COURT FILE NO.: FS-16-20680

DATE: 20180530

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Peter Henderson

AND:

Kelly Anne Winsa

BEFORE: Kristjanson, J.

COUNSEL: Theresa MacLean, for the Applicant

Kelly Anne Winsa, self-represented

Robin Switzer, Office of the Children’s Lawyer, not present

HEARD: May 25, 2018

Trial Management Conference ENDORSEMENT

[1] The Applicant Mr. Henderson and the Respondent Ms. Winsa attended a Trial Management Conference (TMC) on May 25. Counsel from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer was not able to attend. In light of issues that I identify below, I require all parties, including the OCL, to attend another Trial Management Conference before me prior to June 30^th.

BACKGROUND

[2] Mr. Henderson and Ms. Winsa were married in 1993. They have two children, OWH, age 20, and CWH, age 16. The parties had a home in Hawaii, and the children were attending school in Hawaii prior to separation. The parties separated on June 5, 2014.

[3] In August 2014, the parties entered into an interim separation agreement which dealt with parenting, financial support and some property issues. Ms. Winsa had sole interim custody. The termination date of the agreement was June 30, 2015.

[4] In March 2015 Mr. Henderson commenced divorce proceedings in Ontario seeking only a divorce; the divorce was finalized in September, 2015.

[5] On March 25, 2015, after being served with Mr. Henderson’s Ontario divorce proceedings Ms. Winsa commenced family court proceedings in Hawaii seeking a temporary restraining order. In September, 2015 a temporary support order was made, on consent, in the Hawaii proceedings requiring Mr. Henderson to pay $3500 a month in US funds.

[6] On August 14, 2015 Mr. Henderson commenced an Application in Ontario seeking custody, access and child support. Mr. Henderson sought temporary and permanent joint custody among other relief. Ms. Winsa did not file an Answer until October, 2016 due to litigation in both Hawaii and Ontario relating to jurisdiction to deal with custody/child related issues. In her Answer, Ms. Winsa sought joint custody, spousal support, and child support, among other relief.

[7] In September, 2015 a temporary order was made in Ontario placing CWH in Mr. Henderson’s care. In September 2015, the Hawaii court placed the children in Ms. Winsa’s temporary care.

[8] In November 2015 Ms. Winsa appealed the Ontario temporary custody order. On March 22, 2016 the Divisional Court heard the appeal and determined that Ontario lacked jurisdiction to make any orders relating to CWH.

[9] In August 2016, the Family Court in Hawaii made an order terminating all temporary orders including the temporary custody and temporary support orders, on the grounds that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the applicant.

[10] On August 25, 2016 Justice Chiapetta made a temporary order placing CWH in Mr. Henderson’s care. In June 2016 the other son, OWH, returned to Toronto to live with Mr. Henderson and his younger brother, CWH. Both children have resided with Mr. Henderson since the summer of 2016.

[11] Some property issues have already been dealt with by agreement, or by order of the court in Hawaii. The parties owned a cottage property in Ontario which was sold on June 29, 2015. The sale proceeds were divided equally between the parties, with funds of $50,000 being set aside for the children’s postsecondary educational expenses.

[12] There is an order of the Family Court of the Third Circuit of Hawaii dated April 7, 2017 following a trial. The Order seems to indicate that Hawaii assumed jurisdiction over marital assets (the house) and marital debts (debts that was incurred during the marriage, prior to the date of September 4, 2015). The court awarded Mr. Henderson sole authority to sell the jointly owned property in Hawaii. It is presently listed for sale. The Order also dealt with post-separation adjustments in respect of the Hawaii property, some of which appear to be argued in this proceeding (e.g, mortgage payments). The extent to which financial issues relating to the Hawaii property or assets in Hawaii have all been dealt with in Hawaii must be clarified prior to trial, as discussed further below.

ISSUES FOR TRIAL

[13] There is significant disagreement between the parties as to what issues remain for trial, and what time should be allocated to those issues. The Applicant Mr. Henderson raises the following issues for trial:

(1) What is Mr. Henderson’s income, for both child support and spousal support purposes?

(2) What level of income, if any, should be imputed to Ms. Winsa, for both child support and spousal support purposes?

