Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-0590-00 DATE: 2018-07-11
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
AVIS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION Applicant
D. Zulianello, for the Applicant
- and -
GORDON GRAVELLE a.k.a. GORDON R. GRAVELLE Respondent
Self-Represented
HEARD: April 3, 6 and 26, 2018, at Thunder Bay, Ontario
Mr. Justice W.D. Newton
Decision On Vexatious Litigant Application
Overview
[1] Avis Industrial Corporation (“Avis”) brings an application for an order that Mr. Gravelle and corporations associated with him be precluded from commencing further proceedings in this court and, further, that Mr. Gravelle not be permitted to continue any proceeding that he has previously instituted, except by leave of a judge of this court.
[2] Avis relies upon the conduct of Mr. Gravelle in two proceedings related to Avis and in other actions commenced in this court.
[3] Mr. Gravelle argues, in essence, that he has always been acting in good faith in all of his court proceedings and that he should not be precluded from pursuing his many legal claims.
The Law
[4] The Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c C.43 provides:
Vexatious proceedings
140 (1) Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,
(a) instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or
(b) conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner,
the judge may order that,
(c) no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or
(d) a proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,
except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140 (1) ; 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).
(2) Repealed: 1998, c. 18, Sched. B, s. 5 (2) .
Application for leave to proceed
(3) Where a person against whom an order under subsection (1) has been made seeks leave to institute or continue a proceeding, the person shall do so by way of an application in the Superior Court of Justice. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140 (3) ; 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).
Leave to proceed
(4) Where an application for leave is made under subsection (3),
(a) leave shall be granted only if the court is satisfied that the proceeding sought to be instituted or continued is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding;
(b) the person making the application for leave may seek the rescission of the order made under subsection (1) but may not seek any other relief on the application;
(c) the court may rescind the order made under subsection (1);
(d) the Attorney General is entitled to be heard on the application; and
(e) no appeal lies from a refusal to grant relief to the applicant.
Abuse of process
(5) Nothing in this section limits the authority of a court to stay or dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process or on any other ground. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140 (4, 5)
[5] In Dobson v. Green, 2012 ONSC 4432, [2012] O.J. No. 3593, Campbell J. discussed the circumstances when this power should be exercised:
6 It has been said that this type of legislation gives the court an “extraordinary power” which must be “exercised sparingly and with the greatest of care.” It must be reserved for those rare cases where the normal rules of court seem unable to reasonably control a litigant. See, for example: Prince Edward Island (Attorney General) v. Ayangma, 2004 PESCAD 11, [2004] P.E.I.J. No. 45 (C.A.) at para. 45; Canada v. Olympia Interiors Ltd. (2004), 2004 FCA 195, 323 N.R. 191 (Fed. C.A.) at para. 6; Kallaba v. Bylykbashi, at para. 31. [Emphasis added.]
[6] Justice Campbell summarized the common characteristics of vexatious litigants and the applicable legal principles as follows:
7 Generally speaking, vexatious litigants often share common characteristics. They advance claims that are often manifestly without merit. They tend to ignore adverse rulings and procedural setbacks, such as costs orders against them. They may resort to multiple, repetitive proceedings, often against the same adversary. They will sometimes similarly engage others who present themselves as an obstacle in their path. They often launch court proceedings as if unconcerned about the financial resources invariably consumed by such actions. They tend to be litigants who, with persistence, abuse the court process for their own selfish and single-minded goals. They are typically self-represented litigants who seem intent, through a series of persistent and fruitless proceedings, on wearing down their opponents through an ongoing battle of attrition. See: O’Neill v. Deacons, 2007 ABQB 754, at para. 24-25. …
9 In the leading decision of Re Lang Michener and Fabian (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.J.) Henry J. reviewed the judicial authorities decided under an earlier version of this legislation, and extracted the following important principles that are still applicable today: (a) The bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding; (b) Where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious; (c) Vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights; (d) It is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings; (e) In determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action; (f) The failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; (g) The respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.
[7] Justice Campbell and others have described the policy rationale for this power:
8 The purpose of s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act is to protect honest citizens and litigants and the overall integrity of the justice system against those who continually abuse the court process by engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation. It is important to appreciate, however, that even the vexatious litigant is not forever deprived of the right to launch court proceedings. Rather, where an order is made under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order merely serves to require a process of judicial supervision over the initiation of such proceedings. The burden is shifted to the vexatious litigant to establish, to the satisfaction of the court, that there is a reasonable basis for the proposed proceedings. Where such justification can be provided, leave to pursue the proceeding may be granted. See: Roskam v. Jacoby-Hawkins, 2010 ONSC 4439, at para. 19, 25; Foy v. Foy (No.2).
