SCJ 2017

Following the dismissal of the applicant's appeal from an arbitrator's ruling, the successful respondent sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, noting that the applicant's appeal was largely without merit, caused unnecessary delay, and that the respondent had made a reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $18,008.88.

In a family property proceeding, certain added foreign respondents moved to set aside interlocutory worldwide Mareva and preservation orders on the basis that they were foreign parties with no sufficient connection to Ontario.

The court held that the respondent spouse's allegations of trust ownership, asset diversion, and risk of dissipation remained substantively unanswered, and that equity favoured preserving the disputed assets pending adjudication of equalization and support claims.

The court found that concerns about comity and practical enforceability did not bar continuation of the orders, particularly given the parallel Florida proceeding and the applicant spouse's invocation of the Ontario court's jurisdiction.

The motion was dismissed and the prior injunctive orders remained in place.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' negligence claim for mental distress arising from the death of a family member in a helicopter crash.

The defendants argued that common law precludes recovery for mental distress resulting from the negligently caused death of a human being unless the plaintiffs witnessed the accident or its aftermath.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Saadati v. Moorhead, the court found that geographic, temporal, and relational proximity restrictions are not absolute bars to recovery.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding it was not plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The respondent requested clarification of a paragraph in the court's previous decision regarding an insurance coverage dispute.

The court issued an addendum clarifying that the respondent is responsible for the first $200,000 of any judgment or settlement against the insured in the underlying action, while maintaining its contractual right to deny coverage to other parties.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment and permitting the plaintiff to amend its statement of claim to seek only declaratory relief regarding a 5% share ownership.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order because the declaratory relief sought was arguably ancillary to statute-barred consequential relief.

The court also found the parameters of section 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act to be a matter of general importance warranting appellate review.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $189,016.95 obtained by the respondents on their counterclaim.

The underlying dispute involved vendor take-back mortgages related to the purchase of a restaurant, where the moving party alleged the funds were never actually advanced.

Applying the five-part test for setting aside a default judgment, the court found that the delay in bringing the motion was not fatal, there was a plausible excuse for the default, and the moving party had an arguable defence on the merits.

The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured setting aside the default judgment and awarded costs to the moving party.

Following a two-day trial where the plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in agreed damages for a slip and fall, the plaintiff sought costs of $159,947.37.

The court rejected the plaintiff's claim for substantial indemnity costs and reduced the claimed fees and disbursements, noting the trial was uncomplicated and the plaintiff provided insufficient docket details for early work.

Costs were fixed at $82,475, inclusive of fees, disbursements, HST, and prejudgment interest.

The plaintiffs, who had resided in the property for over 25 years, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant property owner from interfering with their use of the home pending the resolution of their constructive trust claim.

The defendant had previously attempted to evict the plaintiffs and breached an interim order by attending the property.

The court applied the three-part test for an injunction and found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if evicted and that the balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her Statement of Claim to seek recovery of statutory accident benefits, a declaration of catastrophic impairment, and punitive damages.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the Superior Court lost jurisdiction over new accident benefit disputes on April 1, 2016, when jurisdiction was transferred to the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed amendments were a particularization and redrafting of the original pre-transition claim, not a new proceeding.

The court deferred the issue of whether the plaintiff failed to mediate the specific benefits prior to commencing the action to the trial judge.

During a jury trial for firearms offences, the Crown sought to call reply evidence to undermine the credibility of a defence witness who testified about two unidentified men looking for the complainant.

The Crown also sought to re-open cross-examination of the witness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed reply evidence related solely to the witness's credibility and therefore offended the collateral fact rule.

The court also declined to permit further cross-examination, noting the Crown had already been given a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

Following a trial where the plaintiff successfully set aside a fraudulent conveyance based on a forged signature, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs against the defendant who committed the forgery, finding that forging a signature to transfer a home constitutes reprehensible conduct.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the other unsuccessful defendants who were not implicated in the forgery.

