COURT FILE NO.: 162/16 DATE: 2018 11 21
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
JENNIFER JEAN TOVELL Kristen Morris, for the Applicant Applicant
- and -
DOUGLAS KEITH JAMIESON Judith Birchall, for the Respondent Respondent
HEARD: June 19, 2017, at Orangeville, Ontario Price J.
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
NATURE OF MOTION
[1] Jennifer Tovell, who separated from Douglas Jamieson in March 2015, after ten years together, moved for an order requiring Mr. Jamieson to pay child support for their two children, 11 and 7 years old, and requiring him to contribute to the payment of the children’s day care, dance and piano lessons. Mr. Jamieson argued that the children should be in the care of both parties. He moved for an order for shared parenting and for child support to be calculated on a set-off basis. He denied that he had failed to pay his share of the children’s expenses.
[2] Ms. Tovell’s last affidavit before the hearing of the motion was served on Mr. Jamieson on June 15, 2017. Mr. Jamieson served additional affidavits on Ms. Tovell at 3:15 p.m. the same day. Ms. Tovell opposed the admission of the last affidavits, which were served after the 2 p.m. deadline, provided for by the Family Law Rules. It was not practicable for the Court to adjourn the motions to permit further reply by Ms. Tovell, as her counsel was expecting to deliver a child in a week and a half and had no one to take her place, and because Ms. Tovell required support urgently as there had been a ten week strike at her place of employment, which had only recently settled. The Court therefore heard argument on June 19. Three issues arose during the hearing which required factual clarification not supplied by the affidavits, which the parties were permitted to address in further affidavits submitted after the hearing.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[3] Ms. Tovell claimed child support of $951 per month, based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines, for the 29 months from March 2015 to August 2017, based on Mr. Jamieson’s 2016 income of $63,984. She additionally sought a 50% contribution from Mr. Jamieson to the payment of the children’s special and extraordinary expenses, pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines.
[4] Mr. Jamieson sought an order for joint custody and shared parenting of the children on a week-about basis, and for child support to be calculated on a set-off basis. He denied owing anything in relation to the children’s special expenses.
[5] There were factual disputes between the parties, which the Court, based on the evidence filed, resolved in Ms. Tovell’s favour. In particular:
(a) Mr. Jamieson claimed that his residence was considered to be within the Upper Grand District School Board catchment areas for the children’s schools because a nearby bus stop was in the catchment area. The Court rejected this argument, which was not supported by evidence, and found that Mr. Jamieson’s home was in Simcoe County, outside the schools’ catchment areas. (b) Mr. Jamieson denied Ms. Tovell’s assertion that she had repeatedly asked him for child support from 2015 onward, but the correspondence from Ms. Tovell’s lawyer documented the requests. (c) Mr. Jamieson denied Ms. Tovell’s assertion that he had not paid his share of the children’s daycare and their dance and piano lessons, which he claimed to have paid directly to the providers, but affidavits from the providers proved otherwise. The day care provider from March 2015 to January 2017, for example, produced records showing that Ms. Tovell had paid $3,328 to her, while Mr. Jamieson had paid $175. The current day care provider’s records disclosed a similar disparity. (d) Mr. Jamieson disputed that he had failed to pay his share of fees for Keera’s dance lessons, but Keera’s instructor produced records of the arrears owed by Mr. Jamieson, and Ms. Tovell produced the instructor’s text messages, which disclosed that Keera’s continued participation was jeopardized by Mr. Jamieson’s non-payment. (e) The Court found that the parties’ Notices of Assessment supported Ms. Tovell’s evidence regarding her earnings from the Canadian Hearing Society, which Mr. Jamieson had exaggerated. The evidence also supported Ms. Tovell’s assertions as to Mr. Jamieson’s earnings. (f) The Court rejected Mr. Jamieson’s allegation that Ms. Tovell had tried to marginalize him from the children’s lives. It found that he had been offered greater access and refused it as it would have required him to drive Keera to her dance lessons in Grand Valley. (g) The Court found that the evidence supported Ms. Tovell’s assertion that she had been the children’s primary caregiver, which Mr. Jamieson denied, and found that Mr. Jamieson had exaggerated his involvement in the children’s lives and activities. (h) The Court found support for Ms. Tovell’s assertion that Mr. Jamieson had a long history of uncontrolled anger, alcohol and marijuana dependency, and that the parties had separated as a result of his ongoing addiction issues and refusal to seek rehabilitation. Mr. Jamieson denied that he was dependent on alcohol or drugs (i) Ms. Tovell stated that Mr. Jamieson had been charged and incarcerated in the past for aggravated assault and domestic assault, and that the parties’ separation in March 2015 had followed an incident in which he had made death threats to her, resulting in police involvement. The Court found that Mr. Jamieson had exhibited an unmanaged anger toward Ms. Tovell’s lawyer a year earlier, which might reflect a domineering attitude toward Ms. Tovell herself.
