CITATION: Muhammad v. 2156555 Ontario Inc., 2017 ONSC 7226
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-2402-00
DATE: 2017 11 05
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: DIL MUHAMMAD and ZUBAIDA MUHAMMAD, Plaintiffs
AND:
2156555 ONTARIO INC., 2413673 ONTARIO INC., SYED NASIR SHAH AKA NASIR SHAH AKA SYED NASIR ALI SHAH AKA SYED NASIR ALI SHAH AND WAQAS SYED, Defendants HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation, non-party
BEFORE: Trimble J.
COUNSEL: Cindy Cohen, for the Plaintiffs
2156555 Ontario Inc., in default 2413673 Ontario Inc., in default Syed Nasir Shah aka Nasir Shah aka Syed Nasir Ali Shah aka Syed Nasir Ali Shah, in person Waqas Syed, in default Victor L. Vandergust, for HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation, non-party
HEARD: September 19, 2017
ENDORSEMENT
NATURE OF MOTION
[1] HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation, the mortgagee of 2156555 Ontario Inc.’s (“2156555”) property and a stranger to this action, sold the property under Power of Sale and seeks an order removing from title:
(a) a Certificate of Pending Litigation (“CPL”) obtained without notice by Order of Barnes, J. on 15 December 2015,
(b) the Judgment of Daley, RSJ. dated 6 March, 2017.
[2] The Plaintiffs and the Defendant, Shah, oppose the mortgagee’s motion. The remaining Defendants are in default and judgment has been entered against them in Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment of 6 March, 2017.
Facts
[3] The facts are convoluted.
[4] 2156555 is the owner of Park Lot 1, Concession 4, Woodhouse, Norfolk County, Ontario, known municipally as 18 Decou Road, Simcoe, Ontario. 2156555 purchased the property on March 15, 2012. The remaining Defendants are the principals and shareholders of 2156555. The property is a vacant piece of land which 2156555 wanted to develop into a residential housing survey.
[5] On March 15, 2012, 2156555 gave a mortgage to HarbourEdge of $3 million which was registered on title.
[6] On August 22, 2012, 2156555 gave a second mortgage to two private individuals in the sum of $800,000, which was registered on title.
[7] On December 3, 2014, 2156555 gave another mortgage to HarbourEdge in the sum of $1 million which was registered on title. The existing private second mortgage was postponed to third place. Therefore, HarbourEdge had the first and second mortgages.
[8] 2156555 began to develop the property. The development did not complete. 2156555 developed financial difficulties. From these difficulties, the current disputes arose for control over the property.
[9] Both of the HarbourEdge mortgages went into default.
[10] On September 18, 2015, HarbourEdge obtained an appraisal of the property for $6,835,000.00, which was subject to some limiting conditions.
[11] On October 30, 2015, HarbourEdge issued a notice of sale on the second mortgage claiming that $1,036,943.63 was outstanding as of that date. Since that date, interest, taxes and other costs on both mortgages continue to accrue at a rate of approximately $1,445 a month, excluding legal costs.
[12] On November 20, 2015, Ashenhurst Nouwens Ltd., a contractor providing services to the property, registered a lien against the property for $151,200. Its certificate of perfection was registered on January 21, 2016.
[13] On December 15, 2015, the Plaintiffs obtained and registered their CPL.
[14] On April 13, 2016, Howlett Development and Construction Services, Ltd., another contractor providing services to the property, registered a lien for $698,974. Its certificate of perfection was registered on June 13, 2016.
[15] On April 27, 2016, HarbourEdge obtained another appraisal for the property of $3,530,000.
[16] On January 24, 2017 HarbourEdge gave to the Defendants a discharge statement for both mortgages showing the total amount owing as $5,674,533.70. Therefore, using either the April, 2016 or the January, 2017 appraisals, there was no equity remaining in the property.
[17] On February 21, 2017, HarbourEdge entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to Simtrek, a company related to one of the lien claimants, to sell the property for $5.4 million. That sale closed on March 3, 2017 at which time HarbourEdge registered a mortgage of $8,260,000. The Agreement of Purchase and Sale provided that Simtrek was to vacate all of the liens registered at the time. The Agreement of Purchase and Sale was conditional on the mortgagee removing from title the CPL and other encumbrances. It was also conditional on the mortgagor redeeming the mortgage. 2156555 never asked or attempted to redeem.
