Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: 10163/14 DATE: 2017/01/18

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Kathleen Margaret Marshall Applicant David Ashford, for the Applicant

• and -

Frederick Robert Alan Marshall Respondent B. Thomas Granger, for the Respondent

HEARD: September 26, 27 & 28, 2016 BEFORE: George J.

BACKGROUND

[1] The parties were married on October 8, 1986, separating on November 4, 2010. The applicant wife commenced this action in 2014 seeking a divorce, child support, and an equalization of net family property (NFP). Only the property issue remains.

[2] There are four children of the marriage. All now live independently.

[3] Prior to marriage the respondent lived in Belfast, Northern Ireland, where he owned a house. This was the marital home until February 1991, when a business opportunity brought them to Canada.

[4] The parties purchased the matrimonial home in Lambeth Village, Ontario with the Belfast home sale proceeds, some savings, and a mortgage. They expanded their business through loans which, in part, were guaranteed by the home’s equity. Both worked there, though the applicant had some part-time, and eventually full-time work, outside the family business.

[5] Over the years the business had its ups and downs. Various owners were brought in and bought out. There was a name change. All culminating, in 2005, with the parties withdrawing from the company’s day to day operations. They sold their shares with the proceeds satisfying an outstanding mortgage and loans. They were also able to max-out RESP accounts and make some RRSP contributions.

[6] This takes us to 2006 when the parties planned a trip to Mexico to explore real estate opportunities. They considered this an investment, but wanted a vacation home, and were looking prospectively towards retirement. In any case in October they found a suitable property, ultimately forming a company to purchase two detached homes in a condominium complex of six buildings. Possession was taken in July 2007. The details and structure of this purchase, and the property’s ownership, is what lies at the heart of this case. The applicant wife does not hold shares in the Mexican corporation that owns the property, nor is she personally on title. The respondent, however, says she has a beneficial interest. More on this shortly.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

[7] In Ontario property issues upon a marriage breakdown are determined by Part I of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (FLA). In section 4(1) net family property is defined as:

…the value of all the property, except property described in subsection (2), that a spouse owns on the valuation date, after deducting,

(a) the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, and

(b) the value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, calculated as of the date of the marriage.

[8] Property is defined as:

…any interest, present or future, vested or contingent, in real or personal property and includes,

(a) property over which a spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power of appointment exercisable in favour of himself or herself,

(b) property disposed of by a spouse but over which the spouse has, alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to revoke the disposition or a power to consume or dispose of the property, and

(c) in the case of a spouse’s rights under a pension plan that have vested, the spouse’s interest in the plan including contributions made by other persons.

[9] The FLA defines the valuation date. In s. 4(2) it sets out excluded property as:

1. Property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift or inheritance from a third person after the date of marriage.

2. Income from property referred to in paragraph 1, if the donor or testator has expressly stated that it is to be excluded from the spouse’s net family property.

3. Damages or a right to damages for personal injuries, nervous shock, mental distress or loss of guidance, care and companionship, or the part of a settlement that represents those damages.

4. Proceeds or a right to proceeds of a policy of life insurance, as defined in the Insurance Act, that are payable on the death of the life insured.

5. Property, other than a matrimonial home, into which property referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 can be traced.

6. Property that the spouses have agreed by a domestic contract is not to be included in the spouse’s net family property.

[10] The onus of proving a deduction or exclusion is on the person claiming it.

[11] I am guided by the purpose of this regime which is to recognize that childcare, household management and financial provision are the joint responsibilities of spouses and that each contributes equally to the relationship, entitling them to an equalization of the net family properties. This very clear objective is subject only to the equitable considerations set out in section 5(6), which no one has pleaded.

[12] The analysis requires that I ask myself these fundamental questions. What property falls subject to division? How is that property to be valued? And who owns what? The equation, which is simple once attribution and values have been determined, would have the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two be entitled to one half the difference between them, subject to, as noted above, my discretionary power to re-apportion the sharing if an equalization would be unconscionable.

