Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FS-09-65100-01

DATE: 2018 11 15

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

WILCASON MATHAIS BULLOCK

Applicant

• and -

MICHELLE DIANE BULLOCK

Respondent

COUNSEL:

Courtney Kazembe, for the Applicant

Michelle M. Abel, for the Respondent

HEARD: January 26, 2016, at Brampton, Ontario

BEFORE: Price J.

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

NATURE OF MOTION

[1] Two years after Lemon J. made a 2012 Order requiring Wilcason Bullock to transfer $73,111.00 to his spouse, Michelle Bullock, for retroactive child support for their two children and, on an ongoing basis, $1,702.00 per month for the support of their children, based on the income of $125,000.00 that Lemon J. imputed to him, and a further $694.00 contribution to the payment of the children’s special expenses Mr. Bullock moved for a variation of that order. Mr. Bullock made his motion on the ground that he earned less than the $125,000.00 that Lemon J. had imputed to him, and that his children were no longer “children of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act and therefore no longer entitled to child support.

[2] After trying for two years to respond to Mr. Bullock’s motion, Ms. Bullock moved to dismiss the motion on the ground that Mr. Bullock had breached multiple orders requiring him to make full financial disclosure. Mr. Bullock submitted that he had substantially complied with the orders and, to the extent that he had not, argued that he should be given a further opportunity to do so. The court found that Mr. Bullock was in breach of the orders and dismissed his motion on that ground.

[3] In its reasons issued March 15, 2017, the court stated that if the parties were unable to agree on costs, they could submit written arguments and Costs Outlines. The Court has reviewed their submissions and this endorsement will address the costs issue.

BACKGROUND FACTS

[4] Wilcason Bullock (“Mr. Bullock”) is a 52 year old self-employed autobody mechanic. Michelle Bullock (“Ms. Bullock”) is his 51 year old former spouse. The parties were married in 1991 and separated after 17 years, in 2008. There are two children of the marriage, now 25 and 23 years old. At the time of the hearing, the older child was taking a reduced course load at university as he suffers from depression and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The younger child is severely autistic, in the lowest 1 percentile of cognitive functioning, and performs at a primary school level. Both children continued to reside with Ms. Bullock after the parties separated.

[5] Mr. Bullock stated that he worked as the “primary mechanic” in his business and that his girlfriend, Ms. Terebeni, worked as the business’ general manager. Mr. Bullock reported earning $24,600.00 and “cash bonuses” that varied each month with the business’ revenue. Ms. Terebeni, who reported earning $24,000.00, bought a home for $315,250.00 with a down payment of $60,000.00 and the balance financed by a mortgage guaranteed by Mr. Bullock. Mr. Bullock told the parties’ older son that he had bought the house himself. In 2009, Mr. Bullock leased a 2008 Lexus GS5 sedan for Ms. Terebeni as a gift.

[6] In 2009, Mr. Bullock applied for a divorce and Ms. Bullock delivered an Answer in which she claimed custody of the children, support and equalization of net family property. Her lawyer delivered a Request for Information and in 2010, Van Melle J. ordered Mr. Bullock to deliver his Response to the Request. Mr. Bullock produced an affidavit with limited information and disputed the relevance of many of the documents he had been ordered to produce. In June 2010, this Court made an Order striking his Application and granting Ms. Bullock leave to proceed with her Answer at an uncontested hearing.

[7] Mr. Bullock appealed the Order striking his pleadings to the Divisional Court but withdrew the appeal as he had brought it in the wrong forum. He then appealed to the Court of Appeal but failed to perfect the appeal, which was therefore dismissed. He then moved to set aside the dismissal, which motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in February 2011. He then moved before this Court to reinstate his pleadings, which motion was dismissed by Fragomeni J. in April 2011.

[8] Ms. Bullock proceeded to an uncontested trial, which Lemon J. heard on April 4, 2012. Justice Lemon made a final order granting Ms. Bullock sole custody of the children with access to Mr. Bullock at her discretion. He ordered Mr. Bullock to pay Ms. Bullock child support based on imputed income of $125,000.00, a proportional contribution to the children’s special expenses, $73,111.00 in retroactive support, a $45,057.77 equalization payment, and costs of $4,500.00 for Mr. Bullock’s failed motion to reinstate his pleadings. The retroactive support and equalization payment were to be paid from Mr. Bullock’s bank and investment accounts. Justice Lemon ordered Mr. Bullock to pay Ms. Bullock’s costs of the proceeding, fixed at $20,000.00.

