COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-846

DATE: 2018/05/25

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Jessie Melanie Mancini AND Eric Mancini

BEFORE: Justice Mark Shelston

COUNSEL: Ozlem Eskiciolu, for the Applicant Micheal Chambers, for the Respondent

HEARD: May 17, 2018 (at Ottawa)

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] Both parties have presented motions for temporary relief.

[2] The parties married on September 20, 2002. The parties separated in November 2015 when the applicant left the matrimonial home. There are two children of the marriage, namely Mikayla, born June 25, 2005, and Matteo, born November 25, 2011.

Litigation history

[3] On April 21, 2016, the applicant commenced an application seeking various claims for relief.

[4] The parties attended a case conference on May 17, 2016 before Master MacLeod (as he then was) where he granted leave to the respondent to file his answer and financial statement by May 31, 2016, that the applicant may proceed to book a motion date after June 28, 2016 and the case conference was adjourned before him on June 28, 2016. The respondent filed his answer on May 31, 2016.

[5] At the case conference, the respondent refused to pay spousal support but did agree to a temporary order dated June 28, 2016 by Justice MacLeod, as follows:

(a) that the parties would continue to exercise access to the children on a week-on/week-off basis, alternating Sundays at 7 P.M.;

(b) on an interim without prejudice basis, the respondent to pay monthly child support to the applicant in the amount of $600 per month in accordance with an annual income of $41,118, commencing June 15, 2016;

(d) reserved the applicant’s right to claim future and/or a retroactive spousal support; and

(e) granted leave to the parties to proceed with motions for temporary relief.

[6] There was a significant delay after the case conference for the applicant to seek a temporary order. The applicant indicated that she had no more hours left on her Legal Aid certificate and it was only recently, in 2017, that she obtained further hours from Legal Aid to pursue the motion.

[7] The respondent had not paid any child or spousal support up to the date of the case conference. The respondent did not pay the child support ordered at the case conference until July 2017. On August 2, 2017, the applicant served a motion for temporary relief returnable on November 16, 2017.

[8] The respondent filed an affidavit dated November 14, 2017 and a financial statement sworn November 14, 2017 where he declared no income, showed monthly expenses of $2,120 and a series of debts to The Brick, Scotiabank, his previous lawyer, Canada Revenue Agency and two mortgage companies. He did not declare any other debts.

[9] At the motion, the respondent sought an adjournment of the motion to retain counsel as his previous counsel had been removed from the record. On November 16, 2017, Justice Engelking granted the adjournment and, with the consent of the parties, made the following order:

(a) commencing November 1, 2017, the respondent to pay to the applicant $3,500 per month in combined child and spousal support on an imputed annual income of $100,000;

(b) the set-off amount of child support for two children is $1,314 per month and spousal support in the amount of $2,186 per month;

(c) the applicant’s income for these purposes is $12,228 per year on social assistance, subject to clawback for any income earned. The temporary order is without prejudice of the applicant’s right to seek further imputation of income to the respondent or her retroactive claims for child or spousal support or section 7 claims; and

(d) the matter to be set down to a new motion date.

[10] The matter was to be set down to a motion date set by the trial coordinator and the issue of costs of the motion were reserved to the judge hearing the motion. Despite agreeing to pay $3,500 per month, the respondent never paid the support and the respondent did not obtain a new date for May 17, 2018 until February 2018, a period of 3 months. He continued to pay the $600 per month as ordered by Justice MacLeod on June 28, 2016. On February 14, 2018, the applicant’s counsel was advised by email that MacLaren Corlett LLP had resumed representation for the respondent and the parties agreed on May 17, 2018 as the return date of the motion.

[11] The respondent seeks a temporary order for the following relief:

(a) an order for a retroactive determination that no spousal support is payable by the respondent retroactive to November 1, 2017;

(b) an order setting the appropriate amount of child support retroactive to November 1, 2017 with the respondent being credited with payments made;

(d) an order for the rescission of all support arrears attributed to the respondent; and

(e) an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of this motion.

[12] The applicant seeks a temporary order for the following relief:

(a) an order that the respondent pay child support for the two children of the marriage retroactive to November 11, 2015, or, alternatively, retroactive to June 1, 2016;

(b) an order that the respondent pay his share of the children’s special and extraordinary expenses;

(d) an order imputing an income to the respondent;

(e) an order that the support be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office;

(f) an order compelling the respondent to comply with paragraph 2 of Justice MacLeod’s order dated June 28, 2016 by December 31, 2017; and

(g) costs on a full indemnity basis.

