COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-4953 DATE: 2017-02-24

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Ms. Malkovich and Ms. Gzik, Crown Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen

- and -

BRANDON BARREIRA, JOSHUA BARREIRA, CHAD DAVIDSON and LOUIS REBELO Ms. Goldlist, Defence Counsel for Brandon Barreira Mr. Zaduk and Ms. Page, Defence Counsel for Joshua Barreira Mr. White and Ms. Audet, Defence Counsel for Chad Davidson Mr. Dorsz, Defence Counsel for Louis Rebelo

HEARD: at Hamilton February 21, 2017

REASONS FOR RULING – DEFENCE APPLICATION TO EDIT STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED JOSHUA BARREIRA

The Honourable Mr. Justice Skarica

INTRODUCTION

[1] Tyler Johnson was shot in the heart at close range on November 30th, 2013 in downtown Hamilton. Surveillance videos show the shooter (a man wearing a red hood) approaching the victim Mr. Johnson with a gun in his hand and then shooting Mr. Johnson, who ultimately died from his injuries. The shooter can be seen to be accompanied by two other men when approaching the victim. It is alleged by the Crown that Mr. Chad Davidson (Chad) is the shooter and Mr. Joshua Barreira (Joshua) is one of the three accused who assisted Chad in a planned and deliberate murder. Joshua was arrested on February 14, 2013 and provided statements to the police on February 14, 2014 (Statement #1) and again on May 20, 2014 (Statement #2). Joshua provided a third statement to Susan Clairmont, a reporter with the Hamilton Spectator, and this statement was published in the Hamilton Spectator on September 11, 2014 (Statement #3). All three of these statements have been ruled admissible at this trial, subject to editing.

ISSUES

[2] Should Statement #1 (of February 14, 2014) be edited to remove numerous references to Joshua’s not wishing to say anything? Should references in this statement to other criminal activity and other potential prejudicial references also be edited out of the statement?

[3] Should Statement #2 (of May 20, 2014) be similarly edited? Is Joshua’s willingness to submit to a polygraph test relevant and admissible at this trial?

ISSUE #1 – DEFENCE APPLICATION TO EDIT STATEMENT #1

BACKGROUND FACTS

[4] Chad Davidson, Joshua Barreira, and the two other accused are charged with the first degree murder of Tyler Johnson on November 30, 2013.

[5] As indicated in previous rulings, my review of the materials filed on this motion and other motions to be decided before me indicates the Crown will adduce a videotape which allegedly shows the victim Mr. Johnson being shot at close range by Chad.

[6] I understand that the Crown’s theory is that Chad shot Mr. Johnson and was aided and abetted by the other three accused in a planned and deliberate murder.

[7] One of the accused, Joshua, has given three statements. The latter two statements indicate that Chad is the shooter and the other three accused charged were innocent bystanders who happened to be merely in the wrong place at the wrong time. These statements are only admissible against Joshua and not against Chad or the other two accused.

[8] Joshua was arrested on February 14, 2014 and provided a videotaped statement that was approximately three hours in length (Statement #1). A voir dire was held on Statement #1 at this trial and I held that the statement was voluntary and admissible at Joshua’s trial, subject to deleting references to his criminal record and criminal past. I also held that Joshua’s statements to the police on May 20, 2014 (Statement #2) and to Susan Clairmont, a reporter employed by the Hamilton Spectator, on or about September 11, 2014, (Statement #3) were also admissible at his trial (see R. v. Barreira, Barreira, Davidson & Rebelo, 2016 ONSC 3962).

[9] An attempt at editing Statement #1 was made after the voir dire but after a few initial rulings, it became obvious that the editing attempts were being made in a vacuum. Accordingly, I held that the editing process should be postponed and not be continued until after other rulings had been made regarding character evidence and past association evidence of the various accused. I further held that once those rulings were made, the initial rulings that I had made would potentially be revisited. See pages 30 and 31 of the June 20, 2016 transcript of the editing pre-trial motion.

