Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FC-17-2483 DATE: 2018/09/18 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Susan Davidson, Applicant AND James Davidson, Respondent

BEFORE: Blishen J.

COUNSEL: Peter Mirsky, for the Applicant Wade Smith, for the Respondent Stephen Pender, for child Chloe

HEARD: September 6, 2018

Endorsement

Introduction

1The parties were married on August 10, 1996 and separated on August 1, 2017. They have three children: Shelby (born August 20, 1998) age 20, Brooke (born September 27, 1999) age 18, and Chloe (born May 12, 2003) age 15. The children have moved back and forth between their parents since separation. The acrimonious, highly conflictual relationship between the parties has had a significant negative impact on their daughters.

2The applicant owns the matrimonial home and resided there with Chloe from separation until November 22, 2017 when the respondent attended at the home and indicated he was moving back in. She and Chloe left and temporarily resided with a friend until an urgent motion could be argued for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. On December 12, 2017, Shelston J. ordered on a temporary without prejudice basis exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant.

3The matrimonial home was listed for sale in September 2017, with a Royal LePage agent agreed upon between the parties. It continues to be listed for sale over a year later.

4The applicant is unemployed and receives disability pension income. The respondent owns and operates an incorporated excavating business, which until around March 2018 was operated out of a large industrial shed located behind the matrimonial home.

5Chloe, 15, now resides with her father and has little contact with her mother. Brooke, 18, attended Trent University last year, but now resides with her mother and attends the University of Ottawa full time. She has no contact or communication with her father. Shelby, 20, attends Algonquin College and resides with her mother and at times with her boyfriend. Her current living arrangements are unclear. She continues to have contact with her father.

Orders Sought

6As per her Notice of Motion and draft temporary order, the applicant seeks:

1. Exclusive possession of the matrimonial home at 3161 Paden Road, North Gower, Ontario without the right of the respondent to attend the property for any purpose and for police enforcement;
2. An order that the matrimonial home be sold as per an Agreement of Purchase and Sale dated August 15, 2018 for $690,000 pursuant to s. 23 (b) (iii) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 as the respondent’s consent is being unreasonably withheld;
3. Until sale, the parties’ continue to pay the expenses as outlined in the previous order, dated December 12, 2017;
4. On consent an order that Chloe reside with the respondent and he have custody with access to the applicant, subject to Chloe’s wishes;
5. An order for sale of the properties at 3145 Paden Road, North Gower, Ontario and 3115 Paden Road, North Gower, Ontario owned by the applicant subject to conditions;
6. Temporary spousal and child support for the adult children, Shelby and Brooke, including section 7 expenses retroactive to January 1, 2018 based on an annual income imputed to the respondent of $82,000; and
7. An order striking the respondent’s Answer and Cross-Application for failure to comply with the disclosure order of Master Fortier dated January 22, 2018.

7The respondent filed a Cross-Motion and a draft temporary order seeking:

1. Exclusive possession of the matrimonial home;
2. That he be permitted to amend his claim to claim a constructive trust in the property at 3115 Paden Road, North Gower and that he have unlimited access to this property;
3. On consent, sale of the property at 3145 Road, North Gower;
4. Child support payable by the applicant to the respondent for Chloe in the amount of $236 per month retroactive to January, 2018 based on an annual income for child support purposes of $28,016; and
5. Spousal support payable by the respondent to the applicant in the amount of $349 per month commencing September 1, 2018.

Previous Orders

8On December 12, 2017, Justice Shelston heard an urgent motion brought by the applicant before a case conference seeking a number of areas of relief. The focus at that time was on the applicant’s request for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home with the child Chloe.

9Justice Shelston found on the basis of the evidence before him:

1. The child Chloe was feeling a great deal of stress and needed to be insulated from the parties’ separation. The court was required to protect the child and act in her best interests.
2. From August-November 22, 2017 the applicant and Chloe resided in the matrimonial home. Despite having the ability to live in short-term accommodation until December 15, 2017, the respondent unilaterally decided to return to the home on November 22, 2017 causing the mother to move with Chloe.
3. Although both parties had a right to exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, the parties could not share the residence.
4. Both appeared to have possible alternative accommodation but Mr. Davidson had a greater financial ability to obtain alternative accommodation.

