Monk v. Monk, 2017 ONSC 717

Monk v. Monk, 2017 ONSC 717

CITATION: Monk v. Monk, 2017 ONSC 717

COURT FILE NO.: 041-15

DATE: 20170209

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Jeffery Alfred Monk

Applicant

– and –

Sylvie Lucie Marie Monk

Respondent

Mark A. Shields, for the applicant

William R. Clayton, for the respondent

HEARD: November 14 to 18, 2016 and December 13, 2016

hockin j.

1This is a proceeding which was commenced under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 for a divorce and a custody order under s. 16 of the Act. The applicant, Jeffrey Alfred Monk seeks a joint custody order. The respondent, Sylvie Lucie Marie Monk seeks sole custody, spousal and child support and an equalization of the net family property in her favour.

2The parties commenced living together in 2000, married August 19, 2006 and separated November 23, 2014.

3There is one child of the marriage, Ashley Marie Monk, born April 2, 2008.

4Today, Mr. Monk is 44 years of age, Mrs. Monk, 45 years of age and Ashley, will soon be 9 years of age.

5From November 23, 2014 to May 3, 2015, Mr. and Ms. Monk lived separately in the matrimonial home at 222 Brentwood Crescent in the village of Belmont. On May 3, 2015, Mrs. Monk left the home and, in time, moved to an apartment in Belmont.

6Belmont is located equidistant from London and St. Thomas. Mrs. Monk’s employment is in London and Mr. Monk carries on a small business in St. Thomas.

7On May 19, 2015 or two weeks after Ms. Monk left the matrimonial home, the parties entered into a shared custody arrangement, by consent order, on a without prejudice basis of one week on, one week off. This is the order of Madam Justice Gorman. The order provided for the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. The Children’s Lawyer assigned the matter to a clinical investigator on August 31, 2015 for the purpose of preparing a report under s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The nominated investigator was Ms. Julie Smith. Ms. Smith gave evidence at the trial and her report was filed. It is part of the trial record, tab 12.

8Mr. and Mrs. Monk and Ashley have carried on their lives under the custody regime defined by Madam Justice Gorman’s order for just shy of two years.

9Mr. Monk until 2009 was employed by Freightliner at factory wages, annually $50,000 to $60,000. In 2009, Freightliner closed. He purchased from Canada Bread a franchise to supply its bread products to retail grocers in the St. Thomas area. At this point Ashley was 14 months old. Mrs. Monk, for a year after her birth in April, 2008, was at home with Ashley on maternity leave, but in 2009 and at all times since, she has been employed in the office at Royal Containers, a firm located in south London. Mr. Monk’s work schedule at Canada Bread was a punishing one. Twelve to fourteen hour days and the weekends. The marriage suffered. To make ends meet, Mr. Monk worked too hard and the double burden on Ms. Monk from her employment and care of Ashely was significant. Mr. and Mrs. Monk carried on with this routine with local day care and the great and reliable assistance of Mr. Monk’s mother, Sue Monk. She lived with her husband, Ken Monk a short drive away. Sue Monk had retired and was happy to help.

10Mr. Monk sold the Canada Bread franchise and purchased in August, 2011, another franchise, Bath Master. Bath Master is an American firm which supplies to its franchisees bathtubs and cupboards for sale at a modest price for the renovation of bathrooms. The motivation to sell Canada Bread and start up with Bath Master was twofold: shorter hours and time at home and an income. Mr. Monk, at the time of trial, was still involved with Bath Master. It has produced a reasonable income and his intention is to carry on with the business. Mr. Monk through his company, JSAM Inc. has paid himself a modest wage. An issue in this case, is whether any portion of JSAM’s profit should be added as “income” to his T1, line 150 income.

11In any event, the switch from Canada Bread to Bath Master, although it left Mr. Monk with more time for Mrs. Monk and Ashley, the marriage stumbled and then ended in November 2014.

12There was an attempt at counselling but Mrs. Monk chose not to continue after a session each with a counsellor.

13On March 2, 2015, this proceeding was commenced. At the time, Mr. and Mrs. Monk separately cared for Ashley on an alternating, daily basis. Daycare was required since both worked.

14In the case of Mr. Monk, he was assisted by his mother.

