SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
v.
RAVI T. SHENAVA
R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE R. POMERANCE
on December 22, 2017 at WINDSOR, Ontario
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS
PROHIBITED FROM PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO
S.486.4(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
APPEARANCES:
J. Holmes Counsel for the Crown
D. Humphrey Counsel for Ravi T. Shenava
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS
PROHIBITED FROM PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO
S.486.4(1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
WITNESSES:
No witnesses gave testimony during this portion of the proceedings
Exam.
in-Ch.
Cr-
exam.
Re-
exam.
L I S T O F E X H I B I T S
EXHIBIT NUMBER ENTERED ON PAGE
No exhibits were entered during
this portion of the proceedings.
Transcript Ordered: January 3, 2018
Transcript Completed: February 1, 2018
Ordering Party Notified: February 2, 2018
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2017
COURT REGISTRAR: Her Majesty the Queen and Ravi Shenava ...
R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T
Ravi Shenava is a psychiatrist practicing in Windsor, Ontario. He is charged with various sexual offences against his patient, S.P. The indictment charges five separate sexual assaults between August 2012 and April 2015, and one count of extortion between August 9th, 2012 and December 31st, 2012.
The complainant testified at trial that the accused sexually assaulted her during her visits to his office in 2012, and then again, during visits in 2015. It is further alleged that the accused extorted sexual acts from the complainant, threatening that if she did not engage in sexual activity, he would tell authorities that she was earning money as an escort while receiving disability benefits.
It is the position of the defence that there was no sexual activity. The defence says that the complainant fabricated her account in the hopes that she might sue the accused for financial gain.
At the outset, I acknowledge the presumption of innocence, the central principle at the heart of
the criminal trial process. Dr. Shenava need not prove anything at his trial. He is presumed innocent and remains cloaked in that presumption unless and until the prosecution has proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.
I will begin by summarizing the evidence of the complainant, describing the alleged assaults. I will then turn to an analysis of the issues, including the critical question of credibility.
Office Visits in 2012
The complainant first met the accused in 2007, when she was hospitalized for mental health issues. Nothing of consequence occurred at that time. Five years later, in 2012, the complainant attended at a facility in Windsor looking for a psychiatrist. The complainant had a preliminary meeting with the accused at the facility, and it was agreed that she would come to see him at his office.
The complainant saw the accused at his office about six times in 2012. She testified that she was sexually assaulted during those visits. The offences took place in the accused’s office with his door closed. All but one took place during regular business hours.
According to the complainant, on the first visit, she told the accused that she needed his signature on documents relating to her disability application. She also told the accused that she was working as an escort. She testified that in response to this the accused said, “You are making money, what you are doing is illegal.” She testified that he told her to stand on the scale so that he could weigh her. He began touching her buttocks and saying, “If you want me not to tell, you have to trust me and I have to trust you.” He then had the complainant stand behind the door and he lifted her shirt, squeezing her breasts. According to the complainant, he sniffed her neck “like a dog” and told her that she “smelled like a real Canadian girl.” He unzipped his pants and was stroking his penis. She testified that he put her hand on his penis and made her stroke it until he ejaculated on the floor. He then told her to leave.
During one of the early visits, the accused sent the complainant to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases. A copy of the report was contained within the complainant’s medical file.
The complainant testified that on the second visit, the accused told her that she would have to trade a sexual favour for his signature on the application for disability benefits. He told her that if she did not perform the sexual favour, he would report her to the government for failing to disclose her income from work as an escort. The complainant testified that she was afraid that her benefits would be cut off and that she would not be able to purchase her medications. She believed that the accused was powerful and would ensure that no one else would sign her documents. Accordingly, she allowed the accused to “hump her leg” while rubbing up against her.
The complainant testified that the accused insisted that she have sexual intercourse with him before he signed the papers. He told her to come to the office at 4:00 p.m. when the secretary would be gone. She did so. She testified that he told her to sit on the desk and lay back. He pulled a condom out from the desk and had vaginal intercourse with her. She testified that after he ejaculated, he took off the condom and threw it in the garbage pail. The complainant testified that he said to her, “Make sure you don’t tell anyone about our deal”, the “deal” being an exchange of sexual acts for the doctor’s signature.