[13] The parties agree to continue the custodial arrangements set out in the order of Justice MacLeod dated June 28, 2016, whereby the parties will continue to exercise access on a 50/50, week-on/week-off basis, alternating on Sundays at 7 P.M.

Income determination

Respondent’s income

[14] The applicant’s position is that the respondent’s annual income is $179,092 and, in the alternative, $197,944, or, at a minimum, $100,000 per year. The respondent’s position is that his income for 2017 was $30,822.60 and, for 2018, it is anticipated to be $42,000.

[15] The respondent has worked in the construction field since the marriage. During the marriage and at the time of the separation, the respondent was self-employed under the sole proprietorship named “Stone Edge Construction”. He operated that business until March 2017. He made an assignment in bankruptcy in March 2018.

[16] In 2017, the respondent started working as a subcontractor for Stone Edge Inc. In January 2018, he became an employee of that company. The respondent’s income tax returns declare a net annual income as follows:

(a) 2012 $476.90

(b) 2013 $22,840.27

(d) 2015 $22,172.13

(e) 2016 $54,738.07

[17] The parties purchased land to build their home in 2011 that was completed in 2012. According to the appraisal by the Affiliated Property Group dated March 10, 2014, the fair market value of the property was $910,000, being a 3,244 square foot, single family home on two acres of land. (The house was reappraised by the Affiliated Property Group in 2015 and the property was valued at $869,000.)

[18] The applicant left the matrimonial home in November 2015. On April 20, 2016, as a result of default on the mortgage payments, one of the mortgage companies took possession of the matrimonial home. Neither party has resided in the home since that time. Subsequently, the matrimonial home was sold for $660,000 which was insufficient to pay the balance outstanding on the two mortgages.

[19] The applicant’s position is that the respondent continues to operate his business under the name Stone Edge Inc. One month before the respondent ceased operating as Stone Edge Construction, on February 10, 2017, Stone Edge Inc. was incorporated. The registered owner of the company is Mr. Ianni, a cousin of the respondent and the best man at his wedding. The registered office address of Stone Edge Inc. is the residence of Mr. Ianni’s mother and not Mr. Ianni.

[20] There is little information provided about Stone Edge Inc. The only documents disclosed by Mr. Ianni are a copy of the incorporation information and the letter dated March 8, 2018. Despite the question of the true ownership of Stone Edge Inc. being a central issue in this proceeding, Mr. Ianni did not file any affidavit material in this proceeding confirming his ownership or providing any information regarding the company. Mr. Ianni simply filed a letter setting out the respondent’s income earned as a subcontractor in 2017. There is no evidence as to the nature of the business, the number of employees or why the business was incorporated on February 10, 2017, one month before the respondent ceased the operations of Stone Edge Construction. In submissions, counsel for the respondent indicated that the reason the names are so close is because the respondent believed there was some goodwill in Stone Edge Construction.

[21] In the respondent’s affidavit dated April 26, 2018, he states that he was a subcontractor for Stone Edge Inc. from approximately May 2017 until December 2017. However, in the letter dated March 8, 2018, Mr. Ianni states that the respondent was paid $30,822.60 gross income in 2017 as subcontract income from February 10, 2017 to December 31, 2017. There is no explanation of the contradiction in the letter and the respondent’s affidavit.

[22] It is very suspicious that the respondent ceased operating his business in March 2017 and that, one month earlier, his cousin incorporated a company with almost the exact name of the respondent’s sole proprietorship.

[23] The applicant also submits that the respondent could not have been able to maintain the monthly costs for the family, including the carrying costs of the matrimonial home based on his declared income. In 2015, the respondent’s declared income was $22,172.13, but at the time he was paying $4,900 per month for the mortgages registered on the matrimonial home. In addition, from his declared income he was required to pay the net income tax of $1349.49, CPP contributions of $1848.54, provincial tax of $603.13, motor vehicle expenses not deducted as a business expense of $1,465.80, motor vehicle leasing costs not deducted as a business expense of $5,993.33 and, finally, $10,820 in use-of-home expenses not deducted as a business expense.

