Freiman v. Freiman, 2017 ONSC 4981
CITATION: Freiman v. Freiman, 2017 ONSC 4981
COURT FILE NO.: FC-15-2427
DATE: 2017/08/23
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Archibald Jacob Freiman Applicant
– and –
Ruth Freiman Respondent
COUNSEL:
Kenneth Radnoff and Beverley Johnston, for the Applicant
Michael S. Rankin, for the Respondent
HEARD at Ottawa: June 15, 2017
DECISION ON A MOTION
JUSTICE ENGELKING
[1] Mr. Freiman brings a motion for an order for interim spousal support, the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, Ms. Freiman to pay an interim disbursement and for certain financial disclosure.
[2] The Freimans were married for 40 years, from 1974 to 2014. Ms. Freiman has received substantial property by way of inheritance, some very much towards the end of the marriage, and has a net worth (approximately $17 million) substantially higher than Mr. Freiman’s (approximately $2.8 million). It is on this basis that he seeks an order of interim spousal support.
[3] Mr. Freiman seeks to have an expert, JC Desnoyers prepare a report on Ms. Freiman’s income for spousal support purposes, and it is for this report that he seeks an order that Ms. Freiman be required to pay for the disbursement.
[4] Ms. Freiman has remained in the mortgage-free matrimonial home at 908 Killeen Avenue, Ottawa, Ontario. Soon after the separation of the parties, Ms. Freiman severed the joint tenancy to one of tenants in common. Mr. Freeman seeks an order for the immediate sale of this property.
[5] Mr. Freiman also seeks an order for specific disclosure.
[6] For the reasons given below, I decline to make a temporary order for spousal support by Ms. Freiman to Mr. Freiman. I am also not prepared to make an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, nor one requiring Ms. Freiman to pay a disbursement for Mr. Freiman. I will make a limited order for disclosure.
Issues
[7] The issues in this motion are:
Has Mr. Freiman made out a prima facie case for entitlement to spousal support?
If the answer is yes, what quantum should be awarded?
Should an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home be granted?
Has Mr. Freiman demonstrated that the court should grant an order requiring Ms. Freiman to pay the disbursement to engage Mr. Desnoyers?
Should an order for disclosure of the items requested by Mr. Freiman from Ms. Freiman be granted?
Issue #1 – Is there a prima facie case for entitlement to spousal support?
[8] As is indicated in s.15.2 (4) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.3 (2nd Supp.), when making an order for temporary spousal support under 15.2 (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including:
• the length of time the spouse cohabited;
• the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and,
• any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.
[9] Case law dictates that at a temporary stage the court is not required to “conduct an in-depth analysis of the standing and entitlement issues. If the Applicant is able to make out a good, arguable case for standing and entitlement the court will assess support on the basis of the parties’ needs and means.” The questions to be answered in an application for temporary spousal support are: does the Applicant have standing; is the Applicant entitled to the support; what are the dependant’s needs; and, does the payor have the ability to pay? ( Robertson v. Hotte, 1996 CanLII 8083 at paras 7 and 8.)
[10] As noted by Labrosse J. in Kelly v. Kelly, 2016 CanLII 6476 at para 17, “interim support motions are not intended to involve a detailed examination of the merits of the case. Orders for interim support are based on a triable or prima facie case: see Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2015 ONSC 1408 at para 8.”
[11] As was indicated above, the parties were married for 40 years, however, notwithstanding the length of the marriage or the era in which it occurred, it was not one that can be described as “traditional”. The essentially uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. and Ms. Freiman each worked fulltime and supported themselves throughout the life of the marriage. While two children, now adults, were born of the marriage, neither parent took on the role of fulltime caregiver to the children; rather they both participated in providing care to the children and engaged a nanny to care for them while they each worked. Neither forewent opportunities or career advancement for the sake of caring for the children, or for the sake of the other’s career.
[12] Mr. and Ms. Freiman, additionally, kept their finances separate one from the other for the entire duration of the marriage. While they were joint owners of the matrimonial home, a condo in Florida, a cottage in Quebec and a property on McArthur Avenue, they had no joint bank accounts and no joint credit cards. Each contributed to the expenses of the household more or less equally, paid for their own expenses independently and paid for their own vehicles. They each paid one half of the expenses of their daughters’ weddings. They never knew what the other made, nor were they privy to the other’s income tax returns. They paid for their own tickets for travel, even when they travelled together. Mr. Freiman never paid any money to Ms. Freiman and Ms. Freiman never paid any money to Ms. Freiman (but for reimbursements for their respective share of agreed upon expenses). The only thing they shared were some charitable contributions. No financial dependency existed between them over the life of the marriage.