15This arrangement became emotionally difficult for both and on May 3, 2015, Mrs. Monk, on her day without Ashley, said something to Mr. Monk, in the presence of Ashley which she regretted. The police were called and on their advice, Mr. Monk with Ashley spent the night with his parents. Mrs. Monk, once alone, caused damage to a number of Mr. Monk’s belongings and their large television was destroyed. When Mr. Monk returned the following morning, he called the police back when this was discovered. Mrs. Monk was charged with domestic mischief under the Criminal Code and taken to the police station. She was released on her recognizance with the condition that she not communicate with Mr. Monk. On September 22, 2015, she entered in to a peace bond which permitted communication with Mr. Monk by text or email and the charge was withdrawn.

16This behaviour by Mrs. Monk was regrettable, but it was out of character and understandable in the anxious circumstance she and Mr. Monk found themselves after the proceeding was commenced; they were engaged in a contest over the custody of their child but still under the same roof. I am instructed by s. 16(9) of the Divorce Act.

17Parenting capacity is not an issue. Mr. and Mrs. Monk agree that despite their difficulties they have always acted in the best interests of Ashley. They are devoted and capable parents who love her greatly. Neither parent has disentitled himself or herself to custody on the basis of his or her inability to act as a custodial parent. Mr. and Mrs. Monk were generous in their praise for each other’s love and affection for Ashley.

18The question is whether in taking into account “only the best interests” of Ashley the result for her should be sole custody to Mrs. Monk or a joint custody order under s. 16(4) of the Divorce Act. In arriving at a conclusion for Ashley, I am bound to take into account the “means, needs and other circumstances of the child” and may be guided by the statutory criteria set out in s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.

19The plan proposed by Mrs. Monk is, in its important aspects as follows:

1. sole custody;

2. access every other weekend and each Wednesday from the end of the school day to 8:00 pm; and

3. important decisions about Ashley’s welfare to Mrs. Monk, including education, health, recreational activities and religious activity.

20This is a grant to Mrs. Monk for full parental control for the care, upbringing and education of Ashley. No means to communicate on decisions is suggested.

21The plan proposed by Mr. Monk, in its important aspects, is as follows:

1. Joint shared custody of Ashley, alternate weeks;

2. Mrs. Monk to exercise parental responsibility on matters of religion and medical care;

3. Mr. Monk to exercise parental control over her dental care;

4. They shall make decisions with respect to Ashley’s education jointly. In the event of disagreement, the decision will follow the school’s recommendation; and

5. On matters of importance, the software program, Our Family Wizard to be used to communicate (texts and emails).

22The two plans are, it seems to me, guided by the different views of Mr. and Mrs. Monk with respect to what each considers the circumstances and needs of Ashley to be and what each believes is “maximum contact” for the other in the best interests of their child.

23The evidence of Mrs. Monk included the following on the issue of joint custody:

1. There is no aspect of the order of Madam Justice Gorman which has been useful or beneficial; she “hates it” she indicated in cross-examination.

2. Sole custody to her is the correct result because she was always Ashley’s primary care giver. The recommendation of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer of joint custody is unacceptable.

3. Mr. Monk is involved in a new relationship and Ashley, on her week with Mr. Monk, is with his friend and her family from time to time. Mrs. Monk indicated that she has received notes from Ashley that she “hates this”. Mrs. Monk has instructed Ashley not to mention Mr. Monk’s friend’s name when they are together. Ashley need not be with Mr. Monk because “now he has his own family”.

4. Communication with Mr. Monk is difficult. Her evidence was that “no communication is better for me because he abused me”.

5. On a number of occasions, Mrs. Monk decided against cooperation with Mr. Monk. As follows:

(a) Mother’s Day, 2015 fell between the day she was charged and the order of Gorman J. Mr. Monk offered Mrs. Monk most of the day with Ashley if a note promising her return was signed. The offer was refused. Mrs. Monk explained the note included an acknowledgement that sole custody was to be with Mr. Monk.

(b) She was represented by counsel at the time and in any event, I find that the only condition was that Ashley be returned. Other offers for access before the order of Madam Justice Gorman were made but refused.

(c) She chose to withdraw from joining with Mr. Monk in the organization of Ashley’s orthodontic treatment, when Mr. Monk agreed to pay half the expense.