[24] In the respondent’s financial statement dated May 31, 2016, after vacating the matrimonial home, the respondent states that he had net employment income of $60,000 a year with yearly expenses of $147,559.92. The respondent’s debts at the date of separation were a first and second mortgage as well as a personal loan from his parents of $230,000. During submissions, counsel for the respondent admitted that most of this debt was incurred as part of the construction of the matrimonial home. As well, there were approximately $60,000 in vehicle loans, a loan to his sister of $6,000, a trailer loan of $5,000 and estimated income tax arrears of $16,000.

[25] Once the construction of the matrimonial home was completed, the respondent was able to pay all of the monthly expenses for the family, including two mortgage payments and two vehicle loans, all on an income of $41,117.53 in 2014, $22,172.13 in 2015 and $54,738.07 in 2016. The respondent’s position is that he was able to pay these expenses by borrowing money. Specifically, the respondent stated the following at paragraph 74 of his affidavit dated April 26, 2018:

In response to paragraph 81 of Jessie’s affidavit, I was only able to afford the mortgage payments on her matrimonial home for as long as I did because the personal loans received from my parents, and high interest loans from other investors that my parents co-signed with me. These were not registered against the matrimonial home, and they were paid in full from the proceeds of the sale of my parent’s home at 4898 Limebank Road, Ottawa as described above at my paragraph 25, I did not default on the mortgage payments for any reason other than the fact that financially, I simply could not afford make the payments.

[26] The respondent has not provided any corroborative evidence of this statement. The respondent and his parents have not provided any information as to when money was loaned and in what amounts. There is no evidence as to when and in what amounts the respondent borrowed high interest loans that were co-signed by his parents. The respondent has not provided copies of the loans indicating when the loans were incurred, in what amount and the applicable interest rates. There are no statements from the lenders and no information as to the amounts of the loans paid out when his parents sold their home.

[27] All this information should have been presented by the respondent. The respondent stated that he was able to carry all of the expenses based on this indebtedness.

[28] I have serious concerns about the lack of transparency of the evidence provided by the respondent regarding his income. The expenses set out by the respondent in his financial statement coupled with the evidence of the applicant raises a serious doubt as to the accuracy of the respondent’s declared income for support purposes.

[29] The applicant stated in her affidavit dated July 24, 2017, at paragraph 52, that when she requested banking information from the respondent for the purpose of setting up FRO enforcement, the respondent advised the applicant that he would not tell her but that he is not banking under his own name anymore. I find that the respondent confirmed the applicant’s statement in his affidavit sworn November 14, 2017, which purported to address the various allegations contained in the applicant’s affidavit dated July 24, 2017. In the respondent’s affidavit, he replies at paragraph 52 as follows:

At this time I am no longer self-employed here are my current pay stubs. I am in the process of declaring bankruptcy because I no longer can keep the business at float (sic). There is also other companies that I also have debts with.

[30] I am also concerned about the lack of timely disclosure by the respondent. The respondent filed a financial statement on May 31, 2016. The respondent did not provide the disclosure ordered at the case conference on June 28, 2016 within the prescribed time. As late as July 24, 2017, disclosure still had not been made. The respondent’s financial statement sworn November 14, 2017 was effectively blank and of no assistance to the court. Despite the motion being set in February for May 17, 2018, the respondent only filed an updated financial statement on April 27, 2018.

[31] Financial disclosure is a basic principle of family law litigation. Both parties must provide updated and timely financial disclosure. A party who does not provide fulsome disclosure does so at his or her own risk. I find that the disclosure or lack of disclosure provided by the respondent raises more questions than providing answers.

[32] The burden of proof is on the respondent to provide evidence to allow the court to conclude on a balance of probabilities that he borrowed money to cover the expenses in excess of his declared income. He has failed to do so in the circumstances where the applicant alleges there were no such loans. I draw an adverse inference and find that the respondent has met his evidentiary burden of proof. I therefore conclude that the respondent was able to maintain the monthly expenses based on income in excess of his declared income on his income tax returns.

[33] I do not accept the respondent’s income as declared on his income tax return to be an accurate reflection of his income for support purposes. The respondent indicates that his net employment income is $3,100 per month and that he worked for Stone Edge Construction until January 1, 2017. However, at paragraph 46 of the respondent’s affidavit dated April 26, 2018, he indicated he was forced to close the business in March 2017. In that same affidavit he states that he was a subcontractor for Stone Edge Inc. from May 2017 until December 2017. These contradictions are significant.

