CITATION: Weeres v. Weeres, 2016 ONSC 861
NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-14-45798-00
DATE: 20160204
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Kimberly Paige Weeres (a.k.a. Paige Nelson, a.k.a., Paige McKenzie), Applicant
AND:
Mark Bernard Weeres, Respondent
BEFORE: THE HON. MR. JUSTICE P.A. DOUGLAS
COUNSEL: Roselyn Pecus, Counsel, for the Applicant
Deborah Herriot-Howes Counsel, for the Respondent
HEARD: January 29, 2016
RULING ON MOTION
[1] On January 29, 2016 I received full submissions with respect to the Respondent Father’s motion and Applicant Mother’s cross-motion in the above matter.
[2] In the Respondent’s Notice of Amended Motion he seeks the following relief:
(a) An order that the primary residence of the child shall be with the Respondent Father effective immediately and thereafter pending further order;
(b) An order that commencing Friday February 5, 2016 the Applicant shall have alternate weekend access to the child from Friday at 7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. as well as such further and other access as her work schedule and travel issues permit, provided the Respondent has consented to such further and other access in writing in advance;
(c) The Applicant’s access shall be exercised only in the City of Markham or, if the Respondent agrees in writing in advance, a location agreed upon by the parents;
(d) An order that the child shall resume attendance at Franklin Street Public School in Markham and the YMCA Reesor Park Daycare in Markham, subject to the consent of the school and the daycare;
(e) An order that the Applicant provide William’s personal belongings (including but not limited to his school backpack and supplies and identification documents, passport, OHIP card, birth certificate). As well as his medication to the Respondent Father on an immediate basis.
(f) An order that the Respondent alone may give instructions to the child’s school, daycare and extra-curricular activity personnel;
(g) An order for costs in respect of the case conference held on January 18 and this motion payable from the proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.
[3] The Applicant Mother seeks the following relief on her cross-motion:
(a) That on a temporary basis the child have his primary residence with the Mother in Orillia;
(b) That the Respondent have access to the child every Tuesday from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., every Thursday from 6:00 p.m. with the Respondent picking up the child to Friday morning at 7:15 a.m. with the Applicant picking up the child from the Respondent’s home and taking him to school;
(c) Alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. with the Respondent providing the transportation to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday with the Applicant providing the transportation. Access on the child’s PA days from 6:00 p.m. on the day before the PA day until 6:00 p.m. on the PA day;
(d) Telephone access each day between 6:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. for a maximum of twenty minutes;
(e) Every March break;
(f) Four of the seven statutory long weekends each year with the Respondent to have first choice each year;
(g) Fifty percent of each summer vacation plus one week each year.
[4] Given the urgency of the matter and the fact that submissions were not completed until late in the day I released my decision immediately with written reasons to follow.
[5] My order was as follows:
(1) The child William Weeres born July 18, 2006 shall continue to attend school at Franklin Street Public School in Markham commencing February 1, 2016.
(2) If Applicant Mother resumes residence in the Markham area, she shall continue to have primary care and control of the child. If she does not, she shall have access with the child per para. 2(i) to (xi) of her Notice of Motion at Vol. 3, Tab 1, subject to her being responsible for the transportation, and Respondent Father shall then have primary care and control of the child.
(3) Parties to make written submissions on costs within thirty days.
[6] These are my reasons for the foregoing decision.
Background
[7] The parties married on June 12, 2002. They separated on October 13, 2013.
[8] Following the parties’ marriage they resided in Edmonton, Alberta where they were both employed, the Applicant as a Pharmacy Technician and the Respondent as a Director, Technology at Allarco Entertainment Inc.
[9] When William was born the Applicant ended her employment and became a stay at home mother and homemaker. The Respondent travelled in relation to his employment.
[10] In October 2008 the parties moved to Markham, Ontario to which the Respondent had moved in February 2008 to work for CTV as part of the Olympic Broadcast Media Consortium.
[11] The Respondent left the matrimonial home at the date of separation.
[12] Although there has been no order with respect to custody, the orders to date in this proceeding confirm that the Applicant has been the child’s primary caregiver in the sense that the child has spent more time with the Applicant than the Respondent.