(d) The Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommended communication by text or email by using the Family Wizard program. She was reluctant and if it was used was given to the use of provocative and insulting language on ordinary matters which required discussion. Some of the emails were offered in evidence. They are exhibits 24 to 34.

(e) A list of Mrs. Monk’s belongings, left behind after May 4, 2015, was prepared and an offer was made by Mr. Monk to her that she could return to pick them up at her convenience. The offer was not accepted and her belongings remain at the matrimonial home. She thought if she accepted that Mr. Monk would report her for breach of her recognizance.

(f) Ashley is an active sports minded youngster but participation by her in soccer, baseball and hockey requires cooperation by her parents. Mr. Monk has influenced Ashley’s decisions and if left to her own, she would not have participated, at least to the extent she has.

(g) Mrs. Monk refused to deliver to Mr. Monk Ashley’s passport for a trip to the United States. The reason offered was that Mr. Monk had denied her access from May 4, 2015 to May 19, 2015 and “I was not prepared to allow this, how did I know he would not come back with her. I was worried he would run away with her”. This excuse is rejected. Access was offered and I do not accept the suggestion Mr. Monk would not return Ashley.

(h) Despite these difficulties, Mrs. Monk described Ashley in glowing terms: “She has an old soul for her age. She is intelligent. She knows what is going on. She is a delight to me. She is my life. She loves both of us.”

24The evidence of Mr. Monk can be summarized briefly. He is in favour of the joint custody/parenting arrangement which has been in place since May 19, 2015. It has worked well and Ashley has done well in school and at home. Her performance at school, as described, is confirmed by her report cards. She is clever and well behaved. There is no area of academic weakness. Mr. Monk described an athletic child who enjoys team sports. This is an optimistic picture which he attributes without qualification or criticism to the care and attention Ashley receives from her mother. His parents, particularly his mother, continue their love for Ashley. They are always ready to help when asked. He asks that the exchanges be changed to Friday to Friday to avoid problems of the long weekends and special occasions. The effect of his evidence was that “we both have a lot to offer and Ashley enjoys spending time with both us”. He favours what has been in place from May 19, 2015 to the present and, of course, agrees with the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

25I am satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence in this case supports the conclusion that joint custody is in the best interests of Ashley. I arrive at this conclusion for these reasons:

1. Ashley’s views and preferences

26I have the benefit of a comprehensive report with recommendations from the Children’s Lawyer after an investigation under s. 112(1) of the Courts of Justice Act. The investigation and author of the report, Ms. Julie Smith, interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Monk, Ashley and a number of others. She has a strong academic background and practical experience. She was cross-examined by experienced counsel. She was, I thought, impartial and fair. From her report and from the witness box, it was clear that she was impressed by the relative maturity and clarity of thought of Ashley.

27She watched Ashley with her mother and father. In the case of Mr. Monk, this was her impression, from p. 13 of her report:

It was observed that Mr. Monk is caring towards Ashley and is in tune with her needs. It was observed that a close bond exists between Mr. Monk and Ashley. Ashley was observed to laugh, joke and smile with her father. She was also affectionate with him. There were no concerns observed during the home visit. Mr. Monk was hands on in his play with Ashley and appeared to enjoy doing activities with his daughter and engaging with her. Ashley appeared comfortable with Mr. Monk.

28In the case of Mrs. Monk, this was her impression from p. 15 of the report:

Overall parent/child interactions were observed to be positive, child focused and developmentally appropriate. Mrs. Monk presents as a caring mother in her interactions with Ashley and she is also in tune with Ashley’s needs. She appeared to enjoy interacting with Ashley. Ashley was observed to be clam, happy and relaxed in her care. Ashley was affectionate with her mother, and this was reciprocated. The visits were positive regarding the quality of parent/child interactions.

29From Ms. Smith’s time alone with Ashley, these views of Ashley, again from p. 15 of the report:

• Ashley reported that her parents don’t fight now because they live in two different houses.

• Ashley was not able to describe her feelings for when her mother and father separated, and her mother no longer lived at home.

• Ashley reported that she likes hanging out with her mother and likes doing all sorts of things with her.

• She stated that she likes going shopping with Elma (father’s friend), her son and her father. She said she likes going to places to have fun with her dad.

• She reported that she is mostly always happy.