[8] Justice Brown in Beard Winter LLP v. Shekhdar, 2017 ONSC 4846, [2017] O.J. No. 4337, made a similar observation:
11 An Order under section 140 is beneficial to all parties as it ensures that public resources are not wasted on vexatious litigation, protects the targets of vexatious litigation from the time and cost of mounting a defence, and also serves the litigant who is attempting to proceed with vexatious litigation by averting what would inevitably be a costly, time-consuming and futile effort: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali, [1998] O.J. No. 5890 (Gen. Div.) at para. 26.
[9] This problem is not unique to Ontario trial courts. Justice Stratus of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42, [2017] F.C.J. No. 242, noted:
19 The Federal Courts have finite resources that cannot be squandered. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant. The unrestricted access to courts by those whose access should be restricted affects the access of others who need and deserve it. Inaction on the former damages the latter.
[10] Justice Stratus also described some of the characteristics of vexation litigants:
32 In defining “vexatious,” it is best not to be precise. Vexatiousness comes in all shapes and sizes. Sometimes it is the number of meritless proceedings and motions or the reassertion of proceedings and motions that have already been determined. Sometimes it is the litigant's purpose, often revealed by the parties sued, the nature of the allegations against them and the language used. Sometimes it is the manner in which proceedings and motions are prosecuted, such as multiple, needless filings, prolix, incomprehensible or intemperate affidavits and submissions, and the harassment or victimization of opposing parties.
33 Many vexatious litigants pursue unacceptable purposes and litigate to cause harm. But some are different: some have good intentions and mean no harm. Nevertheless, they too can be declared vexatious if they litigate in a way that implicates section 40’s purposes: see, e.g., Olympia Interiors (F.C. and F.C.A.), above.
[11] As was noted, great care should be taken before making a vexatious litigant order. In Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, [2014] O.J. No. 5307, Myers J. observed:
18 It should be borne in mind however, that even a vexatious litigant can have a legitimate complaint. It is not uncommon for there to be a real issue at the heart of a vexatious litigant’s case. The problem is often that the litigant either cannot properly communicate the concern or, more typically, cannot accept that the law may not provide the remedy sought despite the unfairness felt by the litigant. While rule 2.1 should be applied robustly to bring to an early end to vexatious proceedings, the matters should not considered lightly or dismissively. Care should be taken to allow generously for drafting deficiencies and recognizing that there may be a core complaint which is quite properly recognized as legitimate even if the proceeding itself is frivolously brought or carried out and ought to be dismissed.
[12] Declaring a litigant vexatious does not deny access to the courts to the litigant. As was stated by Brown J. in Beard Winter LLP v. Shekhdar, 2017 ONSC 4846, [2017] O.J. No. 4337, the court acts as a gatekeeper:
12 The section 140 Order does not prevent access to the Court, but rather requires that applications for leave to the Court be granted before a plausible claim can proceed, while vexatious proceedings will be thwarted: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali, supra.
The Facts
[13] The affidavit of Amy Sicks, corporate paralegal for Avis, sworn January 8, 2018, accurately sets out the facts giving rise to this vexatious litigant application.
[14] As that affidavit discloses, there have been 43 attendances in this court relating to Avis-controlled companies, many of which can be characterized as attempts to vary or reconsider prior orders. Mr. Gravelle has also launched appeals to the Court of Appeal, all of which have been dismissed for delay.
[15] This began with a motion to strike Mr. Gravelle’s claim in action CV-13-0385. By decision dated September 22, 2014, claims for tortious interference with economic relationships and prospective economic relationships were struck. Claims for aggravated damages and punitive damages were also struck with leave to amend.
[16] When this action failed to progress due to a procedural order made against Mr. Gravelle, Mr. Gravelle commenced a parallel action in 2015 which was ultimately dismissed as an abuse of process.
What Judges have said about Mr. Gravelle’s tactics and motions in the Avis actions
[17] Some comments from judges who have dealt with Mr. Gravelle on occasion are relevant to the vexatious litigant issue and demonstrate Mr. Gravelle’s approach to the justice system.
