CITATION: Gendron v. Doug G. Thompson Ltd. (Thompson Fuels), 2016 ONSC 7056
COURT FILE NO.: 073/11
DATE: 20161115
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
WAYNE ALLAN GENDRON
Plaintiff
– and –
DOUG G. THOMPSON LTD., operating as THOMPSON FUELS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND SAFETY AUTHORITY, and LES RESERVOIRS D’ACIER DE GRANBY INC.
Defendants
Martin Forget, for the Plaintiff
Albert Wallrap, for the defendant, Doug C. Thompson Ltd., operating as Thompson Fuels
Adam Grant, for the defendant, Technical Standards and Safety Authority
Brian Sunohara, for the defendant, Les Reservois D’Acier De Granby Inc.
HEARD: November 7, 2016
REASONs FOR DECISION
Charney J.:
[1] This is a motion by the plaintiff for leave to amend his Statement of Claim to add a claim for $313,005.08 to the $2.7 million claim against the defendants. The original Statement of Claim sought damages against the defendants for negligence in relation to furnace oil that leaked from the plaintiff’s residential oil tank in December 2008 in the City of Kawartha Lakes (the City). The plaintiff alleges that the spill caused considerable damage to his house, surrounding property and land abutting his property.
[2] The proposed amendment relates to a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) dated June 30, 2016 relating to municipal orders against the plaintiff dated June 15, 2010 to pay costs and expenses in relation to that same leak of furnace oil from the plaintiff’s home. The plaintiff seeks to add a claim for contribution and indemnity against the defendants in accordance with s. 100.1(1) and (6) of the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19 (the EPA). The EPA provides that the right to contribution and indemnification for municipal orders to pay costs or expenses incurred by the municipality “may be enforced by action in a court of competent jurisdiction” (s. 99.1(7)).
[3] The plaintiff also seeks to amend the Statement of Claim by adding claims for breach of contract and breach of statutory duty in addition to the claim for negligence already made in the Claim.
[4] The motion is opposed by the defendants to this action. They take the position that the amendments are prima facie without merit and would be prejudicial to the defendants.
[5] The trial was scheduled to begin on November 7, 2016, but due to the unavailability of one of the counsel it will begin next week (the week of November 14, 2016).
[6] I heard the plaintiff’s motion on November 7, 2016, and on November 8, 2016 I advised counsel that I would allow the plaintiff’s motion to amend and issued the following Order:
For reasons to follow the Court makes the following order:
Leave to amend the Statement of Claim in accordance with the Fresh Amended Amended Statement of Claim dated September 20, 2016 is granted.
Defendants are granted leave to amend their statements of defence to respond to any amendments, including any limitation period defences.
The defendants may demand particulars with respect to any amendments.
The plaintiff will be made available for further discovery with respect to the amendments on November 9, 10 or 11, 2016.
[7] These are the reasons for my decision of November 8, 2016.
Rule 26.01 – Amendments to Pleadings
[8] Rule 26.01 provides:
On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
[9] In Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, 280 O.A.C. 251, at para. 19, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that “Although the general rule is that amendments are presumptively approved, there is no absolute right to amend pleadings. The court has a residual right to deny amendments where appropriate”. The Court of Appeal summarized the appropriate factors to be considered in a motion to amend pleadings (at para. 19):
• An amendment should be allowed unless it would cause an injustice not compensable in costs.
• The proposed amendment must be shown to be an issue worthy of trial and prima facie meritorious.
• No amendment should be allowed which, if originally pleaded, would have been struck.
• The proposed amendment must contain sufficient particulars.
[10] See also 1317424 Ontario Inc., v. Chrysler Canada Inc., 2015 ONCA 104, at para. 7:
One factor is that an amendment will not be allowed if it would have been struck out had it been originally pleaded. Applying the analysis from Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, a claim will be struck out under rule 21.01(1)(b) if it has no reasonable chance of success.