[13] There was never any order, agreement or arrangement made between them that related to support of either.
[14] Mr. Freiman submits that his claim for temporary support is based on a) his need, relating specifically to the lifestyle he enjoyed during and as a result of the marriage, and b) her means, there purportedly being a substantial discrepancy in income between them.
Lifestyle
[15] Mr. Freiman submits that the parties lived a lavish lifestyle, entertaining in their million dollar home, traveling, dining and enjoying the arts. Ms. Freiman indicates, on the other hand, that the parties enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle, but not a lavish one. The enjoyed their home in Ottawa, condo in Florida and their cottage in Quebec, but they both worked and were careful with their money.
[16] In his questioning on December 14, 2016 (Tab 1, Volume 3 of the Continuing Record), Mr. Freiman agreed that both he and Ms. Freiman had good incomes, but were not independently wealthy (questions 253 to 257); were not extravagant spenders (question 259); did not throw lavish parties (question 259); did not buy extravagant jewelry and fancy items (question 260); and did not “jet-set” around the world (question 261). Mr. Freiman agreed with the description of both him and Ms. Freiman as people who were “careful with [their] finances” (questions 262 and 263). Mr. Freiman’s answers to the questions put to him do not support the contention in his affidavits nor his factum that the parties were accustomed to living a high or lavish lifestyle, something he contends he can no longer afford.
[17] Mr. Freiman submits additionally that because he lives in a small apartment at 456 McArthur Avenue in a building that is owned jointly by Audlaw Investments Limited (belonging to him and his sister) and Ms. Freiman, his accustomed standard of living has significantly diminished. However, Mr. Freiman lives in the apartment rent free. He also has an office in the building for which he pays no rent, as does one of the real estate brokers with whom he does business, Mr. Cavan. It appears that Mr. Freiman chose to live at this address at the time of separation, likely because it was convenient and because there has been no requirement to pay rent there. While there is no doubt that the standard is one different from that enjoyed at the matrimonial home, I have no evidence before me as to any effort, intention or interest by Mr. Freiman to live otherwise, or of his being unable to afford to do so. Mr. Freiman has a not insignificant income, which is outlined below, and a net worth of approximately $2.8 million. I have no basis to conclude that, had he chosen to live in quarters more akin to those to which he was accustomed, he could not have done so.
[18] Mr. Freiman confirmed in his questioning in December of 2016, additionally, that he has had exclusive use of the parties’ jointly owned cottage property since separation.
[19] Mr. Freiman has spent three months of each of 2016 and 2017 at a beachfront condominium in Florida for which he (or one of his companies) paid $5700 US per month in rent. He also appears to have traveled extensively since separation relative to the travel the parties did together prior to separation.
[20] As I have outlined above, no financial dependency was created between Mr. Freiman and Ms. Freiman during the marriage. The lifestyle to which Mr. Freiman was accustomed during the marriage was not one which resulted from or was reliant upon Ms. Freiman’s relatively recently acquired wealth. The parties lived comfortably, but not extravagantly, and I have no evidence upon which to conclude that the same level of comfort was or is not attainable by Mr. Freiman without support by Ms. Freiman (with or without encroaching on his capital).
Disparity of Income
[21] Mr. Freiman asserts that entitlement to temporary spousal support is a foregone conclusion, and the court need only deal with the issues of the incomes of the parties and quantum. He asserts that Ms. Freiman’s income is significantly higher than his, particularly her investment income resulting from her relatively recent acquisition of significant property. He asserts, in fact, that it is likely higher than reported based on rental income she receives from her interests (which she asserts are minority interests) in overseas properties. He asserts further that the only important factors for the court to consider are disparity in incomes and the length of the marriage. Mr. Freiman relies on Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 1223 and Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 in support of this assertions.
[22] In Berta, Goodman J. found on the motion for temporary support at paragraph 26 that “the Applicant is also entitled to a standard of living to which she enjoyed prior to separation, given the long-term marriage and other considerations under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.” However, unlike in this case, entitlement to temporary support was agreed to by the parties in Berta. In fact, at paragraph 5 Justice Goodman stated: “I am not required to conduct an analysis of the various authorities and case law which speak to the issue of spousal support entitlement.” In other words, where entitlement is conceded, a disparity of income, if it exists, may be a relevant (or even the only) consideration in relation to quantum.