[18] On November 26, 2014, Mr. Gravelle sought to have Pierce J. reconsider her decision which struck certain claims. Justice Pierce stated:
The litigants, as well as the courts, have an interest in the finality of decisions. The matter was argued and adjudicated. To permit litigants to reargue matters with which they are unhappy is to strain judicial resources.
[19] On October 30, 2015, Mr. Gravelle appeared before Pierce J. again who noted:
The plaintiff moves again for reconsideration of my order of November 26, 2014 which was itself a motion for reconsideration that was refused. The motion is res judicata and is dismissed.
[20] Justice Fitzpatrick was designated as case management judge in the 2014 action. He ordered that there were to be no further case conferences until the status of the 2015 action was determined. Despite that clear order Mr. Gravelle “improperly scheduled” a case conference.
[21] In Gravelle v. A-1 Security Manufacturing Corp., 2016 ONSC 935, [2016] O.J. No. 915, (the “2015 action”), Pierce J. stated:
1 The plaintiff represents himself in this proceeding which he has turned into a procedural quagmire. He has done so by:
• issuing “parallel” claims and seeking to have one claim stayed; • purporting to amend a notice of motion to claim different relief following a ruling that disposed of the original motion; • delivering notice that he abandons his amended motion and then rescinding that notice when he realized the cost consequences; • seeking leave to amend his statement of claim without providing a proposed draft of the amended pleading; • failing to attend court for a scheduling motion and then objecting to the schedule ordered, and asking to set it aside; • seeking an adjournment of a fixed date for motion to strike his pleadings on the grounds that his counsel cannot attend when no solicitor has filed a notice of appearance, (be it for a limited scope retainer or otherwise); and • failing to pay costs ordered to be paid forthwith.
[22] In Gravelle v. A-1 Security Manufacturing Corp., 2016 ONSC 1486, [2016] O.J. No. 2039, on the motion to strike the 2015 claim, I observed:
17 Mr. Gravelle is well aware of the requirements to follow deadlines imposed by court orders and the consequences for failing to do so. This request for an adjournment is simply another attempt by Mr. Gravelle to circumvent orders made by this court and, in particular, the order of Pierce J. that material be filed and that the motion proceed as scheduled.
29 I find that this action is, as the defendants allege, an attempt by Mr. Gravelle to once again circumvent a court order.
30 In the circumstances, I find that this action is an abuse of process and I dismiss the action.
[23] When Mr. Gravelle sought leave to extend the time to perfect the appeal of that decision to the Court of Appeal, Juriansz J. of the Court of Appeal, in dismissing that application, stated:
The order under appeal struck the appellant’s action, in large measure, as an abuse of process. The judge found the claim duplicated claims in action CV-13-0385 and reinstates claims already struck by the September 22, 2014 order of Pierce J. The appellant does not take issue with this but responds that the new claim added defendants and is based on different law. He says that a party can refile a second claim pleading the same cause of action based on, for example, Texas or Virginia law, and it would not be res judicata. I do not accept this proposition. In my view the appeal is devoid of merit. Considering the appeal has no merit and that the action struck was an abuse of process, I consider the court can reasonably deny the important right of appeal, especially when prejudice to the respondent and the overall demands of justice are considered.
[24] While that application was pending in the Court of Appeal, Mr. Gravelle brought a motion before me to reconsider that same decision dismissing the 2015 action. In my reasons Gravelle (c.o.b. CodePro Manufacturing) v. A-1 Security Manufacturing Corp., 2016 ONSC 6582, [2016] O.J. No. 5465, I noted:
14 Having been unsuccessful at the Court of Appeal on July 11, 2016, Mr. Gravelle brought this motion to have me reconsider my March 1, 2016 decision.
15 As my reasons of March 1, 2016 disclose, Mr. Gravelle has a history of attempting to circumvent court orders. This is but another attempt to do so.
16 Mr. Gravelle’s complaints are with respect to process before me and previously before Pierce J. Any concern over process is defeated when the underlying action is, as Juriansz J.A. stated, “devoid of merit.”
17 This motion is dismissed.
18 This motion has been an abuse of process considering the decision of the Court of Appeal on July 11, 2016. As such, the defendants are entitled to reasonable full indemnity costs.
[25] In Gravelle v. A-1 Security Manufacturing Corp., 2017 ONSC 306, which concerned another attempt to have the decision dismissing the 2015 action varied or reconsidered, based on new evidence, Fitzpatrick J. stated:
3 …. It is not new evidence – it is irrelevant evidence.