10Justice Shelston made the following orders:

1. On a temporary without prejudice basis, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and its contents to the applicant with Chloe to reside with her.
2. The respondent to have access to Chloe at her discretion.
3. The respondent was not to enter into the matrimonial home at any time and the parties were not to communicate with each other except through counsel.
4. No order was made for child or spousal support as the support issue required further disclosure and information.
5. The applicant was ordered to pay the line of credit (mortgage) on the matrimonial home and the respondent ordered to pay the expenses for the matrimonial home including taxes, property insurance, telephone and utilities. The respondent was also to pay car insurance and the license related to the business. The total cost to the respondent was approximately $1659.00 per month.
6. A referral was made to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. Ultimately counsel, Stephen Pender, was appointed to represent Chloe.
7. After written submissions, Justice Shelston ordered costs in the amount of $4000 payable by the respondent to the applicant.

11A case conference was held before Master Fortier on January 22, 2018. At that time, the matrimonial home was listed for sale for $799,000. On consent, the court ordered:

1. The home to continue to be listed for sale at $799,000 until the expiration of the current listing agreement.
2. If the home was not sold prior to the expiration of the listing agreement, a new listing agreement to be signed by the parties. If the parties could not agree on a new listing price, they could return the matter to Master Fortier for a determination. They never did.
3. Both the applicant and the respondent to provide disclosure. The applicant argues the respondent has not provided full disclosure as ordered.
4. Leave for questioning was granted. Questioning has not taken place.

Background

12Since separation, the relationship between the parties has deteriorated dramatically to a situation of extreme high conflict. As noted by Justice Shelston, the affidavits before the court allege threats, intimidation, drunk driving, screaming at each other and unilateral actions. The police have been called by Ms. Davidson on a number of occasions. After a particularly disturbing incident in February, 2018 where the respondent is alleged to have threatened harm to the alleged boyfriend of Ms. Davidson, Dennis Hart, in the presence of both Brooke and Shelby, the police laid charges against Mr. Davidson which were later withdrawn. All three girls have become significantly implicated in their parents’ ongoing conflict. Both Shelby and Brooke provided affidavits. Shelby for her father and Brooke for her mother.

13The applicant continues to receive disability pensions and has an annual income for child support purposes of $28,016. The respondent continues to own and operate J. Davidson Landscaping, an incorporated excavating business. Mr. Davidson’s income for support purposes is contested. As of March 2018 most of the equipment and the operation of the business was moved from the industrial shed behind the matrimonial home to an undisclosed location.

14The applicant owns the matrimonial home and continues to reside there with Brooke and, at times, Shelby. The property was originally listed for sale on September 22, 2017 for a list price of $825,000 against the recommendation of the listing agent who felt it was too high. The list price was reduced to $799,900 in early December, 2017 and then relisted at $749,900. More recently, on April 19, 2018, the list price was reduced to $725,000. The Respondent indicates the listing price was agreed to in error and he did not consent to the reduction. Since then, there have been two offers, one on May 29, 2018 for $650,000 and another on August 15 for $690,000. That offer was irrevocable until September 7, 2018 and may still be available.

Issues

Exclusive Possession of the Matrimonial Home

15Section 24 (3) of the Family Law Act, lists the criteria for the court to consider in determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home as follows:

Order for exclusive possession: criteria

(3) In determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession, the court shall consider,

(a) the best interests of the children affected;

(b) any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations;

(c) the financial position of both spouses;

(d) any written agreement between the parties;

(e) the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and

(f) any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 24 (3) ; 2014, c. 7 , Sched. 9, s. 4.

16On December 12, 2017, Justice Shelston made a without prejudice order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant. He focused on the best interests of the child, Chloe who was 14 at the time and residing with her mother. In addition, he found that although both parties had potential alternative accommodations, Mr. Davidson was in a better financial positon to avail himself of that alternative accommodation. Finally, he noted serious allegations by both parties of threats, intimidation and ongoing conflict and found the parties could not share the residence.