30At p. 16 of the report:

• Ashley said she liked her visits at her mother and father’s. She said she didn’t want anything different about the visits.

• Ashley said that she liked spending one week with her father and one week with her mother.

31And finally, there is this summary by Ms. Smith on Ashley’s preference, at p. 17 of the report:

During the three private interviews with Ashley, she expressed that she did not want to change anything about the current visit schedule of the week on and week off with her parents. She reported that she enjoyed her time with both her parents.

Ashley is very much aware of the conflict between her parents. Ashley reported that her parents don’t live together because they were always fighting. She said her parents don’t fight now because they live in two different houses. She reported that she is mostly happy. She stated that it would make it better for her if her mother and father could talk more, be friends again, and then live together.

She said that when she is with her father, she misses her mother. When she is with her mother, she misses her father. She stated that both her parents are really happy now that they are not together. She said that they are always nice to her. Ashley said that she never really gets in trouble at either her mother or father’s house. Ashley is acutely aware of her parents’ animosity towards one another and stated that her parents don’t talk to each other unless they are in a courtroom with their lawyers.

32Ashley is still young. Her views and preferences I do not consider to be of central importance but they are important. They are an important forecast of her psychological and emotional reaction to a sole custody order. Ashley is an intelligent child and was able to communicate in an unambiguous way what she hopes the result will be not only for her but the peace of mind of her father and mother. In my view, she has told us how her needs for order and happiness may be met.

2. Recommendations of the Children’s Lawyer

33Ms. Smith’s recommendation is that custody of Ashley be joint custody with well-defined areas of responsibility for decision-making. Her reasons for a joint order and not sole custody are set out at p. 21 of her report as follows:

When looking at joint versus sole custody, one parent would see this as “winning” over the other should there be sole custody. There is a risk to the child, as the parent with sole custody will likely marginalize the other parent’s role in the child’s life. Both parents are emotionally charged and neither parent can be trusted at this time with the power of sole custody.

Even if one parent was awarded sole custody, there is still the expectation that communication would still need to occur to inform the other parent. Both parents will need to resolve their communication issues about the child, for the child’s best interest. If only one parent had sole custody of the child, it would likely amplify the current conflict, distrust and lead to further risk of emotional harm to the child as the non-custodial parent would likely try to prove the other parent unfit. Outside of their conflict, both parents are doing well as parents. Ashley deserves to have both of her parents equally involved in her life, as they would have been, should they not have separated.

Joint parallel custody would help remedy the current situation with both parents having a say in the child’s life. Conflict will be minimized with clear roles and responsibilities regarding domains in the child’s life, which will be impressed upon both parents. The lines for communication and decision-making will be clearly drawn out to minimize conflict and misunderstanding.

Joint parallel custody will neutralize the essence of this conflict. Each parent will have an area of final say with the child. By having specific and detailed recommendations regarding all aspects of the child’s life, this will build a firewall between the mother and father, and give the opportunity for Ashley to love her parents equally and to be a child. Should these parents be unable to resolve this matter, Ashley will continue to be at risk of emotional harm due to her parents’ conflict, and will continue to have involvement with police and child welfare services in the future.

The recommendation is for Ashley to continue to spend equal time with both her parents alternating weeks. Ms. Morris, the director at Ashley’s before and after school program identified that Ashley does not have problems with transitions. She reported that Ashley is not fearful or anxious when going with either parent and knows whose time it is and knows who is picking her up. Ashley is comfortable with this routine. Ashley was also clear in all three private interviews that she did not want any change to the current access schedule. She enjoys her time with both her parents. What Ashley did express is a need for her parents to be able to communicate without conflict. She deserves to not feel that she has to make a choice between parents.

34She described Ashley as “intelligent, articulate, quiet but friendly and on the ball”. She loves both parents and expressed in no uncertain terms that the joint custody and parenting arrangement established is May 2015, should continue without change.

3. Length of time Ashley has lived under the May 15, 2015 order

35Section 24(2)(c) of the Children’s Law Reform Act mandates that the length of time the child has enjoyed a stable environment is to be taken into account. Based on the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Monk and Ashley, I find that Ashley has lived in a stable home environment, albeit in two locations for now twenty months. There is no evidence which suggests this arrangement has not created a stable, gentle environment for her. This should continue. There is no evidence that her move from one home to the other has been disruptive. They are a walk away.