[9] In April 2014, Mr. Bullock made a motion to vary Justice Lemon’s order on the ground that he earned only $44,172.00, not $125,000.00, as found by Lemon J., and on the ground that the children were no longer dependent and entitled to child support. As of June 22, 2015, Mr. Bullock owed $147,463.13 in child support. By November 19, 2015, the amount had increased to $154,430.57.

[10] In the course of Mr. Bullock’s motion, he was ordered to make full financial disclosure to Ms. Bullock and failed to do so. On a motion by Ms. Bullock to have his motion dismissed, this Court found that:

(a) Mr. Bullock had breached Lemon J.’s Order requiring payment of retroactive support, ongoing child support, contributions to s. 7 expenses, and costs.

(b) Mr. Bullock had breached the term of Lemon J.’s Order requiring him to pay interest on the costs he was to pay to Ms. Bullock, and the term requiring him to provide proof of life insurance coverage to Ms. Bullock.

(c) Mr. Bullock had control of the information and documents that were in Ms. Terebeni’s possession and could obtain that information and those documents from her if he wished and had failed to explain why he had not done so.

[11] This Court found that Mr. Bullock had breached both the Order of Van Melle J. dated February 17, 2015, and this Court’s Order dated June 17, 2010, requiring him to make financial disclosure. It found that Ms. Bullock had taken many steps to address his non-compliance and non-disclosure, and that Mr. Bullock had had over a year, and four court appearances, to comply with her disclosure requests and his outstanding support obligations and had failed to do so. The Court therefore found that this was an exceptional case in which Mr. Bullock’s motion must be dismissed for deliberate non-compliance with the Court’s orders, including the order that he sought to vary.

[12] In its Order dated March 15. 2017, the Court directed that if the parties were unable to agree on the costs of Mr. Bullock’s unsuccessful motion to change, they were to submit written arguments and Costs Outlines. Both parties submitted written arguments, and Ms. Bullock submitted a Costs Outline.

ISSUES

[13] The court must determine what costs should be paid for Mr. Bullock’s unsuccessful motion to vary Justice Lemon’s Order, and Ms. Bullock’s motion to dismiss that motion.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[14] Ms. Bullock claims her costs on a full recovery basis in the amount of $16,525.29. She relies on her presumptive entitlement to costs by reason of her success in the motions, and on Mr. Bullock’s unreasonable conduct in failing to provide full financial disclosure, which she says was calculated to confuse and frustrate her attempts to reply to his motion, and demonstrated bad faith.

[15] Mr. Bullock acknowledges that Ms. Bullock is presumptively entitled to her costs but submits that the costs she claims are unreasonable and excessive. He submits that the Court should award her less than $6,000.00 in costs. He argues that his motion to change was meritorious and had a reasonable likelihood of success, but for his failure to provide complete financial disclosure, which he says did not amount to bad faith.

ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE

a) General principles

[16] A successful party is presumed to be entitled to his or her costs, pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules. The preferable approach in family law cases is to allow costs on a full recovery basis, provided the successful party acted reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and results and were within the range that the opposing party should have expected if unsuccessful in the motions.[^1]

[17] Costs Orders are designed to achieve three principal purposes, (a) to indemnify successful litigants; (b) to sanction unreasonable conduct of the litigation; and (c) to encourage settlement.[^2]

[18] In Berta v. Berta, (2015), the Court of Appeal stated:

In Biant v. Sagoo (2001), 2001 28137 (ON SC), 20 R.F.L. (5th) 284 (Ont. S.C.), the court considered the costs award scheme under the rules and commented, at para. 20:

[T]he preferable approach in family law cases is to have costs recovery generally approach full recovery, so long as the successful party has behaved reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and the result. There remains, I believe a discretion under Rule 24(1) to award the amount of costs that appears just in all the circumstances, while giving effect to the rules’ preeminent presumption, and subject always to the rules that require full recovery or that require or suggest a reduction or an apportionment.

This court has repeatedly endorsed the Biant court’s approach to the determination of costs in family law disputes: see for example, Ruffudeen-Coutts v. Coutts, 2012 ONCA 263, 15 R.F.L. (7th) 35, at para. 4; Sordi v Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 134 R.F.L. (7th) 197, at para. 21; M. (A.C.) v. M. (D.), 23003), 2003 18880 (ON CA), 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), at para. 40. [^3]

[19] Costs must always be proportional to what is at stake in the case, and to the unsuccessful party’s reasonable expectation as to what costs he may face if he is unsuccessful. In appropriate circumstances, however, unreasonable conduct will result in a higher award of costs.

