NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-07-27672-00
DATE: 20180612
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Jordon Lazare
Applicant
– AND –
Renee Heitner
Respondent
J. Wilson, Counsel for the Applicant
K. Nathens, Counsel for the Respondent
HEARD: May 31, 2018
REASONS FOR DECISION
mCgEE j.
Overview
[1] This is a second review of spousal support payable by Dr. Lazare following a 12 year relationship that ended in 2005.
[2] Dr. Lazare asks the court to terminate his obligation for spousal support and to adjust the February 23, 2011 consent Order for full table child support to reflect two changes: shared parenting of their two teenage children, and an imputation of full-time employment income to Ms. Heitner.
[3] In response, Ms. Heitner asks the court to continue the full table amount of child support without reduction, and to significantly increase the payment of spousal support - with no fixed termination date.
[4] The range for duration of spousal support for this five year marriage/12 year relationship calculated within the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines is six to 16 years. When this action was issued, support had been in pay for 12 years, 13 years at the time of trial. There are no support arrears.
[5] It is agreed that Dr. Lazare’s present annual income is $250,000, that the children have been spending just over 40% of their time in their father’s care since April 2011, and that Ms. Heitner’s annual part-time employment income in 2018 is $47,915.
[6] There is no agreement on whether Ms. Heitner should share in the increase in Dr. Lazare’s income since the last review period, or whether his table support should be reduced to reflect the shared parenting.
[7] I must decide whether Ms. Heitner’s entitlement to spousal support has expired, and if not, when it ought to expire, the appropriate quantum to be paid until expiry, Ms. Heitner’s income for child support purposes and the appropriate adjustment, if any, to reflect the current shared parenting schedule.
[8] My reasons are set out within the subheadings below. They result in the following final Order:
Commencing June 1, 2018 the Applicant, Dr. Lazare shall pay monthly table child support of $3,277 to the Respondent, Ms. Heitner based on annual income of $250,000.
Commencing June 1, 2018 the Respondent, Ms. Heitner shall pay monthly table child support of $1,182 to the Applicant, Dr. Lazare based on annual income of $78,000.
The Applicant, Dr. Lazare shall continue to pay monthly spousal support of $1,848 to the Respondent, Ms. Heitner.
Spousal support shall terminate August 31, 2021.
Commencing June 1, 2018 Section 7 expenses are to be paid in the proportionate shares of 70% by Dr. Lazare and 30% by Ms. Heitner.
Support Deduction Order to issue accordingly.
Entitlement, Duration and Quantum of Spousal Support
[9] The end of duration is the end of entitlement to spousal support.
[10] When duration ends and support stops, “there may still be – and usually is – an income disparity between the spouses.[^1]” The promotion of self-sufficiency as set out in the Divorce Act does not mean parity of income.
[11] Duration and quantum of support are separate and interrelated tools available to courts to best achieve the purposes of an Order for spousal support,[^2] which are to:
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouse arising from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child over and above any obligation for the support of any child;
(c) relieve economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and
(d) promote economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
[12] Spousal support can be restructured to maximize receipt during years of retraining or re-entry into the workforce, to bridge to a retirement period or to create a step down. Support can be paid periodically, in a lump sum, or in a combination thereof.
[13] The applicable formula in this review is the “with child” calculation which generates a duration range of six years post-separation (support would have terminated in 2011) to 16 years (2021). The latter corresponds with the parties’ youngest child turning 18.
[14] The manner in which courts apply their discretion to fix the period of duration and set the quantum of support can be complex. Important considerations include the original basis for the entitlement, whether there have been post-separation events that would change that basis, and if the basis of entitlement permits a recipient spouse to share in post-separation increases in a payor’s income. But first, a review of the relevant facts.
Circumstances of the Separation
[15] Dr. Lazare was already a practicing dentist when the parties began living together in 1993. During their cohabitation he supported Ms. Heitner through a course of qualification to become a physiotherapist. She also trained and gained certification as a Pilate’s instructor.
[16] They were married on July 30, 2000. Both Dr. Lazare and Ms. Heitner were well educated professionals with established careers in their chosen field. Both worked full-time. Two children were born in fairly rapid succession: 2001 and 2003. Following each of her pregnancies Ms. Heitner returned to work, and the parties employed an au pair and part-time caregivers for the children. The parties renovated the basement of their home to create a studio from which Ms. Heitner could offer private physiotherapy services and fitness classes. The renovation included a suite suitable for in-laws or a live-in nanny.