The applicant brought a motion regarding an unpaid equalization payment and sought a preliminary order that the respondent was not entitled to further relief due to his ongoing breach of a 2008 child support order.

The respondent had accumulated approximately $300,000 in child support arrears, claiming his obligation ended due to estrangement from the children, though he never sought to vary the order.

Applying the three-stage test for Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, the court declined to exercise discretion in the respondent's favour.

The court ordered that the respondent's motion be dismissed unless he pays the arrears accumulated up to the children's 18th birthdays and commences a Motion to Change within 60 days.

The applicant, charged with hostage taking, brought an application to exclude statements made to undercover police officers and post-arrest statements.

The police conducted a multi-year undercover operation, posing as a book publisher to lure the applicant to Canada.

The court found the operation was a variant of a 'Mr. Big' operation but did not amount to an abuse of process, and the probative value of the confessions outweighed any prejudice.

The court also dismissed arguments that the applicant's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements violated his section 7 right to silence or his section 10(b) right to counsel, finding the statements voluntary and the right to counsel adequately provided.

The plaintiffs in a class proceeding brought a motion to determine whether a 'loan forgiveness' benefit under a settlement agreement was triggered.

The benefit was payable if there was no Approved Emissions Modification (AEM) by June 15, 2017.

The US EPA approved a fix on May 19, 2017, but it was not implemented in Canada until June 23, 2017.

The court held that the definition of AEM, which required the fix to be 'implementable in Canada', meant available within a reasonable time, not immediately available.

Therefore, the AEM existed by the deadline and the loan forgiveness benefit was not triggered.

During jury deliberations in a first-degree murder trial, the jury requested to take a view of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred.

The Crown opposed the request due to logistical and security concerns, while one of the accused argued a view constitutes real evidence.

The trial judge refused the request, finding that a view would not provide a real and demonstrable advantage given the extensive photographic and video evidence already adduced.

Furthermore, the judge held that a view at the deliberation stage was not in the interests of justice due to the passage of time, the risk of the jury drawing untested inferences, and significant logistical challenges.

The applicants sought an order recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award of $400,000 made by a religious arbitral tribunal (Beth Din).

The respondents opposed, arguing the award was not yet binding as the tribunal had indicated a willingness to consider additional issues regarding costs and damages.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was not yet complete and the tribunal was not functus officio, applying the competence-competence principle to defer to the tribunal's jurisdiction.

The defendant in a construction dispute brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff subcontractor.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, claiming impecuniosity resulting from the defendant's failure to pay for work performed.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide robust particularity of its financial situation to establish impecuniosity.

However, recognizing the merit of the plaintiff's claim and the need to balance financial risk against prejudice, the court ordered security for costs on a step-by-step basis, requiring the plaintiff to post $15,000 rather than the $116,571.12 requested by the defendant.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples and dismiss 'over 80' charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer failed to administer the approved screening device 'forthwith' in violation of s. 8 of the Charter, and failed to implement the respondent's right to counsel of choice in violation of s. 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's analysis, concluding that the officer prioritized privacy over the statutory imperative to administer the test forthwith, and took a 'short-cut' by calling duty counsel instead of facilitating the respondent's counsel of choice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff credit union brought a motion for summary judgment against the corporate defendant and the individual defendant based on a small business credit agreement and a personal guarantee.

The corporate defendant conceded liability.

The individual defendant argued her liability was limited to 25% of the loan based on alleged misrepresentations by the plaintiff's advisor.

The court found the guarantee was clearly unlimited and the defendant had not read the documents or sought independent legal advice.

Summary judgment was granted against both defendants for the full outstanding amount.

The defendants were successful in obtaining summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action on the basis that a settlement had been agreed to.

The defendants sought costs approaching $20,000.

The court found the requested amount disproportionate to the modest amount in issue and the straightforward nature of the motion.

The court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.