[11] In Brookfield Financial Real Estate Group Limited v. Azorim Canada (Adelaide Street) Inc., 2012 ONSC 3818 at para. 23, D.M. Brown J. (as he then was) held that tenability of a proposed claim is to be assessed with reference to the principles developed under the rule 21.01(1)(b) analysis in the context of a motion to strike. He adopted the following discussion of the issue from Morden and Perell, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 1st ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2010)
On a motion to amend a pleading, the court does not examine the factual merits of the proposed amendments or the moving party's motives for seeking the amendment, but it does examine whether as a matter of law, the amendment raises a tenable claim or defence and whether the proposed amendment has been properly pleaded in the sense of complying with the rules that govern pleadings, including sufficient particularity. Put somewhat differently, it makes little sense to grant an amendment that will immediately be challenged as legally unsound, and the court may inquire into the merits to ensure that the amendment is tenable in law and compliant with the rules of pleading. The case law establishes that proposed amendments are to be read generously with allowance for deficiencies in drafting.
[12] Also of assistance is MacDougall J.’s assessment of this same issue in the case of Kawartha Lakes (City) v. Gendron, 2012 ONSC 2035. That decision relates to a civil proceeding brought by the City against the plaintiff and the defendants (amongst others) to the present action in relation to the same furnace oil leak, and which, as discussed below, was consolidated with the present action. When dealing with a motion by the City to amend its statement of claim, MacDougall J. stated:
In the recent decision in 1309489 Ontario Inc, v. BMO Bank, 2011 ONSC 5505, 107 O.R. (3d) 384, Lauwers J. helpfully summarized the applicable principles on this issue with which I agree and adopt. Although that was a motion brought by the defendant to strike out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), the discussion is applicable to our case. In summary form, at paragraphs 11 and following [Case citations omitted]:
i) In a motion to strike a pleading as disclosing no cause of action under rule 21.01(1)(b), the moving party must show that it is "plain, obvious and beyond doubt that the claim will not succeed" at trial.
ii) The Statement of Claim must be read generously to allow for drafting deficiencies; and if the claim has some chance of success, it must be permitted to proceed. The threshold for sustaining a pleading on a rule 21 motion is not high.
iii) “Cause of action” can mean the factual matrix out of which the claim arises, or the legal nature of the claim. The trend of the cases favours the broader, factually oriented approach to the meaning of “cause of action”. This is a more functional approach that is also consistent with a purposive approach to the interpretation of limitations legislation.
iv) An overly technical approach to the definition of the term "cause of action" would produce results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's policy direction. Further, re-establishing the "forms of action" in the guise of construing the term "cause of action" in a more technical, legal sense would be inconsistent with the policy thrust that led to the abolition of the forms of action.
v) When the defendant's claim is that the amendment raises a new cause of action after the limitation period has expired, then the court's usual analytical approach is to consider the constituent elements of the alleged new cause of action to see if the facts as originally pleaded, or as better particularized in the proposed new pleading, could technically sustain that cause of action.
[13] It is with those principles in mind that I will consider the plaintiff’s proposed amendments in this case.
Relevant Legislation
[14] In order to understand the proposed amendment it is necessary to consider the relevant sections of the EPA.
[15] Section 100.1(1) of the EPA provides:
100.1 (1) If a pollutant is spilled, a municipality may issue an order requiring the owner of the pollutant or the person having control of the pollutant to pay to the municipality any reasonable costs or expenses incurred by the municipality, or a local board of the municipality within the meaning of the Municipal Affairs Act, to prevent, eliminate or ameliorate any adverse effects or to restore the natural environment.
[16] In the present case the City of Kawartha Lakes issued a s. 100.1 order against the plaintiff (Gendron) and two of the defendants to this claim (Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) and Doug C. Thompson Fuels Ltd. operating as Thompson Fuels (Thompson Fuels) on June 15, 2010. The s. 100.1 orders required the orderees to pay $471,691.44 to the City for its costs and expenses incurred in cleaning up the spill. On July 29 and 30, 2010, Gendron, TSSA and Thompson Fuels each filed a notice of appeal with the ERT regarding this order. The appeals by TSSA and Thompson Fuels were withdrawn following a settlement with the City, and only the appeal by Gendron remained extant.
[17] In parallel to the appeal before the ERT, both Gendron and the City brought separate civil proceedings relating to the spill. The civil proceedings were consolidated upon consent. Those civil proceedings are the trials scheduled to commence before me on November 14, 2016.