[13] It’s not uncommon for a party to want more at-marriage assets (other than the matrimonial home), and to, at the valuation date, have considerable liabilities, as these are deducted from their net family property. To own less is often better in the context of this type of litigation.

ISSUES & EVIDENCE

Parties Positions as set out in NFP Statements

[14] This trial took place over parts of three days. The applicant and respondent each testified, as did mutual friend, and Mexican property investor, Kevin Gain. Several document briefs were filed detailing emails, joint bank and investment accounts, pre-marital property, and other assets. Each party filed a sworn NFP Statement, and I received into evidence a Form 13C comparison of these statements (Exhibit #3).

[15] The following details from the NFP statements and comparison, set out what the parties agree upon and what is contested:

• The parties attribute to each other two different figures respecting the matrimonial home, which was sold in August 2012. The respondent lists for each half the total sale price ($338,561.50). The applicant lists for each half the total amount paid to them after clearing their joint line of credit and other outstanding debts.
• The applicant claims the respondent, as of the valuation date, had been paid $22,504.42 from the corporation set up to buy the Mexican property, as well as $14,928.00 from the house sale proceeds.
• Respecting a 2000 Mercedes owned by the respondent on the valuation date, the applicant assesses its value at $4,612.00, the respondent at $2000.00. The respondent concedes the black book value is indeed $4612.00 but contends the car, at the relevant time, had rear end damage, severe rust, and that he personally spent a lot of money just to make it road worthy.
• The applicant lists for the respondent the value of a Toyota Camry. He disputes this contending that the Mexican corporation owned it.
• The applicant disputes the respondent’s valuation of her jewellery at $14,000.00. I note, however, that for each of them, her NFP is silent respecting jewellery, art, electronics and hobby equipment.
• The central dispute surrounds the respondent’s shares in the Mexican corporation created in order to purchase the vacation property. As the applicant holds no shares she attributed the full value of them to the respondent at $229,500.00. The respondent takes the position that while the Mexican corporation, Biojote SA de CV (for which he holds a 72% stake), formally owns the condominiums, the investment was actually funded by a jointly owned Canadian corporation (Biojote Canada Inc.) and that both he and the applicant held 50% of those shares. Meaning they should now share equally as she, while not on title, has a beneficial interest. The respondent values their respective interests at $77,472.00.
• Respecting valuation date debts and liabilities, there is a CRA disallowed donation. The applicant assesses her liability at $5,700.00. The respondent explains that he held a, recently settled, $3410.77 liability, and that the applicant was offered a reduced settlement offer which she refused.
• The applicant disputes the respondent’s position on the net value of his date-of-marriage property which, if accepted, would amount to a considerable deduction for him. While the applicant agrees the respondent owned the Belfast home, she disputes his claimed pre-marriage renovations. She assigns a value to the Belfast home, agreeing it operates as a deduction, in the amount of $52,761.50. The respondent provides a lengthy note in the comparison, and testified to the work he says was completed, including to the bedroom, the construction of a skylight, repaired staircase, and new kitchen and flooring. He contends this was a fully furnished home, assessing the value of its contents at $8000. He seeks to include this as a deduction.
• The respondent lists in his NFP a 1983 Volkswagen Polo which he owned at the date of marriage. He assesses its value at $7,964.00.
• The respondent seeks a whole host of other at-marriage deductions which I will not reproduce here. The full comparison was produced at trial and marked as an exhibit. The applicant disputes each notation citing a lack of supporting evidence.

Bottom Line Equalization Positions

[16] All told the respondent claims at-marriage deductions in the amount of $139,250.85. The applicant is prepared only to acknowledge a deduction of $66,741.50, which includes the value of his Belfast home ($52,761.50) as well as a deduction generally for his ‘bank accounts, savings, securities, and pension’ ($13,980.00). The applicant’s position would have the respondent provide her an equalization payment of $141,380.46. The respondent’s position would have the applicant pay him $36,533.00.