17Since Justice Shelston’s order was in made in December, 2017, there have been a number of changes in the circumstances of the parties and the children relevant to the issue of exclusive possession. I note the following:

1. Chloe, now 15, began residing with her father on Prince of Wales Drive in Ottawa in January, 2018 where she remains. Her views and preferences as expressed through her counsel are to remain with her father and to have contact and communication with her mother based on her wishes. She would like to return to the matrimonial home with her father and have some personal belongings returned to her.
2. The applicant, who is the owner of the matrimonial home, has now resided there for all but one month since separation on August 1, 2017, a period of almost 14 months.
3. Brooke, now 18, returned to reside with her mother in the matrimonial home in April, 2018 after completing her year at Trent University. She remains with her mother and is now attending the University of Ottawa in the Nursing Program on a full-time basis. On the basis of the evidence before me, I find Brooke continues to be a child of the marriage as defined under s. 2 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). Although 18 years of age, I find Brooke a vulnerable young person torn between her parents and involved in their conflict. She deposed that, although her father assisted her with education costs when she was attending Trent University, he has now completely stopped supporting her financially. This necessitated her transfer to the University of Ottawa. She disputes her father’s claim that he discussed her education costs and she told him they were covered. She deposed: “Never once did he discuss any costs of my education with me, he didn’t even congratulate me on getting into the Nursing Program this year. He actually told me that my “deadbeat mother” and “my (buddy)” Dennis Hart can pay for my schooling.” She attaches to her affidavit a screen shot of the text message from her father to this effect.
4. Shelby, now 20, attends Algonquin College and resides with her mother in the matrimonial home and also at times with her boyfriend.
5. Brooke deposes her father made death threats towards Denis Hart on February 20, 2018. After she provided a statement to the police, her father stopped all contact with her. Shelby did not provide a statement and her father continues to have contact with her. Ms. Davidson has continued to call the police from time to time. I find the extreme acrimony, conflict and allegations back and forth between the parties referred to by Shelston J. continues.
6. Ms. Davidson alleges Mr. Davidson and his girlfriend Emma McLaughlin have resided together at the Prince of Wales address and are now purchasing and renovating a new home. Her affidavit provides detail as to the purchase of the home, the seller’s name and address. She further indicates Mr. Davidson has been using the property at 3115 Paden Rd., North Gower to dump construction material from the renovation. Although Mr. Davidson filed a cross-motion and was entitled to respond to Ms. Davidson’s affidavit alleging the purchase and renovation of the property, he filed no responding material.
7. Although the order of Justice Shelston was made without prejudice and Chloe began to reside with Mr. Davidson in January, 2018, he did not return the matter to court to change the order of exclusive possession.
8. Although Mr. Davidson deposed there is some equipment left in the industrial shed behind the matrimonial home, he has moved most of the equipment and the operation of his business to an undisclosed location. There is no longer any need for him to access the matrimonial home property for his business.

18Therefore, on the basis of the evidence before me and the relevant criteria under s. 24 (3) of the Family Law Act, I order on a temporary basis that the applicant continue to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at 3161 Paden Road, North Gower, Ontario and its contents. Further, the respondent shall not attend the property for any purpose unless on consent of the applicant.

Sale of the Matrimonial Home

19Mr. Davidson requested exclusive possession of the matrimonial home so he could make repairs, and relist it for sale at between $789,000 and 799,000.

20Ms. Davidson argues the home has been on the market for a year and should be sold immediately at the price offered in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale dated August 15, 2018, $690,000. That offer was irrevocable until September 7, 2018. It is unclear whether that offer is still available.

21Under s. 23 (b)(iii) of the Family Law Act, the court may authorize the disposition of the matrimonial home if the court finds that the spouse whose consent is required, is unreasonably withholding consent. This order may be subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate. Ms. Davidson argues Mr. Davidson is unreasonably withholding his consent.

22In September, 2017, both parties agreed to sell the matrimonial home and to list it with Royal LePage agent, Bev Bonvie.