According to the complainant, there were other occasions when the accused called her into the office, saying that he wanted to talk to her. She would go in and he would engage her in sexual activity, squeezing her breasts, sniffing her neck, and making her masturbate him to ejaculation. During this period, the accused called for the complainant at her mother’s house. This was confirmed by the complainant’s mother who testified that it was the accused himself on the phone, rather than a secretary or staff member.
Once the complainant’s disability benefits were approved, she stopped going to see the accused. As she put it, she did not want to get touched anymore and he was not helping her. The benefits were approved on November 1st, 2012.
Contact with Ryan McKenzie
In 2013, the complainant contacted Ryan MacKenzie, a Windsor lawyer. The complainant waived solicitor client privilege and the communications with Mr. Mackenzie were the subject of evidence at the trial. The complainant testified that she called Mr. Mackenzie because, as she put it, he “is the lawyer that goes after the bad people.” She knew that he was a civil lawyer who sued people.
The complainant testified that she told Mr. MacKenzie about the incidents with the accused. She testified that he told her she needed more proof. She also testified about a discussion with Mr. MacKenzie in which she asked for legal advice about whether or not she could record her visits.
Mr. MacKenzie confirmed that he spoke to the complainant but his account was different than hers. He testified that on December 2, 2013, the complainant called to indicate that she might want to bring a civil action against a psychiatrist. She provided some details to Mr. Mackenzie who advised her to call the police. Mr. Mackenzie denied telling the complainant that she needed more proof. According to him, they never discussed the sufficiency or insufficiency of the case because he was never formally retained.
Mr. MacKenzie testified that the complainant brought up the issue of credibility and he replied that there are issues of credibility in any civil action. In connection with this, the complainant said, “I can prove it. I can describe his penis.” Among the descriptors she offered was the fact that the accused was uncircumcised.
Mr. MacKenzie had a second call with the complainant. He had spoken with a senior partner in his firm and had learned that the firm had a potential conflict that would prevent them from taking the case. He contacted the complainant to tell her this. I accept Mr. MacKenzie’s evidence that he did not provide the complainant with any legal advice and that he did not discuss the case in any detail with her.
Office Visits in 2015
In 2015, the complainant’s disability pension was subject to a medical review. Once again, she needed a doctor’s signature confirming that she was entitled to the benefits and that her condition had not changed. She asked her family physician to sign the documents, but he declined saying that he did not know her well enough. He gave her a referral to go back and see the accused and she did so. According to the complainant, further sexual assaults occurred during this second batch of visits.
The complainant did not try to go to a different psychiatrist. She testified that she did not ask for a different referral because she thought that this time the accused would just sign her papers.
On one occasion, the complainant testified that she told the accused that he should pay her. According to her, the accused said he did not pay for sex and she responded, “I don’t screw for free.” She testified that she said she wanted $100 and the accused said he would pay $50 that time and $100 the next time. She testified that she said, ‘fine’, and had sex with him in exchange for $50.
On one occasion in 2015, the complainant’s mother came with her to the office. She was feeling suicidal and her mother drove her to the appointment. She believed that her mother knew that the accused had sexually assaulted her before, but her mother testified that she did not appreciate that the accused was the doctor that her doctor had complained about.
The complainant did not go to the police at that time. She testified that she did not have hard proof and the accused had told her that no one would believe her, given her criminal past and her work as an escort.
After she was approved for disability benefits in 2015, she stopped going to see the accused at his office.
The Concocted Evidence
After the payment of $50 for sex in 2015, according to the complainant, there was one last visit made by the complainant to the accused’s office. Before that visit took place, the complainant planned to act out a staged event at the accused’s office. She planned this event with her boyfriend H.L.. The two agreed that the complainant would make a scene at the accused’s office. She would deliberately stomp out of the office in full view of the secretary hoping that the secretary would notice her leaving in a distressed state. This, in turn, could generate evidence that would support her case. Mr. H.L. would also be present as a “witness” to her distress.
On the day in question, she attended at the accused’s office with Mr. H.L.. In accordance with the plan, the complainant stomped out of the accused’s office calling him a pervert. Mr. H.L. went in pursuit of the complainant as she fled the premises. In court the complainant testified that, in fact, nothing sexual occurred on that particular visit. She testified that the accused asked for sex and she said no. She testified that she stomped out of the office because that was the plan and because she wished to make it seem as though something improper had occurred.