[18] The City’s civil proceeding seeks similar relief to that sought in the s. 100.1 orders being appealed to the ERT and includes Gendron as a defendant. To prevent duplication of proceedings the ERT adjourned the proceedings before it several times to allow the civil claims to move forward. On September 24, 2015 the City undertook not to pursue the civil action if the ERT proceeded to a hearing. On October 9, 2015 the ERT ordered the hearing to proceed. On December 1, 2015 Gendron filed a motion with the ERT to adjourn the ERT hearing until after the conclusion of the civil actions. That motion was dismissed on January 8, 2016.
[19] The proceedings before the ERT were protracted and considered various preliminary issues regarding the scope of the hearing. Prior to the hearing before the ERT the City reached a tentative settlement of the civil claim with all of the defendants in the City’s action, but not Gendron.
[20] Gendron’s appeal of the s. 100.1 order was finally heard in February 2016, with written submissions in March and April 2016. On June 30, 2016 the ERT allowed in part the appeal by Gendron and reduced the s. 100.1 order to $313,005.08. This amount was calculated by the ERT on the basis of 19 invoices that were reviewed in some detail in the ERT decision.
[21] Section 100.1(6) of the EPA permits a party that is the subject of a s. 100.1 order to claim contribution and indemnity against another person who may be subject to a s. 100.1 order. Section 100.1(6) applies by reference with the necessary modifications the contribution and indemnity provisions in s. 99.1 (5) to (8) of the EPA to orders issued by a municipality under s. 100.1(1). Section 99.1(6) provides:
Contribution and indemnity
(6) Where the Director is entitled to issue an order to two or more persons under subsection (1) in respect of costs or expenses, as between themselves, in the absence of an express or implied contract, each of those persons is liable to make contribution to and indemnify the other in accordance with the following principles:
- Where the Director is entitled to issue an order to two or more persons under subsection (1) in respect of costs or expenses and one or more of them caused or contributed to the costs or expenses by fault or negligence, such one or more of them shall make contribution to and indemnify,
i. where one person is found at fault or negligent, any other person to whom the Director is entitled to issue an order under subsection (1), and
ii. where two or more persons are found at fault or negligent, each other and any other person to whom the Director is entitled to issue an order under subsection (1) in the degree in which each of such two or more persons caused or contributed to the costs or expenses by fault or negligence.
For the purpose of subparagraph 1 ii, if it is not practicable to determine the respective degrees in which the fault or negligence of two or more persons to whom the Director is entitled to issue an order under subsection (1) caused or contributed to the costs or expenses, such two or more persons shall be deemed to be equally at fault or negligent.
Where no person to whom the Director is entitled to issue an order under subsection (1) caused or contributed to the costs or expenses by fault or negligence, each of the persons to whom the Director is entitled to issue an order under subsection (1) is liable to make contribution to and indemnify each other in such degree as is determined to be just and equitable in the circumstances.
[22] Section 99.1(7) provides:
Enforcement of contribution
(7) The right to contribution or indemnification under subsection (6) may be enforced by action in a court of competent jurisdiction
[23] In the proceeding before the ERT, Gendron sought to claim contribution and indemnity for its liability under the s. 100.1 order against the defendants to the civil action. In a decision dated March 10, 2016, the ERT decided that a claim for contribution and indemnity could not proceed before the ERT but had to be enforced in a civil action in court. The ERT stated (at paras. 45, 58 and 61):
…s. 100.1 contemplates scenarios where there can be some perceived unfairness, in that a pollutant owner who is not at fault or is less at fault than others can be subject to a joint and several order to pay costs of a clean-up. However, subsequent recourse can be pursued by those subject to a s. 100.1 order via civil proceedings, which may involve the common law as well as s. 99.1(5) to (8) of the EPA because of s. 100.1(6). In that forum, degrees of fault or negligence can be taken into account in allocating final financial liability according to what is just and equitable in the circumstances (see s. 99.1(6))
Applying the specific words of s. 99.1(7) with the necessary modifications referred to in s. 100.1(6), the Tribunal finds that it does not have the jurisdiction to carry out the contribution and indemnification role set out in s. 99.1(7). … Presumably, if the Legislature had also wished to substitute “Tribunal” for “court” and “Tribunal proceeding” for “action”, it would have done so explicitly. It would have also added contribution and indemnification matters to the list of considerations under s. 100.1(15).