[17] Ms. Heitner was shocked and hurt by Dr. Lazare’s decision to leave the marriage. The timing of his departure – a week after the arrival of a full-time, live in nanny, made her suspicious that it had been planned. The children were only four and two. The parents were 38. They were massively in debt, including owing property taxes on the matrimonial home held in Ms. Heitner’s name.
[18] Three years of a difficult conflict followed. Ms. Heitner actively resisted Dr. Lazare’s proposals for shared parenting. The parties went through a series of mediations and interventions. Ms. Heitner not infrequently changed counsel.
[19] Throughout this three year period Dr. Lazare continued to income split with Ms. Heitner in the amount of $32,500 per year. He also paid her income taxes on that amount, paid for the live-in nanny, paid for the mortgage and covered occasional extra expenses. He maintained the financial status quo with respect to the payment of household bills.
[20] In 2008 the parties finally executed a Separation Agreement. The Agreement provided that Ms. Heitner would retain the home, pay a modest equalization over time, receive formal child and spousal support and make efforts towards self-sufficiency. Those efforts would be evaluated in a spousal support review planned for two years hence, in 2010. This date corresponded with their youngest child having been in school full-time for a year. It was expected that Ms. Heitner, if she had not already done so, would by that time be well established in full-time work.
[21] They were divorced later that year. Dr. Lazare has re-partnered. He and his second spouse now parent a busy household that includes the two children, his partner’s child and a joint child.
[22] The first review of spousal support was planned for 2010, but was not concluded until October 31, 2012[^3] when the parties agreed that spousal support would be reduced by $500 per month. It has since been paid in the amount of 1,848 per month, based on Dr. Lazare’s income of $190,000 – the same income used for the original obligation set out in the 2008 Separation Agreement. The parties also agreed that spousal and full table child support would be non-variable until May 31, 2014 following which, either party could ask the court to change the terms of payment.
[23] Dr. Lazare put off bringing this second review until March 31, 2017, despite having been in a shared parenting arrangement for the prior six years. He testified that he did so deliberately, to give his former spouse more time to advance her part-time employment and become self-sufficient; thus avoiding the stress and cost of litigation, until in his view, it was reasonable to seek a termination of spousal support.
[24] He had genuinely expected that Ms. Heitner would be self-sufficient within a short period of their 2005 separation. Ms. Heitner had a solid history of providing physiotherapy services in both private clinics and home-based care programs, and was a certified Pilate’s instructor. Her independence, skills and ambitions had been part of what had drawn him to her during their early years together. She had advanced her career during the marriage and he truly believed that he had been generous in his provision of support and his contribution to caregiving services that would allow her to work fulltime.
[25] He asserts that there are sufficient facts that weigh against a finding that Ms. Heitner is entitled to spousal support towards the maximum end of the duration. His counsel argues that the non-compensatory support basis for entitlement has been satisfied; and that there is no compensatory basis for support, or at least, a very weak basis.
[26] Ms. Heitner states the opposite: that even now, 13 years post-separation, she has not been fully compensated for the role that she played during the marriage and her post-separation role as a primary caregiver. Her counsel argues that any termination for spousal support, even one at the maximum range of duration is premature. Ms. Heitner claims a compensatory basis for spousal support not only sufficient to extend duration, but to increase her spousal support to as much as $4,000 per month, retroactive to June 2014.[^4]
Non-Compensatory Basis for Spousal Support Satisfied
[27] Spouses are presumed to begin their lives together as financial independents. Over the course of a relationship, one or both may shift to, or alternate between independence, interdependence or dependence. If a spouse is financially dependent when the marriage ends, the Divorce Act requires that spouse to make reasonable efforts to return to independence, or when independence is no longer possible, the highest measure available.
[28] Non-compensatory support primarily addresses the financial need of a dependent, lower income earning spouse by asking what amount within the means of the higher earning spouse, over what period of time, ought to be paid to support the journey towards financial independence. In the language of the Divorce Act, what amount, paid over what period of time will recognize the nature of the failed relationship, relieve resulting economic hardship and promote self-sufficiency?
