Court File and Parties
CITATION: Agboola v. Unoh, 2016 ONSC 6779
COURT FILE NO.: 353/16
DATE: 2016/10/31
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Ayodele Mabolaji Agboola
Applicant
– and –
Emma Samuda Unoh
Respondent
COUNSEL:
Paula Ferré, for the Applicant
Patricia Lucas, for the Respondent
HEARD: October 24, 2016
BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE J.W. SCOTT
J U D G M E N T
[1] On July 14, 2016, Ayodele Mobolaji Agboola (“father”) filed an application with this court against Emma Samuda Unoh (“mother”). The focus of this application is a request, pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (commonly called “The Hague Convention”), that the parties’ child, Zoe Joy Agboola, born October 1, 2014, be found to be wrongfully retained in Ontario by the mother and that the child be returned to Woodland Park, Colorado, United States of America.
Background
[2] Mr. Agboola is 42 years of age. Although born in Canada, he resided in Nigeria for a period of time during his childhood. He currently holds a Canadian passport but his Nigerian passport has expired. I assume he is eligible for a new one should he so desire at some point. He is a software engineer, having graduated from the University of Waterloo in 1996.
[3] Dr. Unoh is 41 years of age. She was born in Nigeria and currently holds both a Nigerian and Canadian passport. She is a psychiatrist and completed her medical studies in Nigeria. In 2001, she left Nigeria for Ireland where she remained until 2008 when she came to Canada.
[4] The parties met in Ottawa in February of 2011 and both moved to St. Catharines in July of that same year. On August 6, 2011, they married in Albany, New York, U.S.A.
[5] Since September of 2011, Dr. Unoh has worked in the Niagara Health System as a psychiatrist. In 2013, between January and November, she also had a full-time private practice. According to Dr. Unoh, she did not completely close her private practice until October of 2015, although it would appear that her involvement would have had to be negligible at best, as a result of the time she took off for maternity leave with respect to Zoe.
[6] At the time of marriage, Mr. Agboola was unemployed. In September of 2012, he obtained work as a software engineer in New Jersey but returned to Canada approximately 13 months later when this job ended. Mr. Agboola had decided shortly before the termination that he wanted to attend Charis Bible College. This institution is located in Colorado, U.S.A. Dr. Unoh, as well, decided to attend Charis Bible College. Both were accepted and in November of 2013, they moved to Colorado for that purpose. Each obtained student visas (M-1). Dr. Unoh continued her employment for the Niagara Health System by returning for a few days approximately once a month for work in the hospital.
[7] When the parties went to Colorado, they moved out of their St. Catharines residence and put their furnishings into storage here, with the expectation that when their schooling was completed they would return here. The parties differ in their evidence as to whether a return to St. Catharines at that point would be permanent or temporary.
[8] In 2014, Dr. Unoh became pregnant. This was not an easy pregnancy. It limited her ability to travel back to St. Catharines to work during her pregnancy and after Zoe was born she took time off as well. Consequently, for about a year, she did not return to St. Catharines for her employment with the Niagara Health System. This would have been between May of 2014 and April of 2015. By May of 2015, her work in Niagara resumed. Additionally, during June and July of 2015, she worked for North Bay Services as a psychiatrist. During those months, the child, Mr. Agboola and Pelumi Ajadi accompanied her there. At that time, Mr. Agboola completed writing a book. Ms. Ajadi assisted with the care of Zoe.
[9] When Dr. Unoh returned to St. Catharines for her periods of work, the routine had been to stay at a hotel or with friends. After Zoe’s birth, the child would be left behind in Colorado with Mr. Agboola and a nanny who assisted. By September of 2015, Dr. Unoh, tired of staying in hotels and with friends, rented an apartment in St. Catharines. The belongings placed in storage in the fall of 2013 were moved to this residence. Mr. Agboola arranged for the internet connection. Aside from these times away from Colorado for work, there was an occasion when Dr. Unoh was required to go to England as part of Charis’ education programme. On this occasion as well, the child was left in the care of Mr. Agboola with the support of the nanny. When both parties were in school this same nanny, Kayla Jones, watched Zoe.