[23] In Bracklow, the Supreme Court of Canada found that there are “three different conceptual bases for spousal support obligations – contractual, compensatory and non-compensatory” (paragraph 37). At paragraph 41, in reference to s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act, the Court stated:
“[E]conomic hardship . . . arising from the breakdown of the marriage” is capable of encompassing not only health or career disadvantages arising from the marriage breakdown properly the subject of compensation (perhaps more directly covered in s. 15.2(6) (a): see Payne on Divorce, supra, at pp. 251-53), but the mere fact that a person who formerly enjoyed intra-spousal entitlement to support now finds herself or himself without it. Looking only at compensation, one merely asks what loss the marriage or marriage breakup caused that would not have been suffered but for the marriage. But even where loss in this sense cannot be established, the breakup may cause economic hardship in a larger, non-compensatory sense.
[24] Further, at paragraph 43, the court stated:
But while the focus of the Act may have shifted or broadened, it retains the older idea that spouses may have an obligation to meet or contribute to the needs of their former partners where they have the capacity to pay, even in the absence of a contractual or compensatory foundation for the obligation. Need alone may be enough.
[25] Bracklow, however, was a case having to do with an incapable spouse due to illness. It also spoke to a spouse who formerly enjoyed “intra-spousal entitlement to support”, a concept which the Supreme Court indicated in Bracklow the parties could “enhance, diminish or negate” by “contract or conduct” (paragraph 53).
[26] Ms. Freiman asserts that, firstly, the parties conduct has negated that Mr. Freiman formerly enjoyed intra-spousal entitlement to support, and he therefore cannot now claim it, particularly on a temporary basis. Secondly, Ms. Freiman asserts that disparity of income, if it exists, does not alone create need and, therefore, entitlement. Finally, she asserts that there may, in fact, not be a disparity of income when all of the evidence is taken into consideration, and that at the end of the day, Mr. Freiman’s income, or his ability to earn same, may be higher than hers.
[27] Ms. Freiman’s income emanates from a combination of real estate investments and a portfolio of dividends. Her line 150 income for the years 2012 to 2016 were as follows:
• 2012 - $430,619
• 2013 - $325.604
• 2014 - $1,134,251
• 2015 $383,864
• 2016 - $450,199
[28] However, commencing from 1979, Ms. Freiman held certain properties in trust for her mother and later for her and her two siblings. She declared all the income on these properties on her income tax returns and remitted either all (to her mother prior to her death in 2001) or some (to her sibling after her mother’s death), and was reimbursed by them for the tax she had been required to pay on it. She states that in 2014, the properties were formally segregated in a non-reoccurring, one-time event which led to her significantly increased declared income in that year as a result of capital gains and recaptured costs. All of that is to say, that Ms. Freiman submits that her line 150 income is not the income which should be attributed to her for spousal support purposes. In support of her position, Ms Freiman provided reconciliation statements prepared by her accountant for the 2012 to 2014 taxation years, which are attached as Exhibit “A” to her affidavit sworn on June 30, 2016 (Volume 2, Tab 1).
[29] Ms. Freiman also engaged an expert, Mr. Pittman, to determine her income for support purposes and in his report dated June 10, 2016, Mr. Pittman concluded that it was as follows post-separation:
• 2014 - $203,999
• 2015 - $261,199
[30] Mr. Freiman’s income is from a combination of management fees for 456 McArthur Avenue, OAS and CPP, dividends from his stock portfolio and business income (real estate commissions). Mr. Freiman’s line 150 income for the years 2012 to 2016 are as follows:
• 2012 - $271,748
• 2013 – 97,897
• 2014 - $116,583
• 2015 – 88,793
• 2016 -$139,146
[31] Ms. Freiman argues that Mr. Freiman’s reported income is significantly lower than it ought to be for support purposes for a number of reasons. Firstly, Mr. Freiman is paid salary through his company, A.J. Freiman Limited, and he decides what amount to pay out as dividend, what amount to draw as income and what amount to defer. Thus, it includes money that could be paid to him but isn’t. Secondly, she argues that Mr. Freiman receives benefits from his companies, A.J. Freiman and Audlaw, which should properly be included as income for spousal support purposes. These include his rent free apartment and office, and rent that he should be receiving for Mr. Cavan’s office. It also includes payments that are made for him by his companies, such as rent of $5700 US for three months per year for 2016 and 2017.