(3) What child support, if any, is owing to Ms. Winsa or Mr. Henderson?

(4) What table child support will be set for the future?

(5) Section 7 expenses: are there any section seven expenses owed by one party to the other, and what allocation of section 7 expenses should now be set?

(6) Is Ms. Winsa entitled to retroactive or future spousal support, and if so, how much and for how long?

[14] Ms. Winsa raises additional issues relating to the trial, which I discuss further below. These issues include:

(1) Should Ms. Winsa be granted a permanent order for sole custody of 16-year-old CWH?

(2) Should Ms. Winsa be granted sole medical decision – making authority with respect to CWH?

(3) Property: Ms. Winsa raises issues relating to property; Mr. Henderson disputes that these issues can be considered at trial given the pleadings, and since the parties have already dealt with property:

(a) Has an equalization of net family property claim been advanced by Ms. Winsa and is it to be argued at trial?

(b) Have post-separation property adjustments been advanced by Ms. Winsa and are they to be argued at trial? Issues in Ms. Winsa’s TMC brief are raised relating to reimbursement of moneys withdrawn from Black Box films in 2015, reimbursement of arrears relating to the cottage sale, and withdrawal of money during the separation agreement period.

(c) If either set of claims in (a) or (b) have been raised, what is the relevance of the court orders in Hawaii dealing with marital assets and debts, the order directing sale of the house in Hawaii, and the prior agreement of the parties to sell and divide the proceeds of the Ontario cottage?

[15] In her TMC brief Ms. Winsa raises Orders not sought in the Answer:

(1) An order for term life insurance to secure support obligations; and

(2) An order that Mr. Henderson be required to undergo treatment for forcing minors under his control, and violence.

The Family Law Rules

[16] The primary objective of the Family Law Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases “justly”: R. 2(2). Rule 2(3) defines what dealing with a case “justly” means; it specifies that this includes:

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

[17] I consider the primary objective in discussing issues relating to the TMC and the trial.

Issues Relating to Self-Represented Status of Ms. Winsa

[18] Ms. Winsa is self-represented. She was originally self-represented when she filed her Answer in October, 2016; she retained counsel in October, 2016 after filing her Answer; she discharged counsel March 20, 2018.

[19] I have carefully considered my obligations toward the self-represented respondent. Judges have a responsibility to ensure that self-represented persons are provided with fair access and equal treatment by the courts, and to facilitate access to justice. There are limits to the assistance which a judge may provide: a judge must always remain neutral and impartial, and balance fairness to all the parties. A judge cannot become an advocate, provide legal advice, advance new arguments for the self-represented litigant or advise on strategy.

[20] On the other hand, the Canadian Judicial Council’s “Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused Persons”, which have been approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, provides that:

1. Judges have a responsibility to inquire whether self-represented persons are aware of their procedural options, and to direct them to available information if they are not. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the case, judges may explain the relevant law in the case and its implications, before the self-represented person makes critical choices.

2. In appropriate circumstances, judges should consider providing self-represented persons with information to assist them in understanding and asserting their rights, or to raise arguments before the court.

3. Judges should ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of self-represented parties. (emphasis added)

[21] As trial approaches, Ms. Winsa is faced with a number of “critical choices”, and I am concerned that she may misunderstand the applicable law and procedure. In the circumstances, I believe that I have a responsibility as a judge to explain the relevant law and its procedural implications, remaining sensitive to the interests of the respondents.

[22] There is also a significant issue about whether or not equalization was properly pled, and whether or not Ms. Winsa may pursue equalization at trial. As a result, this is an issue that I must clarify at the TMC in setting issues for trial. In Moore v. Apollo Health & Beauty Care, 2017 ONCA 383 at para. 47, the Court of Appeal, in addressing the question of whether the trial judge had properly held that the plaintiff was abandoning relief, held that:

[47] Where the evidence of a self-represented party raises a question in the trial judge’s mind about the specific relief the party is seeking, a trial judge must make the appropriate inquiries of the party to clarify the matter. Those inquiries must be made in a clear, unambiguous, and comprehensive way so that several results occur: (i) the trial judge is left in no doubt about the party’s position; (ii) the self-represented person clearly understands the legal implications of the critical choice she faces about whether to pursue or abandon a claim; and (iii) the self-represented person clearly understands from the trial judge which of her claims he will adjudicate.