Applying the principles to the facts of the present case

Entitlement to costs

[20] Subrule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, Ont. Reg. 114/99, articulates the fundamental “presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion . . .” Ms. Bullock was successful in opposing Mr. Bullock’s motion, and in having his motion dismissed based on his non-disclosure. She is presumptively entitled to her costs.

Appropriate scale of costs

[21] Mr. Bullock argues that no costs should be awarded, or that costs, if awarded, should be on a partial indemnity scale because he made his motion to vary Lemon J.’s Order in good faith. This argument fails to take account of the fact that his motion was dismissed because he failed to comply with multiple orders of the Court requiring him to provide financial disclosure to Ms. Bullock. Such non-disclosure amounts to bad faith and attracts a costs order on a full recovery basis.

[22] The Family Law Rules provide:

24(8) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.

[23] Justice J.W. Quinn, in Trudel v. Trudel, (2010), stated:

[17] Where, as here, a party adopts a catch-me-if-you-can approach to financial disclosure, thereby demonstrating bad faith, that fact overshadows everything else such that full-recovery costs should follow. Litigation in Family Court relies heavily on the timely and true disclosure of financial information. Rule 13 of the Family Law Rules is designed to achieve the required financial revelation and the husband made a mockery of its provisions:

[18] The financial non-disclosure of the husband amounts to dishonesty. This equates with bad faith. Thus, the wife is entitled to full-recovery costs on this basis alone, as subrule 24(8) provides: “If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.”[^4]

[Emphasis added]

[24] Harper J. observed in Stevens v. Stephens, (2012):

Deliberate non-disclosure is not merely unreasonable conduct, it is an example of bad faith….One of the most significant contributors to lengthy and costly litigation is untimely and inaccurate disclosure. All too often, one party makes every effort to thrust economic havoc on the other when this game of litigation hide and seek forms a part of their litigation strategy. This cannot be permitted by the court.[^5]

[Emphasis added]

The amount of costs to be paid

(i) Factors to be considered

[25] Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules lists the factors which the court should consider in quantifying costs:

24. (11) A person setting the amount of costs shall consider,

(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;

(b) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;

(c) the lawyer’s rates;

(d) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witnesses, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order;

(e) expenses properly paid or payable; and

(f) any other relevant matter.

[26] I will now turn to consider each of these factors in relation to Ms. Bullock’s claim for costs.

(a) Importance, Complexity and Difficulty

[27] Among motions to change in a final family law Order, this one was relatively straight-forward. It was determined based on Mr. Bullock’s non-disclosure and non-compliance with court Orders. It did not involve a change in access or custody, which such motions sometimes entail and which can add to their complexity.

(b) Reasonableness of Each Party’s Behaviour

[28] In the normal course, costs are awarded to a successful litigant on a partial indemnity scale, representing approximately 60% of the successful litigant’s total legal fees and disbursements; however, the court has the discretion to order costs to be paid on a substantial indemnity scale (partial indemnity costs x 1.5 = 90%)[^6] or, especially in cases where there has been unreasonable conduct, on a full recovery basis.[^7]

[29] As noted above, Mr. Bullock’s conduct in failing to make full financial disclosure and in failing to comply with the court’s orders entitles Ms. Bullock to her costs on a full recovery scale. Rule 24(11)(b) explicitly recognizes that costs may be used to express the court’s disapproval of a litigant’s unreasonable conduct. Further, as noted above, s. 24(8) of the Family Law Rules, provides for full recovery costs if a party has acted in bad faith.

[30] As noted above, persistent refusal to make financial disclosure has been found to be “bad faith” within the meaning of subrule 24(8).[^8] If not “bad faith”, failure to disclose and to comply with court orders is, at the very least, “unreasonableness” within the meaning of Rule 24(11)(b), and can attract the sanction of costs on a full recovery basis.[^9]

[31] In any event, Perkins J. in Biant v. Sagoo, (2001), held that “the preferable approach in family law cases is to have cost recovery generally approach full recovery so long as the successful party has behaved reasonably and the costs claimed are proportional to the issues and the result.”[^10]

(c) The lawyer’s rates

[36] Ms. Bullock claims an hourly rate of $325.00 for her lawyer, Michelle Abel, who was called to the Bar in Ontario in 1995, and had practiced Family Law for over 20 years when Ms. Bullock’s motion was heard. She was assisted by Matthew Abel, who was called to the Bar in 1996, and had also practiced law for more than 20 years.