[32] Ms. Freiman’s expert, Mr. Pittman opined in his June 10, 2016 report that Mr. Freiman’s income post-separation has been as follows:
• 2014 - $146,718
• 2015 - $162,961
[33] Although a subsequent report of Mr. Pittman was not admitted for the purposes of the motion, counsel for Ms. Freiman walked the court through the required calculations which demonstrated, if all of the assumptions relied upon are proven, that for the purposes of spousal support Ms. Freiman’s income for 2016 was $355,431 and Mr. Freiman’s was $389,378.
[34] I am of the view that both the issues of entitlement and quantum, if entitlement is established, are ones that ought to more properly be dealt with at trial. I am not convinced, on the facts of this case that Mr. Freiman had made out “a good, arguable case for standing and entitlement” to support. Even were he able to do so, I am not convinced that Mr. Freiman’s needs or Ms. Freiman’s means are such that it would result in a spousal support order flowing from her to him. The financial issues as they relate to the incomes of both parties for the purposes of spousal support are contentious and complex. They require the fullness of evidence led at trial, including the evidence of the parties’ respective experts, in order for those determinations to be made.
Issue #2 – Quantum
[35] Having come to the conclusion that Mr. Freiman does not have a prima facie case for entitlement to spousal support such that it should be ordered on a temporary (and retroactive) basis, I am not required to deal with the issue of quantum.
Issue #3 – Should an order for immediate sale of the matrimonial home be granted?
[36] There is clear jurisdiction under the Partition Act to order the sale of jointly owned property, including a matrimonial home, prior to trial. However, an order directing the sale of a matrimonial home before trial should only be made where, in all the circumstances, it is appropriate to do so. Additionally, an application for partition and sale should not proceed where it would prejudice the rights of either spouse under the Family Law Act (Martin v. Martin 1992 CanLII 7402 (ON CA); Silva v. Silva 1990 CanLII 6718 (ON CA)).
[37] Mr. Freiman obtained an appraisal in the fall of 2016 that indicated it was worth $1,000,000 at that time. Ms. Freiman consequently made a with prejudice offer to buy Mr. Freiman’s one half interest in the home for $500,000. Mr. Freiman, for reasons which remain unexplained, had not accepted her offer. He suggests that the house may now be worth more than when the appraisal was completed, however, I was given no evidence which would suggest that Mr. Freiman countered Ms. Freiman’s offer for a value that may reflect what he believes the house is now worth.
[38] While the Ontario Court of Appeal has confirmed that an order should not be made for the sale of the matrimonial home before trial as a matter of course, it has also made it clear in that case that the court does not have statutory authority to make an order granting a spouse a right of first refusal. At paragraph 27, Osborne, J. A. noted: “There is nothing in the Family Law Act, 1986 to suggest that, absent consent, one spouse should have a special right to purchase the matrimonial home. As a matter of general principle, while a matrimonial home occupies a special and separate place in the statutory scheme established by the Family Law Act, 1986, once the matrimonial home is ordered to be sold, each spouse is entitled to receive fair market value for his or her interest in it.”
[39] Mr. Freiman relies upon Karker v. Karker, 2011 ONSC 2550 where at paragraph 35, Harvison Young, J. states:
As far as [the] partition and sale issue is concerned, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Latcham v. Latcham, 2002 CanLII 44960 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2126, confirmed that the court’s discretion to refuse partition under the Partition Act, R. S.O. 1990, c. P.4, s.2, is only to be exercised where “malicious, vexatious or oppressive conduct” has been demonstrated: see also Sivla v. Silva (19900, 1990 CanLII 6718 (ON CA), 1O.R. (3d) 436.
[40] Mr. Freiman submits that, like in Karker, there is no evidence that he “lacks good faith in bringing the motion, nor that it is sought for malicious or vexatious reasons” (paragraph 36). Ms. Freiman, on the other hand, contends that there can be no reason other than bad faith in Mr. Freiman seeking what he is seeking today, namely, an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home at 908 Killeen Avenue.