4 Further, I understand Mr. Gravelle has already appealed the findings in this endorsement and the appeal has been dismissed.
5 In my view, this motion is completely without merit and is dismissed.
[26] When appearing before Fitzpatrick J. on January 12, 2017 and addressing what quantum of costs should be awarded against him, Mr. Gravelle stated to the court: “… I believe it will be reversed on appeal so I do not plan on paying it anyhow…”.
[27] In the vexatious litigant application, Mr. Gravelle brought a motion to remove counsel for the applicant as solicitor of record. Justice Smith stated: “To allow a party to have opposing counsel removed from the record by simply serving a summons would make a mockery of the litigation process. This aspect of the respondent’s motion is clearly frivolous and without merit and is dismissed.” (See Avis Industrial Corporation v. Gravelle, 2018 ONSC 2373)
Other Actions commenced by Mr. Gravelle
Gravelle v. Denis Grigoras Law Office
[28] Mr. Gravelle sued his former lawyer for alleged negligence in providing advice relating to some business matters in the United States. That action was dismissed for delay. Mr. Gravelle appealed that decision arguing that he was awaiting the outcome of other litigation. That appeal was dismissed (Gordon Gravelle (CodePro Manufacturing) v. Denis Grigoras Law Office, 2013 ONCA 339).
[29] Following the Court of Appeal decision Mr. Gravelle commenced another action against the Grigoras firm although apparently relating to different matters. That action was dismissed as out of time (G. Gravelle o/a CodePro Manufacturing v. D. Grigoras Law Office, et al., 2017 ONSC 3012). Mr. Gravelle appealed, again arguing that it was appropriate for him to delay pending the result of other matters. That appeal was also dismissed (Gravelle (CodePro Manufacturing) v. Denis Grigoras Law Office, 2018 ONCA 396). This motion involved seven appearances in this court before the appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Gravelle v. Her Majesty the Queen
[30] Mr. Gravelle was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle on December 10, 2015. He appealed that conviction to this court. At the commencement of the appeal, Mr. Gravelle sought leave to file fresh evidence and to amend his appeal to claim incompetence of counsel. Leave was refused. After the appeal was argued, but before the decision was delivered, Mr. Gravelle brought an application seeking leave to file fresh evidence and for a stay. That application was dismissed. The court concluded that Mr. Gravelle was “attempting in effect, to reargue the appeal” (Gravelle v. R., 2016 ONSC 8099, [2016] O.J. No. 6804, at para. 5). Mr. Gravelle brought another application, again before the appeal could be decided. The relief sought was “strikingly similar” to the prior application. Justice Pierce noted:
13 Each application has led to a delay in deciding the appeal on its merits. I am of the view that the appellant's efforts to amend and re-argue his appeal after the appeal was initially argued are motivated by a desire for delay. The court has already dismissed an earlier application for similar relief because there was no evidence due diligence had been exercised to call the "fresh" evidence at trial and because the application was not in keeping with the Criminal Proceedings Rules. The second application to amend the appeal essentially replicates the October 13th application which was dismissed, although for different reasons. It is therefore also dismissed.
[31] The summary conviction appeal was dismissed. Mr. Gravelle sought leave to appeal that decision alleging, among other things, that Pierce J. was biased based on her rulings against him in unrelated civil proceedings. The leave application to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on August 8, 2017 (Docket: M4761 (C63266)).
Gravelle v. Thunder Bay (City) Police Services
[32] In Gravelle v. Thunder Bay (City) Police Services Board, 2017 ONSC 7189, [2017] O.J. No. 6755, Mr. Gravelle sued the two police officers and their employer, the Thunder Bay Police Services Board. These officers had spoken to Mr. Gravelle about his contact with a witness relating to his impaired driving charge. One of the arguments advanced on his summary conviction appeal of the impaired driving charge was that the conduct of these officers infringed his Charter rights. As in the past, Mr. Gravelle also sought to introduce fresh evidence. In striking the claim, Fitzpatrick J. stated:
22 I agree with the submission of the defendants that Mr. Gravelle has been rightfully convicted. He has no basis to assert that he has been wrongfully convicted. He has exhausted his appeals. The fundamental underpinning of his claims has been destroyed. I find his claims, even as set out in the proposed amended pleadings, are a collateral attack on his conviction. His theory that “but for” his interaction with two police officers he would not have been convicted bears no connection to reality. It is a claim that cannot possibly succeed in my view.