The complainant explained that she staged this event because, according to her, Mr. MacKenzie told her that she needed more proof. One way to get more proof was to stage a scene in front of the secretary. It was agreed that Mr. H.L. would also refer to the event and her state of distress when he testified in court.
When she gave her statement to the police, the complainant talked about the staged event as if it was real. In her statement of April 24th, 2015, she said:
“The last time when I went to go see him and tell him that, you know, I was approved for disability, my boyfriend, H.L. came with me to that appointment. He was waiting outside in the waiting room and then Shenava tried to, you know, do his thing with me and I said no and I ran out the room crying. There was a secretary there. I don’t know if that’s reported by H.L. seeing me running out of the room crying.”
At trial the complainant came clean about the scripted evidence. She acknowledged staging the event and planning it with Mr. H.L.. She testified that Mr. H.L. was in on the plan and knew that the event had been scripted. When Mr. H.L. testified at the trial, he referred to the scripted event, but spoke of it as if it were a real occurrence. I will discuss this evidence in more detail when I come to address issues of credibility.
Police Statements
The complainant first spoke to the police in April 2015. She testified that she read a Windsor Star posting on Facebook, which stated that another woman had come forward with allegations against the accused. The complainant testified that when she read the ad, she decided to come forward. She thought it more likely that someone would believe her if she was not the only one complaining of sexual assault.
In the first statement, the complainant was less than forthright with the police. She testified that she left out certain details in her first statement. For example, she testified that she left out the fact that she voluntarily had sex with the accused for $50 as she said she did in her testimony. According to her, she left that out because she did not want to get in trouble and “did not want to ruin her case” against the accused. The complainant initially insisted that she did not lie to the police about this, but rather, just left the detail out. However, during cross-examination, the defence put a passage to the complainant in which she was specifically asked whether the accused every paid for sex and she said no. When confronted with this passage the complainant acknowledged that she had lied to the police on that issue.
The complainant called the police on May 10, 2016, to provide additional information and on that occasion referenced the “money for sex” deal. She testified that she did this because she had spoken to a friend who was a criminal lawyer and he told her that it is better not to lie because if you lie you might get caught. The complainant corrected the money for sex reference but never told the police that she had scripted her departure from the accused’s office on the last visit in 2015.
Analysis
Credibility is at the heart of the analysis in this case. The central question is whether the complainant’s testimony is sufficiently credible and reliable to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. The criminal standard of proof is demanding. It is not enough for the Crown to prove that the accused is probably guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is closer to absolute certainty than it is proof on a balance of probabilities. While absolute certainty is an impossible standard to meet, the criminal standard of proof requires that the court be sure of guilt before it can convict.
The Crown’s case hinges on the testimony of the complainant. She was cross-examined at some length by skillful and experienced counsel. She did not waver from her assertion that she had been sexually assaulted by the accused. However, aspects of her testimony give rise to concern and suggest the need for caution. Counsel for the accused submits that the complainant’s testimony should be subject to what is commonly referred to as a Vetrovec warning, based on the well-known case of R. v. Vetrovec.
The Vetrovec caution, traditionally applied to accomplice witnesses, is applicable to any witness who is “unsavory, untrustworthy, unreliable or tainted.” See R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 4. Where applicable, the instruction alerts the trier of fact to the danger of convicting on the unsupported testimony of the witness. It is a “clear and sharp warning to attract the attention of the juror[s] to the risks of adopting, without more, the evidence of the witness.” See Khela, at para 5.
The Vetrovec caution is most often discussed in the context of jury trials. In Khela, the Supreme Court observed that jurors may not appreciate the special circumstances that call for skepticism and extra scrutiny of a witness’ evidence. In that same case, the court observed that trial judges tend to be more alert to these issues, given the accumulated wisdom of the law’s experience in this area.
In this case, there are various factors that call for enhanced scrutiny of the complainant’s testimony, and a search for confirmatory or corroborative evidence. Because I am the ultimate trier of fact, the question is not so much whether I should regard the complainant’s evidence with caution, it is more aptly, whether I do approach the complainant’s evidence with caution. I have determined that such caution is appropriate for reasons I will soon outline.
