ST. THOMAS COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-0021-00BR DELIVERED ORALLY: Thursday, April 13, 2017
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – DONAL WILHELM PARKER
Counsel: Stephanie L. Venne, for the Crown William J. Glover, for the Defence
HEARD: April 10, 2017
REASONS ON BAIL REVIEW APPLICATION
Howard J.
Overview
[1] This is an application by the accused, Donald Wilhelm Parker, pursuant to ss. 515, 520, and 524(13) of the Criminal Code, for an order setting aside the order of Justice of the Peace C. Emrich made December 23, 2016, at St. Thomas, detaining the applicant in custody, and for an order granting the applicant judicial interim release subject to such conditions as this court deems just.
[2] The issues before me are two-fold. First, whether the accused has shown cause to vacate the detention order, pursuant to s. 520 of the Criminal Code, through new evidence establishing a material and relevant change in circumstances. And if so, whether the accused has met his burden to satisfy the court that detention is no longer necessary for the protection or safety of the public pursuant to s. 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code.
[3] I begin the analysis by reminding myself that s. 11(e) of our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms clearly provides that any person charged with an offence has the right “not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause.”
Factual Background
[4] The applicant is charged with one count of break and enter, to wit, a dwelling house situated at 67 Dunkirk Drive, St. Thomas, with intent to commit an indictable offence therein, contrary to s. 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
[5] A bail hearing was heard before Justice of the Peace Emrich on December 23, 2016.
[6] The factual allegations were read into the record below and are now before me.
[7] At the material times in question, Ms. Chantdell Shearer was residing at 67 Dunkirk Drive, St. Thomas, Ontario, with her three children, and, until very recently, the accused, Mr. Parker. At the time of the incident, Ms. Shearer was 31, having been born on August 31, 1985. The three children who resided with her were Chloe Baker, who was 14-years-of-age at the time of the preliminary inquiry on September 22, 2016, Mackenzie Baker, then 11 years-of-age, and Gabriel Shearer, who was then five years-of-age. Gabriel’s natural parents are Ms. Shearer and Mr. Parker.
[8] Ms. Shearer had commenced a romantic relationship with Mr. Parker in August 2010. By December of that year, Ms. Shearer believed the relationship had changed for the worse because she believed Mr. Parker had a drug addiction and was “going back and forth between [herself] and his ex-girlfriend.” Ms. Shearer perceived it was a “constant battle” of “the drugs and the cheating, so it was rocky.”
[9] The parties do not fully agree on the details of the on-again/off-again nature of the relationship, but it seems that for at least a year leading up to a month before the incident, Mr. Parker was sleeping at 67 Dunkirk Drive very regularly if not every night, such that, one could say he treated it as his residence as well. Mr. Parker states in his affidavit filed in support of this application that from March 22, 2016, to June 30, 2016, he resided on a temporary basis with his father, Mr. Donald Parker Sr., at 31 Parkside Drive, in St. Thomas.
[10] At the time of the incident, Mr. Parker had been working full-time as an assembler at the Cami Automotive Plant in Ingersoll, Ontario.
[11] While the precise date appears to be in issue between the parties, it is common ground that the relationship between the complainant and the accused ended within a matter of days before the incident in question. To that end, Mr. Parker had moved out of the residence within days before the attack.
[12] On or about the time of Mr. Parker moving out of the residence, Ms. Shearer discovered that she had lost her keys to the house, i.e., the key that opens the front and back door. She asked Mr. Parker if he knew where the keys were, and he denied any knowledge. The evidence indicates that it is not unusual for Ms. Shearer to misplace items. Ms. Shearer made a replacement key on Friday, April 22nd, but did not change the locks on the residence.
[13] On the evening of Saturday, April 23, 2016, Ms. Shearer prepared for bed according to her usual routine. Her three children were home with her in the residence at 67 Dunkirk Drive. Her older daughter, Chloe, and her son, Gabriel, were in the upstairs bedrooms, and her younger daughter, Mackenzie, went to sleep on the living room couch on the main floor. Ms. Shearer locked the back door and had asked Mackenzie to lock the front door, although she acknowledged during the preliminary hearing that she did not actually know if Mackenzie did in fact lock the front door.