25 In my view, Mr. Gravelle’s continued attempts to take up court resources in aid of his quest to obtain a monetary remedy from these defendants should be curtailed. I find his pleadings represent an abuse of process. It is an attempt to relitigate matters that have been conclusively dealt with by three different levels of court. For all the reasons set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E. as to why relitigation of matters should be discouraged, this matter should be brought to an end now.
[33] Mr. Gravelle appealed this decision and on a motion to extend the time to perfect his appeal, Roberts J.A., in dismissing the motion (20180403 – C64790), stated:
I agree that his appeals are a collateral attack on the previous judgments of the courts below and in this court. Those decisions affirmed his conviction and dismissed his attempts to introduce fresh evidence that would not have affected the outcome of the criminal proceedings.
[34] These actions accounted for 38 appearances in this court before the appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Actions against Zaitzeff and Watkins
[35] In separate actions, Mr. Gravelle has sued Zaitzeff Law Professional Corporation and an employee and associate for damages for failing to properly represent him in the Avis/A-1 Security actions in 2013 and 2015. He has also sued Watkins Law Professional Corporation for damages for failing to properly represent him in the Avis/A-1 Security actions in 2013 and 2015.
[36] Mr. Gravelle brought a summary judgment application in the Zaitzeff action which was dismissed because Platana J. concluded that the motion was, among other things, premature (Gravelle v. Zaitzeff Professional Corporation et al., 2018 ONSC 693).
This Vexatious Litigant Application
[37] Although this application was first returnable January 16, 2018, Mr. Gravelle brought many motions before the application was heard.
[38] On March 8, 2018, Mr. Gravelle brought a motion to convert this application into an action or, in the alternative, leave to call witnesses and for an order directing that the motion only be heard before a “visiting judge”. The witnesses he intended to call were two lawyers who he sued whom he alleged were assisting him with his litigation and counsel for the applicant and his junior counsel in this application. In his affidavit filed in support of this motion, Mr. Gravelle did not depose a reason for requesting a “visiting judge”.
[39] On March 22, 2018, Mr. Gravelle brought a motion for security for costs and an order removing counsel for the applicant as counsel of record. The ground for removing counsel was that Mr. Gravelle had summoned counsel as a witness on this application and, therefore, that opposing counsel would be in a conflict of interest.
[40] On April 3, 2018, argument on this application proceeded and the decision was reserved. On April 6, 2018, Mr. Gravelle sought to make additional submissions and he was allowed to do so. Additional Submissions were made on April 26, 2018.
[41] On June 7, 2018, while the vexatious litigant application decision was on reserve, Mr. Gravelle, in Gravelle v. A-1 Security, brought a motion to vary my order dated March 1, 2016, to vary the order of Pierce J. dated March 17, 2016, and seeking costs personally against counsel for the applicant. This was done in an obvious attempt to relitigate the prior orders and as a collateral attack on the vexatious litigant application. By endorsement released concurrently with this decision, I dismissed that motion.
Statements of Mr. Gravelle
[42] Mr. Gravelle has made the following comments in affidavits filed in this court and made similar statements in submissions to me. Mr. Gravelle is not a lawyer.
[43] In an affidavit in this proceeding, sworn March 13, 2018, Mr. Gravelle, in seeking security for costs against the applicant, stated:
- Having studied and practiced law for over 25 years, I believe that a minimum of 62 hours would be required to adequately resist Avis Industrials’ pending application to declare me as a vexatious litigant. [Emphasis added.]
[44] In an affidavit in this proceeding, sworn March 19, 2018, Mr. Gravelle stated:
- Having thoroughly reviewed the salient facts set forth within the application record of Avis Industrial, and having intimate knowledge of all issues raised therein; and having thoroughly reviewed salient jurisprudence on the law relating to a s. 140 application under the Courts of Justice Act, including controlling jurisprudence by the Ontario Court of Appeal, and based upon having studied and engaged in the practice of law, on all levels, on and off for over 27 years, I verily believe and assert that the said application is wholly devoid of any merit, to the extent it is doomed to fail.
- Over the past 27 years or so, I have represented my business interests in various legal proceedings, against third parties, and/or corporations, both in Ontario, and the United States.