[10] At the time of the move to Colorado, each party assumed that they would take a three-year programme at Charis Bible College. According to Dr. Unoh, however, the programme could be one, two or three years in length. Following completion of her second year, Dr. Unoh opted to accept her biblical studies diploma at that point. According to her, the third year is an optional internship year, which obviously Mr. Agboola decided to do. During Mr. Agboola’s third year, as Dr. Unoh was not in school, her visa status changed to M-2 which apparently reflected that she was the spouse of a full-time student with a M-1 visa. Mr. Agboola suggests that Dr. Unoh was only taking a year off from school and that the plan was for her to return in 2017. He states that the idea was that he would then look for work in the U.S. while his wife attended school.
[11] The evidence is that within 30 days of completion of the education programme, you are required to leave the country. Mr. Agboola completed school in May of 2016 and his M-1 visa expired on June 18, 2016. He returned to Canada around that date and went to Ottawa to stay with his parents. By that time, Dr. Unoh and Zoe were already residing in St. Catharines.
Zoe’s Move to Ontario
[12] Around the time of Zoe’s first birthday, it appears that there was some friction between the parties. As a result, Dr. Unoh, after discussions with her husband, took the child to Ottawa to visit Mr. Agboola’s parents. It was anticipated that the trip would be only from October 4 until October 7, 2015, at which point Dr. Unoh would return to Colorado with Zoe before her next trip back to St. Catharines for work. There is no dispute that Mr. Agboola consented to Zoe going with her mother to visit his parents from October 4 until October 7, 2015.
[13] Unfortunately, Zoe developed an ear infection during the trip and so it was recommended that she not fly back to Colorado until the infection had resolved. Mr. Agboola was made aware of this development and therefore did not push for the immediate return of Zoe. It was anticipated that the infection would take four to six weeks to clear. Dr. Unoh and the child travelled to St. Catharines to stay in the apartment she had rented there. She was scheduled to work in St. Catharines on October 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 2015, and apparently did.
[14] On October 23, 2015, Dr. Unoh sent a text to Mr. Agboola asking whether he would come to Canada to watch the child during U.S. Thanksgiving as he would have a week off from school. There was no response to this request.
[15] On November 4, 2015, Dr. Unoh advised her husband that she could no longer keep up with commuting to work from Colorado to Canada, with being the main income earner for the family and the main caregiver for Zoe, without his support and commitment to provide care for their child while she worked. (The child was not in daycare and the nanny previously employed had given notice that she would be unable to continue effective December 1, 2015.) Dr. Unoh concluded by telling her husband that she would be staying in Canada with Zoe and that he could come to Canada “at his convenience”.
[16] According to the evidence of Dr. Unoh, Mr Agboola advised that he felt they were separated as of November 7, 2015.
[17] There were requests by Mr. Agboola that their daughter be returned to Colorado. These communications occurred from about November 9 until early December of 2015. On December 3, 2015, according to Dr. Unoh, she requested Mr. Agboola assist in the care of the child during his two-week vacation in December. According to Dr. Unoh, the request was declined and there was no further contact concerning Zoe seeing her father until he arrived very early on December 25, 2016. On that day he appeared at 5:30 a.m., unannounced, and knocked on her door. Dr. Unoh did not let him and instead contacted the police to request their presence. The police did come and Mr. Agboola saw Zoe for only a very brief period of time before leaving. The evidence suggests that he determined to leave, on his own accord, after about 10 minutes. Arrangements were made for Mr. Agboola to see Zoe the following day at a friend’s home. He did not attend nor even call despite Dr. Unoh texting him several times about the visit. Between December 27, 2015 and May 24, 2015, Mr. Agboola did not make any attempt to see or contact the child. He did e-mail Dr. Unoh around March 22, 2016, simply asking “when are you coming home”. Dr. Unoh’s evidence is that she found that message to be strange as she was “living and working in Canada and Mr. Agboola is expected to return to Canada when he completes his studies” about two months later. Mr. Agboola explained that the reason for the lack of contact during this time period was to give Dr. Unoh some time to “reflect”.