[14] The family had two dogs, an older golden Labrador named Lucy, and a two-year-old boxer named Lilly. Lilly had been described as “temperamental” and “very protective of [Ms. Shearer] and [her] children” and she would start to bark “the second as you go to even open the door.” The family had posted a “Beware of Dog” sign on the gate to the backyard.
[15] That said, the evidence of Ms. Shearer at the preliminary inquiry was that Lilly was very friendly with Mr. Parker, and that when he was around, Lilly would be a “very non-aggressive … happy dog.”
[16] That night, according to her routine, Ms. Shearer had taken her sleeping medication, and had let the two dogs outside, fed them, brought them back inside, and put them to bed. The evidence was that, consistent with her nightly routine, Ms. Shearer secured Lilly with a long leash and collar in her bedroom, due to the dog’s temperament, and Lilly then slept on the floor at the foot of Ms. Shearer’s bed in a sort of “cocoon” of blankets.
[17] That night, Ms. Shearer texted both Mr. Parker and Mr. Stuart Ingram, a friend from her childhood days, and then went to sleep sometime after 11:00 p.m.
[18] Between 11:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 23, 2016, and 12:30 a.m. on Sunday, April 24, 2016, Ms. Shearer woke up suddenly, feeling that she was unable to breathe. She had been lying down on her stomach, but woke up with an unknown person sitting on her lower back. The person had duct-taped Ms. Shearer’s neck and was holding her down. Struggling, Ms. Shearer attempted to pull the duct tape away from her neck as she felt she could not breathe. The person behind her held her by the hair and both pulled her head backwards and pushed her forwards. Ms. Shearer struggled and used her right hand to punch backwards, while her head moved back and forth, all the while attempting to loosen the duct tape around her neck for air.
[19] At some point, Ms. Shearer’s nose banged against something hard and started to bleed.
[20] The assailant ran away out the back door and through the back gate, leaving it open. The struggle woke up Mackenzie, who ran to her mother, terrified, asking her what was going on. Ms. Shearer was in hysterics. That set off the dog Lilly, who began to bark. Ms. Shearer immediately called 911 at 12:44 a.m. that Saturday morning to report the incident.
[21] The crime scene was processed by Forensic Identification for evidence. Ms. Shearer was checked medically and found to have small cuts to her mouth and nose, causing the bleeding and scratches to her sore neck, along with a bruised and sore right index finger. Evidence was seized, including the blue-coloured duct tape used on Ms. Shearer’s neck, black disposable gloves from the bedroom (found amongst the blankets in Lilly’s “cocoon’), and Ms. Shearer’s cell phone.
[22] The police found no signs of forcible entry.
[23] Ms. Shearer was interviewed on video by the police, and she was adamant that she never saw nor heard the person responsible for the attack. Ms. Shearer told the police that she had recently ended a relationship with Mr. Parker some days before the incident. Ms. Shearer described the accused within the context of the relationship as being obsessive, possessive, and controlling.
[24] Mr. Parker cooperated with the police throughout. He attended the St. Thomas police station voluntarily and gave a statement to the police, telling Detective Constable Terri Hikele that he had indeed gone to 67 Dunkirk Drive that night on April 23, 2016, around 11:45 p.m. He said that he knocked on the door of the residence but received no answer from Ms. Shearer or anyone else. He denied entering the house.
[25] Mr. Parker also consented to providing a DNA sample to St. Thomas police.
[26] Mr. Parker volunteered to St. Thomas police that he had seen Ms. Ashley Jones, a cab driver for Red Line Taxi, that night, and they had mutually acknowledged each other.
[27] Statements were obtained from the neighbours and people visiting in the area of 67 Dunkirk Drive, including Ms. Jones, who confirmed that she saw Mr. Parker at approximately 11:45 p.m. on Saturday night, April 23, 2016, in his vehicle driving southbound on Dunkirk Drive towards 67 Dunkirk Drive. Ms. Jones recognized Mr. Parker, made eye contact with him, and waved at him.
[28] In his statement to the police, Mr. Parker confirmed that he had placed spyware on Ms. Shearer’s computer to track what she was doing, that he was suspicious of Ms. Shearer, and that he did not trust her. This is consistent with the evidence of Ms. Shearer that he was obsessive, possessive, and controlling of her.
