Wegner v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2016 ONSC 7906

CITATION: Wegner v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2016 ONSC 7906

COURT FILE NO.: 61/16

DATE: 2016/12/15

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: BURKHARD WEGNER (PER SE) (Applicant)

And:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent)

BEFORE: Justice I. F. Leach

COUNSEL: The applicant self-representing Jacob Pollice, for the respondent

HEARD: By way of written submissions

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This endorsement is intended to address and complete the Rule 2.1.01(3) process in relation to this matter that was initiated by my earlier endorsement of July 21, 2016.

[2] It also addresses corollary issues that have arisen by the applicant’s intervening commencement of another application in Woodstock court file number 137/16, styled Burkhard Wegner v. Jody Wilson Raybould, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada.

Background

[3] The applicant commenced this proceeding by way of a Notice of Constitutional Question (sic), albeit more in the nature of an application record, on or about June 21, 2016. In that regard:

• The applicant took issue with the respondent’s alleged ability and/or efforts to force “recognition of a legal personality” or “class of person” on the applicant;

• The applicant similarly took issue with alleged efforts by the respondent to engage in “transactions” asserting rights of “Usufrunct”, “Custodianship” or “Trusteeship” in relation to the applicant’s professed rights of “patrimony” and “natural wealth and resources”, and sought corresponding court-ordered relief from any and all “restrictions” placed upon his freedom to “freely” dispose of his “natural wealth and resources”, including confirmation of his professed right to “issue and utilize promissory notes without interference” by the respondent or representatives of “Her Majesty’s Bank”;

• The applicant also sought a “detailed accounting” in relation to all such transactions, and an order compelling the respondent to “make reconciliations” addressing the applicant’s claims “for an adequate living”.

• In support of his claims for relief, the applicant filed substantial material making various and extended references to, inter alia, international treaty obligations of Canada and inherent and delegated authority of the respondent. The material also included:

  • a notarized copy of the applicant’s German birth certificate;

  • a copy of his Canadian Immigration and Identification Record;

  • a copy of a certificate commemorating his Canadian certificate;

  • a copy of a “Notice of Self-Determination” and affidavit sent to the respondent and others, demanding that the respondent acknowledge her “duty and obligation” to recognize that the applicant had declared a right of self-determination and “ownership” of himself, and his intention to forthwith send an “instruction for payment” to himself, by the Receiver General of Canada”, for sums relating to the cost of his “food, shelter, clothing, etc.”, and a resulting “Claim for Appropriation”.

• Amongst other claims, the applicants asserts that his certificate of Canadian Citizenship represents a “debt obligation” or “security” on the part of the respondent to ensure that the applicant is provided with food, clothing, housing, and an adequate standard of living; that he has since provided notice to the respondent that “revoked and annulled” any ability of the respondent to hold that “security” constructively for him; that the respondent has breached his rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) by failing to “reconcile” the applicant’s claims in that regard; and that the applicant accordingly is entitled to advance a claim for alleged violation of his rights pursuant to s.24(2) of the Charter.

[4] The applicant apparently served his “notice of constitutional question” on the respondent on or about June 22, 2016, with the material indicating a return date of July 8, 2016. The applicant also served supporting material, including an affidavit sworn June 21, 2016, (with numerous exhibits), a factum and a “casebook”.

[5] The respondent moved quickly to deliver a notice of appearance on June 30, 2016.

[6] By July 4, 2016, the respondent also had moved quickly to deliver a responding factum and book of authorities.

[7] On July 8, 2016, the court was asked to adjourn the matter on consent to a two-hour special appointment hearing on September 9, 2016, owing to the volume of material filed and the time estimated to argue the matter.

[8] In the intervening period, counsel for the respondent submitted a written request to the court on June 29, 2016, pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order under Rule 2.1.01(1) staying or dismissing the proceeding because it appeared on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process of the court.

[9] On July 21, 2016, the aforesaid written request was provided to me by the Woodstock trial co-ordinator. In particular, it was brought to my attention upon my arrival in Woodstock as the circuiting judge assigned to attend in Woodstock that week to deal with its weekly rota docket.