[37] The “Information for the Profession” bulletin, from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (“the Costs Bulletin”)[^11], suggests maximum hourly rates (on a partial indemnity scale) of $350.00 for lawyers, such as Ms. Abel and Mr. Abel, with over 20 years’ experience.

[38] The Costs Bulletin, published in 2005, is now dated. It is therefore appropriate to make an adjustment to the rates suggested in the Costs Bulletin based on inflation. Smith J. took this approach in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group.[^12] Ms. Abel’s partial indemnity rate of $350.00 in 2005 was the equivalent of $433.32 in 2017, when the motions were argued, according to the Bank of Canada’s online Inflation Calculator.

[39] Aitken J., in Geographic Resources, allowed the Defendants/Respondents’ costs of an appeal from a Master’s order on a partial indemnity scale in the amount their lawyer had charged.[^13] She rejected the Plaintiffs/Appellants’ argument that the Respondents should be awarded less than they had been charged because the parties had agreed that costs would be paid on a partial indemnity scale. Aitken J. began by considering the Costs Bulletin. She considered adjusting the Costs Subcommittee’s hourly rates for inflation, as Smith J. did in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, but the unadjusted rates of the lawyers in her case were only slightly less than the actual fees they charged, so she used their unadjusted rates.[^14]

[40] Although Geographic Resources was a civil action, the approach that Aitken J. took in that case applies equally in the family law context. The court adjusts the hourly rate, based on the Costs Bulletin, or the resulting fees, to reflect unique features of the case, including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the other factors set out in Rule 24. If an excessive amount of time was spent, or too many lawyers worked on the file, the court reduces the resulting amount of fees accordingly.

[41] Aitken J. makes it clear that the starting point in arriving at an appropriate hourly rate when fixing costs is the Costs Bulletin, not the actual hourly rate the lawyer charged her client. The actual rate charged is irrelevant, except as a limiting factor, in preventing the costs awarded from exceeding the actual fees charged, in keeping with the principle of indemnification.[^15] The Costs Subcommittee’s rates apply to all lawyers and all cases, so everyone of the same level of experience starts at the same place.

[42] In Mantella v. Mantella, (2006), Corbett J. noted that an award of costs is designed to indemnify, and that the amount should therefore not exceed the amount charged to the client.[^16] The Divisional Court, in Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, adopted Corbett J.’s analysis in Mantella, holding that it was not trumped by earlier jurisprudence from the Court of Appeal.[^17] Ms. Abel’s hourly rate of $325.00, which is less than the maximum rate she could claim on a partial indemnity scale, is conservative, especially in the present case, where Ms. Bullock is entitled to her costs on a full recovery basis.

(d) Time reasonably spent

[43] Ms. Bullock’s lawyers spent a reasonable amount of time responding to Mr. Bullock’s motion and preparing her own motion to dismiss that motion. Ms. Abel spent a total of 36.3 hours and Mr. Abel spent 2.08. Ms. Abel was required to meet with Ms. Bullock, conduct a search of Mr. Bullock’s property, draft Ms. Bullock’s financial statement and her Response to Motion to Change, conduct searches of Mr. Bullock’s business, draft a disclosure letter, draft a Dispute Resolution Conference form and Conference Brief, review Mr. Bullock’s disclosure, correspond with the Family Responsibility Office and obtain their Statement of Arrears, examine Ms. Terebeni as a non-party, and attend in court on at least four occasions, and prepare her motion to dismiss.

[44] Mr. Bullock, while challenging the amount of costs claimed by Ms. Bullock, did not tender a Costs Outline of his own, or a Bill of Costs setting out the time his lawyer spent on the motions. This court has held, on more than one occasion, that when one party attacks another’s costs as excessive, but does not put its own dockets before the court, the attack “is no more than an attack in the air.”[^18] In Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (2003), Winkler J., then a motion judge, stated:

The attack on the quantum of costs, insofar as the allegations of excess are concerned, in the present circumstances is no more than an attack in the air. I note that State Farm has not put the dockets of its counsel before the court in support of its submission. Although such information is not required under Rule 57 in its present form, and the rule enumerates certain factors which would have to be considered in exercising the discretion with respect to the fixing of costs in any event, it might still provide some useful context for the process if the court had before it the bills of all counsel when allegations of excess and “unwarranted over-lawyering” are made. In that regard, the court is also entitled to consider “any other matter relevant to the question of costs”. (See Rule 57.01(1)(i). In my view, the relative expenditures, at least in terms of time, by adversaries on opposite sides of a motion, while not conclusive as to the appropriate award of costs, is still, nonetheless, a relevant consideration where there is an allegation of excess in respect of a particular matter.[^19] [Emphasis added.]