[29] The blue duct tape and black disposable gloves seized from the scene were submitted to the Centre of Forensics Sciences, in Toronto, together with the DNA sample provided by Mr. Parker. The results were returned on June 30, 2016, which concluded that DNA belonging to Mr. Parker had been located on the inside of the disposable gloves retrieved from the bedroom of Ms. Shearer. The report also indicated that DNA belonging to Mr. Parker had been located at the end of the duct tape that had been applied to Ms. Shearer’s neck.
[30] Ms. Shearer was re-interviewed and confirmed that she kept no blue duct tape or black disposable gloves kept on the property or inside her house on or before April 23, 2016.
[31] Her evidence was that she kept only gardening gloves and work gloves and that, because she is allergic to latex, she does not bring disposable gloves into her home, not wanting to take a chance that they may contain latex.
[32] Ms. Shearer also gave evidence at the preliminary inquiry that a few days before the incident, she had gone to Wal-Mart to purchase some items for a project of Mackenzie’s, including some Gorilla-brand duct tape, which is black in colour.
[33] Mr. Parker was arrested on the current charge before the court on June 30, 2016. He appeared in court on July 1, 2016, and was ordered under s. 516(2) of the Criminal Code not to communicate directly or indirectly with Ms. Shearer.
[34] On August 23, 2016, Mr. Parker was charged with failing to comply with the s. 516(2) non-communication order under s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code, in that, he sent Ms. Shearer a handwritten, signed letter from Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre by regular mail. It is common ground that Ms. Shearer did not open the letter but called the police and turned the letter over to them.
[35] On September 22, 2016, Ms. Shearer testified at the preliminary hearing, along with Detective Constable Terri Hikele (the investigating officer), Constable Marc Vaughan, and Ms. Heather Shacker from the Centre of Forensics Sciences in Toronto. Mr. Parker was committed to trial at the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry on the one count of break-and-enter.
[36] On September 27, 2016, Mr. Parker pled guilty to the failing to comply charge, acknowledging that he communicated directly with Ms. Shearer by sending the letter to her from the Detention Centre. Mr. Parker received one day deemed served and 20 days pre-sentence custody as his sentence.
[37] As indicated above, on December 23, 2016, Mr. Parker had a judicial interim release hearing before Justice of the Peace Emrich, who subsequently detained him on the secondary grounds.
[38] In his application, Mr. Parker complains of significant delay in disclosure of material evidence until after his bail hearing, including, in particular, text messages from Ms. Shearer’s cell phone between herself and Mr. Ingram. It appears this evidence was held by the police but not released to either the Crown Attorney’s office or Mr. Parker’s counsel prior to the bail hearing.
[39] To that end, on March 3, 2017, the applicant was provided with disclosure of all of the text messages that were retrieved from Ms. Shearer’s cell phone that were in addition to the text messages exchanged between Mr. Parker and Ms. Shearer leading up to the offence. The disclosure involved some 657 text messages exchanged between Ms. Shearer and other parties, including Mr. Parker and Mr. Ingram. Of those 657 text messages, 411 messages were exchanged between Ms. Shearer and Mr. Ingram.
[40] Ms. Shearer’s evidence is that she and Mr. Ingram had been friends since they were 12 years old, and that there were periods of time when they kept in touch and other times when they had no contact with each other.
[41] In Ms. Shearer’s cell phone records, communications with Mr. Ingram appear under the screen name of “Mon Amie” in her contact list. When asked why Ms. Shearer would cause Mr. Ingram’s name to appear under a different name in her contact list, Ms. Shearer explained that from time to time, Mr. Parker would take her SIM card and look at her information, or take her cell phone and look at it to see the names of those individuals with whom Ms. Shearer was communicating.
[42] Mr. Ingram subsequently provided a statement to the police on March 6, 2017, in which he acknowledged that he and Ms. Shearer would text messages back and forth at times. He advised that he lives in London, Ontario, and that he does not drive, nor does he have access to a motor vehicle. He said that his recollection of where Ms. Shearer lives is vague. He said that he does not know Ms. Shearer’s address, and that he did not attend at Ms. Shearer’s residence on April 23, 2016. His evidence was that he had never been to Ms. Shearer’s residence, nor had he ever met her children or her dogs.