[29] There is no question that Ms. Heitner had a non-compensatory basis for entitlement upon the parties’ separation in November 2005. The parties had cohabitated for 12 years and had two young children. Her part time income was insufficient to cover her personal expenses and those necessary to her care of the children, over and above child support. She needed time to return to fulltime work.
[30] I find that Dr. Lazare’s payment of full table child support (even during the last seven years of shared parenting,) his contributions to child care and his payment of spousal support over the last 13 years has addressed Ms. Heitner’s need for non-compensatory support.
[31] By her own admission, fulltime, more remunerative work has been available to her for some time. It is her preference to work part time. She enjoys her flexibility. Even without fulltime work Ms. Heitner has been able to maintain and improve her home while paying down debt; and has been able to purchase gym memberships for her and the children, to travel (with some assistance from a partner,) and to purchase cell phones and laptops for the children over and above that provided for within the payment of child support.
[32] Any need for support at this stage appears to be drawn from a desired personal lifestyle that supersedes that available during the parties’ cohabitation and short marriage.
Limited Compensatory Support
[33] A compensatory basis for spousal support can be found when a recipient has suffered economic loss or disadvantage as a result of a role adopted during marriage; or when a recipient has conferred a benefit on a payor without adequate compensation.
[34] The “with child’ formula for spousal support, whether calculated with, or without shared parenting incorporates some measure of a compensatory claim to promote parity for children living in a two home family.
[35] This is often referenced as a safeguard that children do not grow up between a “have” and a “have-not” home. In reality, it is far more nuanced. As parents re-partner, take on new child care responsibilities, make very different financial decisions and pursue new priories, standards of living between homes can vary greatly. One parent may be a saver, one a spender. One may be building equity in a business or home, another may prefer the purchase of services or experiences.
[36] Nonetheless, the “with child” formula for spousal support attempts to find some measure of parity within ranges of spousal support after adjustment for child support.
[37] In this second review of spousal support I find that Ms. Heitner does have a compensatory claim for spousal support, but it is limited to this narrow ground: achieving some measure of parity between their households so that the children do not experience financial disparity between their parent’s homes.
No Sharing in Increased Income During Second Period of Review
[38] Ms. Heitner’s claim that her spousal support be increased to $4,000 per month must fail.
[39] Children benefit from post-separation increases in a parent’s income through operation of the table child support.[^5] There is no parallel entitlement for former spouses. It is ultimately in the discretion of the court, taking into account the facts of each case and the general objectives of spousal support.[^6]
[40] Each case is different, but there must evidence of a strong compensatory basis for entitlement for a former spouse to share in the post-separation increases in income of the other; again, an economic loss or disadvantage resulting from roles adopted during marriage, and, or the conferral of a benefit for which the support recipient has not yet been adequately compensated.
[41] The evidence conflicts on the parties’ views of their roles during marriage. Ms. Heitner declares that it was their joint intention that she withdraw from her career to be the children’s primary caregiver. Dr. Lazare testifies that there was never any such intention, and that Ms. Heitner did so unilaterally.
[42] I prefer the evidence of Dr. Lazare. He was able to recall with some precision the concurrent timing of the purchase of their first home, a dental practice and the arrival of their oldest in and around 2001. It was clear from his manner of testifying that the financial stress of that period has stayed with him over the years.
[43] His evidence rings true that the parties would not have taken on such overwhelming debt but for a mutual expectation that each would maximize their income while raising their young family. I accept his view that for him, the stress created by the parties’ debt, and divergent view of finances contributed to the end of the marriage.
[44] Dr. Lazare’s evidence is consistent with the parties’ subsequent and post-separation actions. The parents maximized their working and parenting hours. Only Ms. Heitner had employment benefits available, so she took her full maternity leave which provided some modest income while minimizing child care expenses. She testified that Dr. Lazare’s evening care of the children allowed her to develop private income sources: fitness classes and physiotherapy treatments. Both business continue to be available to her.
[45] As for benefits conferred during the relationship, I find that both parties benefitted, perhaps more so Ms. Heitner. Dr. Lazare was already a practising dentist when they began cohabitating. It was Ms. Heitner who advanced in her education and career during the relationship. The benefit to Dr. Lazare was the ability to purchase a dental practice, but that purchase was financed by debt that he carried post-separation, debt that always came second to the payment of support.