[6] The Court found that there was economic instability in Mr. Jamieson’s life, based on his evidence that he was dismissed from his employment at a landscaping business in 2016, and was pursuing a complaint to the Labour Board over withheld pay. He stated that he was currently employed on contract by the City of Toronto, and was “drowning in debt.”
[7] Mr. Jamieson tendered independent evidence of his ability to parent the children. On that basis, the Court extended the children’s alternate weekend access with him, increasing his access to 35% of the children’s time.
[8] The Court found, based on the limited financial disclosure that Mr. Jamieson had provided (he had failed to produce his most recent Notice of Assessment), that his income was $63,997.90, and ordered him to pay the corresponding table child support of $950 per month for 2 children. The Court rejected Mr. Jamieson’s argument that an order for retroactive child support in the amount of $25,650 ($950 x 27 months from June 2015 to August 2017) would not benefit the children or would cause him financial hardship. The Court ordered him to pay a lump sum in that amount, plus his proportionate contribution to the children’s past special and extraordinary expenses, and of their ongoing s.7 expenses.
[9] The Court directed that if the parties were unable to agree on costs, they could submit written arguments. Ms. Tovell submitted her Costs Outline at the hearing.
THE ISSUE
[10] The Court must determine the amount of costs that Ms. Tovell is entitled to receive for her successful motion for sole custody and table child support and for successfully opposing Mr. Jamieson’s motion for shared parenting and set-off child support.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
[11] Ms. Tovell seeks an Order for costs on a substantial indemnity scale in the amount of $8,702.41. Her claimed costs include fees of $7,329.13, consisting of $1,197.80, Costs Outline that her lawyer filed at the hearing, $3,342.00, as set out in her lawyer’s further Costs Outline, filed after the hearing, and an additional $3,987.13, as set out in her lawyers’ dockets for services that followed the hearing. Ms. Tovell relies on her presumptive entitlement to costs arising from the favourable outcome of the hearing for her, and on Mr. Jamieson’s failure to accept an Offer to Setttle made prior to the hearing, which was as or more favourable to him than the outcome of the motion.
[12] Mr. Jamieson’s lawyer, Ms. Birchall, through her assistant Connie Foote, filed with the Court a Notice of Change in Representation on behalf of Mr. Jamieson on September 22, 2017. Neither Mr. Jamieson nor his lawyer filed Costs Submissions on his behalf.
ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE
a) General principles
[13] A successful party is presumed to be entitled to his or her costs, pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules. The preferable approach in family law cases is to allow costs on a full recovery basis, provided the successful party acted reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and results and were within the range that the opposing party should have expected if unsuccessful in the motions. [1]
[14] Costs Orders are designed to achieve three principal purposes, (a) to indemnify successful litigants; (b) to sanction unreasonable conduct of the litigation; and (c) to encourage settlement. [2]
[15] A litigant whose conduct was reasonable and who is successful in a proceeding should not be required to bear the costs of having her rights tested. [3] However, an unsuccessful litigant should not be required to pay the costs of a motion that the successful litigant precipitated by unreasonable conduct, or be so heavily burdened with costs as to discourage other litigants from submitting issues to the court where the outcome is not a foregone conclusion that should have been anticipated.