[17] In addition, the respondent claims post-separation adjustments as compensation for ‘differential contributions’ to the matrimonial home and the children’s post-secondary education. To accept his position, and make those adjustments, would have the applicant owe him $54,324.50.

Net Family Property – Focus on Mexican Property and At Marriage Assets

[18] My focus will largely be on the Mexican property, and value of the respondent’s at-marriage assets.

[19] First, the Mexican property. The parties agree that they, when beginning to plan for retirement, looked to purchase property in Mexico. Two condominiums were ultimately purchased.

[20] Tracing the funds to Canada and the Canadian corporation, there is little doubt that joint funds were used to purchase the property. In fact the applicant testified to her belief that they had jointly purchased it. She believed she was on title only to learn later she was not. She testified to reading on the internet, after this action had been commenced, that the property had been listed for sale. She was not involved and provided no input either in the decision to sell or the asking price. She never discussed these issues with the respondent or a Mexican real estate agent.

[21] In cross examination she was taken through a series of emails which pointed to her considerable involvement in the property search; after purchase decision making; and that she was extensively involved in the Canadian Biojote Corporation. For instance, in 2010, she writes to the respondent seemingly giving her blessing to sell the condominiums. There are other emails which suggest she was extensively involved in the property’s management.

[22] The applicant testified to each aspect of her NFP, focusing on the Mexican property and the respondent’s Northern Ireland home. She claims the renovations were done after marriage. She does not recall whether the house was fully furnished before marriage or whether further pieces and appliances were purchased afterwards.

[23] The respondent’s testimony focused on his at-marriage deductions, post-separation adjustments, and the Mexican property. He obviously prepared extensively for this, going back a long time in his effort to track funds.

[24] He spoke at length about an agreement he says the parties had respecting their children’s post-secondary education. He says the agreement was each child could take $7500 out of the family RESP for each school year they were in university outside of London, and $3500 if they were living at home and going to school in London. He says they agreed to together contribute 1/3, that 1/3 would come from the children as they had student jobs, and 1/3 from student loans arranged through LIBRO. According to him, they guaranteed the student loans with the matrimonial home’s equity. When the home was ultimately sold the proceeds did not in fact go towards the loans. Instead money is being held by LIBRO to be applied against them. These funds are essentially frozen.

[25] Respecting jewellery, the applicant explained why she had not placed any value for it in her NFP. She surmised that some of it was a gift, believing also she had much of it before marriage. This explanation is arguably self-serving, and clearly beneficial to her equalization position, which the respondent argues colours her entire testimony and casts into doubt those aspects of her NFP that conflict with his. That does not, however, mean it is untrue. However, given it is her onus, the question is whether she was able to prove the gifts or deductions. She was not.

[26] The respondent, in noting a $14,000.00 value for the jewellery, simply draws back from the insurance valuation. He argues this is the responsible and reasonable approach. He stresses the fact there is an obligation on a party to identity assets which they own, and to prove its value, which the applicant did not even attempt to do.

LAW & ANALYSIS

Parties Position on Law

[27] The respondent filed several cases, all illustrations of the court seeing fit, using trust principles, to declare a party’s beneficial interest in property. He wants me to essentially impose (and I chose that term purposely) a resulting trust declaring that the applicant has an equal interest in the Mexican property. It’s easy to see why he wants this, as it represents the difference between him making an equalization payment to the applicant, and her making one to him. The applicant opposes any finding she has an interest.

[28] In this respect, it is obvious that the respondent does not really want to involve his ex-wife in the decision making respecting the property, nor is he being benevolent in ensuring the applicant ultimately shares in future rental income or sale proceeds. That’s not what this is about. He is not doing this to ensure her full interest in and benefit to that property is realized. It is equally clear that, in a different context, the applicant would enthusiastically welcome the ownership interest. However, to the extent she does have an interest, and it’s not clear to me she does, the evidence establishes she is unequivocally prepared to forego and relinquish any right she has to property access, rental income, and sale proceeds.