[18] Until the various litigation matters started in May of 2016, there was not really much occurring between the parties.
Current situation
[19] The lease on Mr. Agboola’s residence in Colorado was up in mid-June 2016 and he did leave Colorado around June 18, 2016, as required as a term of his M-1 visa. He drove to Ottawa and stayed with his parents. It appears that he continued to apply for employment in the U.S.A. Very recently, September 14, 2016, he accepted a job with Diversant in Colorado as a computer systems analyst. It is basically a one-year contract at this point, ending on September 11, 2017. He started his work there on October 4, 2016. Counsel for Dr. Unoh was unaware of this development until the Friday afternoon before the matter was argued on Monday, October 24, 2016. Mr. Agboola’s explanation for the lack of making this change in his situation known earlier was that he had to wait for it to be “ratified” after a background check on him was finalized. His entry to the U.S.A. is pursuant to a TN1 NAFTA visa. He advised the Court that he had obtained a place to live in Colorado Springs and as well a placement for Zoe at Hope Montessori daycare. Mr. Agboola is qualified to work in either Canada or the U.S.A.
[20] Dr. Unoh continues to reside in St. Catharines with Zoe and work with the Niagara Health System. She has arranged for a nanny to care for Zoe during her absences. She is not qualified to practice medicine in Colorado and has no visa that would allow her to live there.
Procedural History
[21] In addressing this application, it is helpful to look at the history of the legal proceedings between these parties:
May 20, 2016, Mr. Agboola filed a “Petition for Legal Separation with Child” in Colorado. This petition was served on the respondent on June 9, 2016 along with an emergency motion asking for an order that the child be returned. The petition addresses a number of issues aside from the child, including legal separation and property.
On May 20, 2016, Mr. Agboola also issued an emergency motion for the return of the child. The endorsement of Magistrate Feeney, on May 23, 2016, reads:
(1) The subject child left the state of Colorado more than 182 days ago and, as such, the state of Colorado has neither initial Child-Custody Jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.S. Section 14-13-201(1) nor Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.S. Section 14-13-204 with respect to the subject child.
(2) Therefore, the Motion is denied as the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order for the child to be returned to the state of Colorado.
(3) The consent of the parties was not required for the Magistrate to rule on this matter. If any party wishes to appeal the Magistrate’s decision, he or she must file a Motion for Review of Magistrate’s Decision within 21 days of the date this order was placed in the mail or otherwise transmitted.
(There is no evidence that a Motion for Review was filed.)
On June 3, 2016, the respondent filed an application with the court in St. Catharines, Ontario, requesting custody of Zoe. This application was served on Mr. Agboola on June 15, 2015.
Around this same time Mr. Agboola also contacted the American Central Authority under the Hague Convention who in turn contacted the Central Authority in Ontario.
The Central Authority in Ontario wrote to Dr. Unoh requesting that she voluntarily return to Colorado with Zoe. That did not happen.
On July 14, 2016, Mr. Agboola filed this Hague Convention application.
On July 15, 2016, Dr. Unoh was served with this Hague Convention application.
An Initial Status Conference was held in Colorado on August 3, 2016, with respect to the petition that originated in that State. The next court appearance, scheduled for September 22, 2016, was adjourned.
The Hague application was in court in St. Catharines by way of motion on August 26, 2016. Amongst other things, Harper, J. ordered that the child was to remain in Ontario with Dr. Unoh pending return of the motion/application. Provisions for some access were also included.