4. Academic performance, extra-curricular activity

36Ashley’s grades have been consistently high and she has enjoyed a full schedule of athletics. This points to a well-rounded character. It is a measure of the success of the May 15, 2015 order. It is a good measure of the ability of Mr. and Mrs. Monk to cooperate on matters of importance to Ashley.

5. Maximum Contact and Animus

37In making an order for custody under the Divorce Act, the court is obliged to give effect through its order to the principle that the child or children of the marriage should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. This is s. 16(10) of the Act.

38Mrs. Monk by her actions and words and by her demeanour in the witness box conveyed an animus to Mr. Monk which convinces me that in the event sole custody of Ashley was with her that access for Mr. Monk would be fraught with disappointment and anxiety for Ashley. Mrs. Monk is still driven by her view of the marriage and its unfortunate end May 4, 2015. Her peculiar approach to Ashley’s orthodontic care, her concern over Mr. Monk’s partner, the vitriol reflected in her Family Wizard and emails and the anger in her voice from the witness box point to this. Access, in my view, would become a source of dread for Ashley. Mrs. Monk’s inclination would be to limit access. This stands in the way of “maximum contact” and the best interests of Ashley.

39On this aspect of this case, I am instructed by the following cases: Berry v. Berry, 2011 ONCA 705 (C.A.), Folahan v. Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966, [2013] O.J. No. 2450 (Sup. Ct.), all well summarized by Vogelsang J. in Basley v. Basley, 2016 ONSC 5877 (Sup. Ct.) and Habel v. Hageforn, 2005 ONCJ 242, 2005 Carswell Ont. 3863, para. 4, a decision of Madam Justice McSorley.

40For these reasons, I have come to the conclusion that it is in Ashley’s best interests to continue in the joint custody of Mr. and Mrs. Monk and share time equally with them.

41The form of the order will be that delivered by Mr. Shields on Mr. Monk’s behalf. The decision making on important matters is shared, which is as it ought to be. Paragraphs 5 and 6 reflect the importance of education and the parties’ joint responsibility. The solution to where there is disagreement is reasonable. The use of Our Family Wizard may be initially difficult for Mrs. Monk but should improve communication over time. On the exchanges, the Friday to Friday proposal as well seems reasonable. All other aspects to the draft order appear to be in accordance with family law convention. Paragraph 25 on Section 7 expenses is acceptable. I will deal with paras. 26 and 27 later in these reasons. Paragraph 31 stands. I will deal with paras. 29 and 30, as well, later.

42Mrs. Monk advances claims for child and spousal support.

43Mrs. Monk’s annual income from Royal Containers for 2015 was $43,437.43. At the time of trial, she had been just promoted but there was no evidence her salary would be changed.

44Mr. Monk carries on business as a franchisee through a corporation, JSAM Inc. The business is a bath renovation firm. It purchases its inventory from the United States and so has suffered the increased cost of goods from the depressed value of the Canadian dollar.

45Mr. Monk’s personal and corporate tax returns and the financial statements for JSAM from 2011 to 2016 form part of the record. As well, there is a valuation report for JSAM from a chartered accountant, Mr. William Clothier.

46Mr. Clothier was not called as a witness. The exercise of determining whether Mr. Monk’s income should extend beyond his line 150 income from his personal return and if so, what level of income should be imputed to him under ss. 17, 18, and 19 of the Child Support Guidelines and the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines is a bit more art than science.

47There is this evidence from the 2015 statements. The statements which I accept are the statements at Tab 7 of exhibit 4. They reflect the correction for the mistake with respect to the expense charge of $6000 for management fees. This was not an amount which found its way to Mr. Monk. It represented a payment by JSAM to its franchisor in the nature of a royalty or franchise fee.

48I accept the reconciliation calculation of wages and salaries expense at Tab 7. The total including a bonus from 2014 was $27,792. This was Mr. Monk’s line 150 figure. It seems to me, however, that income at that level does not fairly reflect all that Mr. Monk in all likelihood availed himself of when one takes into account his personal expenses and lifestyle. There was other money available, from the pre-tax corporate income of JSAM. It may be included in income for child support purposes under s. 18(a) or (b) of the Guidelines.