[29] The applicant filed cases all of which confirm the generally accepted principle that the court is to decide marital property rights and equalization in strict compliance with the law, even if, in an individual case, doing so may offend the judge or amount to an unfairness. The only way to stray from this is to apply the unconscionability provision in section 5(6).

[30] The applicant argues that strict compliance with the FLA, and its marital property objectives, require that I attribute the Mexican property’s value solely to the respondent. She asks me to consider the difficulties I would be creating were I to do otherwise.

[31] The respondent counters that to grant her an interest would mean any benefits will hereafter accrue to her, just as it will him. The problem with this is we are dealing with foreign property which limits my jurisdiction to deal with it. For instance, I cannot order its sale, or empower or direct either party, or anyone for that matter, to do anything with it. On the other hand, the evidence establishes that the respondent is frequently in Mexico, collecting rents for the property, and otherwise treating it as his own. I have no authority to ensure the applicant’s ability to travel to Mexico, or that she can access the property.

[32] To force the applicant into this mix would create a hardship on her that would, by its nature, defeat the purpose of an equitable remedy. And, after all, that’s what a resulting trust is. In my view, the property’s location, and way in which it has been treated, means that in actual fact the applicant has no interest in it. To apply trust principles in this case, in these unique circumstances, would bring about a hollow result. In other words, it is not an equitable remedy if the effect is only to impose an obligation or hardship upon the supposed beneficial owner.

[33] I fully appreciate the context, which is the applicant did play a role in the decision to buy the property, and that the funds which flowed from the Canadian corporation were used to purchase it. This isn’t disputed. The question is, if I were to do as the respondent asks, what unfairness would I be remedying?

Case Law

[34] In Hamilton v. Hamilton 1999 CarswellOnt 2421, in addition to the matrimonial home, the parties had a cottage. Title was registered in the wife’s name only. The trial judge treated the cottage as a jointly owned “family asset” leaving it out of the net family property and equalization calculation. In doing so, the trial judge did not rely on trust principles, determining the purchase funds derived largely from a gift to them both from the husband’s mother.

[35] The Court of Appeal, while accepting the trial decision on joint ownership, indicates that that conclusion should have flowed from the FLA and its definition of property, which includes beneficial interests “arising from express, resulting and constructive trusts”. This decision reinforces the presumption in favour of a resulting trust when someone contributes financially to the purchase but does not take title, and when that contribution was not intended as a gift to the owner.

[36] Similarly in Kavcic v. Kavcic [1989] O.J. 1501, it was the plaintiff wife who sought both an equalization of net family property and an interest, under a resulting (or constructive) trust, in a condominium unit owned by the defendant husband. In applying trust principles, and determining that the plaintiff indeed had a beneficial interest, the court, as did respondent counsel in this case, highlighted the principles set out in Hamilton and Rawluk v. Rawluk (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 704.

[37] In Korman v. Korman 2015 ONCA 578 the trial judge ordered the wife, who alone held title to the matrimonial home, to make an equalization payment to the husband. The husband appealed challenging the trial judge’s finding that he gifted his interest in the matrimonial home to the wife. Again, this is an example of a litigant seeking a declaration that they themselves have a beneficial interest. The other distinguishing feature being, in each of these cases, with the property situate in Canada, the court had the ability to force actions that would realize the beneficial owner’s interest (i.e. force a sale; order access).

[38] The applicant argues these are not analogous and, because of the distinctive features of this case, which involves foreign property, not applicable. In each of them the non-titled party was asking the court to declare the trust.

[39] I agree with the applicant. The circumstances and context are far different. While I agree section 4 defines property as including “any interest” in both “real or personal property”, there is an obvious conflict between that plain reading; the objective the court is trying to achieve in each of Korman, Kavcic and Hamilton; and the whole purpose behind the FLA’s property regime and how it would apply in this case were I to declare an interest from a resulting trust.