[46] Since 2011[^7] the parties have shared parenting, allowing each the opportunity to maximize his or her career. It cannot be understated that Ms. Heitner has had the assistance of a full-time, live-in nanny from the time of separation until 2011, and child care thereafter until March 2017. She led no evidence of any child care, or any other impediment to pursuing her career.
[47] I have reviewed the principles in Justice Chappel’s leading decision of Thompson v. Thompson,[^8] particularly, that the right to share in post-separation income increases does not typically arise in cases involving non-compensatory claims, since the primary focus of such claims is on the standard of living enjoyed during the relationship not thereafter; and that having primary responsibility for child care and household duties, without any evidence of having sacrificed personal educational or career plans, will likely not be sufficient to ground an entitlement to benefit from post-separation income increases.
[48] The latter has particular relevance to these facts. Even if one accepts Ms. Heitner’s view of being a primary caregiver (ignoring the parties’ shared custody since 2011) her decision to limit herself to part-time employment work has been wholly her own, and certainly not the result of a role adopted during marriage.
[49] Ms. Heitner led no evidence of any contributions or sacrifices for the benefit of Dr. Lazare’s dental practise conferred during the relationship, the first period of review, or this period: June 1, 2014 to present; that have create economic disadvantage or loss for which she has not yet been adequately compensated. Tellingly, the parties agreed within the first review to use the same income for Dr. Lazare used in the Separation Agreement: $190,000.
[50] A quick comparison of Ms. Heitner’s present net family property to that within her 2007 Financial Statement shows a significant increase, largely attributed to a reduction in her mortgage and increase in the equity of the former matrimonial home located in Thornhill. At the time of trial, her mortgage had been paid down to $62,000. A line of credit on the home has increased, but in large part has been used to fund a renovation and legal fees.
[51] I can observe that Dr. Lazare has also enjoyed a post-separation increase in net worth in the value of his practice and in a home shared with his second spouse, but on the record before me, it is difficult to ascribe any of those increases to the 12 year relationship between the parties.
[52] I find no basis for Ms. Heitner to share in Dr. Lazare’s post-separation increase in income.
Decision: Current Spousal Support to Continue Until Maximum Duration
[53] The current amount of spousal support shall continue until August 31, 2021, at which time it shall terminate.
[54] Dr. Lazare’s counsel proposed that should an immediate termination not be appropriate, that there be a meaningful step-down of spousal support, with service of this Motion to Change acting as notice of this second review period.
[55] There is some merit in this proposal. The 2008 Separation Agreement declared that Ms. Heitner would make her best efforts to secure full-time work. But she testified that she had not made a single job application since obtaining her part-time position in 2010. She has not identified any impediment to obtaining full-time work, and did not disagree in cross-examination that there are hundreds of full-time positions. She has taken no steps towards full time employment since she was served with this Motion to Change.
[56] I have considered counsel’s request, but ultimately, I am not prepared to terminate spousal support at this time. It would have the effect of negating the limited, but valid compensatory basis for support – to apportion the financial consequences of raising children over and above any obligation for child support of any child. I find that this is a sufficient basis to continue spousal support to its maximum duration and best accords with the Divorce Act objectives of spousal support in these circumstances.
Ms. Heitner’s Income for Support Purposes
[57] Since 2010, Ms. Heitner has been employed at a GTA Hospital on a part-time basis. She has developed a specialty in geriatric physiotherapy and the treatment of Parkinson’s patients. Her 2018 salary is $47,915. Her salary reflects only 18.75 paid hours a week.
[58] Ms. Heitner testified that she is at the hospital, more or less, 9 – 3, Monday to Thursday as her duties require certain unpaid hours to complete. She acknowledges that the hospital position in no manner maximizes her income, but asserts that it is otherwise advantageous. It provides her with stability, a pension, opportunities for ongoing training, further specialization and project management; and professional prestige.
[59] When she was specifically asked whether there was an opportunity to supplement her income with agency or private health care services, she answered that she would look at it “down the road.” When asked whether there were opportunities to expand her scope of practice at the hospital, she affirmed that there were many, and that “with more assistance at home” she might well be able to take advantage of those opportunities.
[60] In the leading case of Drygala v. Pauli,[^9] the Court of Appeal set out the three-part test for determining whether income should be imputed on the basis of intentional under-employment or unemployment. The test in Drygala for imputing income for child support purposes applies equally to claims for spousal support.[^10]
Is the spouse intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his reasonable educational needs?
