CITATION: R. v. Gill, 2017 ONSC 723

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-30000216-0000

DATE: 20170130

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Paul Kelly, for the Crown

• and -

GURVINDER GILL

Chris Hynes, for the Defendant

HEARD: January 23, 2017, at Toronto, Ontario

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Michael G. Quigley J.

Overview

1On Thursday, August 1, 2015, Linus Butler and his passenger, Amber Chaboyer, were riding on his motorcycle headed north on Kennedy Road in Scarborough at about 11:00 pm. They stopped at the light at Ellesmere, it turned green and they were continuing north at a normal speed when, moments later, their motorcycle was struck from behind by a motor vehicle. Gurvinder Gill was the drunk driver of that vehicle. The collision caused significant life-changing injuries to Ms. Chaboyer and serious, albeit somewhat less damaging, injuries to Mr. Butler. Mr. Gill stopped at the scene, and he went to try to attend to Ms. Chaboyer, but he was so impaired that he added insult to the injuries his drunk driving had caused her when he fell on top of her as she lay in the roadway. Police came and he was arrested.

2On December 20, 2016, Gurvinder Gill pleaded guilty before me to three impaired driving related charges: driving while impaired, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and failure to comply with the terms of the probation order he was subject to at the time the offences occurred on August 1, 2015.

3No criminal law process or sentence can ever recompense a victim like the two who were injured here for the injuries they sustained and that is not the purpose of this sentencing. The purpose is to punish the offender for his injury-causing conduct in accordance with our law. Nothing more and nothing less, so the issue on this hearing is what should be the fit sentence for this offender, having regard to all of the circumstances and the harm caused to the complainants who were so seriously injured for life in the accident this offender caused.

Summary of Background Facts relating to the Offence

Circumstances of the Offences

4The circumstances of the offences are set out in the agreed statement of facts read into the record and filed on December 20, 2016, when I accepted Mr. Gill’s guilty pleas on these charges. The agreed statement indicates, as previously noted, that Amber Chaboyer and Linus Butler were out driving on his motorcycle on the night of August 1, 2015 when they arrived at the intersection of Kennedy and Ellesmere Road in Scarborough. Both are major arterial roadways: Kennedy Road running north-south, and Ellesmere Road running east-west. They were stopped in the middle northbound lane waiting for the traffic light to change. It did and they proceeded at a normal speed through the intersection.

5Shortly after Mr. Butler’s motorcycle had cleared the intersection, the eastbound car operated by Mr. Gill turned north off of Ellesmere onto Kennedy. Once travelling north it was veering in between lanes. Mr. Nigsan Thavolosan had also just proceeded through the Kennedy and Ellesmere intersection in a northerly direction. He immediately saw Mr. Gill’s erratic driving and it forced him to slow his car down to avoid being struck by or striking the car operated by Mr. Gill.

6Mr. Gill continued northward. With Mr. Thavolosan watching from behind, the Gill vehicle swerved into the lane in which Mr. Butler was operating the motorcycle, swerved out, and then swerved in again striking the motorcycle from behind. The impact caused Ms. Chaboyer to be thrust over Mr. Butler landing on the pavement. Mr. Butler was also thrown to the pavement and was rendered unconscious.

7Numerous persons called 911, including Mr. Thavolosan. Mr. Thavolosan also observed Mr. Gill, as he knew he was the driver and wanted to keep an eye on him. He witnessed Mr. Gill attend upon Ms. Chaboyer as she lay on the ground. Mr. Gill was unsteady on his feet and then actually fell on top of her as she lay there. Mr. Gill then got up and receded into the group of onlookers who had gathered, but Mr. Thavolosan kept his eyes firmly fixed on Mr. Gill.

8When the Police arrived, Mr. Thavolosan identified Mr. Gill as the driver of the car. One of the officers, Officer Banyaem, attended upon Mr. Gill and observed that he was unsteady on his feet and that he stumbled. He observed that his eyes were glassy and his breath smelled of alcohol.

9The officer decided to administer an approved screening device. After numerous attempts, approximately ten in number, a failure was registered, and a formal Intoxilyzer demand was then made. Mr. Gill was taken to the station to provide two suitable samples of his breath. En route to the station, Mr. Gill demonstrated indicia of extreme impairment. After arrival at the station prior to being taken to the breath room, Mr. Gill spoke to duty counsel. Once in the breath room with the qualified breath technician, Mr. Gill’s extreme impairment was in further evidence. He failed to provide a breath sample and was charged with that offence as well.