23Ms. Bonvie sets out the history of the listing in her email to Mr. Davidson dated August 20, 2018 attached as Exhibit B to the applicant’s affidavit at Tab 10. She notes the following:

1. The property was originally listed on September 22, 2017 for $825,000 which was not Ms. Bonvie’s suggested list price. She suggested $775,000-$799,000 but noted if there was no interest at that price, it would need to be lowered.
2. During a two month period when the property was listed for $825,000, there were no requests for any showings.
3. On November 26, 2017, the listing price was reduced to $799,000. Ms. Bonvie suggested an open house but Mr. Davidson was living in the home at the time and indicated the timing did not work for him.
4. There was a showing in January, 2018 after the price was reduced to $799,000 but no offers.
5. The property was relisted on April 12, 2018 at $749,900. There was one showing which resulted in no offers.
6. The price was then adjusted on April 19, 2018 to $725,000. After that price reduction, there were seven showings between April 19 and July 4, 2018. An offer was received on May 29, 2018 for $650,000. The prospective purchasers would not raise their offer beyond $650,000.
7. In August, 2018, there were two showings and one second showing which resulted in the offer of August 15, 2018 to purchase the matrimonial home for $690,000.

Ms. Bonvie comments:

“the listing has had wide exposure and many internet visits and views during its listing terms. When a property is overpriced, agents and the buying consumers respond by by-passing wanting additional information or viewings of the property which happened initially when the property was listed at $825,000. When it is closer to what the agents and the buyers feel is market value you will start to get showings, however no offers still means that the price is too high. At $725 K we have had the most activity, but with two offers both coming in the mid-$600,000’s, the market is telling us that $725 K is still too high. My recommendation in the past has been to adjust the list price to $699,900.”

8. In in an email to Ms. Bonvie on August 22, 2018, Mr. Davidson indicates the home value to him is $700,000.

24Mr. Davidson alleges Ms. Davidson has allowed the home and property to deteriorate including:

1. Damages to the interlock retaining wall;
2. Damage to the above ground pool;
3. Allowing the property to become overrun with weeds; and
4. Not watering the lawn.

25Ms. Davidson deposes she does not have the money to maintain the home in the condition it was when first listed. Mr. Davidson took the lawn mower, left the pool pump out and it froze. Ms. Davidson indicates that she does not have the funds to replace it.

26When the home was in its original condition, and listed at $825,000 and then $799,000 in the fall of 2017, there were no offers and only one showing in January, 2018 after the price had been reduced to $799,000.

27Mr. Davidson provides a Comparative Market Analysis done by Kerri Seabrook of Coldwell Banker dated August 15, 2018. Ms. Seabrook concludes after analyzing the matrimonial home, property and comparable properties on the market as well as recent sales and comparable properties that fail to sell, that the matrimonial home could be listed for between $789,000-799,000. She indicates that,

“Price reflects property being in excellent condition including landscaping, pool and interior of the home. Price will vary in accordance with work completed. List price to be re-examined prior to listing.”

28It does not appear that any of the comparables had a large industrial shed on the property.

29Although Mr. Davidson was ordered by Justice Shelston to pay the expenses of the matrimonial home other than the mortgage, he has not. Ms. Davidson deposes that hydro is in arrears and there have been threats to terminate. Propane is in arrears. This is not contested by Mr. Davidson who indicates he stopped paying some household expenses when he could no longer deduct them for business purposes after he moved his business. The taxes are in arrears. Mr. Davidson indicates he paid the taxes for 2017 and received one tax bill in April, 2018 which he will likely pay in October from renting the corn field at 3115 Paden Road, North Gower. He acknowledges he has not paid any 2018 taxes. At this point, despite the court order, it is Ms. Davidson who is attempting to keep up with the household expenses by making payments on her credit card.

30I find based on the evidence before me that the matrimonial home must be sold as soon as possible. The parties cannot afford to maintain it. It is deteriorating and is a source of conflict. It is has been on the market for over a year with only two offers. Mr. Davidson has indicated the value of the home to him is $700,000.

31If the offer of $690,000, as outlined in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale dated August 15, 2018 is still available, I authorize the sale of the matrimonial home at that price and find that Mr. Davidson is unreasonably withholding his consent. Any issues relating to the sale process are to be resolved by the Master on short notice by a case conference. The net proceeds of the sale are to be held in trust pending settlement or order of the court.