[23] Fairness to both parties, and the appropriate use of the court’s resources at trial, requires that property and equalization issues be clarified prior to trial, through this TMC.

[24] Keeping in mind my responsibilities as set out in the Statement of Principles, and the Court of Appeal’s direction, I review the issues in the Trial Management Conference below. Where required, I explain the relevant law and procedure relating to critical trial management choices facing Ms. Winsa below.

ISSUE #1: Custody

[25] CWH is 16. He has been living with his father for the past two years. Until he was 14 he lived with his mother, in Hawaii. His father has temporary custody. The OCL is representing CWH. Many of the witnesses identified by Ms. Winsa relate to custody issues, and seem to relate the time the son resided in Hawaii (i.e., more than two years ago.) Indeed, some of the evidence Ms. Winsa proposes to call about Mr. Henderson’s parenting appears to go back to CWH’s infancy.

[26] I explained in the TMC that since the younger son is 16, the trial judge would likely not make an order transferring custody. Given that Ms. Winsa is self-represented, I briefly highlight some of the key cases on this issue below. In Supple v. Cashman, 2014 ONSC 3581, the judge explained the importance of a child’s age in considering the issue of custody, saying as follows:

17 In making my order, I am also aware that the children in this case are entering adolescence. They are forming and voicing their own opinions and they are gaining the ability to enforce their opinions, as evidenced by their adamant refusal to see their father despite the efforts of several adult relatives. It is a simple reality that, despite a court order, teenagers are likely to seek out residency as it suits their desires and to "let their feet do the talking…" It is for this reason, among others, that judges often refuse to transfer custody in cases involving older children, even when there is severe alienation: G. (N.) v. E. (R.), 2010 NLTD(F) 18 (N.L. T.D.), at para. 110.

[27] This decision, and this specific paragraph, were approved by the Court of Appeal in L. (N.) v. M. (R.R.), 2016 ONCA 915, para. 36.

[28] Generally, Ms. Winsa should understand that:

(a) The court may consider it appropriate not to make a custody order for a 16 year old: “[A]s a practical matter, older children will make their own residential choices.”: L. (N.) v. M. (R.R.), 2016 ONCA 915 at para. 36.

(b) In order for custody orders relating to a child in his or her teens to be practical, the orders must reasonably conform to the wishes of the child: Clayton v. Clayton (1998), 1998 14840 (ON SC), 40 O.R. (3d) 24, 38 R.F.L. (4th) 320 (Ont. Gen. Div.); and,

(c) There may be very significant costs consequences if Ms. Winsa pursues custody at trial and does not succeed. If Ms. Winsa decides to abandon the issue of custody, the earlier the issue of custody is resolved, the greater the chances of limiting adverse costs consequences.

[29] The OCL should clarify CWH’s views and preferences and indicate in the TMC the evidence, if any, the OCL would call if custody proceeds. Information in the continuing record indicates that he prefers to live with his father, and he prefers arrange access with his mother with no pre-determined schedule. Medical decision-making, which is an aspect of custody and important given the pleadings, is discussed separately below.

Custody and Consent to Health Care/Medical Decision-Making: Age 16

[30] In her materials, Ms. Winsa raises concerns about the son’s use of a prescription drug, and appears to base her custody application in part on the use of this drug. She is asking for “immediate custody” of CWH “as Mr. Henderson had CWH put on [the prescription drug] without medical history.” She asserts that the son “was not advised of side effects”, and she seeks an order at trial that CWH “be taken off [the prescription drug] immediately, with doctor supervision. Medical supervision to be chosen by Ms. Winsa.” She states that she seeks “final say in health and education for CWH.”

[31] I am concerned that Ms. Winsa does not understand the legal framework for medical decision-making for 16 years old children in Ontario, which is relevant to her grounds for arguing for custody, and the likelihood of success on this issue. I discuss consent to health care and the release of health information below, and will then raise questions for the parties relating to this framework.