[13] Following separation the Applicant resided in the matrimonial home in Markham with the child and the Respondent secured a residence close to the matrimonial home. Approximately one year later he moved from that residence to a different residence, again within Markham and within the child’s school catchment area.
[14] The only school that the child has attended prior to issues pertaining to this motion is Franklin Street Public School in Markham.
[15] On September 12, 2014 the Office of the Children’s Lawyer was requested by the court to complete an investigation under s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act. On March 11, 2015 the clinical investigator released her report.
[16] The report included the following observations:
(a) The Applicant would like to relocate back to Alberta with the child.
(b) The child is attending a French immersion school in Markham which is situated within close proximity to both parties’ homes.
(c) The Applicant stated that William has a “very strong, healthy relationship with his Father and that it is important that he is involved in his life”. The Applicant had no concerns about William’s care when with his Father. William appears happy and content when with his Father. There were no concerns with the Respondent’s new girlfriend and William is positive about her involvement in his life.
(d) The Applicant described her communication with the Respondent as “less tense” and described the parties as “co-parenting”. She was requesting joint custody.
(e) The Applicant described the circumstances following separation as “fairly harmonious” between her and the Respondent. Decision making was “amicable”. The parties agreed that William would attend a French immersion school. The parties communicated via Our Family Wizard and all of the child’s needs were being met.
(f) William does well at school socially and has made gains academically. He is happy and well-adjusted and prefers the company of one to two friends versus a big crowd. There were no behavioural concerns or developmental issues identified.
(g) William attended Scouts and swimming lessons.
(h) He was “thriving in the care” of both parents. Both parents are very important to William and he expressed the desire to continue to have both actively involved in his day to day life. This desire was expressed “decisively and in a thoughtful context”. He would be “upset if he saw either of his parents less”.
(i) Both parents are involved in William’s life across many domains; education, health, extra-curricular activities.
(j) The clinical investigator would not support the child relocating to Alberta but recommended that the child’s primary residence continue to be with the Applicant.
(k) There is a “cordial level of communication and respectfulness between the two parties”. Both parties participated in making medical and educational decisions within the family and demonstrated an ability to keep each other informed in a courteous manner.
(l) There is no domestic violence history, no Children’s Aid Society involvement and no police involvement.
(m) The clinical investigator made recommendations including the following:
(i) Joint custody of child to the parties.
(ii) Primary residence of the child with Applicant.
(iii) Access by Respondent on alternating weekends plus Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and Thursday from 5:00 p.m. to Friday morning drop-off at school.
(iv) Major school vacations to be divided equally.
[17] On April 22, 2015 the court ordered that the Respondent have parenting time with William including alternate weekends, extended to include the following Monday if a holiday, every Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and every Thursday from 5:00 p.m. to Friday morning at school.
[18] On May 25, 2015 the court incorporated terms of interim minutes of settlement dated December 23, 2014 and ordered on a temporary without prejudice basis that the Respondent have access on alternating weekends from Friday to Sunday, every Tuesday and Thursday from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. It was also ordered that the parents alternate their attendance at the child’s Scout meetings.
[19] There is no order specifically addressing the issues of “custody” or “care and control” or “decision-making”.
[20] On January 5, 2016 the Respondent was advised by the Applicant’s lawyer by way of letter dated that same day: “Ms. Weeres will be moving to Orillia with William effective immediately. She has leased a townhouse situated at Suite 12, 12 Lankin Blvd. Orillia Ontario L3V 6T2 for occupancy by William and her and has registered William at Regent Park Public School, 485 Regent Street Orillia Ontario.” It was explained that the Applicant had accepted a full-time position as a Pharmacy Assistant with Classic Care Pharmacy in Orillia, Ontario and that the position would help the Applicant complete the practicum requirements of her accreditation in becoming a fully licenced Pharmacy Technician.
[21] This letter represented the first notice of any variety whatsoever to the Respondent that the Applicant was changing William’s residence and school.
[22] Promptly after being notified of the Applicant’s change of the child’s residence to Orillia and the change to the child’s school, the Respondent communicated his objection.
