Mr. Darkins’ interest in the property changed. Effective January 11, 2013, he was entitled only to 50% of the equity when the property was sold, after Ms. Jones received the first $65,000.

What Effect Does the Property Agreement Have on Equalization?

[45] As indicated above, the matrimonial home and the rights of the parties in respect of it, are governed by the Property Agreement as modified by the removal of Mr. Darkins from title on January 11, 2013. The matrimonial home is removed from the equalization property.

What is the Remedy with respect to the Home?

[46] In his Application, Mr. Darkins sought sale of the property. In his opening and closing statements, however, he does not seek a sale. In his opening statement Mr. Darkins sought only $61,500, representing an equalization of the net equity as of date of separation. [7] As the parties agreed that the date of separation value of the house was $540,000, not the $550,000 referred to in Mr. Darkins’ opening statement, the payment he seeks should be adjusted to $56,500.

[47] Since no one requested at trial that the home be sold, the only remedy available at trial is a declaration with respect to the home. Therefore, I declare that since the Property Agreement does not address separation or divorce, on its face, the Property Agreement provides that when the property is sold (there being no other triggering event), Ms. Jones is entitled to the first $65,000 of the net equity, and the parties share equally in any net equity thereafter. In other words, Mr. Darkins’ interest is 50% of the net equity (after Ms. Jones receives the first $65,000). Mr. Darkins’ interest crystalizes only on the sale of the property. Mr. Darkins, however, does not have any right under the contract to force the sale of the property. That decision rests with Ms. Jones or the mortgagees.

Issue 3: Equity Withdrawals and other Adjustments to the Interests in the Home

[48] After January 11, 2013, when Mr. Darkins was removed from title, Ms. Jones refinanced the property several of times, withdrawing further equity. There was no evidence provided as to the value of any of the mortgages at the time of the refinancing.

[49] Mr. Darkins’ position is that Ms. Jones owes him 50% of each of the withdrawals from the property’s equity.

[50] Based on the Property Agreement, I agree that to the extent that Ms. Jones withdrew equity from the property, it is only equitable that she accounts for 50% of the sums that she kept or spent, that were not used to pay down the family’s debts. In now turn to the mortgages about which there was evidence.

a. January 11, 2013 Mortgage for $427,000.

[51] This mortgage discharged a previous mortgage which had a face value of $395,920. Ms. Jones said that she realized approximately $33,000 from this mortgage. She said that $1,300 of that went to repair Mr. Darkins’ van, and the balance to family debt. There is no document such as a lawyer’s trust ledger statement accounting for these funds.

[52] Based on my credibility findings and the fact that Mr. Darkins acknowledged that this mortgage was needed because of the family’s accumulated debt, I find that the equity taken from the property in this mortgage was used to pay family related debt. There is no need for Ms. Jones to account to Mr. Darkins for any part of the money received from the mortgage.

b. June 9, 2014 Second Mortgage for $23,000

[53] Ms. Jones gave this second mortgage 5 days short of four months after the date of separation. It was a one-year mortgage.

[54] Mr. Darkins acknowledged in cross examination on Reply that he discussed with Ms. Jones the need for this mortgage. Notwithstanding that he testified that Ms. Jones wanted the money for non-family debts, Mr. Darkins admitted that he signed the mortgage documents.

[55] The lawyer’s trust ledger indicates that $3,779.67 of this amount was used to pay four credit card debts. A further $3,100 was consumed by a broker’s fee and legal fees. $16,120.33 was paid to Ms. Jones. She said, and I accept that $3,000 was paid to Mr. Darkins’ immigration lawyer toward Mr. Darkins’ outstanding bill of $7,000, and the balance was paid to other family debts.

c. June 6, 2019 Mortgage for $85,000

[56] Ms. Jones acknowledged that she received $85,000 from this mortgage. No documentation was produced to indicate what was done with this money. Ms. Jones must account to Mr. Darkins for $42,500 of this amount. To put it another way, the full $85,000 withdrawal in equity comes from her equity, not his.

d. Other Adjustments

[57] Equity demands that, when Ms. Jones does sell the property, Mr. Darkins’ share of the equity under the Property Agreement should be reduced by 50% of the mortgage payments, insurance premiums and property tax paid on the property since the date of separation.