[18] During the process of the sale, HarbourEdge performed a title search and discovered that the Plaintiffs had registered a CPL on title.
[19] Unbeknownst to HarbourEdge, at some unspecified time in 2012, the Plaintiffs loaned $60,000 to 2156555 as requested by the individual named Defendants. This was supposed to be secured by a mortgage. The loan went into default and in May 2013 and the Plaintiffs became judgment creditors by obtaining judgment on their loan in the amount of $38,587.36 with costs of $1,336.60 and post judgment interest at 10%.
[20] In their Statement of Claim in this action, the Plaintiffs plead that at some point in August, 2014, the individually named Defendants proposed to the Plaintiffs two investments which, they told the Plaintiffs, would result in a profit to the Plaintiffs of $1 million. The nature of these investments is vague. It appears that the first of these proposed investments was that the Plaintiffs would act as guarantors to facilitate the Defendants receiving a second mortgage on the property of $1 million from HarbourEdge. In exchange, according to the Statement of Claim in this action, the Defendants promised to give the Plaintiffs 25% of the shares in 2156555. The second business deal was a loan which was never repaid.
[21] The Plaintiffs have produced no written agreement of the two business deals referred to in the Statement of Claim and their evidence conflicts. The Plaintiffs plead that in exchange for the guarantee on the HarbourEdge 2nd mortgage, they were to receive 25% of the shares in 2156555. In his Affidavit dated August 18, 2017 filed in opposition to the motion on notice to remove the CPL, Dil Muhammed says at paragraph 3: “As a result of a somewhat convoluted set of circumstances, we had loaned the Defendant Nasir Shah the sum of $465,000 and in exchange I was to receive a 25% share in the development project that 2156555 Ontario Inc. was undertaking at the property…” (emphasis added). The only documentary evidence of any such guarantee is that located at Exhibit H of Dil Muhammad’s February 15, 2017 Affidavit, which are guarantees in the amount of $500,000, given in security of funds advanced by 1373077 Ontario Inc. HarbourEdge is not mentioned.
[22] On May 22, 2015, the Plaintiffs sued in this action. On August 6 and November 26, 2015 the Defendants had all been noted in default. Later, Mr. Shah was successful in having the default against him set aside. He has never defended the action.
[23] On December 15, 2015, the CPL was obtained from Barnes, ex parte. It was ex parte because, the Plaintiffs say, they were concerned about 2156555’s assets fleeing the jurisdiction, and because the Defendants were all noted in default. The CPL is registered on January 7, 2016.
[24] On December 10, 2016, HarbourEdge brought its motion to discharge the CPL. Because of crowded motions list, the motion was put over to March 10, 2017. On March 10, it was scheduled for a long hearing date before me in August. I adjourned it to myself on September 19, 2017 and timetabled the remaining steps in the motion. In the intervening time, there was a great deal of correspondence between the solicitors, with HarbourEdge taking the position that since there was no equity left in the property, the CPL had no interest to secure against. The Plaintiffs said that they were trying to sell the property and had, at various times, serious offers.
[25] On March 3, 2017, HarbourEdge’s sale to Simtrek completed. The sale was registered that day but the parties to the action were not notified of the sale and its registration until after the close of business.
[26] In reaction to HarbourEdge’s completion of its sale, the parties settled their action, and obtained a consent Judgment from Daley, RSJ. on March 6, 2017. That Judgement provided, among other things, that the Judgment should be registered on the title. It ordered that the land registrar shall not discharge the certificate of pending litigation without further order or on consent of the parties. The Judgment contained a declaration in rem that the Plaintiffs had an equitable interest in the property. HarbourEdge was not notified of the hearing. It was not served with any material for that hearing. It did not consent to the order or its terms.
Issues and Result:
[27] The three issues which arise on this motion are:
Should the CPL be discharged from title?
Should the March 6, 2017 Judgment of Daley, RSJ. be discharged from title?
What effect, if any, does the Plaintiffs’ new action against Simtrek and HarbourEdge for improvident sale, have on the first two issues?