Before I identify the relevant factors, I propose to identify factors that I have not relied upon. My concerns about credibility are in no way premised on stereotypical reasoning, or the myths that have traditionally distorted trials of sexual offences. Dr. Shenava’s counsel have expressly disavowed any reliance on pernicious myths and stereotypes. I note the following:
First, the need for caution in this case has nothing to do with the nature of the allegations before the court.
The corroboration requirement in sexual offence trials was repealed long ago and has no place in modern Canadian courtrooms. The perception of sexual assault complainants as inherently untrustworthy is an historical anachronism. It is open to a court to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant if that testimony proves the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Just as it is wrong to presume that complainants are untrustworthy, it is also wrong to presume that all complainants are credible. This would do considerable violence to the presumption of innocence that defines our system of justice. Complainants are not presumed to be trustworthy or untrustworthy. The determination of credibility is a holistic, multi-faceted, case-specific exercise. It is informed by the presumption of innocence and the burden and standard of proof. The fact that the charge involves a sexual offence does not affect the credibility analysis one way or the other.
Second, the need for caution in this case has nothing to do with the complainant’s mental health issues.
Historically, sexual offence trials were sometimes distorted by the myth that those who struggle with mental health issues are inherently unreliable. Requests for private counselling records were sometimes used to ground fishing expeditions, or to discredit a witness based solely on the fact that he or she received therapy. Such requests are now tightly regulated by statute. The law is clear that the fact that someone has received counselling or psychiatric treatment does not mean that they are unworthy of belief. Again, every case must be determined on its facts. In this case, the complainant has had some very real struggles with mental health. She has experienced hospitalization and psychiatric treatment. This is an integral part of the narrative because it explains her contact with the accused. Beyond that, it has no impact on the fact-finding process. I do not find the complainant to be incredible or unreliable on the basis of her struggles with depression and other mental illness.
Third and finally, the need for caution has nothing to do with the complainant’s status as a sex trade worker.
The Crown led evidence about the complainant’s work in the commercial sex trade. This, too, is an essential part of the narrative in this case. It is inextricably bound up with the facts of the alleged extortion. Like the mental health issues, its value is limited to its narrative status. The complainant’s work as an escort is otherwise quite beside the point. It does not make it any more likely that she would have consented to sexual activity. It does not make her evidence less worthy of credit.
Having identified those factors that I do not rely upon, I will now turn to those that I have. They are:
The complainant’s criminal antecedents which include significant crimes of dishonesty; and
The complainant’s willingness to manufacture physical evidence and lie about material facts in issue.
I will deal first with the complainant’s criminal antecedents. The complainant was asked about various crimes for which she had been convicted. Those included several thefts and possession of a weapon in 2005, a taser. The complainant testified that she has been selling drugs on the street off and on since the age of 14. She admitted to selling cocaine, crack, magic mushrooms and more recently, fentanyl patches.
Other evidence came from the complainant’s boyfriend, H.L., who has his own long list of prior convictions. In addition to his role as a romantic partner, Mr. H.L. was also something of a partner in crime. He and the complainant have known each other since they were teenagers. In 2007, Mr. H.L. broke into a van and stole a pencil case which contained codes to automatic teller machines. He and the complainant went to a number of machines and withdrew all of the funds. They were both arrested that night, though the charge against the complainant was withdrawn. The two participated in other joint ventures as well.
During her testimony, the complainant admitted to crimes that had not been the subject of charge and might never have come to light were it not for her candour. Save for her testimonial admission, the defence may never have known that she was selling fentanyl patches. Similarly, the complainant offered the rather breathtaking admission that she had stolen about 800 vehicles. Some of the cars were stolen for purposes of transportation, some were stolen for purposes of resale, some were stolen “just for the thrill.” The complainant admitted having committed dozens of break and enters involving both residential and commercial premises. The break-ins were intended to facilitate theft of things of value to resell for money.
The criminal history is relevant to credibility. The sheer number of crimes would suggest that this has become something of a lifestyle. Many of the crimes committed by the complainant involved thefts and other forms of dishonesty, the types of offences that are directly relevant to credibility.
Finally, many of the crimes were committed for the express purpose of financial gain. This is relevant because the prospect of financial gain is the motive to fabricate alleged by the defence in this case.
This is not to say that the criminal record compels rejection of the complaint’s testimony. It is clearly open to the court to find that a person with a criminal record is telling the truth in the witness stand. Here, the complainant was very forthcoming about the extent of her criminal history. That history must, however, be given some weight in the credibility equation. It dictates that the court exercise additional care before accepting the witness’ testimony as true.