10At the time of these offences, Mr. Gill was on a probation order emanating from convictions for assault, threatening death, and mischief under. One of the terms of that order was that he keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In addition, at the time of the offence, Mr. Gill was facing another charge of refusing to provide a breath sample dating from August 5, 2014, but that matter was still outstanding at the time of these offences. He was not subject to any driving restrictions on August 1, 2015 when these offences occurred.

11As a result of being struck by the car operated by Mr. Gill, Ms. Chaboyer and Mr. Butler sustained extensive injuries. Ms. Chaboyer suffered a broken pelvis, broken ribs, severe skin abrasions when she hit and slid along the roadway, and back and neck pain as well as associated injuries. Mr. Butler was unconscious on the roadway after the collision and suffered a concussion, back and neck pain, a dislocated shoulder, and abrasions to his leg.

Victim impact statement

12Although Mr. Butler chose not to file a victim impact statement, Ms. Chaboyer did prepare and filed a statement, which was made an exhibit on the sentencing hearing, in which she attests to the severe emotional and physical trauma that this accident has had upon her.

13She suffered a broken neck and back, her liver was damaged, her lung was collapsed, she had fractured ribs, and she was left paralyzed for several months. She had to wear a metal cage as part of her recovery. Her skin was burned off in a number of places from her impact with the roadway. She has significant scarring on her feet, body and hands. She has nerve damage in her right leg and breast. She has problems with speech and memory loss. Her injuries including a herniated bowel, which causes her to have no ability to enjoy sexual relations anymore.

14One leg is shorter than the other so she walks with a limp. She is in pain all day every day and claims to have been unable to sleep properly for over sixteen months. The simplest day-to-day physical chores of attending to her personal hygiene have become exceptionally difficult. She had to learn how to walk again. She had to learn again how to stand on her own two feet. It is difficult for her to dress herself every day. Every day looking in the mirror reminds her of the damage caused by this incident. This has changed her whole life.

15Family relationships have been strained and she has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. She used to be outgoing and have a lot of friends but she can no longer deal with people. All of this was principally caused by the physical damage she sustained arising out of being thrown from her friend’s motorcycle as a consequence of being hit by Mr. Gill’s car.

16These offences also caused significant financial damage to Ms. Chaboyer. She had to take out loans to live off of until her settlement came in. She had extraordinary costs including the costs of wigs because her hair had been damaged, and she had to buy new clothes that she could get on and off easily because of the physical disabilities that resulted from this incident. She has had to buy special items to assist with her range of disabilities and pain.

17At only forty years of age, she is no longer able to work. She used to be a bartender and bar manager, but she cannot do that anymore and she does not know what else to do for financial reward. She reports that she used to be very good with accounting and mathematics but that her mind no longer permits those functions to work very well. She cannot sit or stand for too long. Her memory loss causes her to have difficulty having the patience to deal with people in public situations, much less in an employment capacity. Her hip surgeon has told her that she cannot work anymore.

18Finally, she feels vulnerable and at risk of being attacked because she feels that her physical circumstances have left her in a position where she is no longer able to defend and protect herself. Plainly, this incident has had an irretrievably and dramatically damaging effect on Ms. Chaboyer’s life and likely future prospects.

Circumstances of the Offender

19Mr. Gill is forty-two-years-old and comes from India. He came to Canada in 1987 and became a Canadian citizen in 1999. He has two sisters and two brothers who are in Canada, and who have been supportive of him, though they were unable to attend the sentencing hearing. He is divorced with two adult children. He is a member of the Sikh faith.

20Mr. Gill drove a cab until 2004-2005, but he was apparently the victim of an attack by a group of individuals who were convicted of assault. At that time he suffered hip and back injuries and evidently also a head injury. While there was no specific medical evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Hynes indicated that Mr. Gill has cognitive issues and may have some mental illness. He is also diabetic. Mr. Hynes suggested at the sentencing hearing that he may have a bipolar disorder or other psychological disability. There was no medical or other evidence of this but as directed later in these reasons, it should be assessed as part of the custodial sentence that I must necessarily impose upon him.

21When I asked Mr. Gill if he had anything to say for me to take into account in determining what sentence to impose upon him, it was plain that he is a simple man who had difficulty speaking in English with any sort of complex thoughts. But he did state that he was sorry for what had happened and looked towards the complainant, Ms. Chaboyer, as he expressed his remorse for what happened and the damage that had been caused to her.