[28] There is a preliminary question that underlies questions 1 and 2; namely, when a mortgage is in default, what interest does the mortgagor of the property/Defendant have which can be secured either by the CPL or Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment?
[29] For reasons set out below, the CPL and Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment must be removed from title and the register page rectified to reflect this. The Plaintiffs’ new action for improvident settlement does not affect this outcome.
The Positions of the Parties
HarbourEdge
[30] HarbourEdge says that CPL should be removed for two reasons. First, it was improperly issued. The cause of action that the Plaintiffs advance in their Statement of Claim in this action sounds in debt, and is for damages alone. While the Statement of Claim seeks a CPL, the only relief claimed in the action is damages. It does not advance any claim that it acquired a right in title to the property. The Plaintiffs claim only that it received 25% of the shares in 2156555 and was owed approximately $500,000.
[31] Second, HarbourEdge says that the CPL attaches to or secures nothing. At the time that HarbourEdge’s sale to Simtrek completed on March 3, 2017, 2156555 had no equity in the property. The debt under HarbourEdge’s two mortgages exceeded the value of the property. Therefore, absent any equity or value in excess of the amount owing under the mortgages at the time that the sale completed, the only interest 2156555 had in the property to which the CPL might attach was the equity of redemption. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants indicated that they wanted to redeem the mortgage.
[32] With respect to Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment, HarbourEdge makes a similar argument. In addition, HarbourEdge says that Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment was a consent order. It is a contract only between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. HarbourEdge was not made aware of the settlement nor was it invited to participate in a consent motion before Daley, RSJ. Therefore even though the Judgment contains a declaration in rem that the Plaintiffs have an interest in the land, it does not bind HarbourEdge.
The Plaintiffs
[33] The Plaintiffs say that they were unaware that the HarbourEdge mortgages were in default or that there were power of sale proceedings in process until they were served with HarbourEdge’s motion record to discharge the CPL.
[34] The Plaintiffs concede that any interest that they may have in the land to which the CPL may attach or Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment might secure, is no greater than that that the Defendants may have at the time that HarbourEdge’s sale completed on March 3, 2017. The Plaintiffs say, however, that the CPL and Daley, RSJ.’s Judgement should remain in place because HarbourEdge entered into an improvident sale of the property, depriving them of equity or value in the property in excess of the amounts owing under the mortgage. They say that in February 7, 2017 HarbourEdge told them that it had a sale under the mortgage for $5.4 million. The Plaintiffs told HarbourEdge that they too had a sale, but for $6.75 million, which would not close until after HarbourEdge’s. That sale did not complete as HarbourEdge refused to postpone its sale to allow the Plaintiffs’ sale to complete. On March 9, 2017, the Plaintiffs received an offer to purchase for $7.2 million.
[35] The Plaintiffs say that they thought their CPL would have stopped the HarbourEdge sale.
[36] With respect to Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment, it contains a declaration in rem that the Plaintiffs have an equitable interest in the land.
[37] The Plaintiffs’ claim of improvident sale is more than puffery, say the Plaintiffs. They have commenced an action against HarbourEdge and Simtrek, Brampton action number CV-17-3862-00. In that Statement of Claim they allege that the mortgagee entered into an improvident sale at a time when it knew the Plaintiffs or Defendants had a better sale, and that the value of the property was well in excess of the $5.4 million for which HarbourEdge sold it. The Plaintiffs argue that it is not fair to set aside the CPL or Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment because HarbourEdge had told them that they could not complete the sale to Simtrek while the CPL remained on the property. Notwithstanding this, HarbourEdge completed the sale. The Plaintiffs, however, do not plead estoppel, or any reliance right or interest. They say, instead, that HarbourEdge’s power of sale was unfair.
[38] The Plaintiffs say that, based on all of the evidence, the CPL and Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment should remain on title. There is an arguable case that the sale was improvident for, among others, the following reasons:
• 2156555 had one accepted offer before HarbourEdge’s sale completed, and one offer far in excess of HarbourEdge’s agreement that came in afterward;
• HarbourEdge sold to a related company to one of the lienholders;
• The lien claims were settled and removed from title but no disclosure has been made about those settlements; and
• HarbourEdge registered a mortgage of over $8 million on the property, when its practice was to lend to 68% of value.