[34] Further, the respondent has contradicted his income allegedly earned as a subcontractor for Stone Edge Inc. On November 16, 2017, the respondent appeared on the motion without counsel where he agreed to an adjournment on terms such that the respondent would pay a combined child and spousal support order of $3,500 on an imputed income of $100,000 to the respondent and $12,228 to the applicant. Further, the temporary order was without prejudice to the applicant to further seek to impute income to the respondent or to her retroactive claims for child and spousal support or section 7 expenses. The order was not without prejudice to the respondent.

[35] In the respondent’s affidavit dated April 26, 2018, he states the following at paragraph 15:

It was therefore as a result of my financial situation that I was without legal representation at the time of the November 16, 2017 motion before Justice Engelking. As noted above, it was at this motion but I was ordered to pay Jessie $3500 per month in combined child support and spousal support, based on an “imputed income of $100,000”

[36] What the respondent failed to address in his affidavit material was that he consented to the order. At the motion, counsel for the respondent acknowledged that the respondent consented to an order imputing an income to him of $100,000 and that he is not paid anything towards that court order. The respondent now seeks to vary the consent order while being in breach of the terms of the same order.

[37] I find that the evidence from the respondent is contradictory and simply not credible. I do not believe the respondent’s evidence regarding his income.

[38] The question for this motion is based on the disclosure or lack of disclosure provided by the respondent and what is a fair and reasonable income to impute to the respondent. There must be an evidentiary basis upon which to impute an income.

[39] I impute an income of $100,000 as the respondent’s income for the following reasons:

(a) on November 16, 2017, the respondent agreed to an imputed income of $100,000 when he was allegedly earning approximately $30,000 as a subcontractor for Stone Edge Inc. If the respondent was working as a subcontractor as he alleges, why would he agree to an imputed income of $100,000? The respondent operated a successful construction company where he grossed significant revenue during the marriage;

(b) despite the respondent alleging that the income of $100,000 is grossly inappropriate in the circumstances, he has not provided any evidence as to why he agreed to that figure on November 16, 2017. The court cannot guess as to why the respondent agreed. The court must make its decision based on the evidence in the evidentiary record. The only statement made by the respondent is contained in the respondent’s affidavit dated April 26, 2018, at paragraph 16, where he states:

This imputed annual income of $100,000 is in no way representative of my actual income, as evidenced by my bankruptcy documents. Again, my monthly income is only $3100 a month;

(d) the respondent has been able to cover significant expenses in excess of his income.

Applicant’s income

[40] At the time of the marriage the applicant was 21 years of age and at the time of a motion she is 36 years of age. She had been working in hair salons since she graduated from high school. Prior to 2008, the applicant worked as a hairdresser for the respondent’s father’s business. In 2008, she started a home based hair salon business.

[41] At the time of separation, the applicant was operating a small business out of the matrimonial home. When she left the matrimonial home in November 2015, she could no longer operate out of the matrimonial home. In March 2016, she started to receive social assistance. In April 2016, the applicant’s motor vehicle jointly owned by the parties was repossessed because the respondent defaulted of the monthly payments.

[42] In June 2016, the applicant restarted her hair salon business out of a condominium that she purchased in May 2016. On October 18, 2016, the applicant filed for bankruptcy. In January 2017, the applicant started studying at OREA Real Estate College with the intention of working as a real estate agent. The applicant failed her first course and stopped studying because she could no longer afford to continue.

[43] In June 2017, the applicant was evicted from her condominium and forced to move into a fifth wheel trailer at a campground in Lanark, Ontario. For the months of June, July and August 2017, she lived in the trailer and had the children on her weeks.

[44] By September 2017, the applicant rented a townhouse and converted the basement into a hair salon and started to rebuild her hair salon business. At the time of this motion, she is earning a gross income of $240 per month.

[45] At the time of the motion, the applicant’s sources of income are social assistance, the child tax benefit, child support of $600 per month plus a gross income of $240 per month. To supplement her income, the applicant is selling old furniture and clothing.