[10] After reviewing the material filed by the applicant, I made a lengthy handwritten endorsement expressing my view that this was a matter in respect of which the process contemplated by Rule 2.1.01 should be engaged. In that regard:

• It seemed to me that the litigation bore many of the familiar hallmarks of proceedings brought by an “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” litigant (or “OPCA litigant”), as discussed at length by A.C.J. Rooke in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, [2012] A.J. No. 980 (Q.B.), which has been accepted and endorsed by the courts of Ontario. I gave, as an example, the relatively recent decision of Justice Myers in Jarvis v. Morlog, [2016] O.J. No. 3662 (S.C.J.).

• In the circumstances, and pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(3)1, I directed the registrar to give notice to the applicant, in the required Form 2.1A, to initiate the process contemplated by Rule 2.1.01(3) to have the Rule 2.1.01 issue addressed and resolved summarily by written submissions.

• Moreover, as that process seemed unlikely to have run its course by the scheduled special appointment hearing date, I vacated that appointment to avoid the risk of precious special appointment hearing time being wasted, and the risk of the parties devoting further resources and time to a matter that might be dismissed through the Rule 2.1.01(3) procedure.

• In my endorsement, I made it clear that I was not seized of the matter. I had simply set the Rule 2.1.01(3) process in motion, so that a judge of the court would be able to rule on the matter once the parties had submitted all of their relevant material, if any, tendered in that regard. At the time, it seemed unlikely that the judge in question would be me, as I was not scheduled to be returning to Woodstock for approximately another year.

[11] On August 4, 2016, the applicant filed a written submission, pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(3)2. The body of that written submission took issue with the suggested dismissal of the application. However, it concluded with a final paragraph indicating that, because the applicant wished to review material provided by respondent counsel, had not yet done so, and would not be able to do so before the deadline for a reply, the applicant had chosen to respond by a “discontinuance of this matter”, which he was said to have discussed previously with respondent counsel. The applicant attached a “Notices of Discontinuance”, (in Form 23A, corresponding to the provisions of Rule 23), purporting to “wholly” discontinue this “action (sic) against the defendant (sic)”, dated August 4, 2016.

[12] On August 11, 2016, respondent counsel delivered reply submissions pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(3)5. That was accompanied by correspondence to the Woodstock trial co-ordinator, copied to the applicant, taking issue with the applicant’s purported discontinuance of the proceeding, and noting that the pleadings in this matter had closed. In the view of respondent counsel, the applicant accordingly was no longer permitted to discontinue the proceeding without leave of the court or consent of the parties, and the respondent had provided no such consent. In that regard, respondent counsel did not expressly refer to Rule 23.01(1), but in my view the content of his remarks, and the reference to Form 23A, made it abundantly clear that he was referring to the provisions of that rule.

[13] On August 12, 2016, the applicant delivered a “Written Objection to Reply Submissions under Rule 2.1 and Consent to Dismissal”. Such a further filing is not contemplated by the procedure mandated in Rule 2.1.01(3). In his further filing, the applicant took issue with the respondent’s Rule 2.1.01(3)5 reply submissions, and emphasized his intention to withdraw his application by the filing of his discontinuance. He added that, in lieu of his Notice of Discontinuance, he was filing an attached “Consent to Dismissal” of his application in full, and made a “petition [to] the court to accept the same”.

[14] On or about August 12, 2016, although I was not seized of the matter, (but owing to the absence at the time of any Superior Court judge in Woodstock, and because of my prior familiarity with the matter), the Woodstock trial co-ordinator then provided me with copies of the parties’ further written filings, and contacted me at my chambers in London seeking further direction.

[15] In particular, the Woodstock trial co-ordinator was not certain as to whether, in light of those further filings, the proceeding should be treated as discontinued, (obviating the need to have it remain on the court’s docket and placed again before a judge), or whether it was still active, (such that it still needed to go before a judge to have the discontinuance issue and/or Rule 2.1.01 issue addressed and decided).

[16] In the result, I made a further direction, conveyed to the parties by correspondence dated August 12, 2011, sent to them from the Woodstock trial co-ordinator. In particular, the further direction:

a. set a timetable for the exchange of further written submissions by the parties, focused on the questions of whether or not the proceeding effectively had been discontinued, and if not, whether the court should grant leave in that regard pursuant to Rule 23.01(1)(b); and

b. directed that all submissions and filings received from the parties in that regard were then to be provided, along with the parties’ respective Rule 2.1.01(3) written submissions, to the same circuiting judge assigned to deal with basket motions in Woodstock, (after the time limits for delivery of all directed filings had run their course), for preliminary determination of whether the proceeding had or should be discontinued, and if the judge ruled that the proceeding had not been and should not be discontinued, for a consequential determination of the issues raised by the Rule 2.1.01(3) procedure.