[16] The Family Law Rules do not explicitly provide for costs on either a partial or substantial indemnity scale. Rule 18(14), dealing with the costs consequences of a failure to accept an Offer to Settle, instead differentiates between “costs” and “full recovery of costs”. Rule 24(8) also refers to “costs on a full recovery basis,” where a party has acted in bad faith. In a family law case, the court need not find “special circumstances” before ordering costs on a full recovery basis. [4] It has a range of costs awards open to it, from nominal to just short of full recovery.
[17] In Sims-Howarth v Bilcliffe, (2000), Aston J. held that the two traditional scales of costs are no longer an appropriate way to quantify costs under the Family Law Rules. [5] Justice Aston stated that, having determined that one party is liable to pay costs, the court must fix the amount at some figure between a nominal sum and full recovery, having regard to the factors set out in Rule 24, without any assumptions about categories of costs. This characterization of costs under the Family Law Rules was approved by the Ontario Court of Appeal in C.A.M. v D.M. [6]
[18] In Berta v. Berta, (2015), the Court of Appeal stated:
In Biant v. Sagoo (2001), 2001 ONSC 28137, 20 R.F.L. (5th) 284 (Ont. S.C.), the court considered the costs award scheme under the rules and commented, at para. 20:
[T]he preferable approach in family law cases is to have costs recovery generally approach full recovery, so long as the successful party has behaved reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and the result. There remains, I believe a discretion under Rule 24(1) to award the amount of costs that appears just in all the circumstances, while giving effect to the rules’ preeminent presumption, and subject always to the rules that require full recovery or that require or suggest a reduction or an apportionment.
This court has repeatedly endorsed the Biant court’s approach to the determination of costs in family law disputes: see for example, Ruffudeen-Coutts v. Coutts, 2012 ONCA 263, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 35, at para. 4; Sordi v Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 134 R.F.L. (7th) 197, at para. 21; M. (A.C.) v. M. (D.), 23003), 2003 ONCA 18880, 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), at para. 40. [7]
[19] Costs must always be proportional to what is at stake in the case, and to the unsuccessful party’s reasonable expectation as to what costs he may face if unsuccessful. In appropriate circumstances, unreasonable conduct will result in a higher award of costs. In Perri v. Thind et al., (2010), Henderson J. granted leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a costs award that was a marked departure from the normal or routine costs made in motions court. [8] In doing so, he stated that costs orders are not designed mainly to be a punishment, but acknowledged that costs, when awarded on a higher scale, can serve to express the court’s disapproval of unreasonable conduct. [9]
[20] Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules explicitly authorizes the Court to employ a costs order to sanction unreasonable conduct. It provides:
24(8) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.
[21] Additionally, a successful litigant may be deprived of costs in certain circumstances, including where he has conducted the litigation in an unreasonable manner. Rule 24(4) of the Family Law Rules provides, in this regard:
24(1) There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion, enforcement, case or appeal.
(4) Despite subrule (1), a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.
(5) In deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine,
(a) the party’s behavior in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle …; [10]
[Emphasis added]
b) Applying the principles to the facts of the present case
(i) Liability for costs
[22] Ms. Tovell was successful in the outcome of the motions and is presumptively entitled to her costs. I find no unreasonable conduct by her that that would disentitle her to costs.
(ii) The appropriate scale of costs
[23] As noted above, the Court of Appeal in Biant v. Sagoo (2001), held that “[T]he preferable approach in family law cases is to have costs recovery generally approach full recovery, so long as the successful party has behaved reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and the result.” While there remains a discretion under Rule 24(1) to award the amount of costs that appears just in all the circumstances, that discretion should be exercised in a way that gives effect to the rules’ presumption of costs for the successful litigant, and subject to the rules that require full recovery or that require or suggest a reduction or an apportionment based on unreasonable conduct, including the failure to accept a reasonable Offer to Settle.