Legal Parameters:

Positions of the Crown and the Defence

22Crown counsel seeks a sentence of four years and three months’ imprisonment as the global sentence to be imposed here. After pre-trial custody credit totalling two years and three months, such a sentence would require a balance of two years to be served. Given that inevitability, Crown counsel seeks a sentence of two years less a day to be followed thereafter by a period of three years’ probation. In Crown counsel’s submission, a total sentence before credit of four years and three months is fit and is the level of sentence required having regard to the serious impact these offences have caused as evidenced by the victim impact statement filed at this hearing, and also having regard to the fact that Mr. Gill was on probation at the time that he committed these offences.

23The case law relied upon by Crown counsel are the decisions in R. v. Hakmati¹, R. v. Latour², R. v. Van Puyenbroek³, R. v. Black⁴, and lastly, but also very importantly, the very recent decision of Fuerst J. of this court in R. v. Muzzo.⁵

24By way of ancillary orders, Crown counsel also seeks a five-year driving prohibition, a DNA order under section 487.04 (a) as a secondary designated offence, and that the terms of prohibition require that he keep the peace and report regularly as required to his probation officer, that he take counselling for alcoholism and provide releases to his probation officer to monitor his attendance, that he not drive or own a motor vehicle in Canada as part of the terms of his probation, and that he have no contact with a number of people involved in this matter. Further, Crown counsel requested that the terms of his probation require that he attend and complete the “Missing You” program, a day-long opportunity for drinking and driving offenders to view horrific and disturbing videotapes of the carnage that their actions cause, and the irreparable damage that results to the victims of impaired driving and their families.

25Defence counsel made submissions for a sentence of between nine and twenty-four months of incarceration in reliance on two decisions of the Ontario Court, the decisions in R. v. Mesgarha⁶, and R. v. Prevost⁷, and two decisions of this court in R. v. Ramkissoon⁸ and R. v. Morin-Leblanc.⁹

Principles of Sentencing

26Section 718 of the Criminal Code states the fundamental purposes of sentencing and lists its underlying objectives. The fundamental purpose of any sentence is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by the imposition of just and appropriate sanctions. Among the specific objectives listed in section 718 of the Criminal Code, there are several that are relevant here. They are to denounce unlawful conduct, to deter the offender and others from committing offences and to separate offenders from society where necessary. They also include rehabilitation, reparation for the harm caused to not only the victims, but also the community. Importantly, a sentence must also promote the acknowledgement by offenders of their responsibility for their actions and the harm those actions have caused to others.

27Further rules are contained in 718.1 and 718.2. The former establishes the principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the extent to which the offender is responsible for it. The latter stipulates that a sentence must be increased or decreased after taking account of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence of the offender. It also requires parity, that is, that a sentence imposed on this particular offender should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders in similar circumstances.

28In a case such as this, however, as drinking and driving offences continue to wreak enormous life-altering carnage on the highways and municipal byways of Canada, denunciation and general deterrence to others must continue to be paramount in deciding what sentence to impose, as is specific deterrence of the particular offender whose conduct of driving a vehicle while impaired must receive the strongest message of community denunciation. The sentence must convey our society’s condemnation of the conduct of the particular offender. But at its core, it is the message of general deterrence to others that must be so strongly communicated, because as Fuerst J. notes so aptly in Muzzo, unlike so many other kinds of crime, more often than not it is otherwise law-abiding citizens who commit these offences. People who would never break the law still think it is acceptable to get behind the wheel of a car when they have been drinking. So the message to those otherwise good citizens must convey a strong message of deterrence that if unheeded will result in substantial penalties of incarceration being imposed.

29Frankly, it is plain that the public is not getting the message. Notwithstanding increasing sentences that have been imposed in recent years, individuals continue to feel at liberty to get into their vehicles, potential killing machines, and drive those vehicles while they are impaired by alcohol. This is not an offence that results from happenstance circumstances. It is not an offence of passion or one caused by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. It is an offence that results from a specific conscious decision by the offender as a person who has been given the privilege of a licence to drive a motor vehicle, to get into his or her car and put the keys into the ignition when they cannot help but know that they are impaired, unless they are so impaired that they are virtually comatose.