To summarize, the court is the body referred to in s. 99.1(7) and the Tribunal finds that the Legislature intended the court to exclusively resolve contribution and indemnification issues arising from both s. 99.1 and 100.1. The “necessary modifications” set out in s. 100.1(6) are not expansive enough to replace court actions with Tribunal proceedings. An innocent owner or controller of a pollutant may initially be liable to pay for municipal costs under s. 100.1 but ultimately be reimbursed by those with a greater degree of fault or negligence in a civil action before the courts (which could involve s. 100.1 and common law causes of action as well). Having regard to the specific wording of s. 99.1(7) and for reasons analogous to those set out in a different context in Straza, the Tribunal finds that it should not attempt to usurp the role of the civil courts in that endeavour. The Tribunal is confined to its specific mandate under the EPA and is not given the legislated mandate to conduct trials of actions to enforce a right to contribution or indemnification. Therefore, the Tribunal would not have entertained any of the Gendrons’ evidence and argument intended to address contribution and indemnification, including the allegations relating to this in the withdrawn Notices of Allegation.
[24] The ERT indicated (at para. 60) that if an orderee commences a civil proceeding under s. 99.1(7) and s. 100.1(6) of the EPA that proceeding “would be subject to the typical civil limitations periods” rather than the 15 day limitation period under s. 100.1(7) of the EPA.
Analysis
[25] Given the decision of the ERT, the plaintiff was faced with three choices. The first was to commence a separate civil action for contribution and indemnity against the parties that are already defendants to this action.
[26] If the plaintiff commenced a separate civil action against the same parties he would be confronted with the argument that a separate claim is inconsistent with s. 138 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chap. C.43, which provides: “As far as possible, multiplicity of legal proceedings shall be avoided.”
[27] A second option was to bring a crossclaim for contribution and indemnity against his co-defendants in the City’s action. Indeed, para. 10(a) of the plaintiff Statement of Defence in the City’s action already included a crossclaim for contribution and indemnity against those co-defendants (Thompson Fuels, TSSA and Les Reservoirs D’Acier De Granby Inc (Granby Inc.)) that are also defendants in the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim (the common defendants). That Statement of Defence was filed on March 3, 2011. Arguably, the proposed amendment is just a particularization of the crossclaim for contribution and indemnity already advanced in that Statement of Defence.
[28] The third option was to amend the Statement of Claim in the present action. That is the option chosen by the plaintiff. The amendment to the Statement of Claim proposed by the plaintiff is the precise claim for contribution and indemnity that the ERT held must be brought in a civil action in court. The claim arises from the exact same facts (the December 2008 furnace oil leak) as the negligence claim already in the Statement of Claim. The persons against whom contribution and indemnity are sought are already defendants to that action. The plaintiff argues that the claim is simply an additional ground of relief arising out of the same set of facts. The ERT decision specifically contemplates (at para. 61) that such a claim “could involve s. 100.1 and common law causes of action as well”.
[29] The defendants argue that the proposed claim is untenable for two reasons. The first is that the claim was commenced outside the two year limitation period established by s. 4 the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c.24. The defendants argue that the limitation period began to run as early as December 2008 when the oil leak was discovered, or, pursuant to s. 18 of the Limitations Act dealing with claims for contribution and indemnity, at the latest on June 15, 2010 when the City issued its s. 100.1 order against Gendron. Either way, they argue, the plaintiff’s proposed amendment is well outside the two year limitation period.
[30] The plaintiff argues that this amendment is not a new cause of action but the particularization of the damages arising from the same factual matrix already pled in its Statement of Claim. In Kawartha Lakes (City) v. Gendron, MacDougall J. stated:
As stated in Cahoon v. Franks, 1967 77 (SCC), [1967] S.C.R. 455; 63 D.L.R. (2d) 274 the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that the "factual situation which gave the plaintiff a cause of action was the negligence of the defendant which caused the plaintiff to suffer damage. This single cause of action cannot be split to be made the subject of several causes of action".
The provision of appropriate particulars does not amount to the assertion of a new cause of action.
[31] In this regard, as noted above, the plaintiff’s Statement of Defence dated March 3, 2011 and filed in the City’s civil action already includes a crossclaim for full contribution and indemnity against the common defendants. Arguably, the proposed amendment is just a particularization of the claim already advanced in that Statement of Defence. If that were correct then the plaintiff would meet the limitation period even if it began to run on June 15, 2010 when the City issued its s. 100.1 order against Gendron.