[41] Mr. Freiman obtained an appraisal of the home in the fall of 2016 that indicated it was worth $1,000,000 at that time. Ms. Freiman consequently made a with prejudice offer to buy Mr. Freiman’s one half interest in the home for $500,000. Mr. Freiman, for reasons which remain unexplained, has not accepted her offer. This is especially troubling in light of his assertion in his affidavit of May 13, 2016 that Ms. Freiman has refused “to buy out my interest in the matrimonial home” (paragraph 20) and that in his affidavit of July 12, 2016 that Ms. Freiman ought to make an offer “to buy out my interest in the home if she wants to remain in it” (paragraph 39). Ms. Freiman subsequently did just that. While he suggests that the house may now be worth more than when the appraisal was completed, I was given no evidence which would suggest that Mr. Freiman countered Ms. Freiman’s offer for a value that may reflect what he believes the house is now worth. Indeed, I was given no particular reason for placing the matrimonial home for sale at this juncture, except that Mr. Freiman wishes it.
[42] In determining whether there has been malicious, vexatious or oppressive conduct, Justice J.E. Ferguson stated at paragraph 12 of Osborne v Myette, 2004 CanLII 7051 (ON SC) “that conduct should relate to the partition and sale issue. Specifically it is necessary to look at the reasonableness of the positions taken by the parties as it relates to the partition and sale.” In that case, Ferguson J. ordered the partition and sale, but did so on the basis that Mr. Myette’s refusal to accept Ms. Osborne’s appraised value and calculation of his interest did not represent malicious, vexatious or oppressive conduct (emphasis added). In this case, the calculation of Mr. Freiman’s interest (and offer to purchase it) was based on his appraised value, and his position that the home needs to be immediately placed on the open market is consequently entirely unreasonable. On that basis, and keeping in mind that the Ontario Court of Appeal has not “endorsed the wholesale issuance of these orders” (Martin, paragraph 26), I decline to make the order prior to trial.
Issue #4 – Should an order requiring payment of an interim disbursement be granted?
[43] Pursuant to Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, the court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on a case by the other party. The power to do so is discretionary and the discretion must be applied to further the primary objection of fairness. (Rogers, J. Stuart v. Stuart, 2001 ONSC CarswellOnt 4586)
[44] The rule is intended to enable the court “to provide a level playing field, to ensure that all parties can equally provide or test disclosure, make appropriate valuations of net family property, make or consider offers to settle or prepare and proceed to trial.” (Boris v. Boris, 2005 ONSC CarswellOnt 975)
[45] In paragraph 29 of Woodburn v. Woodburn, 2016 ONSC CarswellOnt 17658, Justice Emery summarized the principles applicable on a motion for payment of interim costs as follows:
The moving party must provide evidence to establish that, on the balance of probabilities, there is a prima facie case of sufficient merit to warrant pursuit;
The moving party must provide evidence that the interim payment of a specific amount of money for expenses to carry the case is necessary and the basis for the amount requested;
The moving party must demonstrate that she or he is incapable of funding the requested amounts.
The moving party must provide evidence that there are no resources available to fund the cost or that it would not be fair or reasonable to access resources for the litigation;
The court has discretion in special circumstances to level the playing field so that all parties have an equal and fair opportunity to engage the litigation process for a just determination of their issues.
[46] Mr. Freiman seeks an order from the court that Ms. Freiman pay $75,000 as an interim disbursement for both accounting and legal fees. He has retained or wishes to retain an expert, formerly Mr. Dave Clarke, now Mr. JC Desnoyer, to prepare a report in respect of Ms. Freiman’s income for spousal support purposes as well as to assist him in respect of her claim that significant portions of her property are excluded from her NFP.
[47] As I have indicated above, the incomes of both Mr. Freiman and Ms. Freiman are complex and likely require expert evaluations of what they are for spousal support purposes. In this regard, there is a prima facie case to warrant pursuit of such evidence. Ms. Freiman has provided same by way of a series of reports from Mr. Steve Pittman (the last of which was not admitted for the purposes of the motion). Mr. Clarke also provided a report in response to Mr. Pittman’s first report, and was apparently working on another when there was a breakdown in the relationship between him and Mr. Freiman. Counsel for Ms. Freiman submits that this breakdown happened well in advance of Mr. Freiman’s request for an adjournment of his motion on January 26, 2017 before Justice MacLeod. Counsel for Mr. Freiman insists that at the time of the requested adjournment, a report from Mr. Clarke was still anticipated. Certainly, Justice MacLeod was of the view that a report from Mr. Clarke would be forthcoming when he stated that the Applicant was to serve “the expert report currently in preparation no later than February 24, 2017”. No such report was forthcoming, notwithstanding that its preparation was given as the reason for the required adjournment. Rather, a report dated February 17, 2017 prepared by Mr. J.C. Desnoyers was filed with the court.