[45] Based on my observation of the oral argument and motion material, I find that the time spent on behalf of Ms. Bullock was reasonable and necessary.

(e) Expenses properly payable

[46] The disbursements claimed by Ms. Bullock were conventional ones that were necessarily made. They include approximately $300.00 in searches and related agency fees, and $830.28 for the examination of Ms. Terebeni, both of which were made necessary by Mr. Bullock’s failure to produce the information and documents he had been ordered to provide, and courier and photocopy charges. The disbursements will be allowed at the amounts claimed.

(f) Other Relevant Matters - proportionality

[47] I have considered the proportionality of the costs that Ms. Bullock has claimed. The principle of proportionality was added to the Rules of Civil Procedure by the amendment of Rule 1.04, which I apply by analogy to the present motion as there is no equivalent provision in the Family Law Rules. Rule 1.04 directs that the Rules be “liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits.” Sub-Rule 1.1, which was added, provides:

c) Proportionality

(1.1) In applying these rules, the court shall make orders and give directions that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding. O. Reg. 438/08, s. 2.

[48] Ms. Abel did not “over-lawyer” the motion. The time she spent was reasonably necessary to oppose Mr. Bullock’s motion and to assert Ms. Bullock’s right to the information and documents required to respond to it. The costs claimed are proportional to the amount at stake in the motion, having regard to Mr. Bullock’s claim that his child support obligation should be based on an income of $44,172.00 rather than the $125,000.00 imputed to him by Lemon J.

(c) What is fair and reasonable

[49] I must, at this point, step back and examine the overall award with a view to determining whether it is ‘fair and reasonable’ for the kind of matter involved. In making this determination, I take into account the reasonable expectation of the parties concerning the amount of costs.[^20]

[50] Mr. Bullock has not disclosed the time his own lawyer spent or the amounts his lawyer charged him during the proceeding. Those amounts, if disclosed, might have helped the court assess what Mr. Bullock’s expectations were as to the costs he would face if unsuccessful.

[51] Awards of costs in motions to change final orders vary greatly, depending on their factual complexity, the extent of the change sought, and the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct. I have considered the following costs awards made in similar cases:

(a) In Winton v. Lofranco, Himel J. awarded costs of $61,000.00 ($50,000.00 for fees and $11,000.00 for disbursements) in a motion to change custody and cross-motion for support involving a three day hearing.[^21]

(b) In Piskor v. Piskor, Blishen J. awarded costs of $18,000.00 on a full recovery basis in a motion to change support.[^22]

(c) In Blanchard v. Walker, Curtis J. awarded the husband his costs of $30,000.00, on a full recovery basis, for the wife’s unsuccessful motion to change child support.[^23]

(d) In Boneva v. Bonev (No. 3), Jones J. awarded costs of $83,241.04, on a full recovery basis, for the husband’s unsuccessful motion to change child support.[^24]

(e) In S. (S.) v. S. (M.) and A. (P.), 2007 ONCJ 95, Dunn J. awarded a wife her costs of $40,000.00 on a full recovery basis in the husband’s unsuccessful motion to change child support.[^25]

(f) In Ross v. Ross, Mesbur J. awarded a wife costs of $26,543.70, some of it on a full recovery basis, for a husband’s unsuccessful motion to change child support.[^26]

(g) In Chan v. Town, (2014), this Court awarded the moving party her costs of $32,223.69 in a successful motion to change support.

[52] Based on those awards, the costs claimed by Ms. Bullock are well within the range of what Mr. Bullock should have expected to pay if unsuccessful.

[53] There is an element of behaviour modification to a costs order serving to encourage a change in attitude from a “litigate with impunity” mindset.[^27] In Mooney, Curtis J. made the following observations, which I adopt:

Parties to litigation must understand that court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and stressful for all concerned. They are not designed to give individual litigants a forum for carrying on in whatever manner they may choose, oblivious to the impact of that conduct on the other side and, perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this case, oblivious to the mounting costs of the litigation: Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004, Ont. Ct., supra, para. 20.

Matrimonial litigation is an occasion for sober consideration and thoughtfulness rather than intemperate behaviour: Heuss v. Sarkos, 2004, Ont. Ct., supra, para. 20.