32If the $690,000 offer is no longer available, I order the sale of the matrimonial home be supervised and directed by the Master including agent, list price, approval and execution of any offer or agreement and terms of sale.

Child and Spousal Support

33It is agreed that Ms. Davidson is entitled to spousal support and Chloe, who resides with Mr. Davidson is entitled to child support. In addition, I am satisfied that Brooke, who resides with Ms. Davidson, is entitled to child support as she continues to be a “child of the marriage.”

34It is agreed that for support purposes, Ms. Davidson’s income largely from disability pensions is $28,016.

35Mr. Davidson’s 2016 Notice of Assessment and his two financial statements filed with the court indicate self-employment income of $20,250. His 2017 Tax Summary shows only $110.89 of rental income which is unexplained.

36Mr. Davidson deducted numerous expenses for business purposes which he now agrees should be added back in to adjust his income for support purposes. Although not indicated on his financial statements, he now indicates cash income of approximately $5,700 annually for selling wood and a corn cash crop which should be grossed up. Therefore, he argues his income for support purposes should be $52,553. Ms. Davidson takes strong exception to this and notes a number of anomalies in his tax information and financial disclosure. She argues that net self-employment income of $82,000 should be imputed to Mr. Davidson.

37Although it is agreed that income should be imputed to Mr. Davidson pursuant to s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, the amount is contested. The only financial information provided by Mr. Davidson to the court was his financial statement sworn December 11, 2017 to which he attached his 2014, 2015, and 2016 Notices of Assessment and his August 15, 2018 financial statement to which he attached his 2017 Tax Return Summary and his business financial statements from December 31, 2017. Those statements were compiled by his accountant based on information provided by Mr. Davidson. The accountant notes neither a review nor an audit was performed and accordingly, “I express no assurance thereon. Readers are cautioned that the statements made may not be appropriate for their purposes.”

38Mr. Davidson has been self-employed running his excavating business for many years. Despite the order of Master Fortier, he has not valued that business and his financial statements sworn December 11, 2017 and August 15, 2018 indicate value “TBD”.

39After the order of Justice Shelston, Mr. Davidson removed most of his inventory, equipment and machinery from the industrial shop behind the matrimonial home which in his 2017 financial statement had an initial book value of approximately $1 million dollars. There is no evidence as to where that equipment went, whether it was disposed of and, as noted previously, his new business location.

40As noted by Justice Shelston, I find Mr. Davidson’s reported income even with the addition of the business expenses deducted and cash income, unreliable for a number of reasons including:

1. His 2017 corporate financial statements and Tax Summary indicate no employment income in 2017 yet he did employ staff and was working. He has not provided his 2017 corporate tax return nor Notice of Assessment.
2. He has been able to acquire and maintain mortgages and credit which would be difficult on a $20,250 income.
3. Mr. Davidson was paying approximately $18,000 for the mortgage on the matrimonial home and over $19,000 for household expenses in addition to the taxes on his properties. His first financial statement of December, 2017 indicates yearly expenses of $66,459.84 yet a gross income of $22,250.
4. There is evidence he rents his Kemptville recreational property but no rent is disclosed.

41Suffice it to say, there are a number of questions that remain to be answered in order to make a final determination of Mr. Davidson’s income for child and spousal support purposes.

42In the interim, on the evidence before me at this time, I find income should be imputed to Mr. Davidson pursuant to s. 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines. He has admittedly unreasonably deducted expenses from income. In addition, he has failed to provide income information when legally obliged to do so. The financial information provided to the court since Justice Shelston’s order is insufficient and confusing. Justice Shelston did not order spousal support or child support as more information was required but did order Mr. Davidson to pay $1659 for household expenses. At this point, the house is to be sold.

43Given the financial information available to date, I find Mr. Davidson continues to be able to pay approximately $1600 per month in expenses. The DivorceMate calculations provided by Ms. Davidson indicate, pursuant to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, Department of Justice Canada, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, by Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, Catalogue No. J2-397/2016E-PDF (Ottawa: Justice Canada, April 2016)(SSAG), mid-range, spousal support of $1607 would be payable on $82,000 net self-employment income. This calculation, however, does not include child support for Chloe and Brooke.