[39] The facts show, prima facie, that the mortgagee’s sale was “shady”, according to the Plaintiffs’ oral submission. The facts indicate that HarbourEdge knew that the appraisal on which it based its sale was inadequate.
Mr. Shah
[40] The Defendant, Syed Nasir Shah filed no material. I allowed him to make oral submissions. He indicated that he had at least one deal and one offer more favourable than the one that the mortgagee accepted. It would have closed two weeks after the mortgagee’s sale.
Analysis:
[41] The parties agree to the following:
The test with respect to the discharge of the CPL is the same as the test for granting the CPL. The CPL claimant must establish that a triable issue exists between the parties which gives the claimant an interest in the land against which the CPL will attach.
The Plaintiffs can only attach such interest in the land that the Defendants have, and any interest that they have is subject to interests previously registered on title. They can have no greater interest in the land than the interests of any of the Defendants, individually or collectively, at the time of the sale under power of sale.
What Interest does the Defendant, 2156555 Ontario Ltd. have in the Property at the Closing of HarbourEdge’s Sale to Simtrek on March 3, 2017?
[42] The CPL and Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment must be removed from title. I say this based on basic real estate and mortgage principles.
[43] The only asset or interest in the land that the Defendants had at the time of the power of sale, to which the CPL or Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment could attach, was the equity of redemption.
[44] At common law, when a mortgagor gives a mortgage to a mortgagee, the fee simple is transferred to the mortgagee. What remains in the mortgagor’s hands is the equity of redemption. In other words, the mortgagor can redeem the mortgage and recover the fee simple by paying out the mortgage at the end of its term or at another time in accordance with the mortgage’s terms or the applicable legislation. See: Greed v. National Trust (2003), 11 R.P.R. (4th) 108 (Ont. S.C.J.), Anger and Honsberger, Canadian law of Real Property, 1959, page 968; and McConnell et al., Ontario Real Estate Law Guide, CCH Canada Ltd, 2006, page 2255.
[45] The mortgagor’s equity of redemption, prior to the end of the mortgage term, is triggered by the mortgagee serving a notice of sale indicating that the mortgagee intends to resort to the security on the property. The equity of redemption is extinguished after the mortgagee has completed a sale under power of sale as the mortgagee no longer has any interest in the mortgaged property. See: Municipal Savings & Loan Corp. v. Wilson (1981), 1981 2979 (ON CA), 20 R.P.R. 188 (Ont. C.A.); 665456 Ontario Ltd. v. Barelan Management Inc. (1990), 1990 6907 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.). The mortgagee may still pursue the mortgagor or any guarantors of the mortgage for any deficiency between the net sale proceeds and the amount owed under the mortgage. A mortgagee is under no obligation to allow the mortgagor to pay the arrears and put the mortgage back into good stead. The mortgagee is entitled to insist that the mortgagor pay full payment under the mortgage once the mortgagor defaults. See: Mortgages Act, section 22(1)(a).
[46] More specifically, under section 22(1)(a) of the Mortgages Act, the equity of redemption ends when the mortgagee has entered into a bona fide agreement of purchase and sale, and the date for the redemption specified in the notice of sale has passed. A completed Agreement of Purchase and Sale is not necessary for the equity of redemption to end. See: Logozzo v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, (1999) 1999 9313 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.), at para. 74. The sale may not extinguish the equity of redemption where the person claiming the right to redeem can demonstrate that the sale was fraudulent or improper. See: Hal Wright Motor Sales Ltd. v. Industrial Development Bank, (1975) 1975 712 (ON SC), 8 O.R. (2d) 76 (Dist. Ct.) at para. 39.
[47] Any prior encumbrances are not affected by the power of sale. The new owner who purchases the property under the power of sale acquires good title to the property subject only to prior encumbrances so long as the mortgage sale was completed in compliance with the Mortgages Act and all proper parties are served with the notice of sale. All subsequent mortgages and encumbrances lose their interest in the mortgaged property as a result of the exercise of the power of sale of a mortgagee in higher priority. The mortgagor may have a claim against the mortgagee for any improvident sale of the mortgaged property and an accounting for any surplus sale proceeds. See: 37th Bar Admission Course materials, phase 3, Enforcement of Mortgages, page 2 – 49, title 2.14 “The Results Of The Power Of Sale”.