On October 14, 2016, a judicial conference call occurred between Magistrate M. Feeney and Justice J.W. Scott. In Ontario, the mother and her counsel attended as did an agent for the father’s counsel. No party nor counsel attended in Colorado.
On October 24, 2016, the Hague motion was argued.
The Law and Its Application in the Current Proceeding
[22] Both counsel have provided books of authorities which have been most helpful to the Court.
[23] In Ontario, section 46 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.12, as amended, proclaims in force the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in Ontario. The Convention itself is actually a schedule within this legislation. Where there is conflict between the Act and the Convention, the Convention prevails. Section 46 (5) of the Act also provides that an application may be made to a court in pursuance of a right or an obligation under the Convention. That is what Mr. Agboola has done.
[24] Applications under the Hague Convention are intended to deliver expeditious decisions on enforcement. The application is not intended to be a forum to decide the case on its merits or to determine a child’s best interests. (Thomson v. Thomson, (1994) 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), 6 R.F.L. (4th) 290 SCC). As pointed out in Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis, 2001 CanLII 24075 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. No. 1598, at para. 32, “Hague Convention contracting states accept that the courts of other contracting states will properly take the best interests of the children into account.” When there has been a wrongful removal or retention of a child, and no defence is established within the meaning of the Hague Convention, the child must be returned to his or her habitual residence.
[25] In Brown v. Pulley, [2015] O.J. No. 1770, Sherr, J. wrote at paragraph 131:
The Convention's underlying rationale is that disputes over custody of a child should be resolved by the courts in the jurisdiction where the child is habitually resident; child abduction is to be deterred. The Convention presumes that the interests of children who have been wrongfully removed are ordinarily better served by immediately returning them to the place of their habitual residence where the question of their custody should have been determined before their removal. See: V.W. v. D.S., 1996 CanLII 192 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108.
[26] Article 1 of the Convention provides:
The objects of the present Convention are:
(a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
(b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.
[27] The onus is on Mr. Agboola to prove to the Court that there has been a wrongful removal or retention of Zoe by Dr. Unoh. In this regard, Article 3 states:
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.
[28] There is a distinction between rights of custody and rights of access and the difference between these two rights is defined in Article 5.
[29] The Convention on its own does not give preference to a primary caregiver in protection of custodial rights. As pointed out in Ellis v. Wentzell-Ellis 2010 ONCA 347, 102 O.R. (3d) 298 at para. 30:
…The Convention does not make protection of custodial rights contingent on an applicant being the primary caregiver, nor does it give preference to the custody rights of the primary caregiver….
[30] Drawing from that, in the case at hand, the Court need not determine who was primarily responsible for the care of the child. The parties were married and living with one another and consequently, in law, considered to be joint custodians of Zoe. If one parent was more involved in the care of the child, that factor is not relevant for the Hague application.
[31] Key to a determination of this present application is Articles 12 and 13. Article 12 provides:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.
Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.
[32] This Article firstly requires a finding as to whether the child has been wrongfully removed or retained as described in Article 3. Inherent in that, is a determination by the Court as to where the child’s habitual residence was at the time of the wrongful removal or retention. In the case at hand, no one has argued that the child was wrongfully removed from Colorado on October 4, 2015. The child obviously left the State with her mother and with her father’s knowledge and consent. Similarly, everyone agrees that the anticipated return date initially was October 7, 2015. On that date the child was unable to return home due to medical issues. Mr. Agboola clearly agreed that the child need not travel while her health prevented it. It appears, however, that by November 3, 2015, Dr. Unoh had reached the decision that the child would not be returning to Colorado. Her reasons did not relate to the health problem of the child but to other issues as previously described. Whether on that date she felt as if the parties were separating or not, this decision to keep Zoe in Ontario was unilateral on her part. Later, apparently Mr. Agboola described the separation date as November 7, 2015. The question then is where was the habitual residence of Zoe in November of 2015?