[40] An equalization, recognizing that a marriage is, in part, an economic partnership, assumes that each spouse contributed equally to the relationship. The purpose behind this is to ensure spouses share the value of any property that was gained during marriage and still owned at separation. This does not contemplate an actual splitting of the property as each party is to keep that which they own. It is to equalize the net increase in value of the marital property, no matter who paid for it or whose name is on title.

[41] The applicant argues that, because the respondent owned the shares on the valuation date they are his to keep. She didn’t then, and doesn’t now, want any interest in them.

[42] What the court did in each of the cited cases was to give effect to the Act’s purposes. In each case, the person who was not on title, was being deprived of that which was rightfully theirs. And, more importantly, to not declare the interest, would have been to the non-titled spouse’s detriment.

[43] This is not what I am being asked to do. The respondent’s logic could arguably be applied to any item purchased with joint funds during a marriage. For example, could it really be said that section 4 applies so as to impact upon, let’s say a vehicle, that was purchased during marriage using joint funds, but which was legally registered to one spouse only? The very spouse who has possession of it on the valuation date? Would a court reasonably consider a request to not solely attribute the value of that vehicle to the titled spouse? Of course not. The Act’s purpose is achieved by including that in the titled spouses NFP and in allowing them to reap the benefits of that asset going forward (either in using it or by selling it). This is the proper analogy.

[44] What does give me pause are the court’s comments at para. 26 in Hamilton, where it writes:

The first step required by s.4 is to identity all relevant property. Then ownership has to be determined. At this stage trust principles may be brought to bear such that ownership of property for net family property purposes is deemed to be different from that which may be recorded in a title document. Once the ownership of property is established, the value of the property at the valuation date must be determined.

[45] Also, section 14 of the FLA provides that:

The rule of law applying a presumption of a resulting trust shall be applied to questions of ownership of property between spouses, as if they were not married, except that,

(a) the fact that property is held in the name of spouses as joint tenants is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the spouses are intended to own the property as joint tenants; and

(b) money on deposit in the name of both spouses shall be deemed to be in the name of the spouses as joint tenants for the purposes of clause (a).

[46] However, this must be read in light of the general purpose of the regime, and para. 39, where the court goes on to say that:

A presumption of a resulting trust arises in favour of persons who contribute financially to the purchase of property but do not take title in their own name, and do not intend to give a gift of the entire beneficial interest in the property to the registered or recorded title holder. Equity presumes that the non-titled party does not intend a gift when he contributes to the purchase price of a property. The non-titled party is treated as the equitable holder of the beneficial interest; the extent of his other beneficial interest is proportionate to the financial contribution made to acquire the property. The presumption of a resulting trust is rebuttable on a showing by the title holder that the non-titled party intended the title-holder to have the property for his or her own benefit. The presumption of a resulting trust is also rebuttable on a showing that the transfer to the titled party was not gratuitous.

[47] In a way, the respondent’s request turns the analysis on its head. In our case the party making the claim (respondent) is not doing so to have a beneficial interest declared for him personally, but to impose it against the will of another (applicant), with a view to minimize or completely eliminate a financial obligation, and possibly even trigger a payment to him. This is the respondent’s goal.

[48] But if, as the court says in Hamilton, this concept is grounded in the law of equity, and again a resulting trust is an equitable remedy, its application on these facts makes no sense. Equity is based on a judicial assessment of fairness as an alternative to the rigid rules of the common law. It was conceived as an appeal to one’s conscience.

[49] No one is asking me to consider s. 5(6). However, if the respondent’s view of the law is correct, and I must by virtue of ss. 4 and 14 of the FLA find that the applicant has a beneficial interest in a foreign property, which she doesn’t want, it is arguable that an unconscionable result would ensue. In those circumstances, given the respondent has title, will continue to have title, is and will continue to reap the benefits of any rents he can collect, and receive (together with his other investors) sale proceeds, and most importantly given the person who would supposedly benefit from this would not in fact benefit at all, we would have an overwhelmingly one sided result. This becomes evident as I consider the court’s limitations in actually dealing with foreign property. I have no ability to give direction and hold the respondent to account in any way, or otherwise ensure the applicant’s beneficial interest is protected.