[17] In compliance with that same further directed timetable, counsel for the respondent then tendered a written responding submission, by way of correspondence dated August 19, 2016. In that regard:

• The submissions outlined the respondent’s reliance on the provisions of Rule 23.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dictating that discontinuance following the close of pleadings required the consent of all parties, (which the respondent had not provided and would not be providing), or leave of the court.

• In light of its position on the Rule 2.1.01 issue, (supporting dismissal of the application on the basis it was frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process on its face), the respondent expressed its concern about permitting a discontinuance without terms that would prevent the applicant from simply advancing the same or similar proceeding again in the future, without leave of the court.

[18] On August 26, 2016, the applicant filed a document entitled “Written Submissions Under Rule 2.1 and Re Rule 23”. Its content made further submissions about the merits of the respondent’s Rule 2.1.01(3)5 submissions, but did not address the Rule 23 discontinuance issue apart from an indication that the applicant was “unschooled in court procedure”.

[19] Perhaps not surprisingly, in the circumstances, the respondent apparently chose not to exercise its right, under the timetable established by my further direction, to tender any written reply submissions directed to the Rule 23 discontinuance issue.

[20] At that point, pursuant to my original handwritten endorsement and further direction of August 12, 2016, all of the written submissions filed by the parties in relation to the Rule 2.1.01 issue and the Rule 23 discontinuance issue should have gone to the next available circuiting judge in Woodstock, to be dealt with in writing along with other basket motions.

[21] Unfortunately, the matter then seems to have languished completely for many months, (from August 26, 2016, up until December 15, 2016), without being placed before another judge, without either party proactively making any inquiries to the Woodstock trial co-ordinator in the context of this proceeding to ask whether that had been done,[^1] and without the Rule 2.1.01 and Rule 23 discontinuance issues being decided.

[22] Nor had I heard anything further about the matter between August 12, 2016, and December 15, 2016, during which time I did not return to Woodstock.

[23] On December 15, 2016, I then happened to be reassigned by chance to circuiting duties in Woodstock, owing to a conflict in the Stratford trial sittings docket that required a switch with the circuiting judge scheduled to attend in Woodstock that day and December 16, 2016.

[24] In preparing for hearings on December 16, 2016, I found that the applicant had commenced a further application in Woodstock, styled Richard Wegner v. Jody Wilson-Raybould, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, court file number 137/16. That new application was on the court’s docket for December 16, 2016, apparently for its first return date, along with an intended motion by the applicant asking that his new proceeding be “moved in-Camera” (sic).

[25] Court filings in relation to the “new” application, (Court File No. 137/16), include the following:

• a “Notice of Application Record”, “Application Record”, an affidavit of the applicant (sworn November 25, 2016), a factum, a “casebook”, and a notice of motion (relating to the applicant’s request to have the proceeding “moved in-Camera”), all served on or about November 30, 2016;

• a notice of appearance filed by counsel for the named respondent on December 7, 2016; and

• a responding application record, factum and book of authorities delivered by the respondent on or about December 12, 2016.

[26] A review of the material filed by the applicant in that new proceeding readily discloses very substantial similarities and overlap with the issues, arguments and evidence filed by the applicant in this application, (although he nominally has redirected his efforts towards a new but related litigation target). Filings in the new material also make it clear that the respondents in each proceeding are represented by the same lawyer from the Department of Justice.

[27] Moreover, by correspondence dated December 5, 2016, (consisting of two letters with somewhat duplicative and overlapping content), the same lawyer had made a similar Rule 2.1.01(6) written request in relation to Court File No. 137/16.[^2] As noted above, (in Footnote 1), that correspondence included a passing reference to the fact that no order had been issued in Court File No. 61/16.

[28] My review of Court File No. 137/16 therefore prompted me to make inquiries of the Woodstock trial co-ordinator as to what had happened in relation to this earlier proceeding.