[23] Regarding timing of the Applicant’s decision to move to Orillia, she provided the following evidence, in part, in her January 26, 2016 affidavit filed in respect of these motions:
I moved to Orillia, Ontario very quickly and did not discuss the move with the Respondent prior to the move for several reasons.
First, I was offered this position with a very short timeline for a start date. Unfortunately the offer came within the Christmas holidays which meant that offices were closed and people were unavailable including my lawyer’s office. I wanted my lawyer’s advice about how to tell the Respondent and quite frankly, I wanted my lawyer to act as a buffer between me and the Respondent in conveying the information. I quickly but thoroughly completed my research about schools, accommodations, extra-curricular activities, my new employer, the city, etc. Also, this job was a huge opportunity for me especially since I hadn’t worked for about nine years. The hours are very good (regular business hours) as it allows me to spend time regularly with William. I did not want to lose out on this great opportunity.
Second, the Respondent and I do not get along well and generally do not speak to each other directly. I try not to have verbal conversations with him as he tends to twist what I say. He often reacts poorly to any requests that I make. I did not want to have to debate this move with him and end up losing out on the job because he would not agree or intentionally delay the process….In all candour, I was not looking forward to this conversation/written discussion with him about my desire and eventual decision to move to Orillia.
Third, the Respondent can be very demanding, controlling and unreasonable. He has not, at any time, considered how my move to Alberta may be best for William, and for me. He did not at any time consider my very reasonable offer of monthly and very generous access for him if I moved to Alberta. I wanted to have a rational, honest and reasonable discussion with the Respondent about the move but it never happened. And now he is not considering my move to Orillia and how it may be best for William. For me, the move to Orillia is a compromise of my desire but, in a way, that works for all and is in the best interests of William.
The Law
[24] This is a divorce proceeding and accordingly s. 16 of the Divorce Act governs the issues raised on these motions. In making an order under s. 16, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of the child. Further, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person from whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.
[25] Counsel have referred to s. 24 of Children’s Law Reform Act. This section does not govern the issue before me given paramountcy of the Divorce Act; however, the factors outlined in s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act for the court to consider in relation to the best interests of the child do represent a useful list of factors to consider.
[26] In Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 1991 (SCC) the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the law in mobility cases at para. 49 of that case as follows:
(1) The parent applying for a change in the custody or access order must meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting the child.
(2) If the threshold is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child, having regard to all of the relevant circumstances relating to the child’s needs and the ability of the respective parents to satisfy them.
(3) This inquiry is based on the findings of the judge who made the previous order and the evidence of the circumstances.
(4) The inquiry does not begin with a legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, although the custodial parent’s views are entitled to great respect.
(5) Each case turns on its own unique circumstances. The only issue is the best interests of the child in the particular circumstances of the case.
(6) The focus is on the best interests of the child, not the interests and rights of the parents.
(7) More particularly, the judge should consider, inter alia:
(a) The existing custody arrangement and relationship between the child and the custodial parent;
(b) The existing access arrangement and the relationship between the child and the access parent;
(c) The desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents;
(d) The views of the child;
(e) The custodial parent’s reason for moving only in the exceptional case where it is relevant to that parents ability to meet the needs of the child;
(f) Disruption to the child of a change in custody;
(g) Disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, and the community he or she has come to know.
[27] The Supreme Court of Canada observed that on an interim mobility motion, factors five to seven inclusive are particularly relevant.
[28] In Plumley v. Plumley, 1999 13990 (ONSC) Justice Marshman discussed the factors important in deciding mobility cases on a temporary basis. She had this to say:
(1) A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim basis when there is a genuine issue for trial.
(2) There can be compelling circumstances that might dictate that a judge ought to allow the move. For example, the move may result in a financial benefit to the family unit which will be lost if the matter awaits a trial or the best interests of children might dictate that they commence school at a new location.
(3) Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong probability that the custodial parent’s position will prevail at trial.
(4) Where there is incomplete and/or conflicting evidence, courts are generally reluctant to sanction fundamental changes to children’s lifestyle and circumstances on an interim basis.