[10] The Crown subsequently brought a Leaney application (see R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1078) and an application to permit introduction of other discreditable conduct (see R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1178). The defence brought an application to exclude evidence of the applicants’ marriages and convictions of their spouses (see R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1179). Once these applications were dealt with as outlined in the cited rulings, the defence brought its application for editing Joshua’s statements once more.

[11] As anticipated, the editing process was far more efficient once the rulings outlined above were completed. Accordingly, the Crown and the defence were able to agree on a number of matters that should be edited out of the three statements. The Crown and defence submitted, with reference to Statements #1 and #2, (a) a list of agreed edits, and (b) a list of proposed edits by the defence that the Crown was not consenting to. (See Exhibit 1 on this editing voir dire.) The Crown and defence have reached an agreement with respect to all the proposed edits to be made to Statement #3. Accordingly, I will not deal with the proposed edits regarding Statement #3 as those are being done on consent.

[12] I accept the edits, regarding all three statements that the Crown and defence have agreed to, as being proper in the circumstances.

[13] This leaves me with the defence’s proposed edits that the parties cannot agree to with reference to Statements #1 and #2.

LAW

[14] I am to be guided by the following principles of law in conducting the editing process:

1. Post-offence conduct is not a neutral term embracing all behaviour by an accused after a crime has been committed but refers only to conduct which is probative of guilt. See R. v. Turcotte, 2005 SCC 50, at para. 37.

2. The right to silence has received Charter benediction. An accused’s valid exercise of his right to silence cannot be used as evidence of his guilt and silence, on its own, cannot be probative of guilt. See Turcotte, at paras. 44-46. The right to silence is not extinguished simply because the accused chose to speak to an officer regarding some matters and did not exercise his right to silence completely. See R. v. G.L., 2009 ONCA 501, at paras. 38-39.

3. Evidence of silence is, however, admissible in limited circumstances if the Crown can establish real relevance and a proper basis. In those circumstances, evidence of silence can be admitted with an appropriate warning to the jury. See Turcotte, at paras. 47-50.

4. Silence may be admissible if it is inextricably bound up with the narrative or other evidence and cannot easily be extricated. See Turcotte, at para. 50.

5. As indicated in my previous ruling regarding the admissibility of Statement #1, the ultimate question is whether the accused exercised free will by choosing to make a statement. See Barreira, Barrieia, Davidson & Rebelo at paras. 25, 26 and R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48 at para. 53.

6. Police persuasion, which falls short of denying a detainee the right to choose or of depriving him or her of an operating mind, does not breach the right to silence. See R. v. Ryback, 2008 ONCA 354, [2008] O.J. No. 1715 (C.A.) per Watt J. at para. 189. A finding of voluntariness extinguishes the appellant’s s. 7 Charter claim as well. See Ryback at para. 191.

7. Where an accused adopts a game plan to answer some questions, decline to answer others and to pose questions to the officer as he sees fit, a trial judge is entitled to find that the accused never chose to exercise his right to silence. See R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No.4252 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A. at paras. 12, 13 and Ryback at para. 191.

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

[15] In my ruling holding that Statement #1 made by Joshua was voluntary, I detailed numerous examples where the accused repeatedly said he would not answer questions but then did anyway. See Barreira, Barreira, Davidson and Rebelo, 2016 ONSC 3962, at para. 24. I concluded, at paras. 25-26:

After seeing the video and reviewing the transcript, it is my opinion that the accused, while telling the officer that he did not want to talk, did in fact contradict that assertion with very little prodding by the police. This accused knew his rights and talked anyway. This was a savvy and experienced individual with a lengthy criminal record (see Exhibit 3) who tested the police and repeatedly tried to make a deal in exchange for letting his wife and brother go. My viewing of the video shows an individual who not only was not intimidated by the police but took ample opportunity to berate the police with a variety of long standing grievances.

I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of his right to silence, chose not to exercise it and had an operating mind throughout.

[16] I now propose to deal with the contested edits as outlined in Exhibit 1 in this voir dire, relating to Statement #1.