[43] On March 20, 2017, the trial of the charges against Mr. Parker commenced before a judge and jury, with the Honourable Madam Justice K. Gorman presiding. The jury was selected, the Crown delivered its opening statement, Constable Bryant testified, and Ms. Shearer gave her testimony in-chief and was part way through her cross-examination.
[44] However, on Thursday, March 23, 2017, counsel for Mr. Parker brought an application for a mistrial based upon what he considered to be the spurious “bad character” evidence being offered up by Ms. Shearer. Justice Gorman allowed the defence application and declared a mistrial.
[45] On March 28, 2017, the Crown consented to the applicant’s request to re-elect his mode of trial to a judge-alone trial. A new trial date of May 23, 2017, has been scheduled for Mr. Parker’s trial by judge alone.
Guiding Principles
[46] It is common ground that in R. v. St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the standard of review applicable to superior court judges under ss. 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code.
[47] The Supreme Court has held that the Criminal Code does not confer an open-ended discretion on the reviewing judge to vary the initial decision concerning the detention or release of the accused. Rather, the provisions establish a hybrid remedy.
[48] The Supreme Court held:
On the basis of the wording of ss. 520 and 521 [of the Code], a comparison with other review provisions and with sentence appeals, and the nature of the decision being reviewed, I conclude that these sections do not confer on the reviewing judge an open-ended power to review the initial order respecting the detention or release of the accused. The reviewing judge must therefore determine whether it is appropriate to exercise this power of review.
It will be appropriate to intervene if the justice has erred in law. It will also be appropriate for the reviewing judge to exercise this power if the impugned decision was clearly inappropriate, that is, if the justice who rendered it gave excessive weight to one relevant factor or insufficient weight to another. The reviewing judge therefore does not have the power to interfere with the initial decision simply because he or she would have weighed the relevant factors differently. … Finally, where new evidence is submitted by the accused or the prosecutor as permitted by ss. 520 and 521 [Code], the reviewing judge may vary the initial decision if that evidence shows a material and relevant change in the circumstances of the case.
[49] The Supreme Court went on to consider the test for establishing a material change in circumstances, and it concluded that the four criteria established in its decision in Palmer v. The Queen, were relevant and appropriate, with any necessary modifications, in the context of a bail review.
[50] The four criteria in Palmer for establishing a material change in circumstances are:
a. The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at the bail hearing; b. The evidence must be relevant to an issue; c. The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and d. It must be such that if believed, and when taken with the other evidence adduced at the bail hearing, it could reasonably be expected to have affected the result.
Analysis
[51] In his notice of application before me, Mr. Parker does not argue that Justice of the Peace Emrich committed an error of law in her decision. Rather, his materials, and the argument before me, focused on whether the late disclosure of the text messages could be said to constitute a material change in circumstances, such that, this court would then be authorized to repeat the analysis and balancing exercise under s. 515(10)(c) of the Code as if I were the initial decision-maker.
[52] In particular, Mr. Parker argues that the 411 text messages between Ms. Shearer and Mr. Ingram establish that Mr. Ingram “had the motive, opportunity, and inclination to attend at and enter the complainant’s residence.”
The four Palmer criteria
[53] In terms of the four Palmer criteria for establishing a material change in circumstances, Ms. Venne has very candidly and very properly conceded on behalf of the Crown that the first three elements of the Palmer analysis are satisfied in this case.
[54] It is common ground that the critical factor in this case is the fourth criteria. The applicant argues that if the evidence of the 411 text messages between Ms. Shearer and Mr. Ingram had been before the Justice of the Peace, they would have, if believed, and when taken with the other evidence adduced at the bail hearing, reasonably be expected to have affected the result.
[55] The applicant’s argument focuses on a handful of the 411 text messages and, more specifically, some of the texts that were exchanged between Ms. Shearer and Mr. Ingram on the evening of April 23, 2016, in the hours before the assault, where the two are musing about whether Mr. Ingram could come over and how he might go about doing that, given that he lives in London and does not have a car. Not surprisingly, the applicant places considerable emphasis on the texts sent at 7:20 p.m. from Mr. Ingram to Ms. Shearer where he says, referencing his friend Dave, that: “Dave said he’d drive … LOL” and again at 8:49 p.m. where Mr. Ingram says: “He [meaning Dave] was also urging me to go to ur place tonight and fuck your brains out.”