(5) Although both parties in a dispute concerning care and custody of children bear an evidentiary burden in connection with the best interests of the children, the burden is on the moving party (seeking to change the status quo) on an interim mobility motion to establish compelling reasons to grant the motion.
[29] In I.A.P. v. C.W.V. (2008), ONCJ 748 Justice Renaud of the Ontario Court of Justice observed:
…Extensive and regular travel with a child to accommodate parents is not in the child’s best interests. This is particularly so when travel is on highways, in all seasons and with varying degrees of traffic congestion. Children do not always travel well. This presents risks to the child and to the parent.
[30] In McDonald v. McDonald, [2006] CarswellOnt. 1755 (S.C.J.) the court had before it a motion for an interim order requiring the mother to maintain the child’s home in Sudbury or that the child reside primarily with the father. The parties enjoyed an amiable and respectful relationship. The child spent significant time with the father including alternating weekends and two nights per week. The court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to allow him to continue to reside primarily with the mother and that there would be a more significant disruption to the child’s life if there was a change in primary residence away from the mother. A move with the child to Toronto was permitted on an interim basis.
[31] In Baxter v. Cameron, [2010] ONSC 4501, the court allowed the mother to change the child’s residence 380 kilometers from the prior residence. The mother had always been the primary parent to the children although the father had exercised consistent and significant access. The new residence had the benefit of the mother’s support network nearby and greater financial stability. The mother had demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the children’s relationship with their father whereas the father was less willing to support the children’s relationship with their mother.
[32] In Ryall v. Ryall, [2009] ONCJ 687 the court observed:
Courts have recognized in permitting the parent to move away with children that modern day technology has made it significantly easier to overcome the distance problem with respect to access and maximizing contact with the other parent.
Analysis
[33] I prefer to consider this motion assuming that the Applicant has not yet changed the child’s residence and school as to do otherwise would be to put undue emphasis on the Applicant’s precipitous conduct in moving the child without notice to the Respondent. Such conduct is not generally relevant to a consideration of the child’s best interests although it may reflect on her parenting judgment and on her readiness to promote and maintain a positive relationship between the Respondent and the child.
[34] Obviously these motions are governed by the child’s best interests and not the interests of either parent. The OCL report is the most objective evidence I have with respect to the child’s best interests. The clinical investigator specifically rejected the Mother’s proposed move to Alberta. That does not mean that a move to Orillia would not be in the child’s best interests. I take the OCL rejection of the move to Alberta as emphasis upon the importance of the Respondent’s role in this child’s life.
[35] At the time of completion of the report in March of 2015 the Applicant had not developed a plan to move to Orillia, something that she now describes as “permanent”. This assertion of permanency in the move to Orillia has not been tested at trial through cross-examination and is a very recent development given her previously long-standing intention to return to the province of Alberta with the child; similarly, the Applicant’s evidence regarding her job offer presents some difficulties (to which I refer in more detail below) and the Respondent again ought to be able to challenge same at trial. The Plumley case encourages consideration of whether a job opportunity will be lost, but the Applicant has offered no evidence from her employer in this regard. This would represent the best evidence on this important issue.
[36] The Applicant submits that an order requiring the child to return to Markham would disturb the status quo. She defines the status quo as the child residing in the Applicant’s primary care. There is no doubt, for the purposes of this motion, that the child has been in the Applicant’s primary care; however, this is but one component of the status quo. The other components include extensive parenting time with the Respondent, the child’s placement in Franklin Street Public School in Markham, his attendance at Scouts in Markham and the Respondent’s significant involvement in the child’s extra-curricular activities. I find therefore that it is the Applicant who is seeking by her motion to change the status quo. She therefore bears the onus.
[37] As confirmed in Plumley, the Court will be more reluctant to change the status quo on an interim basis when there is a genuine issue for trial. In my view the content of the OCL report, which can be updated but has not, raises a genuine issue for trial as to whether it would be consistent with the child’s best interests to be residing a significant distance away from either parent.
[38] Plumley also suggest consideration of whether there is a strong probability that the Applicant will succeed at trial. Given the available evidence I would assess the likelihood of success as no greater that a strong possibility.