[29] Court File No. 61/16 then was also produced for my review. At that point, I then noted and reviewed the further court filings made in this matter, tendered pursuant to my earlier directions. I also learned of the subsequent lack of progress and absence of finality that had ensued when my earlier involvement in the matter came to an end on August 12, 2016.

[30] On December 15, 2016, after further review and consideration of the parties filings in this matter, (and the material filed by the applicant in Court File No. 137/16), I directed the Woodstock trial co-ordinator to send faxed written notice to the parties indicating, as soon as possible, and for written reasons to be delivered the next morning, that:

• this proceeding (in Court File No. 61/16) had been dismissed, and the application in Court File No. 137/16 had been stayed;

• the hearing scheduled in the latter matter for December 16, 2016, accordingly would not be proceeding; and

• there accordingly was no requirement for the parties or counsel in Court File No. 137/16 to attend at court on December 16, 2016.

[31] These are the reasons promised in that faxed written notice.

Purported discontinuance of application in Court File No. 61/16

[32] In my view, neither the Notice of Discontinuance served by the applicant on August 4, 2016, nor the “Consent to Dismissal” served by the applicant on August 14, 2016, had the apparently desired effect of formally bringing an end to the proceeding prior to the court ruling on the Rule 2.1.01 procedure which already had been engaged.

[33] However, I arrive at that conclusion for reasons different than those relied upon by the respondent.

[34] In particular, on its face, Rule 23.01 deals only with situations where a plaintiff seeks to discontinue all or part of an action. It does not deal with applicants and applications.

[35] Situations involving applicants no longer wishing to pursue applications are addressed instead by Rule 38.08, which indicates that an applicant “may abandon an application by delivering a notice of abandonment”. That rule has no express restrictions comparable to those set forth in Rule 23.01(a).

[36] With that in mind, I begin this aspect of my analysis by noting the fundamental point that the applicant in this case did not comply with the provisions of Rule 38.08. No notice of abandonment was ever filed. The proceeding accordingly has not been formally abandoned, and continues.

[37] Nor, in my view, is that an irregularity or non-compliance with the Rules that should be overlooked, excused or remedied, pursuant to Rule 2.01(a) and/or Rule 2.03 in the particular circumstances of this case.

[38] In that regard, it seems to me that Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules was enacted to provide the Court with an important and meaningful mechanism to address, in a timely way, the serious and growing problem of litigation that is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process on its face. Such litigation is not only stressful and financially oppressive from the perspective of its direct targets, but also diverts limited and increasingly strained court resources away from legitimate disputes requiring time and assistance from the courts.

[39] In this case, I already had made a preliminary determination that this litigation warranted the issuing of a notice engaging the summary review and determination procedure contemplated by Rule 2.1.01(3). I do not think the applicant should be permitted to effectively avoid that procedure and its possible outcomes by the simple expedient of unilaterally terminating the litigation. As emphasized by the respondent, such an outcome would leave the applicant entirely free to renew his claims in the future.

[40] The proceeding not having been abandoned to date, I therefore am not disposed to grant any remedial relief permitting the applicant to abandon it now on a nunc pro tunc basis.[^3]

[41] In any event, as the proceeding therefore formally continues, the outstanding Rule 2.1.01 issue can and should be addressed.

Rule 2.1.01 determination in relation to this proceeding

[42] Having reviewed the parties’ filings again, and their respective written submissions in relation to the Rule 2.1.01 issue, I find that an order should go pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(1) dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process.

[43] The applicant disclaims association or affiliation with OPCA litigants, as described in Meads v. Meads, supra, and denies any association with or support for the “Free Men” movement. He also points to certain professed distinctions between his material and that filed in other cases found to have involved OPCA litigants, such as his willingness to cite and reply upon provisions of the Charter rather than the Canadian Bill of Rights.

[44] In my view, however, this ignores the emphasis, in authorities such as Meads v. Meads, supra, that OPCA litigants and their claims may appear disparate, and employ a variety of strategies and verbiage, but they share a fundamental and concerning unifying feature: an underlying assertion that such litigants should be immune from obligations.

[45] That is the case in this proceeding.