[32] Consent to Health Care: The Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2, Sched. A, provides that anyone “capable with respect to treatment” may give consent to treatment on his or her own behalf. There is no minimum age. Rather, the Act states that the health practitioner should assume that the person is capable of consenting on his or her own behalf unless there are reasonable grounds to believe otherwise. Thus, generally, the law presumes that a 16 year old is capable of consenting to health care, including prescription drugs, on his own; parental consent is not required, and a parent cannot force medical treatment where a capable 16 year old does not agree. In addition, the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 provides that a person who is aged sixteen years or more is presumed to be capable of giving or refusing consent in connection with his or her personal care.

[33] Release of Personal Health Information: Under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A, CWH alone has the ability to control access to any of his health information. The disclosure of that information is possible only with CWH’s consent. Ms. Winsa does not have the right to access CWH’s health information (including the drugs he is prescribed, and the diagnosis underlying the prescription) without CWH’s consent and authorization in writing.

[34] Section 23(1) of the Personal Health Information Protection Act provides:

Persons who may consent

23 (1) If this Act or any other Act refers to a consent required of an individual to a collection, use or disclosure by a health information custodian of personal health information about the individual, a person described in one of the following paragraphs may give, withhold or withdraw the consent:

1. If the individual is capable of consenting to the collection, use or disclosure of the information,

i. the individual, or

ii. if the individual is at least 16 years of age, any person who is capable of consenting, whom the individual has authorized in writing to act on his or her behalf and who, if a natural person, is at least 16 years of age.

[35] If the child is less than 16 years of age, a parent may give or refuse consent unless the information relates to treatment within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, about which the child has made a decision on his or her own in accordance with that Act. Even for children under 16, there are limits on parental authority regarding consent to health care.

[36] Thus, because CWH is 16, the orders which Ms. Winsa seeks relating to CWH’s medical treatment, including taking him off medication, and that she choose CWH’s medical supervision, are not orders which this Court can make. CWH is entitled to make his own health care choices. He may choose to share that information with his parents, or he may deny access to that information to either or both parents.

[37] In the TMC brief, I request that the OCL address the issues relating to CWH’s ability to consent to medical treatment, and CWH’s position on the orders which Ms. Winsa seeks relating to medical treatment and medical (health care) decision-making.

Custody and the TMC

[38] Turning to the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, given CWH’s age, I am concerned that allotting time to litigating the issues relating to custody that Ms. Winsa raises would not be just, fair, or a proportionate use of the resources of the court or of the parties. It would needlessly contribute to the expense of the trial. I note that in Ms. Winsa’s TMC brief, she identifies a large number of witnesses, many of them historical, on the custody issue, and raises a number of collateral issues.

[39] Given the legal framework on transferring custody of a 16 year old, the 16 year old’s right to consent to health care, and the inability of Ms. Winsa to receive disclosure of CWH’s health care information, much less to direct treatment on CWH’s behalf without his consent, the custody related issues raised by Ms. Winsa do not seem to be an appropriate use of the court’s resources. In order to deal justly with the case, I am reluctant to direct that a week be set aside to deal with these issues as seems required by Ms. Winsa’s witness list.

[40] As a result, I have identified case management possibilities for dealing with the issue of custody of CWH at or before trial, and would like all three parties to comment on this in a supplementary case management brief. I note the purposes of Trial Management Conferences are set out in Rule 17(6), and include exploring settlement; stipulating how evidence is to be received; deciding how a trial will proceed; ensuring the parties know who the witnesses are and what they will testify about; and estimating the time for trial.

[41] I request submissions of the parties on how to deal with custody issues, given the legal framework set out above. I have considered the following Order, and remain open to all suggestions. I could order that:

(1) Ms. Winsa be required to file all her evidence in chief on the custody issue by way of affidavit, including all exhibits, pursuant to R. 1(7.2)(i), by a specific date to be set by me; that time limits be set for the custody aspect of the trial pursuant to R. 1(7.2)(j); and that all witnesses be available for cross-examination at trial, during the court day of 10 to 1 and 2:15 to 4:30 p.m.