[33] The Hague Convention offers no definition or direction on how to determine habitual residence. In Korutowska-Wooff v. Wooff, 2004 CanLII 5548 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 3256 (ONCA) the Court summarized the principles that come into play for this determination at para. 8:
- the question of habitual residence is a question of fact to be decided on all of the circumstances;
- the habitual residence is the place where the person resides for an appreciable period of time with a "settled intention";
- a "settled intention" or "purpose" is an intent to stay in a place whether temporarily or permanently for a particular purpose, such as employment, family, etc.;
- a child's habitual residence is tied to that of the child's custodian(s).
[34] It may also be helpful to consider section 22 (2) (a) and (b) of the Children’s Law Reform Act which reads:
A child is habitually resident in the place where he or she resided,
(a) with both parents;
(b) where the parents are living separate and apart, with one parent under a separation agreement or with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other or under a court order; or
(c) [not relevant]
whichever last occurred.
[35] In my view, the fact that the parties were only in Colorado for a planned temporary period for education purposes is not relevant when the child was born there and in essence lived there with her parents. Short trips away to Canada, including the two month period in North Bay, did not change the habitual residence of Zoe. I have no difficulty in concluding that in November of 2015 the child was habitually resident in Colorado. I also have no difficulty in concluding that the unilateral decision of Dr. Unoh not to return the child to Colorado, despite the requests of Mr. Agboola in November and December of 2015, was a wrongful retention of Zoe.
[36] With those findings made, it is necessary for the Court to next consider Article 13 of the Convention:
Despite the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that:
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.
[37] The onus of establishing that Article 13 applies in this case rests on the mother, Dr. Unoh.
[38] Part of the mother’s argument is that the father was not actually exercising his custody rights to the child. Case law has suggested that there is a very low threshold for the left-behind parent to establish that he was exercising his rights to custody and similarly a very high standard for the parent who has the child to establish that the left-behind parent has abandoned his rights of custody. I have commented earlier on the limited impact that being the primary caregiver has and simply repeat again that it is not a factor to be used, in essence, to determine where a matter should be heard although it may be quite a significant factor in the actual custody hearing.
[39] The strongest aspect of the mother’s argument under this Article appears to relate to the issue of whether Mr. Agboola subsequently acquiesced to the child remaining in Ontario.
[40] Backhouse, J. noted in De Martinez v. Rios [2008] O.J. No. 3098:
25 Under Article 13 of the Convention, the onus is on the party opposing the return of the child to prove that the applicant consented to, or subsequently acquiesced in, the child's removal or retention. In Katsigiannis, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that there must be clear and cogent evidence of unequivocal consent or subjective acquiescence:
When determining whether a parent consented to the removal of a child under Article 13(a), the court must determine whether, as a matter of fact, the applicant parent intended to and did give unconditional consent to the removal of the child. (Mathews v. Mathews 2007 CarswellBC 3078 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 13 and 14; Katsigiannis, supra at paras. 43 and 49)
[41] Mr. Agboola did commence his application within the 12 month period referred to in Article 12 of the Convention, so the issue is whether there was clear and cogent evidence of unequivocal consent or subjective acquiescence after the child was retained in Ontario.
[42] As noted previously, Mr. Agboola consistently for a period of time between approximately November 9, 2015, and December 2, 2015, did request that Zoe be returned to Colorado. Thereafter there was no contact until December 25, 2015, when he appeared at Dr. Unoh’s apartment and had some brief contact with Zoe. Then, although Dr. Unoh made arrangements for the father to see Zoe on December 26, 2015, there was no contact. She did not hear from Mr. Agboola further until about March 23, 2016, when, according to her evidence, she received a message from him wanting to know when she was returning to Colorado. There was no specific reference to Zoe in that message and based on the evidence of Dr. Unoh no further requests concerning Zoe occurred until May of 2016 after he commenced his court application in Colorado. In passing, I would note that at the time the application in Colorado was filed and at the time that Mr. Agboola contacted the Central Authority, his M-1 visa was expired and as a result he was under a requirement to leave Colorado by around June 18, 2016. It strikes me as somewhat odd that he would be requesting Zoe be returned to Colorado at that point when neither he nor Dr. Unoh had visas that would permit them to live there.