[32] In the alternative the plaintiff argues that the limitation period did not begin to run until June 30, 2016 when the ERT issued its decision reducing the s. 100.1 order to $313,005.08. Until that time, he argues, he could not know whether the order was valid or how much the claim for contribution and indemnity would be. While the court has jurisdiction in a civil action to order contribution and indemnity, only the ERT can determine whether the s. 100.1 order is valid and the correct amount.
[33] The plaintiff advised the defendants of his intention to amend the pleadings immediately after the June 30, 2016 ERT decision, and provided the defendants with a draft of his proposed amendments on September 20, 2016.
[34] The first issue is whether the s. 100.1 claim for contribution and indemnity is a new cause of action or the particularization of the existing claim or crossclaim arising from the facts as already pleaded. If it is a new cause of action, the second issue is the date when the limitation period began to run. These are legal questions. There is no case law directly on point. At this stage the court should not decide issues of law that are not fully settled by the jurisprudence. Since the legal issues are novel, it is not plain and obvious that the claim for contribution and indemnity is barred by the limitation period; see: Toronto Community Housing Corporation v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada) Limited, 2011 ONSC 4914 at paras. 85-88(); Skrobacky v. Frymer, 2014 ONSC 4544 at para. 17(); Boyes Home Inc. v. Payne, 2013 ONSC 1056 at paras. 21-24). In these circumstances the plaintiff should be permitted to amend the claim, without prejudice to the defendant’s right to raise the limitation period defence. The legal issues, including the appropriate date for the commencement of the limitation period, are best dealt with in the context of a trial, particularly given the fact that the original negligence claim, which arises from the same set of facts, will be the subject of a trial in any event.
[35] The second issue raised by the defendants is that they cannot be liable for contribution and indemnity under s. 100.1 because that provision gives the municipality the right to issue orders against the “the owner of the pollutant or the person having control of the pollutant” within the meaning of the EPA. The plaintiff can only bring a claim for contribution and indemnity against another owner or person having control of the pollutant. The defendants argue first that the proposed amendments to the statement of claim are deficient in that they do not allege that the defendants are either owners or persons having control of the pollutant. Second, and in any event, they argue that it is untenable to argue that any of the defendants qualify as either the owner of the pollutant or the person having control of the pollutant.
[36] The terms “owner” and “person having control of the pollutant” are defined in s. 91(1) of the EPA:
“owner of the pollutant” means the owner of the pollutant immediately before the first discharge of the pollutant, whether into the natural environment or not, in a quantity or with a quality abnormal at the location where the discharge occurs, and “owner of a pollutant” has a corresponding meaning;
“person having control of a pollutant” means the person and the person’s employee or agent, if any, having the charge, management or control of a pollutant immediately before the first discharge of the pollutant, whether into the natural environment or not, in a quantity or with a quality abnormal at the location where the discharge occurs, and “person having control of the pollutant” has a corresponding meaning;
[37] In order to bring the defendants under the liability provisions of s. 99.1 the plaintiff must establish on a balance of probabilities that the defendants were the owner or had control of the pollutants “immediately before the first discharge of the pollutant” (Gagnon & Associates Inc. v. Genier et. al., 2014 ONSC 3019 at para. 24)
[38] The plaintiff acknowledges that he was the sole “owner” of the pollutant within the meaning of the EPA, but takes the position that the pleadings provide a basis to argue that the defendants were, at the relevant time, “persons having control of a pollutant”.
[39] At this point the principle that “the Statement of Claim must be read generously to allow for drafting deficiencies” comes into play. It is true that the precise words used in the statute are not repeated in the Statement of Claim. However, giving the pleading a generous interpretation as required, the words in the Statement of Claim are sufficient to support the claim for contribution and indemnity. The proposed amendment expressly references s. 100.1 of the EPA, which arguably incorporates by reference the statutory standard. The Statement of Claim alleges that Thompson Fuels “provided fuel oil to the fuel heating system” immediately before the leak, which the plaintiff argues could qualify as having control of the pollutant. Similarly, the Claim alleges that TSSA failed to take steps to prevent the leak of fuel oil at the material times, which the plaintiff also argues could qualify as having control of the pollutant. Finally, the third defendant, Granby Inc., manufactured the fuel tank. The plaintiff wants to argue that as the manufacturer it retained some control over the contents of the tank. I am not permitted to consider the factual merit of the plaintiff’s claim at this stage – like a motion under Rule 21.01 I must assume that the facts alleged are true. The factual merit will be an issue after all the evidence has been heard. Again, given the lack of settled jurisprudence on this legal issue I am not prepared to find that the plaintiff’s assertion is untenable.