One of the purposes of costs is to change behaviour. The justice system is a precious public resource. Access to the justice system by individuals must be balanced with the need to ensure that the resource is available for all those who need it. This is one of the purposes of Rule 2.

Unless courts discourage this behaviour, it will continue and increase. Orders for costs are one way to discourage this behaviour.[^28]

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

[54] For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:

1. Mr. Bullock shall pay Ms. Bullock’s costs of the motions, fixed in the amount of $16,525.29, consisting of the following:

Fees: $12,441.00

H.S.T. on Fees: 1,617.33

Disbursements: 2,183.15

H.S.T. on Disbursements: 283.81

TOTAL: $16,525.29

2. These costs shall be payable forthwith, with 3% post-judgment interest from today’s date.

Price J.

Released: November 15, 2018

[^1]: Family Law Rules, O Reg. 114/99, Rule 224(1); Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 ONSC 22584, para. 11; Biant v. Sagoo 2001 ONSC 28137, para. 1 [^2]: Paranavitana v. Nanayakkara, 2010 ONSC 2257 [^3]: Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, at paras. 92-93. [^4]: Trudel v. Trudel, 2010 ONSC 5177. [^5]: Stevens v. Stevens, 2012 ONSC 6881, at paras 22 and 23, aff’d, 2013 ONCA 267. [^6]: Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 1, as authorized by Family Law Rules, Rule 1(7) [^7]: Feinstein v. Freedman, 2014 ONCA 446 at para. 21; 131843 Canada Inc. v. Double “R” Toronto Ltd. (1992) 7 C.P.C. (3d) 15 (Ont. Gen. Div., per Blair J., as he then was) at p. 17, approved in Murano v. Bank of Montreal,1998 5633, (1998) 41 O.R. (3d) 222 (C.A.) at p. 244 [^8]: DePace v. Michienzi (2000), 2000 22460 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 4436 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), at paragraph [22]; Riha v. Riha (2001), 107 A.C.W.S. (3d) 251, [2001] O.J. No. 3211, 2001 CarswellOnt 2770 (Ont. Fam. Ct.). Domb v. Domb, 2002 45568 (ON SC), para. 4; Reisman v. Reisman, [2007] O.J. No. 5538 (S.C.J.) at paras. 2-3, aff’d [2008] O.J. No. 1843. [^9]: DePace v. Michienzi, supra, at para. 24. [^10]: Biant v. Sagoo, 2001 28137 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 3693 (S.C.) at para. 20 [^11]: “Information for the Profession” bulletin (“the Costs Bulletin”) from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (that the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee issued to replace the Costs Grid, which it repealed in 2005). The Costs Bulletin has advisory status only and not statutory authority, as it was not included in the Regulation that repealed the Costs Grid. [^12]: First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359, 2012 ONSC 1359 (S.C.J.) [^13]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041, [^14]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 [^15]: The principle that costs should not exceed the amount charged was articulated by Corbett J. in Mantella v. Mantella, 2006 17337 (ON SC), (2006), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 76 (S.C.J.), subsequently approved by Aitken J., sitting as a Divisional Court judge in Geographic Resources. [^16]: Mantella v. Mantella, 2006 17337 (ON SC), (2006), 27 R.F.L. (6th) 76 (S.C.J.) [^17]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041 [^18]: Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2003), 2003 43566 (ON SC), 64 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 10 (S.C.), per Winkler J., cited in Springer v. Aird & Berlins LLP (2009), 2009 26608 (ON SC), 74 C.C.E.L.(3d) 243 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 12-17. [^19]: Risorto, at para. 10 [^20]: Referring to: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario,2004 14579 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 2634 (C.A.) (released June 22, 2004); Moon v. Sher, [2002] O.J. No. 4651 (C.A.) (released November 16, 2004); and Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada Ltd. v. Leveltek Processing LLC, 2005 1042 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 160 (C.A.) (released January 24, 2005) [^21]: Winton v. Lofranco (2005), 2005 63819 (ON SC), 21 RFL (6th) 228 (Ont. S.C.). [^22]: Piskor v. Piskor, 2004 5023 (ON SC), [^23]: Blanchard v. Walker, 2012 ONCJ 799 [^24]: Boneva v. Bonev (No. 3), 2005 ONCJ 249 [^25]: S. (S.) v. S. (M.) and A. (P.), 2007 ONCJ 95 [^26]: Ross v. Ross, 2012 ONSC 3205 [^27]: Parsons v. Parsons, 2002 45521 (ON SC), at para. 14, Campbell J. [^28]: Mooney, at paras. 30-34.