W. M. v Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, 2017 ONSC 5887
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
W.M. et al.
Applicants
-and-
Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee
Respondent
BEFORE: F.L. Myers J.
COUNSEL: W. M., in person
Alan Rachlin for the Public Guardian & Trustee in its capacity as Litigation Guardian of W.M.
Yeoh-Tae Kim, for the Public Guardian & Trustee on its own behalf
HEARD: September 20, 2017
ENDORSEMENT
1For most of his life, WM has suffered serious mental health and behavioural challenges. To make matters worse, when he was a teenager, WM suffered brain damage and other personal injuries when he was struck by a motor vehicle as he crossed the street in Toronto.
2WM is plaintiff in two personal injury actions that were commenced for him when he was a minor. Substantial damages were claimed on his behalf. When he attained the age of majority, WM dismissed his counsel and commenced an additional 25 or so lawsuits arising out of alleged mistreatment that he claims to have suffered from educators, social agencies, police, the airport, couriers, telephone service providers, banks, foreign governments, the federal government, the province, the city, and others.
3Mew J. was assigned to case manage all of WM's cases. Mew J. appointed the PG&T to act as the litigation guardian for WM in the two personal injury actions but not in any other actions.
4I replaced Mew J. as case management judge. Shortly after, I stayed all of the actions other than the two in which the PG&T was involved pending review as I considered that many of the other 25 appeared to be frivolous proceedings.
5Shortly after, WM underwent a capacity assessment and was found to be incapable of managing his own property. As a result, the PG&T became his guardian for property and automatically became his litigation guardian in all of the cases by operation of law.
6With the PG&T and WM's input, many of the 25 other cases have been dismissed on consent. Those dismissed on consent to date are listed in Schedule "A" to this Endorsement. WM agrees that all but the two personal injury claims and two claims against the US government should be dismissed. Most of the defendants have previously agreed to waive costs. Therefore, the claims listed in Schedule "B" are dismissed without costs.
7By decision dated June 1, 2017, the Consent and Capacity Board overruled the capacity assessor and held that WM is capable of managing his property. As a result, WM moves to remove the PG&T as his litigation guardian in all of his litigation.
8The Consent and Capacity Board ruled that the capacity assessor had improperly placed a burden on WM to prove his capacity. Moreover, it found that he had demonstrated sufficient and reasonable foresight of the consequences of his decisions regarding management of his property generally. It was also positively impressed with WM's presentation at the hearing. The board found:
He followed the proceedings carefully and presented his own evidence in a way that was clear and compelling. The panel was taken with WM's efforts to pursue work and educational goals despite the challenges of his disabilities.
9A person is under “disability” under the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, if he or she is "mentally incapable within the meaning of section 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 in respect of an issue in the proceeding…" [Emphasis added.]
10The case law is clear that in assessing disability for litigation purposes the issues are somewhat wider than the considerations before the Consent and Capacity Board under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992. Capacity "in respect of an issue in the proceeding" involves an assessment of capacity addressed in the context of the administration of justice. In Huang v Braga, 2016 ONSC 6306, http://canlii.ca/t/gv313 Archibald J. summarized the state of the case law and held:
[19] The jurisprudence has established the following additional factors should be considered when determining whether a party is under disability and requires a litigation guardian:
(a) The person's ability to know or understand the minimum choices or decisions required and to make them;
(b) An appreciation of the consequences and effects of his or her choices or decisions;
(c) An appreciation of the nature of the proceedings;
(d) A person's inability to choose and keep counsel;
(e) A person's inability to represent him or herself;
(f) A person's inability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant issues; and
(g) A person's mistaken beliefs regarding the law or court procedures.
11Although the board found that the capacity assessor had erroneously reversed the burden of proof, there was no medical evidence contradicting the assessor's factual findings. WM concedes that as a result of his disabilities, he sometimes cannot process information. He recognizes that he is prone to manic "episodes" that can last a week or more during which he is unstable and should not be instructing counsel. I agree with the board that WM shows much and growing insight into his health issues. He is developing coping mechanisms to help him deal with his issues. For example, he says that he recognizes a need to re-read documents multiple times to try to understand the information that they convey. He recognizes that he needs to withdraw during episodes of mania. He has physical limitations that prevent him from taking medications that might otherwise help.
12Last summer, for example, WM found himself without accommodation briefly while suffering through a period of mania. He tried to instruct counsel to settle his litigation at an imprudently low level in view of his urgent desire for cash. WM says that he is getting better at detecting when he is descending into an "episode." He also says that his economic circumstances have improved so that he is less likely to find himself thinking that he is desperate for funds during a manic episode.
13There is also a concern with WM's ability to keep counsel. He fired and sued Mr. Rachlin previously. He complains about a lack of involvement in decision-making between Mr. Rachlin and the PG&T. By contrast, Mr. Rachlin says that although the PG&T instructs him, he responds to WM and communicates with him on important issues. It is apparent to me that if WM is put in charge of his claims, Mr. Rachlin is not likely to remain his counsel of record for very long.
14Although WM is able to engage in discussion and respond to issues, it does not take long for him to descend into lengthy soliloquys that lose the focus of the discussion. He is not able to maintain a train of thought concerning issues of relevancy in the litigation. He is cooperative and tries to respond to questions in court. But, it is difficult for him to contribute with any depth or complexity. He does not display the ability to understand the issues, to articulate the facts relevant to specific issues, or the potential risks and benefits of available decisions on the issues. He certainly could not present or be helpful in the presentation of highly complex evidence to a jury concerning brain injury or the assessment of damages when brain injury compounds pre-existing significant mental health issues.