(2) Mr. Henderson or the OCL on behalf of CWH be granted leave to bring a motion at the outset of trial, asking the trial judge to rule that given CWH’s age, the judge will make no custody order, and will hear no evidence about custody;

(3) The total time for trial be set and allocated for all issues among the three parties in accordance with R. 1(7.2)(q), and that if the Respondent wishes to allocate time to custody, she will have to reduce time spent on the other issues.

Issue #2: FINANCIAL ISSUES

[42] There are a number of questions regarding financial issues. The first issue is whether Ms. Winsa has, in fact, advanced an equalization claim that can go to trial (as she claims), or whether she has not advanced an equalization claim, and the parties have dealt with equalization outside the trial process.

[43] Ms. Winsa was self-represented when she filed her Answer in October, 2016. In her Answer Ms. Winsa ticked the box identifying equalization of net family properties. However, there is no Order sought relating to equalization in the Answer, and no pleadings specifically relating to equalization. In addition, she did not file a Form 13.1 Financial Statement with the Answer, which is a requirement.

[44] Ms. Winsa retained counsel October 13, 2016. While represented by counsel, she served and filed a Form 13.1 Financial Statement in February, 2017. She did not amend her Answer. Whether or not the Applicant knew or should have known that Ms. Winsa was seeking equalization is also in dispute. The pleadings in the case (Application and Answer and Reply) define what is in issue – the case to be met.

[45] The disclosure request made by her counsel was clearly tied to spousal support, and mentions net family property. A letter from her counsel dated April 28, 2017 states that:

Ms. Winsa requires this financial disclosure to determine Mr. Henderson’s income for support purposes and in order to assess each party’s net family property. Ms. Winsa is seeking spousal support from Mr. Henderson and this disclosure is necessary and relevant to that claim.

[46] The responding letter of November 24, 2016 refers to spousal support as it demands a sworn financial statement from Ms. Winsa, stating that counsel “know that she cannot proceed with any claim for spousal support when she has failed/refused to produce a sworn Financial Statement….” There is no clear claim for equalization other than the ticked box on the original Answer.

[47] Ms. Winsa discharged her counsel on March 20, 2018. She did not amend her Answer at any time.

[48] In her TMC brief, Ms. Winsa indicates that she is seeking “equalization of Hawaii Property.” She does not appear to seek equalization in respect of other net family property in the TMC brief. She also appears to be seeking an arrears adjustment relating to payments regarding Hawaii debt.

[49] I am concerned about the ability of the trial judge to deal with any issues relating to Hawaii, since there is an order of the Family Court of the Third Circuit dated April 7, 2017 following a trial. The Order seems to indicate that Hawaii assumed jurisdiction over marital assets (the house) and marital debts (debts that was incurred during the marriage, prior to the divorce date of September 4, 2015). The Order also dealt with post-separation adjustments in respect of the Hawaii property, some of which appear to be argued in this proceeding (e.g, mortgage payments). The Hawaii Order also directed the listing of the house, and it is presently on the market.

[50] If either party intends to rely on the law of Hawaii, I caution that proof of foreign law requires expert evidence.

[51] Ms. Winsa also appears to be advancing adjustment arguments relating to the cottage property, and the extent to which that has already been dealt with is unclear to me (as the proceeds have been distributed).

[52] The question of post-separation adjustments in Canada should also be addressed by the parties, since it is unclear if the Answer makes a claim for post-separation adjustments.

[53] At the next TMC, the parties must address the issue of which debts and assets were dealt with by the Hawaii court, and which remain to be dealt with in Canada, if any. The Applicant must review all the claims asserted in the Answer and the TMC Brief in order to respond to these issues.

Issue #3: DISCLOSURE:

[54] Ms. Winsa makes a number of disclosure requests. It may be that disclosure is required, but that disclosure will be governed by the issues to be determined at trial.

Issue #4: INTERIM DISBURSEMENTS:

[55] Ms. Winsa seeks to bring a motion for interim disbursements. I note that interim disbursements are discretionary, and remain an exceptional order. There are significant evidentiary requirements that Ms. Winsa should be aware of.