[17] At page 14, Joshua says he has nothing to say, but immediately says he is lost and then talks about his brother Brandon. This is consistent with the pattern throughout the statement where the accused says he will not talk but immediately does so with little prodding by the police. I find that these comments are inextricably part of the narrative and if they are all edited out, the statement would be confusing. The statement would make little sense if all these denials are edited out. In any event, I find that the accused’s right to silence was not breached. I find it was part of Joshua’s game plan to say he would not talk but then do so, often berating the police, and later, trying to arrange a deal for the release of his brother and wife. The probative value of these many denials followed immediately by talking in Statement #1 exceeds any prejudicial effect and can be ameliorated by a proper instruction to the jury.

[18] At page 16, Joshua says he has nothing to say and has said enough, but then talks about how he knows Tyler and feels horrible for Tyler. Again, this is part of the narrative and part of the pattern of the accused saying he will not talk but then immediately talking further.

[19] At page 17, the accused says that the police have ruined his life. The defence argues that this is character evidence regarding past criminal involvement. The Crown says it is a comment regarding his current arrest. Later in the statement, at page 81, the accused says, “Brandon, me, Jenn. You’re ruining lives.” An analysis of any statement is contextual – see R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, at paras. 19-21. Accordingly, I find that Joshua’s reference to ruining his life refers to his current arrest, along with the arrests of his brother and wife. I find that its probative value exceeds any prejudicial effect and accordingly is admissible as part of the narrative.

[20] At page 20, the accused makes a comment that his lawyer has proved him innocent the last two or three times “you guys” [presumably the police] arrested him. The defence argues that this answer is prejudicial and not probative of guilt on the current charge. I agree that this comment and the question preceding it should be edited out. The remaining comments on page 20 refer to the Tyler Johnston murder investigation and are part of the narrative and will remain in the statement.

[21] The accused, at pages 23 and 24, continues to tell the police he won’t talk but does so anyway. As I have found, this is part of the narrative. The comments by Joshua regarding his being shot and then going to jail, at page 24, have little probative value. Whatever probative value they may have is exceeded by the prejudicial effect they pose. Accordingly, they are to be edited out of the statement.

[22] On pages 30 to 34, the accused again makes a number of comments about not talking but does so anyway. This is again part of the narrative. This is yet another example consistent with the pattern throughout the statement where Joshua says he will not talk but talks anyway, demonstrating his inconsistent efforts to exercise his right to silence.

[23] However, at page 34, the accused makes reference to Shane and Thomas and to Joshua possibly being a child molester. I find that there is no probative value to these comments. Any probative value would be outweighed by their prejudicial effect. These comments will be edited out of the statement.

[24] At page 35, Joshua says he is going to kick in the cell doors. The defence argues this is a fit of pique and has no probative value. I do not agree as, in my opinion, this statement confirms that the accused is not intimidated by the police and is prone to rage and insults. The statement is accordingly part of the narrative and its probative value exceeds any prejudicial effect.

[25] Again, the accused’s comments about not talking but immediately doing so from pages 35 to 37 are part of the narrative for reasons already outlined.

[26] At page 37, the accused calls Louis Rebelo a “retard” and says, “I don’t even … know.” This evidence is relevant to the association of Joshua with Louis Rebelo. I find that its probative value exceeds any prejudicial effect.

[27] At page 39, the accused talks about his brother’s best friend David Pereira being killed. This information has no probative value to this murder charge. It will be edited out of the statement.

[28] From pages 42 to 75, the police are showing videos to the accused. There is no reason to edit this material as it is part of the narrative. In particular, the accused, at page 75 of the statement, after viewing the videos for some time, confesses to shooting the victim Tyler Johnson in the hope of making a deal to have his brother and everybody else released. The officer indicates that the video shows that Joshua is not the shooter and refuses to accept his admission as being true. The evidence leading up to this demonstrably false confession provides context for this admission and is part of the narrative leading up to it.

[29] From pages 76 to 81, there is further discussion regarding the shooter, culminating at page 81 with the police telling Joshua to tell the truth as the video shows where Chad and Joshua stood and that Chad is the shooter and not Joshua. Again, this is all part of the narrative for reasons already outlined. The defence objects to the police comments regarding the police not believing Joshua and outlining their theory but I find that it is a legitimate attempt to encourage Joshua to tell the truth in the context of the video evidence that they are reviewing.