If the answer to question #2 is negative, what income is appropriately imputed in the circumstances?
[61] There is a duty on the part of a payor to actively seek out reasonable employment opportunities that will maximize income earning potential so as to meet the needs of their dependents.[^11] Income imputation is not strictly limited to the payor spouse; income may also be imputed to the recipient spouse.[^12]
[62] Dr. Lazare presents a number of basis for an imputation of income to Ms. Heitner: the plethora of available full-time physiotherapy positions, an expansion of her role at the hospital, and the opportunity for private practice as a supplement to her employment position. Ms. Heitner resists them all on an oft repeated basis: she is the children’s primary caregiver, a self-identification on which she continues to rely while sharing the parenting of an almost 17 year old and a 15 year old.
[63] At her current hourly rate of approximately $40 an hour, an increase to full-time would bring her into the annual range of $78,000 – the amount sought to be imputed.
$78,000 per Year Imputed
[64] I agree with Dr. Lazare that Ms. Heitner is intentionally under-employed given her skills and experience, the current demand for physiotherapists, the ages of the children and the shared parenting arrangements.
[65] That said, I need not delve too far into the applicant’s proposal for imputation: the evidence at trial exposed a more authentic basis for Ms. Heitner’s reluctance to seek full-time employment.
[66] Ms. Heitner’s evidence in cross-examination revealed a private practice operated from her home, entirely in cash. She was evasive concerning her hourly rate and contradicted herself with respect to the number of patients that she has seen in the past six months.
[67] In short, the evidence at trial suggests that Ms. Heitner has been supplementing her employment income through a private practice. The amount cannot be known, but a mere five to six paid hours a week at $100 an hour, for 45 weeks a year, grossed up would easily, and at a minimum, approximate the proposed imputed income of $78,000.
Shared Parenting: Section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines
[68] I do not accept Ms. Heitner’s proposal that there be no adjustment to child support. The children have alternated residences between their parents’ homes since April 2011 in a now, well settled routine. They can walk to their school from each of their parent’s homes. Dr. Lazare testified to a compelling list of additional expenses necessary to shared parenting.
[69] Section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines[^13] provides that:
9 Where a spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account
(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses;
(b) the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and
(c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.
[70] Each parent having care of children 40% of the time does not automatically result in a set-off of child support, in which each parent pays to the other a full amount of table child support.[^14] A court must examine the nature of the time spent, the increased costs of the shared custody and the financial circumstances of the parents. The weight of each factor under section 9 will vary according to the particular facts of each case.[^15]
[71] This latter consideration ties in the payment of spousal support, the calculation of which is dependent on the amount of child support. Neither can be considered in isolation. To repeat some of my earlier reasons, the underlying principle is to avoid children living between markedly disparate homes, understanding that parent’s lives may take them in different directions and that parity may not always be possible, or appropriate.
[72] As a starting point, the table amounts payable by each parent are set off against one another to determine the net amount payable to the support recipient.[^16] This set-off amount presumes that each parent has an equal sharing of the children’s variable expenses and does not take into account actual spending patterns as they relate to such expenses.[^17]
[73] Section 9(b) of the Guidelines recognizes that the total cost of raising children under a shared parenting arrangement may be greater than in situations in which the children reside primarily with one parent. Courts are, therefore, called upon to examine the budgets and actual childcare expenses of each parent and apportion such expenses between the parents in accordance with their respective incomes.[^18]
[74] Much evidence was led by each of the parties as to perceptions of the other’s advantageous circumstances. I have reviewed that evidence, the parties’ respective spending patterns, considered their income disparity (after payment and receipt of spousal support) and taken a broad view of their standards of living. I do so with the benefit of seven years of information, as shared parenting has been the norm for a considerable period.
[75] Ms. Heitner argues that she is running a financial deficit, and that the end of full table child support will impact the children considerably. Her budget does not bear that out. For example, she is paying her $62,000 mortgage in the amount of $1,270 per month when it could carry in the range of $300 per month. Her annual expenses include payments on a line of credit for non-reoccurring expenses like legal fees, which should end with the release of this decision, and discretionary expenses, like a home renovation.
[76] Dr. Lazare submits that the set-off approach under section 9 is most consistent with the objectives of the Child Support Guidelines: to establish a fair standard of support that ensures that children continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses after separation, using a simple methodology.