30It is a conscious decision that puts numerous people’s lives at risk, not to mention ruining the lives of those who may be injured or damaged or killed as a result of the actions of the impaired driver. It requires the strongest judicial condemnation. Sentences must reflect the public’s total despair and outrage over the continuing proliferation of drinking and driving offences in this country and the loss of life and damage that they occasion.

Reasons

Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

31There are a number of aggravating factors present in this case:

(i) Mr. Gill made the choice to drink and drive. We do not know what circumstances preceded this incident, but plainly he made a conscious choice to put his keys in the ignition and take his vehicle out onto the roadway when he was significantly impaired by alcohol. There is no evidence that he did not know or think he was impaired, so it must be presumed he knew how intoxicated he was at that time. Nevertheless, he made the conscious choice to drive his vehicle;

(ii) His driving was plainly dangerous when measured against the test of the prudent driver, swerving in and out of lanes of traffic. I note, however, that there is no evidence here that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed;

(iii) His extreme level of impairment is a very seriously-aggravating factor. He is a big man but his measure of impairment is demonstrated by the fact that instead of providing assistance, he was so impaired that he toppled over and fell directly on top of Ms. Chaboyer, forcing her to endure that further trauma as she lay on the roadway severely injured, and as well, he displayed signs of extreme impairment while being transported to the police division;

(iv) It is aggravating that we cannot know the exact level of his alcoholic impairment. After failing the roadside screening test, and being taken to be tested using the Intoxilyzer equipment, he refused to blow. He was charged with that offence but it was withdrawn as part of the plea arrangement made between counsel. Nevertheless, that fact, even if it will not result in a conviction here is an aggravating factor. It is also aggravating in the context of him having been charged the year before with the same offence, even if, as defence counsel observes, he has not been re-arrested on that matter and the disposition of that matter is not known. Officially, however, apart from the gravamen of these offences, he does not actually have other drinking and driving offences prior to this occurrence.;

(v) While not driving or impaired driving-related, Mr. Gill’s prior criminal record, and particularly his failure to abide by orders, is aggravating since one of the charges here to which he pleaded guilty was his failure to abide by the promise he made to the Court as part of his probation, that he was on at the time of these offences, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour; and

(vi) The level of moral culpability of this offender is plainly very high, and that as well must be considered to be aggravating.

32There are no real mitigating factors here apart from Mr. Gill’s decision to plead guilty to these charges, but that is after the evidence produced against him at the preliminary inquiry, including requiring the victims of this offence to have to endure testifying at that hearing, would have left him little doubt of the strength of the Crown’s case. So while he does not get the mitigating benefit of an early plea that save the victims that trauma, at least at the preliminary hearing, he is entitled to benefit from mitigation to some extent for having saved the court resources that would otherwise have been consumed by a trial. Crown counsel claimed in his argument that Mr. Gill also showed no remorse. I do not agree with that since he plainly expressed in front of me that he was sorry and apologized for what he had done, and he looked toward Ms. Chaboyer as he expressed sorrow for the damages his actions had caused to her.

Determination of the fit sentence

33Defence counsel argues that the circumstances in the 2014 decision of Dunnet J. in Ramkissoon are similar to those here and notes that she imposed a fifteen-month jail sentence for a third-time offender. However, even though it was his third offence, there were significant mitigating factors found to be present by Dunnet J., including in particular the steps the offender had taken to address his obvious alcohol problem, and the fact that he was fully employed and that he enjoyed the support of his family. In Mesgarha, O’Donnell J. of the Ontario Court considered the appropriate range to be between nine and twenty-four months and sentenced the offender to eleven months’ imprisonment but there were significant health-related mitigating factors there and other considerations that caused the judge to impose that sentence.

34In Prevost, H.L. Fraser J. of the Ontario Court sentenced that youthful offender to three years in the penitentiary, but that was on a charge of criminal negligence causing death. Importantly there, apart from the fact that the victim died, there was only “some evidence” that the accused was impaired and the Crown needed to rely on the accused’s failure to provide a breath sample as the evidence of impairment. There is no comparable difficulty in this case. The offender here was blatantly and obviously seriously drunk. His failure to blow simply deprives the court of knowing to what egregious extent his impairment exceeded the statutory legal limit. Finally, Morin-Leblanc is presumably included to show that even there where a death resulted, which is not the case here, Mulligan J. of this Court still saw fit to impose a sentence of only four years duration.