CONCLUSIONS

How to Treat Mexican Property?

[50] The complete value of the respondent’s interest in the Mexican property is properly included on his side of the NFP statement.

What is Each Party’s NFP?

[51] After considering the evidence and reviewing the document briefs, I reach the following conclusions respecting valuation date property values:

• I adopt the respondent’s position respecting the value of the matrimonial home and, because it was jointly owned, attribute to each half the value - $168,935.98.
• I decline to, as the applicant requests, list on the respondent’s NFP $22,504.42 as money paid on behalf of Biojote, and $14,928.00 on account of funds, she alleges, he personally took from the sale proceeds.
• I accept the respondent’s position respecting the value of the matrimonial home’s contents, noting half on each party’s NFP - $4000.00.
• The value of the 2003 Volkswagen Jetta TDI is fully attributed to the applicant - $6,937.50.
• The value of the 2001 Toyota Echo is fully attributed to the respondent - $2,150.00.
• There should be no diminution of the 2000 Mercedes’ black book value, and I therefore note for the respondent $4,612.00.
• Respecting the 1999 Honda VT750 the respondent bears its full valuation date value - $3000.00.
• I agree with the respondent and accept that the Mexican corporation owns the 2008 Toyota Camry, and should not be attributed to him personally.
• The respondent advances the position that, even though the applicant was silent on this, a value should be noted, to each party, for jewellery, art, electronics, tools, sports and hobby equipment. I agree. There is an obligation on a party to note their assets, prove its value, and justify deductions. In this case the applicant’s silence doesn’t make it go away. The applicant has not established any such items were gifted to her. The respondent identified these assets and went to some effort to determine appropriate values. In the result the applicant bears a $14,000.00 value for this category, and the respondent $2,800.00.
• There will be equal value attributions for each of their Libro joint chequing account, US dollar account, and Libro business account.
• Although of little consequence, I adopt the respondent’s position respecting their RBC joint savings account - $10.29.
• Respecting a series of items listed in their NFP statements, and the comparison, beginning at the Tangerine savings account on page 5 and continuing until the end of that page, I adopt the values and attributions that the parties agree upon.
• Respecting the first three items listed in the Business Interests section of the comparison, I adopt the applicant’s position noting for her the values listed.
• Because of a lack of evidence, and my confusion arising from both the testimony and document briefs, I assign no values for each of these items:
  • Savings / TD Canada Trust (Account #0154985)
  • Class A Shares Profit Shares RSP (Libro)
  • Class A Profit Shares Account (Libro)
  • Member Shares Biojote Account (Libro)
• Given my conclusion respecting the Mexican property, the respondent’s NFP includes the full value of his shares in the corporation, which I list at $229,500.00.

[52] The total value of property owned by each on the valuation date is as follows: Applicant = $331,158.67 Respondent = $587,409.84

[53] I reach the following conclusions respecting valuation date debts and liabilities:

• On the CRA donation issue I note for the applicant $5,700.00, and the respondent $3,410.77.
• I accept the parties agreed upon value for the item listed at the top of page 9 of the comparison (Notional Income Tax - Contingent Tax Liability - 25% of RRSP’s) - noting for the applicant $31,775.50 and respondent $39.074.25.
• For the same reason I declined to assign a property value for the $22,504, I decline to note for each the shared debt on the loan repayment to A.T. Marshall.
• They equally share the debt associated with the Joint Meritline Line of Credit - $56,927.17.

[54] The total of all valuation date debts and liabilities for each is as follows: Applicant = $94,402.67 Respondent = $99,412.19

[55] I reach the following conclusions respecting the net value of property held on the date of marriage:

• I was impressed by the time and effort the respondent put into researching this issue, and in the documentation he kept and was able to retrieve in order to substantiate this part of his NFP statement. Having regard to his testimony, and the pre-marriage asset brief, I adopt the respondent’s valuations for each item listed in section 3 of the comparison.
• There are no assets or debts to attribute the applicant.