[40] The final argument raised by the defendants is that the amendment is premature because the plaintiff has appealed the ERT decision to the Divisional Court under s. 100.1(16) of the EPA. The defendant argues that since there is a potential for the Divisional Court to overturn the ERT order, the proposed claim may become a nullity and should not be entertained by the court.
[41] The defendants also take the position that the appeal to the Divisional Court automatically stays the order of the ERT. This position appears to be contrary to s. 100.1(18) of the EPA which provides:
(18) An appeal of a decision of the Tribunal to the Divisional Court or to the Minister under this section does not stay the operation of the decision, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise.
[42] The argument here is that the court should not entertain the amendment until after the plaintiff’s appeal to the Divisional Court (and any subsequent appeals) is determined. If I accepted this argument the plaintiff would be faced with three choices: abandon his appeal in order to have the entire action (including contribution and indemnity) heard immediately, adjourn the entire case until after the appeal process is exhausted, or separate the negligence claim from the contribution and indemnity claim, having the former heard immediately and the latter heard at some later date after the appeal process is exhausted. In my view, the third option, which would result in a multiplicity of proceedings, substantially increased costs and an unnecessary duplication of expert testimony, is an untenable option. The other two options are only slightly better.
[43] The determination of whether to adjourn a proceeding on the ground of prematurity is a discretionary matter falling within the court’s jurisdiction in the administration of justice Canadian Planning and Design Consultants Inc. v. Libya, 2015 ONCA 661 at para. 57. In my view the just, most expeditious and least expensive way of proceeding is to permit the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim to add his proposed amendments and continue with the trial as scheduled on November 14, 2016. Any order that I make with regard to the defendant’s liability for contribution and indemnity can easily be made subject to any subsequent decision of the Divisional Court or subsequent appeal should leave be granted.
[44] Finally, the addition of the claims for breach of contract and breach of statutory duty arise from the same factual matrix as the claim for negligence. An amendment of a statement of claim to assert an alternative theory of liability based on facts that have already been pleaded in the statement of claim does not assert a new claim for purposes of s. 4 of the Limitations Act: see Salvatore Fuda v. Jim McIntosh Petroleum Engineering Ltd., 2013 ONSC 2122 at para. 305() Forjani v. Vali, 2010 ONSC 2225 at paras. 45-46. This is consistent with the more general approach to the definition of a cause of action as the particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the claimant his cause of action, i.e. the factual matrix that describes the cause of the plaintiff’s complaint: see Ivany v. Financière Telco Inc., 2011 ONSC 2785, at paras. 26-28.
[45] As the proposed amendments relate to the same factual matrix already set out in the Statement of Claim, the City’s civil action, and a variety of proceedings before the ERT, the defendants have been unable to point to any real or specific prejudice that could arise from these proposed amendments. In order to ensure that there is no prejudice I have given the defendants an opportunity to amend their Statements of Defence to plead any limitation period defence that might arise, an opportunity to seek particulars and an opportunity for further discovery of the plaintiff with regard to these amendments.
Conclusion
[46] Accordingly, the amendments sought by the plaintiff are allowed on the terms set out at paragraph 6 above. Costs of this motion are reserved to the final determination of costs at the end of trial.
Justice R.E. Charney
Released: November 15, 2016
CITATION: Gendron v. Doug G. Thompson Ltd. (Thompson Fuels), 2016 ONSC 7056
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
WAYNE ALLAN GENDRON
Plaintiff
– and –
DOUG G. THOMPSON LTD., operating as THOMPSON FUELS, TECHNICAL STANDARDS AND SAFETY AUTHORITY, and LES RESERVOIRS D’ACIER DE GRANBY INC.
Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION
Justice R.E. Charney
Released: November 15, 2016