35In my view, however, these cases provide little assistance in determining an appropriate sentence in this case, apart from indicating that dangerous driving while significantly impaired will, virtually of necessity, demand a penitentiary sentence. Individual judges make individual decisions, but I will explain in the paragraphs that follow why I find the lower level sentences, for offences claimed to be similar to these, would not be appropriate in this case.

36Before 2010, there was plainly a lighter hand being applied in the determination of sentences for impaired driving. In fact, I have found it instructive to note the increases in sentence since the last time I myself imposed a sentence for exactly the same offences as these. That was a decision in 2010 in the case of R. v. Marlon Thompson¹⁰, where I imposed sentence just after the Court of Appeal had rendered its decision on July 9, 2010 in R. v. Ramage¹¹ and after the decision in R. v. Junkert.¹²

37In Ramage, the Court of Appeal commented on the appropriate ranges of sentence for cases involving serious drinking and driving offences, such as this one. It specifically approved of the four-year penitentiary sentence and five-year driving prohibition given to Ramage, notwithstanding that it was a first-time offence in an otherwise exemplary life. That was acknowledged by both the trial and appeal judges, and attested to in the panoply of strong letters of reference received from numerous other outstanding members of the community. However, those considerations could not override the need for a strong, direct and serious message of deterrence to be conveyed.

38In Junkert, decided the same year, a severely impaired driver killed a jogger after going up on a sidewalk in a residential area, hitting a lamppost and then the victim, before returning to the roadway. A sentence of five years’ imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition was upheld on appeal.

39In Thompson, I imposed a sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the same offences at issue here, but the facts were less severe and there were mitigating factors. Sentencing is an individualized process and no two sentences are ever the same because no two crimes, while they may be similar, are ever the same. Then in even more egregious circumstances in R. v. Kummer¹³, the Court of Appeal upheld an eight-year sentence and a twelve-year driving prohibition against a first-time offender of good character with no prior criminal record although he had an unusual prior provincial careless driving conviction when he drove onto a runway after he had been drinking and failed to report it.

40The point that emerges is that the scaled up range of sentences for dangerous and impaired driving causing death that commenced in 2010 and then continued with Kummer in 2011 show that prior caselaw must now be regarded as being of more limited guidance on appropriate ranges of sentences. This is so for these offences as well, even though no death resulted here, because the plain tone of the message emanating from appellate courts is that impaired driving offences that cause either death or serious injury to persons must call for longer terms of incarceration in the interests of general and specific deterrence.

41So this leads to Muzzo. There is no question that the offences in that well-publicized case are far more serious than the offences in this case. In that case, three children and their grandfather, all from the same family, perished as a result of the collision caused by the offender. But sentences of ten years’ imprisonment concurrent, a two-year jump up from Kummer, were not the only sentences imposed there. In Muzzo, the offender was also sentenced to five years concurrent for impaired driving causing bodily harm to each of the grandmother and the great-grandmother of the same family; a point that attracts less attention than the sentences for the victims who died.

42Looked at from that perspective, the caselaw advanced by the Crown is pretty closely on point. In Hekmati¹⁴, a sentence of four years’ imprisonment and an eight-year driving prohibition was imposed in circumstances very similar to these, but against a driver who had two prior convictions but had otherwise led a good life, and whose record was considerably less weighty than that of Mr. Gill. Nevertheless, Garton J. noted there, as I concur here, that there is an upward trend in the sentencing decisions.

43The decision in Latour¹⁵ is probably the closest factually to this case and in that case a sentence of thirty-four months was imposed, but the offender had a lesser criminal record, was not on probation, and had not given an undertaking for a similar offence as the offender here did after being arrested for failing to give a sample in 2014. Certainly, Mr. Gill is a significantly worse offender because the facts show disrespect for court orders.

44Finally, Van Puyenbroek¹⁶ was given a three-year sentence on top of fifty-five days of pre-trial custody for impaired driving causing bodily harm where he insisted on driving home after a Christmas party even though he knew he was impaired and then hit two pedestrians who were walking on the shoulder of the road causing bodily harm. He was only seventeen and had no prior criminal record. That case, however, precedes the more recent judicial developments.