[56] The total value of all date of marriage assets for each is as follows: Applicant = $0 Respondent = $139,250.85

[57] The total of all date of marriage debts and liabilities for each is as follows: Applicant = $0 Respondent = $45,999.00

[58] The net value of property owned by the respondent on the date of marriage is therefore $93,251.85.

[59] Each party’s NFP is: Applicant = $236,756.00 Respondent = $394,745.80

Equalization Payment

[60] In order to equalize their net family properties, the respondent would pay to the applicant $78,994.90.

Post Separation Adjustments

[61] The last issue to address is whether to allow post separation adjustments in order to rectify, what the respondent alleges, were unequal contributions to home renovations and RESP’s. Upon my review of the testimony and briefs, and after considering counsel’s submissions, I believe the evidence establishes that, respecting post separation renovations to the matrimonial home, $9,241.50 is due the respondent. Respecting post separation RESP contributions I am not satisfied an adjustment is required. In the result $9,241.50 is deducted from that which the respondent owes.

ORDER & COSTS

[62] The respondent is therefore ordered to pay the applicant $69,753.40.

[63] Should the parties not agree on costs, I invite brief written submissions together with a costs outline. The applicant shall file within 30 days, and the respondent 10 days after that.

“Justice J. C. George” Justice J.C. George Released: January 18, 2017

SCHEDULE

APPLICANT WIFE

Valuation Date Assets: MH - $168,935.98 MH contents - $4000.00 2003 VW Jetta - $6,937.50 Jewellery etc. - $14,000.00 Libro JC- $8,284.03 Libro USD - $125.77 Libro Bus. - $101.26 RBC Jt. - $10.29 RBC TFSA - $2,437.50 Trimark RRSP - $83,419.41 Libro/Tri. RRSP - $18,449.67 Libro Locked in RRSP - $23,816.26 Class A PS KMM - $401.00 Class A PS Sub 1 - $215.00 Class P PS Sub 1 - $25.00 Total: $331,158.67

Valuation Date Liabilities: CRA - $5,700.00 NIT Contingent Tax Liability - $31,775.50 Joint Meritline LOC - $56,927.17 Total: $94,402.67

At Marriage Assets (Other than MH): Total: $0

At Marriage Debts: Total: $0

Net Value of DOM Property = $0

NET FAMILY PROPERTY = $236,756.00

RESPONDENT HUSBAND

Valuation Date Assets: MH - $168,935.98 MH contents - $4000.00 2001 Toyota Echo - $2,150.00 2000 Mercedes - $4,162.00 1999 Honda - $3000.00 Jewellery etc. - $2,800.00 Libro JC - $8,284.03 Libro USD - $125.77 Libro Bus. - $101.26 RBC Jt. - $10.29 Tangerine Savings - $8,810.05 Tangerine Savings - $35.46 Libro RRSP - $155,495.00 Biojote SA de DV shares - $229,500.00 Total: $587,409.84

Valuation Date Liabilities: CRA - $3,410.77 NIT Contingent Tax Liability - $39,074.25 Joint Meritline LOC - $56,927.17 Total: $99,412.19

At Marriage Assets (Other than MH): Belfast Home - $67,694.00 Belfast Home Furnishings - $8,000.00 1983 VW Polo - $7,964.00 Jewellery, electronics, etc. - $2,000.00 RTS - $4,155.72 RTC - $2,000.00 RT RRSP - $108.04 RT RHOSP - $3,277.13 Scotiabank UK Acct. - $250.88 CSB’s - $27,852.62 TSB Chq. - $1,991.00 Northern Bank - $11,946.00 Northern Bank Ltd. - $608.46 Cash - $1,403.00 Total: $139,250.85

At Marriage Debts: Abbey National Building - $45,999.00 Total: $45,999.00

Net Value of DOM Property = $93,251.85

NET FAMILY PROPERTY = $394,745.80