44Based on Ms. Davidson’s income, the limited financial information as to Mr. Davidson’s income, the needs of Ms. Davidson and Mr. Davidson’s ability to pay, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the Federal Child Support Guidelines and the DivorceMate Calculations including child support, I find on a temporary without prejudice basis Mr. Davidson’s imputed income for support purposes to be $82,000 and order on a temporary without prejudice basis Mr. Davidson to pay Ms. Davidson spousal support of $1014 per month commencing September 1, 2018.

45I further order on a temporary without prejudice basis, Ms. Davidson to pay child support for Chloe of $236 per month based on $28,016 annual income and Mr. Davidson to pay child support for Brooke in the amount of $764 per month on an $82,000 annual income. Pursuant to s. 8 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, Mr. Davidson is to pay Ms. Davidson $528 per month for child support commencing September 1, 2018.

46Both spousal support and child support are without prejudice with respect to retroactivity, determination of Mr. Davidson’s income and determination of Shelby’s living arrangements and post-secondary education.

Disclosure and Questioning

47The order of Master Fortier for disclosure has not been fully complied with by the respondent. Questioning, which was permitted has not taken place. It will be necessary to complete disclosure and proceed with questioning, before there can be a final determination of Mr. Davidson’s income for support purposes.

48I order all outstanding disclosure as ordered by Master Fortier on January 22, 2018 be provided by the respondent within 30 days. In addition, disclosure is to include a full business valuation and disclosure as to the location of Mr. Davidson’s business and equipment inventory, machinery etc. If the equipment and the machinery have been disposed of, disclosure is to include documentary evidence of to whom and the amount received. Further, I order questioning take place within 45 days to cover all financial issues. Questioning is limited to five hours for each party.

49Ms. Davidson is to provide further information regarding Shelby’s living arrangements and further disclosure required under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, to support claims for base child support and special or extraordinary expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines for both Brooke and Shelby who are 18 years of age or older.

Striking of Pleadings

50Although a possible remedy under R. 1 (8) (c) of the Family Law Rules, I am not prepared to strike Mr. Davidson’s pleadings for lack of full disclosure as requested by Ms. Davidson. This is an extreme remedy to be used in exceptional circumstance where no other remedy would suffice. It would deny Mr. Davidson the right to participate in the trial.

51I have ordered Mr. Davidson to comply with the previous order of Master Fortier and provide all outstanding and additional disclosure. In addition, questioning for which leave was provided should take place before any further argument to strike pleadings. Ms. Davidson has not yet availed herself of the right to question Mr. Davidson.

3145 Paden Road and 3115 Paden Road, North Gower

52Rule 11 (3) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, provides:

AMENDING APPLICATION OR ANSWER WITH COURT’S PERMISSION

(3) On motion, the court shall give permission to a party to amend an application, answer or reply, unless the amendment would disadvantage another party in a way for which costs or an adjournment could not compensate. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 11 (3) .

53Mr. Davidson is given leave to amend his pleadings to claim a constructive trust interest in the 3115 Paden Road property. He shall be permitted access to that property upon which he has a corn cash crop. If this amendment proves to be unnecessary and results in extra costs to Ms. Davidson, she may at the end of the day claim these costs in compensation.

54On consent, the property at 3145 Paden North Gower shall be listed for sale forthwith. The parties are to agree upon a listing agent and the list price. The net proceeds are to be held in trust pending settlement or order of the court. Any issue related to the sale processing including the agent, list price and approval and execution of any offer or agreement and the terms of sale are to be resolved by referral to the Master on short notice at a case conference.

Custody of Chloe

55There will be a temporary order with respect to the parenting of Chloe Davidson, born May 12, 2003, as per the draft temporary order filed approved to as form and content.

Costs

56The applicant was the more successful party on the motions.

57If the parties cannot agree upon costs, the applicant shall provide costs submissions not to exceed two pages plus a bill of costs and any offers to settle by October 9, 2018. Respondent is to provide his costs submissions not to exceed two pages plus a bill of costs and any offers to settle by October 23, 2018.