[77] Both counsels agree that a simple formula will avoid future conflict and minimize, if not eliminate costs. For this family, to make this calculation complicated is to invite conflict as early as this time next year, when the oldest finishes high school.
[78] At the conclusion of the oral evidence, and having read the affidavit evidence filed on this expedited trial, and after applying the criteria in section 9 of the Guidelines it does not appear to me that a set-off amount of child support would lead to a significant variation[^19] in standards of living between their household.
[79] A set-off amount of child support with the continuation of spousal support of $1,848 will give the parties net disposable income of (rounded) 53% to Dr. Lazare and 47% to Ms. Heitner.[^20] This is remarkably close to parity, given the differing circumstances of each parent’s home, 13 years post-separation.[^21] It cannot be said that such percentages create financial disparity for the children. Ms. Heitner has the ability to close the gap even further should she maximize her earning potential in the same manner that Dr. Lazare maximizes his earning potential.
[80] If the task is to create a simple process to determine child support, that avoids creating disparate standards of living between households for the children, then the comparative NDI suggests that it is achieved with a set-off of table amounts paid by each parent.
Change in Child Support as of June 1, 2018
[81] In proposing June 1, 2018 as the date for the adjustment of ongoing child support, Dr. Lazare is not seeking credit for what would be a significant overpayment of child support for the period of this second review. This is a real benefit to Ms. Heitner and should be recognized as such.
[82] Commencing June 1, 2018 Dr. Lazare shall pay monthly table child support of $3,277 to Ms. Heitner based on income of $250,000 and Ms. Heitner shall pay monthly table child support of $1,182 to Dr. Lazare based on annual income of $78,000.
Proportionate Shares of Section 7 Expenses
[83] Commencing June 1, 2018 section 7 expenses are to be paid in the proportionate shares resulting from the terms of this Order: 70% by Dr. Lazare and 30% by Ms. Heitner.
Life Insurance
[84] I do not have sufficient information to determine the face value of life insurance necessary to secure Dr. Lazare’s payment of spousal support, or the parties’ mutual obligations for child support. Should counsel be unable to resolve that point, they may schedule a telephone conference through the judicial assistant to provide further submissions.
Costs
[85] The applicant is to deliver his submissions for costs by June 29, 2018 and the respondent by July 20, 2018. Reply if necessary by August 3, 2018. Submissions are limited to three pages exclusive of a Bill of Costs and Offers to Settle.
Justice H. McGee
DATE: June 12, 2018
[^1]: Revised Users Guide to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, page 11 [^2]: s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act [^3]: Justice Gilmore granted an Order on consent as of this day. The Order was again issued by Justice Corkery on February 6, 2013. I have cited the former in these reasons as it accords with the date of the Support Deduction Order and the Notice of Withdrawal. [^4]: Neither an increase, nor a decrease can take effect earlier than June 1, 2014 on these facts. Support prior to this period was agreed to be non-variable. Moreover, the fact that it was set out in a final Order means that support cannot be varied prior to the date of that Order: Gray v. Rizzi 2011 ONCA 436. [^5]: E. (B.P.) v. E (A.) 2016 CarswellBC 2072 BCCA [^6]: Kozak v. Kozak, 2018 ONSC 609 [^7]: It is worth noting that Dr. Lazare actively sought shared parenting from the date of separation. The 2011 start was not for lack of trying on his part. [^8]: 2013 ONSC 5500 [^9]: (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 771 (C.A.) [^10]: Thompson, supra, and Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 72 [^11]: Thompson, supra, and Jackson v. Mayerle, supra [^12]: Smith v. Smith, 2016 ONSC 1157 [^13]: cite [^14]: Wright v. Wright [2015] CarswellOnt 8312 ONSC 3 [^15]: Contino v. Leonelli Contino, 2005 SCC 63 [^16]: Although Orders ought to state the full amount to be paid by each, for tax purposes. [^17]: Contino, supra [^18]: Contino, supra at para. 52 [^19]: As understood within the decision of Justice MacKinnon in Evans v. Watson, 2010 ONSC 1550. [^20]: This was calculated using incomes of $250,000 for Dr. Lazare and $78,000 for Ms. Heitner [^21]: It does not take into account his spouse’s salary, nor should it. A spouse’s income is not part of the analysis. See B.P.E. v. A.E., 2018 BCSC 335.