CITATION: McEown v. Parks, 2016 ONSC 6761

COURT FILE NO.: F1113/15

DATE: October 28, 2016

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

FAMILY COURT

RE: BRITTANY ANNE McEOWN, applicant

AND:

BRANDON PARKS, respondent

BEFORE: VOGELSANG J.

COUNSEL: Thomas W. Curran for the applicant Brandon Parks in person

HEARD: August 12, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Ms. McEown commenced an application in September, 2015 in which she sought a custody order concerning Audrey Jody-Lee Parks, born April 13, 2012. The respondent is the father of the child, born during about four years of the parties’ cohabitation which ended only a few months before the application was issued.

BACKGROUND

[2] Emergency relief apparently was necessary and Fryer J. made a temporary order on October 7, 2015 providing Mr. Parks access to his three-year-old daughter up to four hours on Wednesdays and Fridays and a weekly overnight visit from Saturday afternoon until Sunday morning. Ms. McEown was granted temporary custody.

[3] There were unusual terms in the consent temporary order. Access pick up and drop off were to be effected at the Merrymount Children’s Centre supervised facility. Until the Merrymount Centre could be put in place, pick up and drop off were at Mr. Parks’ residence but he was ordered not to exit that residence during the exchange.

[4] The order specifically required Mr. Parks to comply with the directions of his medical care givers concerning prescribed drugs and to abstain from alcohol or illicit drugs before and during access. If an access facilitator was of the view that Mr. Parks had violated the drug/alcohol strictures, access was to be refused and, should there be a second lapse, access was summarily suspended pending a further court order.

[5] In addition, Fryer J. incorporated specific terms of the detailed consent signed by the parties and their counsel. Mr. Parks was made responsible for complete compliance with his then judicial interim release order when he made access arrangements. Both parties were warned not to involve Audrey in the litigation, and particularly against questioning the child about her feelings concerning Mr. Parks.

[6] Unfortunately Mr. Parks immediately conducted himself very badly and was charged with a number of other offences. It is fair to observe that he showed no ability whatsoever to avoid harassing Ms. McEown and treating her despicably – even to the point, among other things, of engineering her arrest and detention on a false charge and threatening her professional livelihood by passing an untrue allegation to the Ontario College of Nurses.

[7] A few short weeks after the order of Fryer J., Hebner J. conducted a case conference at London on November 24, 2015. An order was made with respect to the release of Bell Canada text records and Ms. McEown proceeded with an urgent motion to vary the access ordered on October 7, 2015. Mr. Parks was in custody, now facing several new and serious charges. Hebner J. was satisfied that there were “serious mental health issues on the part of the respondent that need to be addressed before access can take place.” She suspended the access ordered by Fryer J. and ordered that the respondent would have no access to Audrey pending further order of the court. Leave was granted to either party to deal with access (and the terms thereof) after Mr. Parks’ release from detention.

[8] After about nine months, Mr. Parks initiated an access motion. He had moved to Kingston, Ontario after his release from custody – having been banned from the City of London as a term of a probation order. He proposed that he have weekend access in Kingston for one weekend each month, supervised by the child’s great-aunt, Jill Elliot Kish, after an introductory one day visit in Toronto, again supervised by Ms. Kish.

[9] Ms. McEown responded with a motion for summary judgment, seeking sole custody of Audrey, child support and no access to Mr. Parks.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[10] The motion is to be determined by applying rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, expanded by O. Reg. 69/15 (effective May 2, 2015). The operative portions of the amended rule are:

WHEN AVAILABLE

16(1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED

(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

EVIDENCE OF RESPONDING PARTY

(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

EVIDENCE NOT FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

(5) If a party’s evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusions unfavourable to the party.

POWERS

(6.1) In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties, and the court may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:

1. Weighing the evidence.

2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.

3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

ORAL EVIDENCE (MINI-TRIAL)

(6.2) The court may, for the purposes of exercising any of the powers set out in subrule (6.1), order that oral evidence be presented by one or more parties, with or without time limits on its presentation.

ORDER GIVING DIRECTIONS

(9) If the court does not make a final order, or makes an order for a trial of an issue, the court may, in addition to exercising a power listed in subrule 1 (7.2),

(a) specify what facts are not in dispute, state the issues and give directions about how and when the case will go to trial (in which case the order governs how the trial proceeds, unless the trial judge orders otherwise);

(b) give directions; and

(c) impose conditions (for example, require a party to pay money into court as security, or limit a party’s pretrial disclosure).

[11] While the expanded summary judgment provisions have attracted significant comment, other portions of r. 2 of the Family Law Rules remain of considerable importance:

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

2(2) The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.

DEALING WITH CASES JUSTLY

(3) Dealing with a case justly includes,

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

DUTY TO PROMOTE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

(4) The court is required to apply these rules to promote the primary objective, and parties and their lawyers are required to help the court to promote the primary objective.