45Looked at against this background, and having particular regard to the sentences given by Fuerst J. in Muzzo for the two convictions of impaired driving causing bodily harm, it seems evident that a sentence in the range of three-and-a-half to five years is not at all inappropriate for these offences. The five years imposed by Fuerst J. in that case may be at the top of the range, or perhaps not. There is no specific discussion by Fuerst J. of her reasons for imposing those sentences on the lesser offences and it may be entirely a product of the overall context of the disastrous Muzzo circumstances, but I would not have found it to be excessive if the Crown had sought a sentence of that duration in this case, given the offender’s prior criminal record, his disrespect of court orders, and the severe injury caused to the victims of this accident.

46However, I accept that a lesser sentence of four years and three months’ imprisonment, combined with a five-year driving prohibition is a suitable sentence in this case. It is suitable because there are more aggravating factors present here than in the other cases cited by Crown counsel. Considering also that the five-year sentences imposed in Muzzo for impaired and dangerous driving causing bodily harm may have established a new threshold, I find that a sentence of four years and three months will permit additional safeguards to be imposed after credit for pre-sentence custody is taken into account.

47Mr. Gill is entitled to two years and three months’ credit for his pre-sentence custody calculated on a 1.5:1 basis, that is, a day-and-a-half of credit for each day spent in pre-sentence custody having regard to the conditions that are present in provincial remand facilities. That means that the balance of sentence that can be imposed on him commencing with a sentence of four years and three months is two years of imprisonment. However, a balance of sentence of two years less a day together with a five-year driving prohibition also permits me to impose the three-year term of probation on Mr. Gill that the Crown requests. The sentence sought by the Crown permits this offender to be subjected to three years of probation after serving his two-year less a day sentence, and thereby serves to provide added protection to the public by way of a continuing period of state supervision when he is released back into the community at the end of serving his custodial sentence.

48In my view, this is an entirely appropriate and fit disposition for this offender in the circumstances of this case.

Ancillary Orders:

49As a secondary designated offence, I agree with Crown counsel that a DNA order will issue under s. 487.04 (a) of the Code requiring Mr. Gill to provide a sample of his DNA to the authorities.

Final Decision

50Mr. Gill, please stand. I sentence you as follows:

(i) On count one of driving while impaired, I sentence you to serve a remaining sentence of two years’ imprisonment, less a day,

(ii) On count two of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, I sentence you to serve a sentence of two years’ imprisonment, less a day but concurrent to count one,

(iii) On count three of failing to comply with the terms of your probation order, I sentence you to serve a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment, also concurrent to counts one and two, and

(iv) On each of counts one and two, there will also be a driving prohibition registered for five years to run concurrently with counts one and two.

51In light of the concerns expressed by counsel concerning Mr. Gill’s cognitive abilities and possible cognitive impairment, I would respectfully request Corrections Officials to arrange for Mr. Gill to be assessed for any cognitive abnormalities while he is serving his custodial sentence.

52At the conclusion of your custodial sentence, you will be subject to a three-year term of probation which shall contain the following terms:

(i) Keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

(ii) Report to your probation officer as and when he or she shall determine when you report for probation or as amended thereafter by your probation officer;

(iii) Attend all counselling, specifically for alcoholism, as your probation officer shall direct, and also attend meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous as mandatory should your probation officer so direct, and you will provide all necessary releases to permit your attendance at and such sessions or meetings to be monitored by your probation officer;

(iv) You will not own a motor vehicle in Canada during the continuance of and as a term of your probation;

(v) You will have no contact with the persons whose names shall be specified by Crown counsel and recorded in the terms of your probation; and finally,

(vi) You will attend and complete the “Missing You” program at the time and place for which your attendance is arranged by your probation officer.

Michael G. Quigley J.

Footnotes

1. 1[2011] O.J. No. 3703 (S.C.J.).
2. 2[2005] O.J. No. 4341 (S.C.J.).
3. 32007 ONCA 824, [2007] O.J. No. 4689 (C.A.).
4. 4[2014] O.J. No. 2789 (S.C.J.).
5. 52016 ONSC 2068, [2016] O.J. No. 1506 (S.C.J.).
6. 62014 ONCJ 238, [2014] O.J. No. 2415 (O.C.J.).
7. 7[2014] O.J. No. 6562 (O.C.J.).
8. 82014 ONSC 1316.
9. 92014 ONSC 2056.
10. 102010 ONSC 4691, [2010] O.J. No. 3635.
11. 112010 ONCA 488.
12. 122010 ONCA 549.
13. 132011 ONCA 39.
14. 142011 ONCA 4642
15. 15R. v. Latour, above.
16. 16R. v. Van Puyenbroek, above.