The second and most critical factor at play in this case is the complainant’s willingness to lie about or concoct material facts. The complainant lied to police despite giving a solemn affirmation to tell the truth, and the fact that she was warned of the consequences of making a false statement.
More importantly, the complainant set out to manufacture evidence in the hopes that it would support her case. This consisted of her plan to act out a script in the accused’s office. On the complainant’s own evidence, no sexual activity took place on the last visit. Nonetheless, in accordance with the script, the complainant stomped out of the office in full view of Mr. H.L. and the accused’s secretary. In her statement to police, the complainant reported this as if it had been a real event. The complainant acknowledged in her testimony that she was going to testify about this incident in court as if it was a real event. She changed her mind before she testified, but the plan did result in false evidence being led in court through the testimony of Mr. H.L..
It would seem that when Mr. H.L. testified, he was unaware that this particular “jig” was up. He spoke about the scripted incident as if it had really happened though he believed that it was in 2012 rather than 2015. He described the event according to the plan. He spoke of the complainant leaving the office in a state of distress. As he put it, she came dashing out right past him looking very upset. He ran after her and tried to get her to tell him what happened. He said he could not get a word out of her and was very concerned. He testified that eventually the complainant told him that something had happened in the office and that she had given the accused a “hand job”.
By the time Mr. H.L. testified, the complainant had already acknowledged that this entire scene had been scripted, yet, Mr. H.L. spoke about it with apparent sincerity. When it was put to him that the event had been scripted, he responded with indignation that the suggestion was “preposterous.” Mr. H.L.’s testimony is a cautionary illustration of the danger of relying on demeanour evidence as a cue for credibility. Mr. H.L. was a skillful liar. If the backstory had not been told, Mr. H.L.’s testimony and feigned sincerity could well have misled a trier of fact.
The Crown argues that despite all of this, the court should feel comfortable accepting the complainant’s testimony. The Crown notes that the complainant was forthcoming about her lies. It was said that the complainant is a very honest dishonest witness.
The complainant was forthcoming about several facts that were less than flattering. This included her criminal history and her willingness to manufacture evidence. It appeared that she was trying to present as an open book, but this is a double-edged sword. The admission of a willingness to lie does not necessarily make everything else true.
The complainant’s testimony was akin to the assertion: “I am telling the truth that my earlier statements were lies.” This calls to mind the liar’s paradox in which a hypothetical declarant asserts everything I say is false. If the person is lying the statement is true. If the person is telling the true the statement is false. Much has been written about this paradox and I do not intend to explore its complexities. The point I make is simply that in cases of this nature it can be very difficult to distinguish between truth and falsehood.
The complainant acknowledged in her testimony that she was concerned about concealing evidence that might, as she put it, “ruin her case”. On her own testimony she only came forward with the truth because she was warned that she could get caught in a lie. This suggests that the decision to come forward was based on something other than a respect for the truth. The complainant was willing to lie when it was necessary to stay out of trouble and/or support her case. She was willing to tell the truth when it was necessary to stay out of trouble and/or support her case. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to be confident about other aspects of the complainant’s testimony. Even if the statements about earlier lies are the truth, it is difficult to know whether earlier assertions of the truth are lies.
The complainant testified that the accused chose her as a victim because of her troubled past. It was said that he deliberately chose a victim whom no one would believe. Some might say that if I were to find the accused not guilty, I would somehow vindicate that choice. Of course, a verdict of acquittal would mean that the accused did not choose any victim on any basis. He would be found not guilty of the offence. Nonetheless, it bears noting that my concerns in this case are not a product of the complainant’s character, or her occupation, or her struggles with mental health. Even the complainant’s criminal antecedents, while extensive, were not dispositive of credibility. The critical factor was the complainant’s willingness to curate her evidence based on whether the facts supported or detracted from her case. The complainant may or may not be lying, that is the point. My concern is that I cannot be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that what she is saying is true.
The Crown argues that even if the complainant’s evidence is viewed with caution, there is corroboration of her account. The Crown points to the fact that the complainant testified that the accused’s penis is uncircumcised. It is an admitted fact at the trial that the accused is, in fact, an uncircumcised male. The Crown argues that this stands as independent confirmation that the complainant saw the accused’s penis. This confirms that there was sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.