[56] The leading case on interim disbursements remains Stuart v. Stuart, 2001 28261 (ON SC), 2001 CarswellOnt 4586, [2001] O.J. No. 5172, paras. 8-14:

8 The themes in the case law concerning interim disbursements in Canadian jurisprudence are as follows:

1. The ordering of interim disbursements is discretionary: Airst v. Airst, [1995] O.J. No. 3005 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Hill v. Hill (1988), 1988 4710 (ON SC), 63 O.R. (2d) 618 (Ont. H.C.) and Lossing v. Dmuchowski, [2000] O.J. No. 837 (Ont. S.C.J.).

2. A claimant must demonstrate that absent the advance of funds for interim disbursements, the claimant cannot present or analyse settlement offers or pursue entitlement: Hill v. Hill (1988), 1988 4710 (ON SC), 63 O.R. (2d) 618 (Ont. H.C.) and Airst v. Airst, [1995] O.J. No. 3005 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

3. It must be shown that the particular expenses are necessary: Lossing v. Dmuchowski, [2000] O.J. No. 837 (Ont. S.C.J.).

4. Is the claim being advanced meritorious? Lynch v. Lynch (1999), 1 R.F.L. (5th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Randle v. Randle (1999), 1999 ABQB 954, 3 R.F.L. (5th) 139 (Alta. Q.B.).

5. The exercise of discretion should be limited to exceptional cases: Organ v. Barnett (1992), 1992 7433 (ON SC), 11 O.R. (3d) 210 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

6. Interim costs in matrimonial cases may be granted to level the playing field: Randle v. Randle (1999), 1999 ABQB 954, 3 R.F.L. (5th) 139 (Alta. Q.B.).

7. Monies might be advanced against an equalisation payment: Zagdanski v. Zagdanski, 2001 27981 (ON SC), 2001 CarswellOnt 2517 (Ont. S.C.J.) .

Rule 24(12)

8. The court must consider which of these principles adhere to the primary objective of the Family Law Rules.

9. The court interprets the new Family Law Rules to require the exercise of the discretion in rule 24(12) on a less stringent basis than the cases that call for such only in exceptional cases. The discretion should be exercised to ensure all parties can equally provide or test disclosure, make or consider offers or possible go to trial. Simply described, the award should be made to level the playing field.

10. An order under section 24(12) should not immunise a party from costs awards. The order is to allow the case to proceed fairly and should not be such that a party feels a license to litigate.

11. Certainly the proof of the necessity of interim disbursements would be critical to the successful claim. The claimant must clearly demonstrate that the disbursements are necessary and reasonable given the needs of the case and the funds available. In particular, if an expert is the subject of a requested disbursement, the claimant must demonstrate there is a clear need for the services of said expert.

12. The claimant must demonstrate that he or she is incapable of funding the requested amounts.

13. The claim or claims being advanced in the case must be meritorious as far as can be determined on the balance of probabilities at the time of the request for disbursements.

14. The order for interim disbursements should not be limited to cases where it would be taken out of an equalisation payment. There are cases where there would not be an equalisation payment. The litigants could be a child suing a parent, an elderly parent suing an adult child or a family that has not acquired assets. It may be that a party with a minimal income stream and no liquid assets needs disbursements to test evidence that might lead to him or her resisting an equalisation order. The levelling of the playing field should not be limited to those with an expected equalisation payment.

[57] I also draw the attention of Ms. Winsa to the case of McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2018 ONSC 1355, which illustrates the type of evidence that Ms. Winsa must consider.

[58] If Ms. Winsa is determined to pursue an interim disbursement order, the schedule may be set at the next TMC.

TRIAL SCHEDULING ENDORSEMENT FORM

[59] Ms. Winsa and the OCL must complete the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form. It is important for Ms. Winsa to clearly set out the Issues (Ms. Winsa would fill out the Respondent’s sections on items 3 and 4, as well as the general sections items 5 through 19). There is space for the full names of witnesses, the issues, the specific topics, and time for cross and chief. Where unknown, simply allocate equal time for cross and chief, then add up the time.

TMC DATE

[60] The parties are to canvas dates and reserve a TMC before me, through the Family Office, before June 30.

Kristjanson, J.

Date: May 30, 2018