The CPL Should be Discharged and Removed from Title
[48] In this case, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants challenge the validity of HarbourEdge’s mortgages, that they were in default, or validity of the notice of sale. They do not challenge that HarbourEdge was in the position to and entitled to sell the property. The only claim that they advance is that HarbourEdge’s sale was “unfair” and that it sold the property improvidently.
[49] Therefore, for the following reasons, the CPL must be discharged:
- In the absence of fraud that affects the mortgagor’s right to redeem, a mortgagor may not obtain a CPL to stop a power of sale, without having first offered to redeem the mortgage. See Lawrence Avenue Group Ltd. v. Innocan Realty Inc., (1999), 1999 14793 (ON SC), 44 O.R. (3d) 155; [1999] O.J. No. 1213, 1999 14793 (ON SC), at p. 4, leave to appeal to Div. Ct. dismissed, [1999] O.J. No. 2892. In Lawrence Avenue, the Plaintiffs allege that by reason of the Defendant mortgagees’ wrongful conduct, they paid too much for the mortgages. The Court held that the Plaintiffs had no interest in the land. The claim advanced was essentially a claim for damages. The Defendant held a valid mortgage, and the Plaintiffs defaulted in the mortgage.
In this case, the Plaintiffs are creditors to the Defendants and have no higher interest in the land than the Defendants. This case is analogous to Lawrence Avenue, supra. Absent any fraud that affects the Defendant’s right to redeem, and absent a demand to redeem the mortgage, the Defendant mortgagor had no right to obtain a CPL. The Plaintiffs, as creditors as alleged in its Statement of Claim, or judgment creditor under Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment, have no greater interest in the property than the Defendants;
The Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendants do not alter HarbourEdge’s priority. Even if the Plaintiffs had completed their assessment of damages, obtained judgment against all of the Defendants, and filed executions, their interest is subject to HarbourEdge’s priority. Any interest in the property that underlay the CPL would have been extinguished by the notice of sale and subsequent sale. Under the Rules, however, once a CPL has been registered, it can be deleted only by court order. Therefore, even though the CPL cannot be removed, without an order (absent consent), the obligation which underlies the CPL is extinguished on completion of the power of sale process. Therefore, the CPL must be discharged;
The Plaintiffs in this case are judgment creditors against the Defendants. In the Statement of Claim in this action, they claim only damages. The Defendants agree that they all owe approximately $500,000 to the Plaintiffs. The claim advanced by the Plaintiffs is an action on a debt. The Plaintiffs plead that in exchange for their guarantying the second mortgage, they would acquire 25% interest in the company. As Plaintiffs in an action on a debt, or as judgement creditors in that action, they have no greater interest in the land than the Defendants. See: Central Guaranty Trust Company v. The City of Sudbury, (1992), 1992 7547 (ON SC), 8 O.R. (3d) 565. Even if the Plaintiffs assumed all of the Defendants’ mortgagor’s interest in the land (by assignment, for example), their interest would be the equity of redemption, and neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants sought to redeem the HarbourEdge mortgages;
The CPL is not the correct remedy. The Affidavit in support of the original CPL says, in essence, that the CPL is necessary because the Defendants are dissipating their assets, there was a substantial likelihood that there would be no assets to satisfy any judgment. The Plaintiffs really wanted Mareva injunction, the test for which is different than a CPL. The CPL was not the appropriate remedy; and
Even if I assume that the Plaintiffs had filed writs, those writs only attach to the debtor’s interest in the land, not to the mortgagee’s. The mortgagee does not have to serve any execution creditors who have filed writs after the notice of sale has been given. See section 31 (2) of the Mortgages Act, and Bennett on Power of Sale, 4th edition, pages 60 to 62. In this case, any interest that the Plaintiffs may have by way of their CPL or the Judgment of Daley, RSJ. was acquired after the notice of sale was issued. Therefore, the mortgagee had no obligation to notify the Plaintiffs of the sale.
Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment Should be Removed from Title
[50] For the same reasons that the CPL should be removed from title so too should Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment. In addition, Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment does not bind HarbourEdge. Notwithstanding that the Judgment contains a statement in rem that the Plaintiffs have an interest in the land, Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment was not reached after an adjudication of the issues on the merits. The learned Justice’s Judgment is a consent Judgment arising from a term of settlement. Therefore, the Judgment is a contract. HarbourEdge was not a party to the contract and is not bound by it.
The Action for Improvident Sale has no Effect on Removing the CPL and Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment
[51] The Plaintiffs say that both the CPL and the Judgment should remain in place based on their separate and recently issued Statement of Claim for improvident settlement. The Plaintiffs say that the facts as set out in that Statement of Claim create the arguable case that the sale was improvident. HarbourEdge sold the property to a company related to one of the lien claimants. HarbourEdge settled the liens for undisclosed terms. It registered a mortgage well in excess of either of the two appraisals that it had in respect of the property. It told the Plaintiffs, originally, that it could not complete the sale so long as the two clouds remained on title. Notwithstanding this statement HarbourEdge sold the property to Simtrek. HarbourEdge proceeded with its power of sale notwithstanding that it knew that the Plaintiffs and/or the Defendants had a sale which would have completed only a few weeks after HarbourEdge’s sale, for a sum substantially greater than that in HarbourEdge’s sale. Therefore, the CPL must remain on title to protect the Plaintiffs.
[52] I disagree for the following reasons:
The CPL that the Plaintiffs seek to protect was issued in this action. It is inappropriate to maintain a CPL in this action, based on a pleading in a different action;
The cause of action of improvident sale cannot sustain the CPL. The cause of action of improvident sale, itself, assumes that a sale has been completed. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to maintain the CPL; and
In the prayer for relief in their improvident sale action, the Plaintiffs ask for an order setting aside the sale. All of the other paragraphs in the Statement of Claim, however, relate to improvident sale. The Statement of Claim does not plead that HarbourEdge’s sale was fraudulent. There is no allegation, for example, that Simtrek was anything other than a bona fide purchaser for value.
In Bank of Montréal v. Ewing, 1982 3342, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 382 (Div. Ct.) the court held that a CPL claimant need not assert for himself an interest in the land. Rather, it was sufficient if the title to or interest in land is brought into question. In other words, there is a triable issue that claimant has an interest in the land.
In the improvident sale action, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant, Shah have raised a triable issue as to whether the Plaintiffs have an interest in the land. Any finding of improvident sale is a cause of action in negligence, or breach of fiduciary or other obligation arising from the mortgage. The remedy for the breach is damages, not setting aside the transfer. In other words, where the sale is improvident, unless there is fraud or the transaction is a reviewable transaction under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act or Preferences Act such that the purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser for value, the mortgagor’s action is for damages. A CPL is not appropriate; and
- For the same reasons, the removal of Daley, RSJ.’s Judgment from title is also not affected by the improvident sale action.
Costs
[53] Unless the parties agree on costs, I will address them in writing. Submissions will be limited to three double spaced pages, excluding bills of costs and other material. HarbourEdge’s are to be served and filed by 4 p.m., December 21, 2017 and the Plaintiffs’ and Mr. Shah’s by 4 p.m., January 12, 2018.
Trimble J.
Date: December 5, 2017
CITATION: Muhammad v. 2156555 Ontario Inc., 2017 ONSC 7226
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-2402-00
DATE: 2017 11 05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
RE: DIL MUHAMMAD and ZUBAIDA MUHAMMAD, Plaintiffs
AND:
2156555 ONTARIO INC., 2413673 ONTARIO INC., SYED NASIR SHAH AKA NASIR SHAH AKA SYED NASIR ALI SHAH AKA SYED NASIR ALI SHAH AND WAQAS SYED, Defendants HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation, non party
COUNSEL: Cindy Cohen, for the Plaintiffs 2156555 Ontario Inc., in default 2413673 Ontario Inc., in default Syed Nasir Shah aka Nasir Shah aka Syed Nasir Ali Shah aka Syed Nasir Ali Shah, in person Waqas Syed, in default Victor L. Vandergust, for HarbourEdge Mortgage Investment Corporation, non-party
ENDORSEMENT
Trimble J.
Released: December 5, 2017