[43] The determination of whether acquiescence occurred is a subjective test and may be found in words and conduct, including silence. (see: Katsigiannis, supra.) It is my view that initially, clearly, there was no acquiescence by the father to Zoe remaining in Ontario. What is troublesome, however, is the lengthy period of time after that when there was no contact. It is difficult to accept that Mr. Agboola was so concerned about upsetting the mother, about potentially pushing her “over the edge” that he simply ceased any contact to see how his daughter was faring in the situation he perceived to exist. I recognize that clearly under the Convention, Mr. Agboola has 12 months to bring forward his application and I want to emphasize that I am not at all looking at the timing of that application being commenced. What I am referring to is the silence of Mr. Agboola after December until May. What I am pointing to is the conduct of Mr. Agboola in not making efforts to make inquiries about or see his daughter. It was really not until his school programme ended that his attention again turned back to Zoe. With the silence and his conduct, it is not unreasonable that Dr. Unoh assumed that he had consented and acquiesced to the child being in Ontario. As noted previously, both parties had envisioned that at the conclusion of Mr. Agboola’s third year at Charis they would be returning to Ontario, either permanently or temporarily. Their visas obviously would be at an end at that point as well.
[44] In Jackson v. Graczyk 2007 ONCA 388, [2007] O.J. No. 2035, the Ontario Court of Appeal commented on acquiescence at para. 50:
The standard for finding acquiescence is high. "Clear and cogent" evidence of "unequivocal acquiescence" is required. See Katsigiannis, supra, at para. 49. Ordinarily the test for acquiescence is subjective, but as Lord Brown-Wilkinson said in Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence), [1998] A.C. 72 at 90 (H.L.):
Where the words or actions of the wronged parent clearly and unequivocally show and have led the other parent to believe that the wronged parent is not asserting or going to assert his right to the summary return of the child and are inconsistent with such return, justice requires that the wronged parent be held to have acquiesced.
[45] I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Agboola “subsequently acquiesced” in the retention of Zoe in Ontario by Dr. Unoh. Whether the child should continue in Ontario or whether the child should be in the custody of Dr. Unoh are issues to be dealt with in the outstanding custody action.
[46] Having found that acquiescence has been shown, it is not necessary for the Court to consider Article 13(b). I would comment however that there is no evidence at this point that would show that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm if returned to Colorado. Dr. Unoh’s factum was prepared and filed by her counsel prior to receiving the information concerning the father having found work again in Colorado. If Mr. Agboola’s circumstances had not changed and he was without a visa to go back into the U.S.A., I would have had no difficulty in concluding that the child would be placed in an intolerable situation if ordered back to Colorado when neither of her parents had the right to reside there and, on the information available, it is not clear to me that the Colorado court would have accepted jurisdiction, in any event.
Order
[47] The application of Ayodele Mobolaji Agboola is dismissed.
[48] The application under the Children’s Law Reform Act of Ontario filed on June 3, 2016, in St. Catharines by Dr. Unoh may proceed.
[49] If the issue of costs cannot be resolved between counsel, brief written submissions shall be filed, with the judges’ secretary, by the respondent within 30 days from today and by the applicant within 45 days from today. Any reply submissions shall be filed within 15 days thereafter. If no submissions are filed, the endorsement shall be no order on account of costs.
Scott J.
Released: October 31, 2016
CITATION: Agboola v. Unoh, 2016 ONSC 6779
COURT FILE NO.: 353/16
DATE: 2016/10/31
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Ayodele Mabolaji Agboola
Applicant
- and –
Emma Samuda Unoh
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Scott J.
Released: October 31, 2016