[48] In the Notice of Motion for January 26, 2017, which motion was adjourned to June 15, 2017, as his second claim for relief Mr. Freiman sought: “An order that the Respondent pay the applicant interim disbursements in the amount of $75,000 for legal and accounting fees.” When the motion was first brought forward in the spring of 2016, this claim was based, originally, on a retainer letter from Mr. Clarke dated May 12, 2016 attached as Exhibit “G” to the affidavit of Mr. Freiman sworn on May 13, 2016 (Volume 1, Tab 12 of the Continuing Record). In it, Mr. Clarke estimated his fees “could be over $75,000 if we are required to thoroughly analyse the income streams stemming from $12 million in investible assets.” However, Mr. Clarke is no longer involved, and I received no evidence with respect to the cost of Mr. Desnoyer’s engagement. With respect to the second principle in Woodburn, I have no basis upon which to determine the amount requested.
[49] More significantly, however, I am of the view that Mr. Freiman has not demonstrated that he is incapable of funding the request, or that there are no resources available to him to do so. Certainly, although many of his assets are not liquid, he has sufficient resources available to him to fund the request. He also continues to have the option to accept Ms. Freiman’s offers to purchase his interests in the matrimonial home for $500,000 and in the family cottage for $300,000, which would give him $800,000 in liquid assets to do with as he pleases. I am thus not inclined to make the order requested.
Issue #5 – Should an order for disclosure be granted?
[50] In his Notice of Motion, Mr. Freiman sought “an Order that the Respondent produce all outstanding financial disclosure. A list to be provided to the court after questioning has been completed.” Despite this, the evidence before the court with respect to the disclosure issue is confined to Mr. Freiman’s affidavit sworn on May 13, 2016, at Tab 12 of Volume 1 of the Continuing Record. In it, Mr. Freiman has attached a letter from his counsel as Exhibit “C” dated April 29, 2016 requesting disclosure of specific items referred to in a letter of Mr. Clarke dated April 13, 2016 pursuant to the order at case conference of Master Champagne dated February 29, 2016. In paragraph 1 of her Order, Master Champagne provided: “Within 30 days of the date of this Order, parties shall exchange all relevant financial disclosure save and except for the appraisal of the properties overseas and the cottage and matrimonial home. Those assets shall be appraised within 60 days”.
[51] Ms. Freiman has filed a Certificate of Financial Disclosure dated June 13, 2017 at Tab 2 of Volume 6 of the Continuing Record. Mr. Freiman’s counsel has provided a list of outstanding disclosure at Tab A of Mr. Freiman’s Factum. Many of the items appear on both lists. Both the disclosure requested and provided is voluminous. Without cross-referencing every item from Mr. Clarke’s letter dated April 13, 2016 with Ms. Freiman’s Certificate of Financial Disclosure and Tab A of Mr. Freiman’s Factum (which I am not going to do), it is not possible for the Court to determine what exactly remains outstanding at this time such that it should be the subject of a specific order. Therefore, Mr. Freiman shall have 30 days from the release of this decision to provide Ms. Freiman with a list of the specific items, and for what timeframes, he still requires. If they are items which appear on her Certificate of Disclosure, then the request shall include specific information as to what is missing and for what dates. Ms. Freiman shall have 30 days from the receipt of Mr. Freiman’s list to provide the documents requested, or, if she cannot obtain the documents, to provide an explanation as to why not. If, after the exchange, there remain specific items outstanding which require an order of the Court, an appearance before me can be arranged through the Trial Coordinator.
Order
[52] The Applicant, Mr. Freiman’s motion for orders of temporary spousal support, sale of the matrimonial home prior to trial, and payment of an interim disbursement by Ms. Freiman is dismissed.
[53] There shall be an order for disclosure as per paragraph 51 above.
Costs
[54] The Respondent is entitled to costs of this motion. If the parties cannot agree on costs then they may make written submissions not exceeding three pages together with bills of costs and any offers to settle within 15 days of the release of this decision.
Madam Justice Tracy Engelking
Released: August 23, 2017
CITATION: Freiman v. Freiman, 2017 ONSC 4981
COURT FILE NO.: FC-15-2427
DATE: 2017/08/23
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Archibald Jacob Freiman
Applicant
– and –
Ruth Freiman
Respondent
DECISION ON A MOTION
ENGELKING J.
Released: August 23, 2017