[46] Moreover, as noted by the respondent at paragraph 14 of its Rule 2.1.01(3)5 written submissions, this particular litigation bears several of the “telltale fingerprints” or traits of an OPCA claim, including the following:

a. The applicant no longer wants to be recognized as a servant or subject of Her Majesty the Queen, and desires to be recognized only by the designation of a “man”.

b. The applicant corresponding refers to himself irregularly in this litigation as “Burkhard Wegner (per se)”.

c. The applicant asserts that he is entitled to opt out of legislative obligations that he says he neither chose nor accepted, and correspondingly denies the validity of his Canadian citizenship. He also reproduces his birth certificate and citizenship certificates in atypical circumstances.

d. At the same time, he advances a “money for nothing” scheme, whereby he asserts that his certificate of citizenship should be treated as a form of “security” or “debt obligation” requiring the respondent to pay him sums or reconciliation from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

e. In connection with that scheme, the applicant asserts the existence of a unilateral agreement by asserting that the respondent has somehow been constituted a trustee of that supposed “security” by virtue of the Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c.46, and other cited legislation and international agreements.

[47] Moreover, insofar as the applicant attempts resort to section 7 of the Charter as a basis for his argument to economic entitlements from the respondent, his claims are demonstrably baseless, as section 7 of the Charter provides no protection for economic rights, and certainly no guarantee of an adequate standard of living. See, for example, Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5410 at paragraphs 31-38, 40, 48, 57, 59, 81-82 and 120.

[48] I agree with A.C.J. Rooke’s sentiment, in Meads v. Meads, supra, that there is no place in Canadian courts for anyone attempting to espouse and advance OPCA concepts.

[49] I also share the views expressed by Justice Myers in Jarvis v. Morlog, supra, at paragraphs 2 and 3, which read in part as follows:

Plaintiffs who file OPCA claims are playing a game that is designed to frustrate the system and inflict unrecoverable expense and needless stress on … defendants. OPCA claims have been derided as abusive over and over again in courts across the country. . .

All litigants are entitled to [be] treated with respect and with simple human decency before the court. The OPCA positions they adopt are not. In my view, it is more respectful to OPCA plaintiffs to truthfully tell them that they are engaged in a despicable enterprise that cannot be tolerated than to pretend that there is some merit which deserves academic debate and response. In my view, precious judicial time should be spent on resolving real matters. Simply taking judicial time to respond seriously to OPCA claims gives the claimants a measure of success in advancing their improper purposes. Associate Chief Justice Rooke spent more than enough of his very valuable time creating a textbook of abusive OPCA practices in Meads v. Meads. In my view, not another moment of judicial resources or party expense should be invested on OPCA claims. They should be summarily nipped in the bud with reference to Meads v. Meads and no more…

[50] I self-evidently have done more than that in this case, as I felt it necessary to clarify:

• how the Rule 2.1.01(3) process came to be engaged in this matter, and the steps taken to ensure full compliance with the procedural requirements of that rule;

• why I think that process continued to apply despite the applicant’s unilateral attempts to terminate the litigation before the process had run its course;

• how this matter came to be before me again;

• the circumstances in which I am making a Rule 2.1.01(1) order dismissing this proceeding; and

• the circumstances underlying my decision to also hereby make an ancillary directions and orders staying the applicant’s new application, in Court File No. 137/16, and prohibiting the applicant from commencing any further proceedings in this court without first obtaining an order granting leave to do so.

Rule 2.1.01 relief granted in relation to proceeding in Court File No. 137/16

[51] In relation to the last point, the circumstances before me represent a nascent but clear example of what happens when a frivolous, vexatious and abusive litigant is not addressed quickly and effectively.

[52] Perceiving pending frustration of his initial attempt to pursue such claims directly against Her Majesty, Mr Wegner has simply repackaged and revised much of his earlier material to advance substantially the same claims indirectly; i.e., by naming one of Her Majesty’s cabinet ministers, (the Attorney General of Canada), as the respondent to his new proceeding.

[53] As Justice Myers said, these time-consuming, expensive and oppressive litigation games should be nipped in the bud at the earliest opportunity, and in my view that process becomes easier and capable of acceleration where the litigant in question already has been found to be an OPCA litigant in one proceeding, (as I have done in this case).

[54] In my view, I have authority to make the contemplated ancillary orders set out above pursuant to Rule 1.05, which allows me to impose additional terms “and give such directions as are just” when making an order under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[55] Alternatively, the similar situation in Court File No. 137/16 effectively having been brought to my attention, (through my independent review of that court material in preparation for the court sitting on December 16, 2016, including but not limited to respondent counsel’s correspondence therein dated December 5, 2016), I have authority to make a similar order in relation to that separate proceeding on my “own initiative”, pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(1).