- As such, I have attended jury trials, personally appeared in Federal and State courts, argued successful appeals in Federal Court and Ontario Court of Appeal in Toronto, conducted depositions/examinations, prepared statement of claims/Complaints, argued complex motions, replies and oppositions, and so forth.
- To the extent that in or about 2012, the Hon. Mr. Justice Harold of the Superior Court of justice, in Thunder Bay, formally indicated that he found my knowledge of the law to be quite “impressive”.
- A Divisional Court Judge, sitting on Appeal, also indicated her disbelief as to my inherent legal knowledge, and skills to prepare a factum, and argue an appeal. [Emphasis added.]
Outstanding Costs Awards
[45] The affidavits filed set out that Mr. Gravelle has not paid five costs orders from 2016 and 2017 relating to his 2015 action against Avis/A-1. These orders total approximately $9,500.00. Costs exceeding $10,000.00 are also outstanding in other actions.
[46] Mr. Gravelle argues that he is impecunious, that he has attempted to pay costs orders in the past, and, in any event, that his claims are meritorious and he should therefore be allowed to proceed notwithstanding that costs orders are outstanding.
Analysis and Disposition
[47] Mr. Gravelle has appeared or sought to appear in this court over 100 times since 2013. He has sought to have decisions of this court reconsidered. He has appealed to the Court of Appeal unsuccessfully.
[48] As the excerpts from decisions outlined above indicate, many of the characteristics of vexatious litigants as outlined by Campbell J. in Dobson v. Green, supra, are present in Mr. Gravelle’s litigation:
- ignoring adverse rulings and procedural setbacks
- resorting to multiple, repetitive proceedings, often against the same adversary
- launching court proceedings as if unconcerned about financial resources invariably consumed by such actions
- persistently abusing the court process
- bringing one or more actions to determine an issue which is already been determined by the court
- rolling forward issues raised previously into subsequent actions
- failing to pay costs of unsuccessful proceedings
- persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.
[49] I do not question Mr. Gravelle’s sincerity when he suggests that he believes that he is not bringing unmeritorious claims. However, his record in this court and in the Court of Appeal demonstrate that his belief, although sincere, is not correct in law.
[50] At a time when court and judicial resources are strained these, as Stratus J.A. stated, “finite resources… cannot be squandered. Every moment devoted to a vexatious litigant is a moment unavailable to a deserving litigant.”
[51] Although Mr. Gravelle may not appreciate the fact, an order under s. 140 is to his advantage as well.
[52] As Brown J. in Beard Winter LLP v. Shekhdar, supra, stated:
11 An Order under section 140 is beneficial to all parties as it ensures that public resources are not wasted on vexatious litigation, protects the targets of vexatious litigation from the time and cost of mounting a defence, and also serves the litigant who is attempting to proceed with vexatious litigation by averting what would inevitably be a costly, time-consuming and futile effort: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali, [1998] O.J. No. 5890 (Gen. Div.) at para. 26. [Emphasis added.]
[53] I conclude, therefore, that it is appropriate to make an order under s. 140 for all proceedings currently before the courts and for any actions that Mr. Gravelle and entities controlled by him may bring in the future.
[54] Therefore, the following orders shall issue:
a. Neither Gravelle nor any company he controls shall: i) institute proceedings in any court except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. This does not apply to an appeal of this decision; ii) continue any proceedings previously instituted, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
b. If Gravelle or any company he controls: i) seeks to institute or continue proceedings or appeals in any court governed by the Courts of Justice Act, without first filing an entered order permitting him and/or it to do so, that proceeding shall immediately be stayed upon any person filing a copy of this order; ii) makes an application for leave to initiate or continue any proceeding in any court governed by the Courts of Justice Act, he and/or it shall provide written notice of such application to the Attorney General of Ontario and to the applicant and any proposed defendant at least 10 days before the application is brought; iii) obtains leave to continue any proceeding in any court governed by the Courts of Justice Act, he and/or it must first satisfy in full all outstanding costs orders made against him and/or it in that proceeding.
c. The consent and/or approval from Gravelle or any company he controls as to form and content of this order shall be dispensed with;
d. The applicant shall be entitled to his costs of this application. The applicant shall deliver his costs submissions limited to five pages plus costs outline plus authorities within 30 days of this decision. The respondent shall thereafter have 30 days to respond, again, limited to five pages plus authorities. If no cost submissions are received within 30 days then costs will be deemed settled.
“Original signed by” ____
The Hon. Mr. Justice W.D. Newton
Released: July 11, 2018