[30] From pages 82 to 91, the police are again reviewing the video with Joshua. He oscillates from saying he is not saying anything to discussing details of the video. At page 90, Joshua again tries to say he will say he is the shooter even though the video contradicts that. Joshua says he will say he is the shooter if Jenn and his brother are let go. The discussion from pages 82 to 90 provides context for this admission and is part of the narrative.

[31] From pages 90 to 93, there is more discussion regarding Chad pulling out the gun. Joshua says that it looks too skinny. Again, this is an example of Joshua saying he does not want to talk but then doing so anyway. This evidence is part of the narrative for reasons already outlined.

[32] More discussion takes place regarding the video from pages 93 to 96. I find that all this evidence is part of the narrative.

[33] At pages 96 to 97, there is discussion regarding other murders that Joshua is aware of. The Crown argues this is relevant to Joshua knowing about party liability. I find this inference to be somewhat dubious, particularly since in his third statement, Joshua indicates he is not the shooter and asks why he is in jail then. I agree with the defence that this evidence is really just bad character evidence that suggests Joshua is part of a criminal subculture. The prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value. This part of the statement regarding discussion of other murders will be edited out of the statement.

[34] Pages 97 to 98 are again part of the narrative as Joshua returns to talking about his situation. However, at pages 98 to 99, Joshua resumes talking about other murders. This part of the statement where he discusses other murders will be edited out, as the prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value.

[35] From pages 99 to 103, conversation returns to the video and this is again part of the narrative. The comment at the bottom of page 103 that Joshua, at Hess Village, gets either arrested or punched out is relevant to the Radej incident that occurred shortly before the murder. Accordingly, the probative value of this comment exceeds any prejudicial effect.

[36] Pages 103 to 112 contain a discussion regarding where Joshua was the night of the murder and other details regarding that night. It is admissible as part of the narrative.

[37] At page 112, there is a reference to someone trying to give Joshua six years for “fucking” ten marijuana plants. At page 115, there is more discussion regarding 18 marijuana plants and how his lawyer got him off the charge. This appears to refer to criminal behaviour in 2011 or earlier; there was no evidence before me that it was proximate to the murder. Accordingly, both of these references to quantities of marijuana plants have no probative value. Any probative value is exceeded by their prejudicial effect and they will be edited out of the statement.

[38] At page 113, there is a discussion regarding why Joshua got married. The officer refers to the spousal privilege reason. Given my previous ruling that the marriage for spousal privilege reasons is not admissible and that no adverse inference can be taken from the fact of his marriage, this discussion has prejudicial effect that outweighs any probative value and will be edited out of the statement. See R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1179, at paras. 47-52.

[39] The remaining portions of the statement from pages 112 to 116 are admissible as part of the narrative for reasons already outlined.

CONCLUSION REGARDING ISSUE #1 – DEFENCE APPLICATION TO EDIT STATEMENT #1

[40] Accordingly, the bulk of Statement #1 is admissible as it has been proven voluntary and its probative value exceeds any prejudicial effect except for the portions of the statement that I have ordered to be excised for reasons outlined above. The portions of Statement #1 to be edited out and excised are summarized at the end of this ruling.

ISSUE #2 – DEFENCE APPLICATION TO EDIT STATEMENT #2

FACTS

[41] As indicated previously, the defence and Crown have outlined the edits that are going to be made, on consent, in Exhibit #1 to this application. I accept that these proposed edits are proper and order that they be made.

[42] Exhibit #1 outlines proposed edits suggested by the defence that are not agreed to by the Crown. I will deal with these on an individual basis.

[43] At page 33 of Statement #2, there is a reference to drug charges that Joshua is “going to get smashed on”. For reasons outlined in my previous ruling regarding prior discreditable conduct, drug charges proximate to the murder are admissible due to Joshua’s indicating that he pulled his car over at the murder scene because he was doing a drug deal and was afraid of getting charged. See R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1178, at paras. 16-18. Accordingly, this portion of the statement has probative value that exceeds the prejudicial effect and is admissible at this trial.