[24] Ms. Tovell achieved an outcome that was as, or more, favourable than if Mr. Jamieson had accepted her Offer to Settle. In those circumstances, it was unreasonable for Mr. Jamieson not to have accepted her Offer and to have opposed her motion and made his own cross-motion which this Court found to be substantially without merit and based on assertions that the evidence proved false. The level of misleading evidence by Mr. Jamieson amounted to bad faith.
(iii) The amount of costs
Factors to be considered
[25] Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules lists the factors which the court should consider in quantifying costs:
- (11) A person setting the amount of costs shall consider, (a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues; (b) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case; (c) the lawyer’s rates; (d) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witnesses, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order; (e) expenses properly paid or payable; and (f) any other relevant matter.
[26] I will now turn to consider each of these factors in relation to Ms. Tovell’s claim for costs.
(a) Importance, Complexity and Difficulty
[27] Among motions for temporary custody and child support, these motions were of moderate complexity. They required factual determinations in the face of conflicting affidavits, upon which there had been no cross-examination, and required a consideration of the best interests of the children based on that evidentiary record.
(b) Reasonableness of Each Party’s Behaviour
[28] In the normal course, costs are awarded to a successful litigant on a partial indemnity scale, representing approximately 60% of the successful litigant’s total legal fees and disbursements; however, the court has the discretion to order costs to be paid on a substantial indemnity scale (partial indemnity costs x 1.5 = 90%) [11] or, especially in cases where there has been unreasonable conduct, on a full recovery basis. [12]
[29] As noted above, Mr. Jamieson’s failure to accept Ms. Tovell’s Offer, and the false and misleading evidence he relied on, entitles Ms. Tovell to her costs on a full recovery scale. Sub-rules 24(5) and (11)(b) explicitly recognize that costs may be used to express the court’s disapproval of a litigant’s unreasonable conduct, and that the Court may consider a party’s failure to make, or accept, an Offer to Settle in assessing the reasonableness of their conduct. In the present case, the fact that Ms. Tovell made a reasonable Offers to Settle, which was not accepted, supports a finding that she is entitled to her costs on a full recovery basis.
(c) Lawyer’s rates
[36] Ms. Tovell claims an hourly rate of $265.00 for her lawyer, Kristen Morris, who was called to the Bar in Ontario in 2012, and had practiced Family Law for 5 years when the motions were argued. Ms. Morris was assisted by two senior law clerks, for whom Ms. Tovell claims an hourly rate of $155.00.
[37] The “Information for the Profession” bulletin, from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (“the Costs Bulletin”) [13], suggests maximum hourly rates (on a partial indemnity scale) of $225.00 for lawyers, such as Ms. Morris, with under 10 years’ experience, and $80.00 for Law Clerks.
[38] The Costs Bulletin, published in 2005, is now dated. It is therefore appropriate to make an adjustment to the rates suggested in the Costs Bulletin based on inflation. Smith J. took this approach in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359. Ms. Morris’s partial indemnity rate of $225.00 in 2005 was the equivalent of $271.49 in 2017, when the motions were argued, according to the Bank of Canada’s online Inflation Calculator. The Law Clerk’s rate of $80.00 per hour was the equivalent of $96.53. Their rates, on a substantial indemnity scale, using the multiple of 1.5 prescribed by Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, [15] were $407.23 and $144.80, respectively.
[39] Aitken J., in Geographic Resources, allowed the Defendants/Respondents’ costs of an appeal from a Master’s order on a partial indemnity scale in the amount their lawyer had charged. [16] She rejected the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ argument that the Respondents should be awarded less than they had been charged because the parties had agreed that costs would be paid on a partial indemnity scale. Aitken J. began by considering the Costs Bulletin. She considered adjusting the Costs Subcommittee’s hourly rates for inflation, as Smith J. did in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, but the unadjusted rates of the lawyers in her case were only slightly less than the actual fees they charged, so she used their unadjusted rates. [17]
[40] Although Geographic Resources was a civil action, the approach that Aitken J. took in that case applies equally in the family law context. The court adjusts the hourly rate, based on the Costs Bulletin, or the resulting fees, to reflect unique features of the case, including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the other factors set out in Rule 24. If an excessive amount of time was spent, or too many lawyers worked on the file, the court reduces the resulting amount of fees accordingly.