[39] I propose to use the Gordon v. Goertz principles as the framework for the balance of my analysis.
[40] The first considerations are the existing custody and access arrangements in place for the child.
[41] While clearly a custodial parent’s views are entitled to great respect, in this case there has been no determination regarding custody. It is clear that the Applicant has been the parent primarily responsible for the child’s day to day care and control in the sense that the child has spent more than fifty percent of his time with her. This history preceding the motion is consistent with the observations and findings of the clinical investigator in the OCL report dated March 2015. That report also confirmed that the parties were in agreement regarding custody of the child and went on to recommend joint custody of the child. Although this agreement has not been embodied in a court order, I consider it in the context of my assessment of this factor in relation to this motion. Considering the content of the OCL report and the preponderance of the parties’ evidence filed in support of their motions before me, the parties have conducted themselves as joint custodial parents of the child. Having said that, given that the Applicant is nevertheless the child’s primary custodial parent I ascribe marginally greater respect to her views than I do to those of the Respondent.
[42] The OCL report recommended that the child have his primary residence with the Applicant subject to extensive access with the Respondent including Tuesday each week and Thursday overnight to Friday morning drop-off at school each week. It is clear from both the report and the parties’ affidavits that both parents have been extensively involved in the child’s life including extra-curricular activities, such as Scouts. Clearly both parties enjoy a close and loving relationship with the child and they have historically communicated constructively regarding child-related issues.
[43] The existing access arrangement between the Respondent and the child, as noted above, meant that the Respondent has been actively and significantly involved in the child’s life. Although the Respondent has worked hard to maintain his court ordered level of contact with the child since the move to Orillia, weather has presented some difficulties and I conclude, given the distance between Markham and Orillia, that it is likely that ultimately the Respondent’s contact with the child will be diminished as a consequence of the proposed move as will the Respondent’s level of involvement in the child’s extra-curricular activities.
[44] The next consideration according to Gordon is the desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents. The existing Order is based upon the parties’ Minutes of Settlement and defined what they considered to be in the child’s best interests at the time. The care and control regime they implemented defined the level of contact each parent would have with the child; in other words, the Order represents how the parties themselves chose to maximize the contact between the child and both parents. It is clear that the proposed move to Orillia will ultimately result in erosion of the quality of contact between the Respondent and the child both in terms personal time together and in terms of the Respondent’s active involvement in the child’s extra-curricular activities.
[45] The next Gordon consideration is the child’s views and preferences. The most reliable articulation of the child’s views is contained in the OCL report as outlined above. These views militate against the proposed move.
[46] The next Gordon consideration is the reason for the proposed move. Regarding the Applicant’s reason for moving, I accept for the purposes of this motion that the intention is to pursue completion of her academic qualifications and employment. Although both parties have expended considerable effort in developing evidence of employment opportunities, or lack thereof, in the Markham area, this issue remains one that cannot be determined on a motion and is better explored at trial. The question remains whether the Applicant’s job opportunity represented the only reasonable option available to her. I have difficulty with the Applicant’s evidence in this regard. She did not include any evidence from her employer confirming when she was offered the job, the latest date she could commence and whether the job would be available to her at a later date. The Respondent should be entitled to challenge her evidence in this regard before a decision is made to change the child’s residence from a community in which he has resided for approximately seven years and from the only school he has ever known.
[47] In considering the disruption to a child of a change in custody, this factor might weigh in favour of the child remaining primarily with the Applicant, to the extent that “custody” refers to the relative time the child spends with each parent; however, the Respondent has also been exercising joint custodial rights (as described above) and it can be argued that the proposed move disrupts the joint custodial regime informally implemented by the parties. In my view, when the Supreme Court of Canada spoke of “custody” in this context, it was referring to the person who had primary care and control of the child. I say this because, from a child’s perspective, the most significant and meaningful component of any custodial regime is: Who is looking after me? The decision-making component of custody is an issue of greater immediate significance to the parents than to the child. As indicated above, the Applicant has been the child’s primary care-giver since separation, albeit subject to extensive and meaningful involvement by the Respondent. I therefore find that this Gordon factor weighs in favour of the Applicant.