[44] The officer, at page 84, asks Joshua why all the guys got married together. Joshua gives a long rambling answer that is not responsive to the question. There is no reference to spousal privilege. The officer asks again, at page 99, and the gist of Joshua’s response is that it was Chad’s idea that was never explained and Joshua just went along with it. Accordingly, there is no reference to any reason for the marriage as being spousal privilege. In my previous ruling, I held that the facts leading up to the marriage and the marriage itself are admissible as evidence of a close relationship between Chad and Joshua, and are also admissible to rebut, for example, Joshua’s allegation that he was an innocent bystander at the murder who was shot at by Chad. See R. v. Barreira et al., 2017 ONSC 1179 at paras. 41-46. Accordingly, none of the discussion regarding Joshua and Chad’s marriages should be edited out of Statement #2.

[45] At pages 105 to 106, there is a discussion regarding the police taking all of Joshua’s information to the Crown, and the police tell Joshua that it is the Crown’s decision regarding whether Joshua testifies, presumably pursuant to some deal. The defence contends that as no deal was made and the prosecution continued, this is prejudicial evidence that the Crown did not believe Joshua. I agree with this argument and find that the prejudicial effect of this evidence exceeds any probative value. Accordingly, this discussion will be edited out of Statement #2.

[46] The only remaining issue regarding Statement #2 is at pages 103 to 104. The officer asks if Joshua would do a polygraph test and Joshua says yes. The defence wants this evidence to stay in the statement. So does the Crown. See Exhibit #1. Without that agreement, the law appears to state otherwise.

[47] It is well established that polygraph evidence is not admissible at a criminal trial. See R. v. Phillion (1977), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 535 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Beland and Phillips (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).

[48] However, a reference to a polygraph test may appear in evidence at a trial which may raise a host of complex issues, depending on the circumstances of an individual case. See R. v. Alexis (1994), 35 C.R. (4th) 117 (Ont. Gen. Div.) per Hill J., at paras. 155-157.

[49] Two Nova Scotia Court of Appeal cases illustrate the Alexis point in a dramatic fashion. In R. v. Smith (1985), 70 N.S.R. (2d) 158 (C.A.), Pace J.A. indicated that Phillion is not binding authority for the proposition that a refusal by the accused to agree to a polygraph test is inadmissible. Justice Pace, at para. 17, held that the admissibility of a refusal will depend on the circumstances present in each case: “If the evidence is relevant and does not endanger the presumption of innocence, it will be admitted.”

[50] In R. v. Bedgood (1990), 98 N.S.R. (2d) 426 (C.A.), the accused, after being charged with sexual assault, requested to be subjected to a polygraph test but the police, without explanation, refused to perform the test. From this request and lack of explanation by the police, the trial judge invited the jury to make an adverse inference against the Crown. Justice Chipman, at page 3, distinguished Smith and held that the evidence at issue was not admissible as it was hearsay and offended the rule against “oath helping.” See also R. v. Richards (1997), 6 C.R. (5th) 154 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 24-26. Further, Chipman J.A., in Bedgood, at page 3, held that the trial judge should not have invited the jury to draw an adverse inference against the Crown by reason of the failure to explain to the accused the omission to give the polygraph test.

[51] In R. v. S.C.B. (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 516 (C.A.), Doherty and Rosenberg JJ.A. held that evidence from an accused that he offered to take a polygraph test is a prior consistent statement that has very limited, if any, probative value. The court held that, if the evidence of the accused’s offer to take a polygraph test stood alone, it agreed with the Crown’s contention that the evidence had no probative value, as it was a self-serving, prior consistent statement. However, the accused testified that he gave a statement to the police upon his arrest and offered to provide a sample of his blood, saliva and hair samples for DNA testing, as well as offered to take a lie detector test and turn his clothing over to the police. The Crown did not object to this evidence being introduced at the trial. The court held that this type of evidence should not always be received, but since the Crown did not object, this was taken as a concession that the evidence had probative value not significantly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See S.C.B. at paras. 27-39.

[52] Where an accused wishes to advance after-the-fact conduct reasonably capable of supporting an inference favourable to the accused, it should be received unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See S.C.B., at para. 34; R. v. Zouaoui, 2014 BCCA 316, at para. 36; and R. v. Grant, 2015 SCC 9, at paras.18-20.