[56] I have read the text messages in question. When I read all the text messages collectively, I would say that the 8:49 p.m. text is not representative of the tone of the communications between Mr. Ingram and Ms. Shearer. Indeed, in my view, it is not without significance that Mr. Ingram attributed the “fuck your brains out” comment to his friend Dave, in the context of which there is a tone that Mr. Ingram almost eschews responsibility for the comment, attributing it to his buddy.
[57] In my view, without focussing on a singular comment, but rather viewing as a whole all of the text messages between Mr. Ingram and Ms. Shearer – which is in keeping with the spirit of the fourth Palmer criteria, which directs the court to consider the evidence “when taken with the other evidence adduced at the bail hearing” – I would characterize the communications between Mr. Ingram and Ms. Shearer that evening as general flirting, with the occasional suggestive or even graphic reference. I would add that the suggestive comments come from Mr. Ingram, and are typically and somewhat gently or politely rebuffed or side-stepped by Ms. Shearer.
[58] I would also observe that the suggestion of Mr. Ingram coming over that evening is certainly not the exclusive topic of discussion, nor even the predominant one. There is, for example, a not insignificant amount of their text discussion that night that is devoted to Mr. Ingram’s report that he had just smoked a marijuana joint and the ensuing discussion about the relative benefits of different types of “weed papers” and Ms. Shearer’s use of different types of flavoured weed papers, including her favourite flavour, which apparently is watermelon.
[59] On my read of the texts that evening, the predominant theme – and certainly the most consistent message from Ms. Shearer – is how tired she was feeling that night, culminating in her various texts that, for example, “I think I’m going to bed night xo” (10:05 p.m.), “I don’t wanna move” (10:12 p.m.), “I’m awake but I am not leaving this bed” (10:22 p.m.), “my bed is holding me hostage” (10:29 p.m.), “I crashed” (10:47 p.m.), and ending with Ms. Shearer saying “Goodnight” (11:01 p.m.), to which Mr. Ingram replies “Night baby.”
[60] In terms of the applicant’s argument that the text messages confirm that Mr. Ingram “had the motive, opportunity, and inclination to attend at and enter the complainant’s residence,” I accept that, as whole, they support the notion that Mr. Ingram would have liked to have gone over to see Ms. Shearer that evening. I would even accept that the 7:20 p.m. text that “Dave said he’d drive … LOL,” notwithstanding its apparently joking tone, could reasonably be considered to be evidence of his opportunity to attend at Ms. Shearer’s home.
[61] But, that said, I do not accept that the text messages confirm Mr. Ingram’s inclination to attend at and enter the complainant’s home. Ms. Shearer repeatedly told Mr. Ingram that she was very tired and wasn’t moving from her bed. In my view, his messages show he was accepting of that and sympathetic to her fatigued condition. To suggest that his text messages establish that, despite him knowing that she just wanted to sleep, he showed an inclination to go over to her residence and enter her home is, in my view, simply not supported by the evidence.
[62] Consequently, I reject the applicant’s argument that had the text messages been before the Justice of the Peace at the bail hearing in December 2016, they would have, if believed, and when taken with the other evidence adduced at the bail hearing, reasonably be expected to have affected the result.
[63] On the contrary, I agree with the contention of the Crown that, if the text messages had been available at the bail hearing in December 2016, they would have corroborated the evidence that was read into the record and also would have shown the unpredictability or volatility of the applicant in his communications with Ms. Shearer. That volatility is, for example, quite evident in the exchanges between Mr. Parker and Ms. Shearer on April 21st.
[64] Mr. Parker was denied bail on the secondary grounds. In my view, disclosure of the text messages would have reinforced the need for the protection and safety of Ms. Shearer and her children. Again, the evidence is that in his statement to the police, Mr. Parker confirmed that he had placed spyware on Ms. Shearer’s computer to track what she was doing, that he was suspicious of Ms. Shearer, and that he did not trust her. That is consistent with the evidence of Ms. Shearer that he was obsessive, possessive, and controlling of her. That is also consistent with the reasons why Ms. Shearer felt compelled to use an alias contact name for Mr. Ingram in her cell phone contact list because from time to time, Mr. Parker would take her cell phone and look at it to see who Ms. Shearer was communicating with.