[41] Aitken J. makes it clear that the starting point in arriving at an appropriate hourly rate when fixing costs is the Costs Bulletin, not the actual hourly rate the lawyer charged her client. The actual rate charged is irrelevant, except as a limiting factor, in preventing the costs awarded from exceeding the actual fees charged, in keeping with the principle of indemnification. [18] The Costs Subcommittee’s rates apply to all lawyers and all cases, so everyone of the same level of experience starts at the same place.
[42] In Mantella v. Mantella, (2006), Corbett J. noted that an award of costs is designed to indemnify, and that the amount should therefore not exceed the amount charged to the client. [19] The Divisional Court, in Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, adopted Corbett J.’s analysis in Mantella, holding that it was not trumped by earlier jurisprudence from the Court of Appeal. [20]
[43] Ms. Morris’ actual rate is $265.00; her Law Clerk’s rate is $155.00. Ms. Morris’ rate is substantially below the maximum she is entitled to claim on a substantial indemnity scale; her Law Clerk’s rate is only $10.00 per hour above her substantial indemnity rate. Accordingly, I find that the hourly rates claimed are reasonable, especially having regard to the fact that Ms. Tovell is entitled to her costs on a full recovery basis.
(d) Time reasonably spent
[44] I have reviewed the hours claimed. Based on the oral argument and material filed, I find the time spent to have been reasonable and necessary.
[45] Mr. Jamieson has neither challenged the time claimed nor provided the time that his own lawyer spent, to serve as a comparison in assessing the reasonableness of the time spent by Ms. Morris and her Law Clerks. Accordingly, I find no reason to reduce the time claimed by Ms. Morris.
[46] I note that the time spent by Ms. Morris’ Law Clerks almost equaled the time spent by Ms. Morris. This suggests a reasonable delegation of tasks, where possible, to the Law Clerks, which reduced the overall costs claimed.
(e) Expenses properly payable
[47] The disbursements claimed by Ms. Tovell’s lawyers are standard ones that were also reasonable and necessary. Mr. Jamieson did not challenge the disbursements, which will be allowed at the amounts claimed.
(f) Other Relevant Matters - proportionality
[48] I have considered the proportionality of the costs that Ms. Tovell has claimed. The principle of proportionality was added to the Rules of Civil Procedure by the amendment of Rule 1.04, which I apply by analogy to the present motion as there is no equivalent provision in the Family Law Rules. Rule 1.04 directs that the Rules be “liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.” Sub-Rule 1.1, which was added, provides:
(1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding. O. Reg. 438/08, s. 2.
[49] Mr. Morris did not “over-lawyer” the motions. The time that she and her Law Clerk spent was necessary to prosecute Ms. Tovell’s motion to a successful outcome and to oppose Mr. Jamieson’s cross-motion. The costs claimed are proportional to the amount at stake, having regard to the positions taken by Mr. Jamieson regarding the parties’ income and the amounts he claimed to have contributed to the payment of the children’s s. 7 expenses.
(c) What is fair and reasonable
[50] I must, at this point, step back and examine the overall award with a view to determining whether it is ‘fair and reasonable’ for the kind of matter involved. In making this determination, I take into account the reasonable expectation of the parties concerning the amount of costs. [21]
[51] Mr. Jamieson was represented in the motions by Judith Birchall. Ms. Birchall was called to the Bar in 1985 and would command a higher hourly rate than Ms. Morris. I presume that based on the amounts he was paying his own lawyer, the costs claimed by Mr. Tovell are within the range of what he expected to pay if unsuccessful in the motions. This is especially so, having regard to the fact that a litigant, especially one represented by experienced counsel, can be presumed to know the risk of higher costs he faces after receiving a reasonable Offer to Settle, if he fails to achieve an outcome that is more favourable than the Offer.