[53] Given the authorities listed above, it is my view that the accused agreeing, when asked by the police, to provide a polygraph test has limited, if any, probative value. However, there is no evidence before me of any prejudicial effect and the Crown is not asking for the evidence to be edited out of Statement #2. In the balancing process, I cannot say that the prejudice of this evidence substantially outweighs its probative value (i.e., the accused agreeing to take a polygraph test, after being asked by the police to do so). See Grant, at para. 19; and R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at p. 611 per McLachlin J. (as she then was).

[54] Accordingly, the evidence, at pages 103 and 104 of Statement #2, that the accused agreed to take a polygraph evidence, is admissible at this trial and will not be edited out from the statement.

CONCLUSION – ISSUE #2 – DEFENCE APPLICATION TO EDIT STATEMENT #2

[55] In addition to the edits agreed to on consent, the only additional evidence to be edited out of Statement #2 will be the references at pages 105 to 106 that the police will take the information from the statement to the Crown for its decision.

ORDER

[56] Regarding Statement #1, in addition to the edits agreed upon by the Crown and defence, the following evidence is ordered to be edited out of Statement #1:

1. At page 20, starting with Detective Adams at the top of the page saying “I want to…” and continuing and ending with Joshua’s response, “…arrested me, so…” The edit is approximately four lines in length.

2. At page 24, starting with Joshua saying, “That’s like me going and having a conversation with the guy…” and continuing and then ending with Joshua saying, “And I’ve been in nothing but jail ever since.” The edit is approximately 11 lines in length.

3. At page 34, starting with Joshua saying, “Look at Shane and Thomas…” and continuing and ending with Joshua saying, “That’s right.” The edit is approximately 12 lines in length.

4. At page 39, starting with Joshua saying, “My brother’s best friend David was just killed…” and continuing and ending with Joshua saying, “the kid.” The edit is approximately 11 lines in length.

5. At pages 96 to 97, starting with Joshua saying at page 96, “You know what kills me the most…” and continuing the rest of page 96 and into page 97, and ending at page 97 with Joshua saying, “next thing you’re doing more time than somebody else,” and Detective Adams saying, “Mm-hmm.” This edit is approximately 17 lines on page 96 and approximately 24 lines on page 97.

6. At pages 98 to 99, starting with Joshua saying at page 98, “fucking Ashley Dore and Jason and Rob and Lou…” and continuing on for the rest of page 98, and continuing on further into page 99 and ending at three lines from the bottom of page 99, with Joshua saying, “You know what I mean.” This edit includes approximately the last 24 lines of page 98 and all of page 99 except the last two lines.

7. At page 112, the two lines with Joshua saying “you guys are fucking just trying to just fucking give me six years for fucking ten plants of weed.” This edit is two lines in length.

8. At page 113, starting with Detective Adams saying, “Why are you guys getting married?” and continuing and ending with Joshua saying, “you’re all fucked up.” This edit is approximately eight lines in length.

9. At page 115, starting with Joshua saying, “My lawyer – obviously…” and continuing and ending with Joshua saying, “they tried to give me five years for 18 plants.” This edit is approximately seven or eight lines in length.

[57] Other than the edits referred to in paragraph 56 above, the remainder of Statement #1 has probative value that exceeds any prejudicial effect, for the reasons outlined, and is admissible at this trial once the paragraph 56 edits are completed.

[58] Regarding Statement #2, in addition to the edits agreed upon by the Crown and defence, the following evidence is ordered to be edited out of Statement #2:

1. At pages 105 to 106, starting with Detective Adams saying, “We’ll go to the, we’ll go to the Crown…” and continuing for the rest of page 105 and into page 106, and ending with Detective Cattle saying at page 106, “That’s all we can do.” The edit includes approximately the bottom 12 lines on page 105 and the top nine lines on page 106.

[59] Other than the edits referred to in paragraph 58 above, the remainder of Statement #2 has probative value that exceeds any prejudicial effect for the reasons outlined and is admissible at this trial once the paragraph 58 edits are completed.

Skarica J. Released: February 24, 2017