Issue 4: Net Family Property Calculations, Equalization, and Adjustment for Pension.

[58] Once the value of and the mortgages registered against the house are removed, Mr. Darkins’ most recent Form 13.1 Financial Statement dated August 28, 2019, at tab 4 of the Trial Record, shows that he has assets of $4,200 as of separation date, aside from the matrimonial home.

[59] He has another asset that Mr. Darkins failed to disclose – his pension, mentioned above. His last pay stub from Colourtech Inc. indicated that, for the pay period ending January 7, 2012, $45.15 was deducted from his pay for “EERPP”. Mr. Darkins admitted in cross examination that this was a pension account which he joined on January 10, 2011, and which by December 31, 2013 (6 weeks before separation) contained $6,471.60.

[60] The pension was never valued for NFP purposes. Therefore, assuming a two week pay period and a contribution of $45.15 per pay, I conclude that the pension would have held $6,607.25 by the date of separation. Therefore, Mr. Darkins’ total NFP is $10,807.25.

[61] Once the value of and the mortgages registered against the house are removed from Ms. Jones most recent Form 13.1 Financial Statement dated July 23, 2015, at tab 5 of the Trial Record, she owned no assets as of separation date. This cannot be so, since she still lives in the house. She attributes $2,500 value to her sectional and bedroom set, and $7,000 to music equipment. Since it appears that these all existed at the time of the separation, I attribute $9,500 to her as of separation date.

[62] Based on these property holdings, Mr. Darkins owes Ms. Jones an equalization payment of:

Mr. Darkins’ NFP $10,807.25 Ms. Jones’ NFP $ 9,500.00 Difference: $ 1,307.25 X 50% $ 653.62

Summary

[63] Based on my findings, above, Mr. Darkins owes Ms. Jones the following sums:

Child Support Arrears: $ 9,670.00 NFP Equalization: $ 653.62 Total $10,323.62

[64] With respect to the home, the Property Agreement governs the parties’ interests and removes the home from the NFP calculation. According to the Property Agreement, when the house is sold, Ms. Jones shall receive the first $65,000 from the net proceeds of sale, and the parties shall share equally in the balance of the net proceeds. Payment of the net proceeds is triggered by sale of the property, not before. The Property Agreement, on its face, does not give Mr. Darkins any explicit right to sell the property, or to force Ms. Jones to sell it.

[65] After the sale, Mr. Darkins’ 50% share of the net equity (after the deduction of Ms. Jones’ $65,000) shall be increased by $42,500, representing 50% of the $85,000 reduction in equity Ms. Jones took through the July 9, 2019 mortgage.

[66] After the sale, Mr. Darkins’ 50% share of the net equity (after the deduction of Ms. Jones’ $65,000) shall be reduced by 50% of the total mortgage payments (interest and principal), insurance costs, and property taxes Ms. Jones paid between the date of separation and the sale.

Costs

[67] If the parties cannot agree on costs, I shall decide the question of who pays whom costs and in what amount, in writing. Submissions are limited to five double-spaced typed pages, excluding bills of costs, offers, and other supporting material. The applicant’s written cost submissions are to be served and filed by 4:00 p.m., March 24, 2020. The respondent’s written costs submissions are to be served and filed by 4:00 p.m. April 8, 2020. If costs are settled or agreed upon, the parties are to advise the court, in writing.

Trimble J. Released: February 27, 2020

Footnotes:

[1] Brittany with Mother Feb to Oct 2014 [2] Brittany with Mother Feb to Dec. 2015 [3] Brittany with Mother 12 months [4] Brittany with Mother Jan. to Oct. 2017 [5] Mr. Darkins earned $25,000 in 2017, and Ms. Jones made $33,120 per her Financial Statement in 2018, her closest year’s income she disclosed. She paid $260 to the neighbor while Brittany stayed with the neighbor. Applying a 5:7 ration to $260, Mr. Darkins’ share is $108. [6] Ms. Jones seeks child support for only up to December 2017. [7] $550,000 V day valuation - 427,000 mortgage at V day.