[52] There is an element of behaviour modification to a costs order serving to encourage a change in attitude from a “litigate with impunity” mindset. [22] In Mooney, Curtis J. made the following observations, which I adopt:
Parties to litigation must understand that court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and stressful for all concerned. They are not designed to give individual litigants a forum for carrying on in whatever manner they may choose, oblivious to the impact of that conduct on the other side and, perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this case, oblivious to the mounting costs of the litigation: Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004, Ont. Ct., supra, para. 20.
Matrimonial litigation is an occasion for sober consideration and thoughtfulness rather than intemperate behaviour: Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004, Ont. Ct., supra, para. 20.
One of the purposes of costs is to change behaviour. The justice system is a precious public resource. Access to the justice system by individuals must be balanced with the need to ensure that the resource is available for all those who need it. This is one of the purposes of Rule 2.
Unless courts discourage this behaviour, it will continue and increase. Orders for costs are one way to discourage this behaviour. [23]
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
[53] For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:
Mr. Jamieson shall forthwith pay Ms. Tovell’s costs of the motions, fixed in the amount of $8,702.41, inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.
These costs shall be enforceable as support by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office;
A Support Deduction Order shall issue.
Price J. Released: November 21, 2018
[1] Family Law Rules, O Reg. 114/99, Rule 224(1); Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 ONSC 22584, para. 11; Biant v. Sagoo 2001 ONSC 28137, para. 1 [2] Paranavitana v. Nanayakkara, 2010 ONSC 2257 [3] Serra v Serra 2009 ONCA 395 [4] Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 283 O.A.C. 287. [5] Sims-Howarth v Bilcliffe, 2000 ONSC 22584, [2000] O.J. No. 330 (S.C.J.) [6] C.A.M. v D.M., 2003 ONCA 18880, [2003] O.J. No. 3707 (C.A.), at para. 42. [7] Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, at paras. 92-93. [8] Perri v. Thind et al. (2010), 2009 ONSC 34977, 98 O.R. (3d) 74 (S.C.). [9] Perri, at paras. 24-26, 32-33. [10] O.Reg. 114/99 as am. [11] Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 1, as authorized by Family Law Rules, Rule 1(7) [12] Feinstein v. Freedman, 2014 ONCA 446 at para. 21; 131843 Canada Inc. v. Double “R” Toronto Ltd. (1992) 7 C.P.C. (3d) 15 (Ont. Gen. Div., per Blair J., as he then was) at p. 17, approved in Murano v. Bank of Montreal, (1998) 41 O.R. (3d) 222 (C.A.) at p. 244 [13] “Information for the Profession” bulletin (“the Costs Bulletin”) from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (that the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee issued to replace the Costs Grid, which it repealed in 2005). The Costs Bulletin has advisory status only and not statutory authority, as it was not included in the Regulation that repealed the Costs Grid. [14] First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359, 2012 ONSC 1359 (S.C.J.) [15] Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 [16] Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 [17] Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 [18] The principle that costs should not exceed the amount charged was articulated by Corbett J. in Mantella v. Mantella, 2006 ONSC 17337, (2006), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 76 (S.C.J.), subsequently approved by Aitken J., sitting as a Divisional Court judge in Geographic Resources. [19] Mantella v. Mantella, 2006 ONSC 17337, (2006), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 76 (S.C.J.) [20] Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 [21] Referring to: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, 2004 ONCA 14579, [2004] O.J. No. 2634 (C.A.) (released June 22, 2004); Moon v. Sher, [2002] O.J. No. 4651 (C.A.) (released November 16, 2004); and Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada Ltd. v. Leveltek Processing LLC, 2005 ONCA 1042, [2005] O.J. No. 160 (C.A.) (released January 24, 2005) [22] Parsons v. Parsons, 2002 ONSC 45521, at para. 14, Campbell J. [23] Mooney, at paras. 30-34.