49On this, I am instructed by the reasons of Simmons J.A. in Mason v. Mason, 2016 ONCA 725. As she pointed out, the object of the exercise is to arrive at an amount that is “fair and reasonable” to borrow from s. 17(1) and which does not disregard the legitimate interests of the company or lead to an unfair result to the corporation. She recognized that corporations have a “legitimate corporate interest in retaining pre-tax corporate income”. I would have thought this is especially the case with a modest operation and unattractive credit.

50In this case, the pre-tax corporate income of JSAM in 2015 was $18,579. I would attribute to Mr. Monk for present purposes $15,000. In the result, his income for child and spousal support is the same as Mrs. Monk’s income. On a joint custody order, therefore, no child support is payable and no spousal support.

51Section 7 expenses, Mrs. Monk to pay $630 for Ashley’s expenses and for hockey, half that only for 2016-2017, this from the equalization payment due.

52There remains the equalization calculation. I make the following findings with respect to property, its value and the debts of Mr. and Mrs. Monk.

222 Brentwood Crescent

53This is the matrimonial home. Title is in the name of Mr. Monk alone. This had been the case before its purchase on two other properties. Mrs. Monk had no legal interest in the home. She says she understood she would own with Mr. Monk Brentwood but I find this was not the case. She did not sign the agreement of purchase and sale, and was not involved in its purchase. Mr. Monk had been careful on earlier purchases to own his real estate alone. Mrs. Monk is a well-organized woman who would have insisted on participation at every stage if she was to take title with Mr. Monk. She did not. In arriving at this conclusion, I chose not to rely on the cohabitation agreement. It is clear there was one, but the evidence does not lend itself to a finding without the document. I chose not to speculate.

54The purchase of 222 Brentwood was completed August 25, 2005. There is a solicitor’s reporting letter. It is directed only to Mr. Monk. The deed is tab 6 of exhibit 1. Mr. Monk is the transferee. There was a mortgage entered into at the time with the Bank of Nova Scotia. The mortgage is not in evidence but one was registered coincidentally with the transfer. See the abstract of title at Tab 11. The reporting letter is Tab 7.

55In May, 2007, Mrs. Monk disclosed to Mr. Monk that she was in debt under a line of credit. This impaired their access to their joint line. Mr. Monk moved Mrs. Monk’s debt over to his existing line to consolidate her debt with their debt. This was accomplished by their application to the Bank of Nova Scotia under its Scotia Total Equity Plan (also described as a Personal Credit Agreement). The 2005 mortgage for $198,000 was replaced by a mortgage for $245,000. Mr. Monk signed as “chargor” but Mrs. Monk consented to the mortgage as “spouse”.

56On the Banks’ acknowledgment and Directions she again signed but soley as Mr. Monk’s consenting spouse. She did not sign the mortgage as “chargor” and the act of Standard Charge Terms does not saddle her with any liability to the Bank. See para. 24 of the terms. The abstract of title includes as parties only Mr. Monk and the Bank. Likewise the charge. These documents are found at Tabs 9 and 10. The loan agreement at Tab 8 described Mrs. Monk as a co-borrower, and that she was but there is nothing to elevate her status in law to that of a mortgagor responsible to the Bank of Nova Scotia for any part of the mortgage she claims as a debt against her net family property. Where she has signed any of these documents, other than the application for credit, where the Bank expects an interest in land as security, she has signed as a “consenting spouse”. This would have been expected routinely by the Bank in light of Section 21 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 980, c. F. 3.

57Half the mortgage may not be claimed as a debt by Mrs. Monk.

58For the value of 222 Brentwood Crescent, I accept the Belmont realtor’s figure of $276,000. Golf clubs, Mrs. Monk’s value. Ring, Mrs. Monk’s figure. Value of JSM: mid-point of Mr. Clothier’s range of $70,000 to $80,000 or $75,000. Tax on sale of JSM. There is a claim for a notional tax of $15,000 as a debt or cost to Mr. Monk on the sale of JSM. Half or $7500 is reasonable.

59I need not grant the parties a divorce. It was granted by Justice Gorman, September 6, 2016, effective October 7, 2016.

60I will re-attend in St. Thomas to deal with any matter which may require “fine tuning”, particularly on the custody order. As well, the issue of costs will be dealt with.