[46] A history of the applicant’s income is set out as follows:

(a) 2005 $15,176

(b) 2006 $30,680

(d) 2008 $27,740

(e) 2009 $-4,285

(f) 2010 $15,109

(g) 2011 $17,042

(h) 2012 $49,353

(i) 2013 $24,211

(j) 2014 $9,009

(k) 2015 $12,235

(l) 2016 $26,849.98 based on the two separate tax returns

[47] The respondent’s position is that the applicant should have an imputed income of $28,000 for the years 2016 going forward based on her declared income in 2016 and any cash income not reported. Further, the respondent submits that the applicant should have an imputed income of the minimum wage in the province of Ontario which is $28,000.

[48] At the date of this motion, the respondent is 36 years of age and in good health. She has decided to operate a hair salon out of the basement of her rented townhouse. That is her choice. I find it fair and reasonable to impute an income to her where she is seeking spousal support as well as child support. She has an obligation to become self-sufficient within a reasonable period of time.

[49] I do not find it reasonable that she would continue to work out of her basement earning $240 gross a month. She can and should work on a full-time basis. Further, her daughter Mikayla is, according to the parties, able to babysit her younger brother.

[50] Considering all the circumstances, I find it is fair and reasonable to impute an income to the applicant in 2017 in the amount of $20,000. I do so considering the applicant moved three times and lived at a trailer in June, July and August 2017.

[51] Commencing in 2018, I will impute to her an income of $28,000. This amount is consistent with income earned during the marriage and it is the minimum wage applicable in Ontario.

Child Support

Commencement date of support

[52] The applicant seeks support retroactive to November 2015 and, in the alternative, June 2016. On June 28, 2016, Justice MacLeod ordered the respondent to pay $600 per month as child support, which he had paid.

[53] After the case conference, the applicant could have brought a motion for temporary relief. Her evidence is that there was a delay in Legal Aid funding and she could only do so when she served her materials on August 2, 2017, returnable November 16, 2017.

[54] I will exercise my discretion and order that the support commence as of August 2017, when the respondent served her notice of motion returnable November 16, 2017. By August 2017, the respondent was on notice that the applicant was seeking a temporary order. With respect to the claims from the date of separation to July 2017, that claim will be reserved for the trial judge.

Table Child support

[55] The parties agreed that the order of Justice MacLeod dated June 28, 2016 regarding the parenting arrangements will not be varied despite the allegation by the applicant that her daughter has been residing with her full-time since September 2017. Consequently, at this time, the children are residing in a shared custody arrangement.

[56] However, for the purposes of support, the applicant alleges that she has had the child Mikayla more than 60% of the time in 2017 and that the child should be designated as residing with her on a full-time basis, entitling that child to full table child support. Regarding Matteo, the applicant concedes that that child continues to be in a shared custody arrangement.

[57] After the motion, I requested that the parties calculate the time that Mikayla lived with the applicant in 2017. The applicant alleges it amounted to 66.3% of the year while the respondent alleges that it was 59.4 % of the time. Both parties agree that it is 59.4% of the time in 2018.

[58] The evidence is contradictory on the actual time spent by Mikayla with the applicant in 2017. As this is a motion for temporary relief, I cannot reconcile the evidence. This matter is best left to the trial judge who will hear the viva voce evidence of the parties. For the purposes of this motion, I find that the children are living in a shared custody arrangement.

[59] Commencing August 1, 2017 and on the first day of each month thereafter, based on the respondent’s income of $100,000, the applicant’s income of $20,000 and both children in a shared custody arrangement, I order the respondent to pay to the applicant $1,110 per month as child support.

[60] Commencing January 1, 2018 and on the first day of each month thereafter, based on the respondent’s income of $100,000, the applicant’s income of $28,000 and both children in a shared custody arrangement, I order the respondent to pay to the applicant $1,019 per month as child support.

[61] The respondent shall be entitled to a credit of any child support paid as of August 1, 2017 to be credited against the amount of child support payable pursuant to this endorsement.

Section 7 expenses

[62] The applicant is seeking a contribution to certain expenses as section 7 expenses pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines. The court makes the following findings:

Year 2017

(a) Yoga expenses $744.56 for Mikayla

I find that this expense is actually a membership for the child in a gym and consequently does not qualify as an extraordinary expense.