[65] In my view, disclosure of the additional text messages would have put Ms. Shearer at a greater risk that the applicant may commit further offences towards her given the nature of the relationship that she had with him and the fact that the applicant is now privy to the content of all of her text messages with Mr. Ingram.
[66] In sum, disclosure of the additional text messages would not have affected the result and the decision of the Justice of the Peace not to release Mr. Parker. Rather, the disclosure would have increased the vulnerability of Ms. Shearer and her children, which elevates the risk on the secondary grounds.
Detention is still justified
[67] Although not necessary given my conclusion above, even if the applicant had satisfied all four of the Palmer criteria and had established that a material change in circumstances has taken place, thus authorizing this court to undertake the analysis of the decision-maker at first instance, I would still conclude that detention is justified after reviewing and balancing all of the factors.
[68] Again, I reiterate my view that with the disclosure of the text messages, and the applicant now being aware of the content of the communications between Mr. Ingram and Ms. Shearer, coupled with the applicant’s admitted suspicion of Ms. Shearer, the disclosure only underscores the need for Ms. Shearer’s protection and safety.
[69] Moreover, I agree with the submissions of Ms. Venne, as set out in paras. 39 and 40 of the Crown’s factum, as follows:
In the Applicant’s application and affidavit, the Applicant articulates a bail plan that is less onerous than the one he presented at the initial judicial interim release hearing on December 23, 2016, which included his father as a surety. Justice of the Peace Emrich ruled that the Applicant’s bail plan was not sufficient to guard against safety and protection for Ms. Shearer and her children on the secondary grounds.
The Applicant is proposing to be released on his own recognizance and to be supervised through the John Howard Society Bail Verification Program, which is unacceptable to the Respondent given the secondary grounds of protection and safety initially presented at the bail hearing in the additional concerns that are presented at this stage of the proceedings, which heightens the risk on the secondary grounds.
[70] The new bail plan suggests that the applicant be subject to house arrest within his father’s apartment. I do not need to repeat all of the concerns that were canvassed in the original bail hearing and the decision of the Justice of the Peace concerning Mr. Parker Sr.; I merely say that some of the same considerations apply to the new plan. In particular, Mr. Parker Sr. has his own health concerns. In my view, it is not so much a question of the good intentions of Mr. Parker Sr. but rather his abilities.
[71] Further, even if the court were to impose a complete prohibition on Mr. Parker operating his motor vehicle, it has to be acknowledged that the Parkside Drive residence of the father is not that far from the Dunkirk Drive residence of the complainant. They are easily within walking distance, within a small community. One cannot escape that reality, and, in my view, that is a significant factor in considering whether there is a substantial risk that if the applicant were released from custody, he would commit further criminal offences or interfere with the administration of justice.
[72] For all of these reasons, I would conclude, had it been necessary, that detention is justified.
Delay
[73] For the sake of completeness, I would also address the argument touched on in Mr. Parker’s notice of application that there has been a significant delay in these proceedings. Mr. Parker points to the consequences of the mistrial that was declared on March 23, 2017.
[74] In response, I agree with the submissions of the Crown on point. I would add that, while it is unfortunate that the comments made by the complainant during the course of the first trial before Justice Gorman resulted in a mistrial – and I note that no fault was attributed to either Crown counsel or the applicant’s counsel – as a result of Mr. Parker’s re-election to a judge-alone trial, his trial has now been scheduled to commence May 23, 2017, which is less than six weeks away at this point. Mr. Parker will not be waiting until the fall sittings for his trial. In the circumstances, I do not accept the argument that there will be significant and impermissible delay until Mr. Parker’s next trial.
Conclusion
[75] Accordingly, for all of these reasons, I find that the applicant has not established a material change of circumstances. In particular, in my view, the evidence of the late-disclosed text messages, when taken with the other evidence adduced at the bail hearing, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.
[76] In the result, and notwithstanding Mr. Glover’s able argument, I dismiss the application for judicial interim release.
“original delivered by Howard J.”
J. Paul R. Howard Justice