[56] In that regard, I expressly find that the circumstances herein, where the applicant and respondent counsel common to both Court File No. 61/16 and Court File No. 137/16 already have made submissions in relation to the underlying OPCA concerns in the context of Court File No. 61/16, little would be served by incurring the time, expense and delay associated with once again engaging and completing the full process contemplated by rule 2.1.01(3). This is a case where I think it appropriate to “order otherwise”, as contemplated by the preamble to Rule 2.1.01(3).

Conclusion

[57] In addition to my order dismissing the proceeding herein, ancillary orders therefore also will be made whereby:

a. the proceeding in Burkhard Wegner v. Jody Wilson Raybould, Minister of Justice and Attorney General for Canada, Court File No. 137/16, is stayed; and

b. the applicant Burkhard Wegner shall be prohibited from commencing any further proceeding in this court without first having obtained leave to do so from the court.

[58] Orders to go accordingly. Copies of this endorsement and resulting orders also should be filed in both this court file, and in Court File No. 137/16.

Justice I F. Leach

Date: December 15, 2016

[^1]: As noted below, counsel for the respondent did send letters to the Woodstock trial coordinator on December 5, 2016, in the context of a separate and later proceeding commenced by the applicant, in respect of which the respondent to that new proceeding was represented by the same lawyer from the Department of Justice. In requesting a similar Rule 2.1.01 dismissal of that proceeding, the two duplicative and overlapping letters mentioned that the court had not yet issued an order with respect to Court File No. 61/16. However, the letters did not make any further inquiries or request any further action in that regard, and the correspondence simply was filed in Court File No. 137/16 for review by whatever judge would happen to be dealing with that formally separate matter.

[^2]: I note that the applicant sent a responding letter to the Woodstock trial coordinator, on or about December 7, 2016, expressing the view that the correspondence sent by respondent counsel on December 5, 2016, was “of no force and effect, as he was not enjoined to or on record for Application 137/16 on that date, and as such had no standing with respect to the same”. The applicant essentially took the position that the Rule 2.1.01(6) written request submitted by the new respondent’s lawyer should be completely disregarded and ignored because it was faxed two days before formal delivery of the new respondent’s notice of appearance. I disagree, although I also find it unnecessary to engage the Rule 2.1.01(3) process further in relation to the new application, for the reasons outlined below. Rule 2.1.01(6) is but one contemplated method of bringing potential Rule 2.1.01 concerns to the court’s attention. However, it is not the only permissible or contemplated method of that happening. In my view, that is implicit in the provisions of Rule 2.1.01 (1), which makes it clear that the court may grant such relief “on its own initiative”. If the matter effectively is brought to the court’s attention, even by way of a purported rule 2.1.01(6) written request that arguably is deficient in some technical respect, the request need not be ignored, and the court is free to act on it. More generally, having regard to the particular circumstances, I think the particular timing defect identified by the applicant is an irregularity which can and should be addressed by the court making an order pursuant to Rule 2.01(a) and/or Rule 2.03, so as to deem that counsel for the new respondent continued and/or repeated his Rule 2.1.01(6) written request after formal delivery of his client’s notice of appearance confirming his retention as lawyer of record. Indeed, that factually is the case, as respondent counsel made renewed reference to his Rule 2.1.01(6) written request, (which need not follow any prescribed format), in the cover letter that accompanied filing of his client’s notice of appearance on December 7, 2016.

[^3]: In the particular circumstances of this case, it accordingly is not necessary for me to formally decide whether or not a proper Notice of Abandonment, served after the Rule 2.1.01(3) process has been engaged, should be regarded as effective. However, I think not, as a matter of policy and legislative interpretation. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Rule 2.1.01 control mechanism is one formally engaged by the court rather than the parties, (possibly but not necessarily in response to a party’s written request), and once started it accordingly should be permitted to run its course unless and until the court makes a contrary ruling. Were it otherwise, the court’s ability to control its own process, and address and deal with frivolous, vexatious and abusive litigants when they surface and are brought to the court’s attention, would be all too easily frustrated.