(b) Daycare $352.02 for Matteo

This expense is incurred by the applicant for babysitting services for Matteo while the applicant and Mikayla are doing yoga. I have no evidence of any yoga expense and even if I did, it would not qualify as a section 7 expense.

The evidence to support this expense confirms that the children were registered at certain daycare agencies. The only expenses that may qualify are the expenses at the Shoreline KSAP. However, these expenses do not indicate that they were for summer camp. In the circumstances, the evidence is contradictory and, consequently, I will not order the sharing of this expense without prejudice to the applicant providing better evidence at trial.

(d) Clothing of $3,600 for both children

Clothing is not a section 7 expenses and I deny this expense.

Year 2018

(a) After school daycare $706.86

The applicant’s evidence is that she meets clients in the afternoon and, consequently, she requires after school daycare. The respondent argues that the daycare expenses do not qualify as section 7 expenses. I will not allow this expense as the evidence is unclear that this expense was incurred to allow the applicant to earn income without prejudice to the applicant providing better evidence at the trial.

(b) Chiropractic care $1,150 for April to August 2018 for Mikayla

There is no evidence, such as a doctor’s note, to support the requirement for Mikayla to be undergoing chiropractic care. Without such evidence, I cannot confirm that this is a valid section 7 expense and, consequently, I deny this claim.

I deny this claim because the receipt does not refer to yoga and appears to be a monthly payment for membership in a gym which does not qualify as a section 7 expense.

(d) Daycare $370.98 for Mateo

I deny this claim because it is daycare for Matteo while his sister and mother are using the gym.

Spousal support

[63] The applicant seeks spousal support both on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis. The respondent’s position is that he has no ability to pay spousal support. The respondent’s counsel admitted that the applicant is entitled to spousal support but there is no ability to pay after factoring in the child support based on his position that his client’s income is approximately $42,000 per year. I have rejected the respondent’s submission regarding his income and found the respondent’s income to be $100,000 per year.

[64] As this is a temporary motion, the applicant must provide evidence to conclude that she has a prima facie entitlement to spousal support. I make the following findings of fact:

(a) the applicant was the main caregiver of the children throughout the marriage;

(b) upon request of the respondent, the applicant started to work part-time to be able to care for the children on a full-time basis;

(d) the applicant cannot meet her most basic needs;

(e) the respondent was the main wage-earner during the marriage; and

(f) the applicant cannot maintain the standard of living to which she was accustomed to during the marriage.

[65] Based on said findings, I find that the applicant has a prima facie entitlement to spousal support.

[66] For the period August 2017 to December 2017, I have considered the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines which indicate that based on the respondent’s income of $100,000, the applicant’s income of $20,000 and the respondent paying child support of $1,110 per month, the range of spousal support is as follows:

(a) Low $1,063

(b) Mid $1,380

[67] Commencing January 1, 2018, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines indicate that based on the respondent’s income of $100,000, the applicant’s income of $28,000 and the respondent paying child support of $1,110 per month, the range of spousal support is as follows:

(a) Low $799

(b) Mid $1,113

[68] In the circumstances, considering this is a motion for temporary relief, I will apply the midrange of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and order that commencing August 1, 2017, the respondent shall pay to the applicant spousal support of $1,380 per month. Commencing January 1, 2018, I order the respondent to pay to the applicant spousal support of $1,113 per month. The respondent is to be credited with any spousal support payments made.

Ancillary orders

[69] I order that this matter be placed on the trial sittings for January 2019.

[70] I order the parties to attend at a settlement conference no later than November 16, 2018.

Costs

[71] I direct that the parties should attempt to resolve the issue of costs. If they are unable to do so by June 4, 2018, I order that the applicant provide her costs submissions not to exceed three pages plus a detailed bill of cost and any offers to settle by June 11, 2018. The respondent is to provide his costs submissions by June 18, 2018 with said submissions not to exceed three pages plus a detailed bill of costs and any offers to settle.

Shelston J.

Date: May 25, 2018

COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-846

DATE: 2018/05/25

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

RE: Jessie Melanie Mancini AND Eric Mancini

BEFORE: Justice Mark Shelston

COUNSEL: Ozlem Eskiciolu, for the Applicant Michael Chambers, for the Respondent

ENDORSEMENT

Shelston J.

Released: May 25, 2018

Mancini v. Mancini, 2018 ONSC: 3282

Case Summary