The defence argues that the complainant could have other ways of surmising that the accused is uncircumcised. The defence points out that the accused is a man of Indian descent and of the Hindu religion. It is said that men of this ethnicity tend to be uncircumcised. It is said that this fact could be readily determined through a simple internet search. The complainant was asked if she had done an internet search of circumcision practices and she said no.
I accept the complainant’s testimony that her description of the accused’s penis was not the product of an internet search. The complainant would not have known what to search for as she was unable to accurately identify the accused’s country of origin.
The complainant was asked about where the accused was from. She testified that she believed that he was from Pakistan. When asked why she believed him to be from Pakistan she answered, “Because he is Indian.” When asked, “Do you call Pakistani men Indians?” she responded, “I call them Pakis.” The complainant clearly conflated persons from India and persons from Pakistan. There is no reason to believe that an internet search of circumcision practices of Indian men from Pakistan would have yielded any information of value.
When asked about the internet searches the complainant spontaneously asserted that she had “seen a lot of penises.” This evidence engaged the prohibition against introduction of sexual history evidence in s. 276 of the Criminal Code. The defence brought an application under s. 276 to permit questioning about whether the complainant had any belief about circumcision practices of men like the accused; brown-skinned men who are Pakistani or Indian, as distinct from brown-skinned men who are Asian or black. I did permit a very limited line of questioning. It did not explore any details of sexual activity, but only whether the complainant had formed a belief about circumcision practices based on her observations. The complainant testified that she did not have an opinion or belief about whether men in the designated category would tend to be circumcised or not.
In the end, I do not believe that the complainant took any concrete steps to research circumcision practices. I accept that the identification of the accused as an uncircumcised male has some potential confirmatory value. It is, however, in context of limited weight.
The issue itself has a binary quality. A male is either circumcised or not. Even an entirely random guess has a 50 percent chance of being correct. This is not a case in which the witness identified a distinctive physical marking, such as a tattoo or birthmark. In that instance, the chance of a sheer guess becomes far more remote. I also note that the complainant offered the description of the accused’s penis when she perceived that she needed more proof. She did other things when she perceived that she needed more proof including the staging of the dramatic exit from the accused’s office. I cannot rule out the possibility that the complainant took a chance and offered a guess about the accused’s penis that happened to be correct.
Therefore, while the evidence of the correct identification of the accused as being uncircumcised is of some confirmatory value, it is not of sufficient quality to overcome the factors discussed above.
There are other aspects of the complainant’s evidence that bear on credibility. For example, the complainant claimed never to have had any money problems, yet, she had claimed bankruptcy in 2010 with $64,000 in debt. When confronted with this in cross-examination, the complainant responded that it was not her fault, as her house had been broken into. She had stopped paying rent because she was burgled in a supposedly secure building. Other aspects of the debt involved a dispute over a car. She maintained that she did not see this as having money problems.
I mentioned this because it is the defence position that the complainant was motivated by money in bringing the allegations forward. It was put to her that it was her intention to launch a law suit against the accused. Her response was that she felt entitled to compensation for pain and suffering. The complainant replied that she wanted “full justice.” She did not just want to sue the accused, she wanted him to go to jail as well. She acknowledged that she wanted to “take him to the cleaners.” The fact that the complainant thought about suing the accused does not necessarily detract from her credibility. A person who is sexually assaulted may well feel aggrieved and seek recourse in the civil courts. However, in this case, the proposed law suit, together with the history of financial crimes, and the effort to concoct evidence, presents as a dangerous combination. I must conclude that if nothing else, those ingredients logically present as a recipe for reasonable doubt.
For all of these reasons, I conclude that the Crown has failed to prove the guilt of Dr. Shenava beyond a reasonable doubt and I find him not guilty on counts one through six of the indictment.
I want to thank all counsel for your assistance with this case.
FORM 2
Certificate of Transcript
Evidence Act, subsection 5(2)
I, Agnes Dickson, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of H.M.Q. v. Ravi T. Shenava in the Superior Court of Justice, held at 245 Windsor Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, taken from DRD recording number, 0899-245-CRTRM2-20171222-093842-10-POMERAR, as certified in Form one.
“February 5, 2018” “Agnes Dickson”
Date Agnes Dickson
Authorized Court Transcriptionist