[48] Before leaving this component of the Gordon factors, I wish to address a few related issues. In support of her position that she be allowed to relocate with the child the Applicant described the Respondent as “uncooperative”, “demanding”, “unreasonable” and “controlling”. I find these descriptors unreliable given that such observations are inconsistent with her statements to the clinical investigator and given that such statements appear to have made their first appearance in this proceeding in response to the Respondent’s motion to prevent the change in the child’s residence to the City of Orillia.
[49] It is my preference that the custodial arrangements (that is, the child in the Applicant’s primary care) not be changed and that the Applicant either finds a way to maintain her employment in Orillia, defer same, or return to the City of Markham pending a final determination of the issues of custody and access and child’s residence in this proceeding. I leave it to the Applicant to determine if she intends to return the City of Markham pending final determination of this application or whether she will continue to reside in Orillia. It is the Applicant’s decision in this regard that would trigger a change in primary care of the child to the Respondent. This is a wholly unsatisfactory situation; however, it is one which has been largely authored by the Applicant.
[50] I do not accept, for the purposes of this motion, the Applicant’s assertion that her reason, in part, for not notifying the Respondent in a more timely way regarding her decision to move to Orillia related to the Respondent’s problematic communications with her cannot be accepted as credible for the reasons outlined above. Also, the Applicant indicated that she was offered the position “within the Christmas holidays”. The Christmas holidays, if referring to the child’s Christmas holidays, are typically approximately sixteen days in length. The Applicant is the only person who knows precisely when she received the offer. She has not been precise in her evidence in this regard. In other words, did it happen on the first day of those holidays, the last, or some day in between? Further, she withheld from the Respondent the fact that she was applying for a position in Orillia and she did not disclose when she applied for that position in Orillia.
[51] The next Gordon consideration is disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools and the community he has come to know. I note that the child, according to the OCL investigator, has no memory of his life prior to living in Markham. Markham is the only community he remembers residing in. The school he was attending before the recent change is the only school he has ever attended. Although the Applicant has made much in her affidavit material of the child’s struggles at school in Markham, that evidence is largely inconsistent with the observations contained in the OCL report, including input from the child’s teacher to the effect that:
…Overall, William was doing well. He is average academically and is emotionally where he needs to be with his peers. He appears as a well-adjusted child who prefers the company of one to two students versus a crowd. William sometimes needs to be encouraged to join in in the classroom as he gets lost in his thoughts. His attendance and homework completion is good and both parents are involved in the school.
[52] The child is well-established in Markham. While he does not have a large constellation of friends, it appears he is not interested in having more than a couple close friends. There is no way to predict how he would settle into his proposed environment in Orillia, compared to how he fares in Markham. From this child’s perspective, Markham is a known and Orillia is an unknown.
[53] The Applicant’s removal of the child from his tested environment and installation in an untested environment represents a gamble, particularly in the midst of the existing school year.
[54] I note that the Respondent is paying child and spousal support at appropriate levels given the parties’ incomes. There is no evidence that the Respondent has not been timely in his payments apart from some initial difficulties which often follow a support order until such time as the Family Responsibility Office starts actively collecting and remitting payments to the intended recipient. The Applicant argues that she should be entitled to complete her academic component of training on her way to securing her certificate to work as a pharmacy technician. I agree but I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that such cannot be accomplished without disrupting the child’s residence and school environments before trial.
Conclusion and Additional Orders
[55] Considering the foregoing factors I conclude that the Applicant has failed to discharge the onus she bears to prove that it would be in the child’s best interests to change his school and residence on an interim basis before trial.
[56] In coming to this conclusion I note that the application was commenced in May of 2014 almost two years ago. There was a case conference on September 12, 2014 and a motion on April 22, 2015 but no settlement conference. Therefore, in addition to the orders I made above, the parties shall forthwith contact the trial coordinator in order to schedule a date for settlement conference and they shall exchange complete briefs and offers to settle in this regard.
[57] Further, there shall be an order requesting the OCL to update the report dated March 11, 2015.
Douglas J.
Date: February 4, 2016