15In light of WM's 25 lawsuits, it is also clear that he has mistaken views of the purposes of civil litigation and the bases on which civil relief may be available. His desire to continue suing the government of the United States shows that he does not appreciate sovereign immunity or, on a less technical and more practical level, that the US government can hardly be expected to be interested in engaging with him in civil proceedings here.
16Under the factors set out by Archibald J. therefore, I have many concerns.
17I am very aware of the need to contain any paternalistic desire to protect a competent person from the consequences of his or her own decisions however foolish they may seem to others. Respecting each individual's autonomy is fundamental to the exercise of his or her right to participate in the Canadian community on an equal footing with fellow participants. But, the administration of justice is a particular area in which the needs of the individual can come into conflict with the needs and rights of the party opposite. Moreover the civil justice system's ability to provide fair, just, and proportional relief must also weigh in the outcome.
18The party opposite is entitled to expect that it will be met by a competent person instructing counsel. Cooperation among competent litigants is required to achieve fair procedures. A competent litigant opposite is required to ensure that there is someone who will be bound by costs awards that may be made. A competent litigant opposite is required to provide an assurance that the court's orders will be responded to by someone able to ensure that they are obeyed in letter and in spirit. Cameron v Louden, [1998] OJ No 2791 (Gen Div).
19In all, despite the burden of proof before the Consent and Capacity Board, it is undisputed that WM has a complex medical history including a range of learning and behavioural development disorders in addition to his traumatic brain injury that is the subject of the litigation being carried by the PG&T. At various times, WM has been diagnosed with ADHD, OCD, intermittent explosive disorder, receptive/expressive language disorder, and articulation disorder. After the motor vehicle accident, he suffered or suffers seizures, chronic pain, visual charges, a heart disorder (from medication), short-term memory deficits, migraines, and what he calls manic episodes.
20The board was content that WM's overall appreciation of his financial circumstances precluded a general finding of incapacity. But, in the more limited context of complex personal injury litigation, in my view, WM must be found to continue to suffer disability at this time. He does not appreciate the purposes or complexity of civil litigation. He cannot take in and process the highly specialized and difficult procedures, evidence collection and presentation methods, or the very difficult expert medical evidence that will be required to present his cases. He cannot instruct counsel in a timely way identifying and balancing relevant factors and outcomes. Neither the parties opposite nor the court can be assured of a competent client directing counsel so as to protect the rights of both parties to a fair and just proceeding.
21I understand that WM has sufficient intellect and comprehension to be disappointed at this decision. I do not make this decision just to do what the court feels is “good” for WM. Rather, in balancing all of the relevant factors set out in the relevant case law, the court is required to weigh WM's capacity specifically in the context of his ability to appreciate issues in civil litigation considering the rights of the parties opposite, and the overall goals of the civil justice system. In that context, the decision to keep the PG&T in place as litigation guardian reflects a proper systemic outcome. I note as well that this decision is consistent with the submissions of the PG&T in its public policy role and Mr. Rachlin as counsel in the two actions.
22The claims listed in Schedule “C” will continue with the PG&T remaining as WM’s litigation guardian.
F.L. Myers J.
Date: October 6, 2017
Schedule “A”
Actions Previously Dismissed
W.M. v. Alan Lewis Rachlin of Rachlin & Wolfson LLP et. al., CV-15-529826
Dismissed, Mew J., Jul 28, 2015
W.M. v. Bell Canada Enterprises and its subsidiaries et. al., CV-15-532131
Dismissed, Myers J., Dec 22, 2015
W.M. et. al. v. Hatts Off Specialized Services et. al., CV-15-538376
Dismissed, Pollak J., Jun 3, 2017
W.M. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, CV-15-538383
Dismissed, Myers J., Dec 22, 2015
W.M. et. al. v. Hamilton Police Services, CV-15-538390
Dismissed, Myers J., Jan 3, 2017
W.M. v. United Kingdom Home Office, CV-15-538395
Dismissed, Myers J., Feb 21, 2017
W.M. v. Ontario Provincial Police et. al., CV-15-538401
Dismissed, Myers J., Feb 21, 2017
Schedule “B”
Actions Dismissed
W.M. v. Ryerson, Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, CV-15-529306
W.M. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, CV-15-529308
W.M. v. Toronto Police Services et. al., CV-15-529829
W.M. v. Ministry of Children and Youth Services et. al., CV-15-529831
W.M. v. Presidents Choice Financial, CV-15-529835
W.M. v. United Parcel Services of America, Canadian Division et. al., CV-15-529838
W.M. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board et. al., CV-15-532132
W.M. et. al. v. Bell Canada Enterprises, CV-15-538380
W.M. v. Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport et. al., CV-15-538403
W.M. v. Air Canada, CV-15-538404
W.M. v. Office of the Public Guardian & Trustee et. al., CV-17-304300ES
W.M. v. Canadian Mini-Warehouse Properties Company, Acting as Public Storage Canada et al., CV-17-579765
Schedule “C”
Matters to Proceed
W.M. et. al. v. Government of the USA et. al., CV-15-538392
W.M. v. United States Department of Homeland Security and its divisions et. al., CV-15-538382
W.M. v. Canadian Road Management Co. et. al., CV-12-456473
W.M. v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, CV-14-516323