[12] In Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court explained how undue, protracted trials, and attendant unnecessary expense and delay, could result in a process disproportionate to the nature of the case and the issues, thereby obviating a fair and just result. The Court discussed the new powers granted in rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 and heralded a required “shift in culture.”

[13] As the amendments to r. 16 of the Family Law Rules now effectively mirror the changes to summary judgment under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the statements of Karakatsanis J. represent a call for a significant and general change to determine family law claims at an earlier state, geared to avoid the almost inevitable prolixity, cost and frustration – it is what she says, a wide cultural shift in which we as judges have to participate:

4 In interpreting these provisions, the Ontario Court of Appeal placed too high a premium on the "full appreciation" of evidence that can be gained at a conventional trial, given that such a trial is not a realistic alternative for most litigants. In my view, a trial is not required if a summary judgment motion can achieve a fair and just adjudication, if it provides a process that allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, apply the law to those facts, and is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result than going to trial.

5 To that end, I conclude that summary judgment rules must be interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims.

[14] If a “full appreciation” of evidence as at a conventional trial requires too much, the court walked through what now suffices:

34 The summary judgment motion is an important tool for enhancing access to justice because it can provide a cheaper, faster alternative to a full trial. With the exception of Quebec, all provinces feature a summary judgment mechanism in their respective rules of civil procedure. Generally, summary judgment is available where there is no genuine issue for trial.

(footnotes omitted)

[15] The Supreme Court emphasized that a motion judge will be able to differentiate between cases amenable to a more summary resolution and those where the issues or the evidence make a full trial a necessity:

43 The Ontario amendments changed the test for summary judgment from asking whether the case presents "a genuine issue for trial" to asking whether there is a "genuine issue requiring a trial". The new rule, with its enhanced fact-finding powers, demonstrates that a trial is not the default procedure. Further, it eliminated the presumption of substantial indemnity costs against a party that brought an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, in order to avoid deterring the use of the procedure.

44 The new powers in Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) expand the number of cases in which there will be no genuine issue requiring a trial by permitting motion judges to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility and draw reasonable inferences.

45 These new fact-finding powers are discretionary and are presumptively available; they may be exercised unless it is in the interest of justice for them to be exercised only at a trial; Rule 20.04(2.1). Thus, the amendments are designed to transform Rule 20 from a means to weed out unmeritorious claims to a significant alternative model of adjudication.

(footnotes omitted; emphasis in original)

[16] The court took pains to avoid categorizing cases or issues where no genuine issue requires a trial and mandated a broader approach:

47 Summary judgment motions must be granted whenever there is no genuine issue requiring a trial (Rule 20.04(2)(a)). In outlining how to determine whether there is such an issue, I focus on the goals and principles that underlie whether to grant motions for summary judgment. Such an approach allows the application of the rule to evolve organically, lest categories of cases be taken as rules or preconditions which may hinder the system's transformation by discouraging the use of summary judgment.

49 There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.

[17] As the expanded judicial powers of weighing evidence, evaluating credibility and drawing inferences delineated in r. 16(6.1) may be exercised “unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial,” the following words of Karakatsanis J. are helpful:

52 The enhanced fact-finding powers granted to motion judges in Rule 20.04(2.1) may be employed on a motion for summary judgment unless it is in the "interest of justice" for them to be exercised only at trial. The "interest of justice" is not defined in the Rules.

56 While I agree that a motion judge must have an appreciation of the evidence necessary to make dispositive findings, such an appreciation is not only available at trial. Focussing on how much and what kind of evidence could be adduced at a trial, as opposed to whether a trial is "requir[ed]" as the Rule directs, is likely to lead to the bar being set too high. The interest of justice cannot be limited to the advantageous features of a conventional trial, and must account for proportionality, timeliness and affordability. Otherwise, the adjudication permitted with the new powers - and the purpose of the amendments - would be frustrated.

57 On a summary judgment motion, the evidence need not be equivalent to that at trial, but must be such that the judge is confident that she can fairly resolve the dispute. A documentary record, particularly when supplemented by the new fact-finding tools, including ordering oral testimony, is often sufficient to resolve material issues fairly and justly. The powers provided in Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) can provide an equally valid, if less extensive, manner of fact finding.

58 This inquiry into the interest of justice is, by its nature, comparative. Proportionality is assessed in relation to the full trial. It may require the motion judge to assess the relative efficiencies of proceeding by way of summary judgment, as opposed to trial. This would involve a comparison of, among other things, the cost and speed of both procedures. (Although summary judgment may be expensive and time consuming, as in this case, a trial may be even more expensive and slower.) It may also involve a comparison of the evidence that will be available at trial and on the motion as well as the opportunity to fairly evaluate it. (Even if the evidence available on the motion is limited, there may be no reason to think better evidence would be available at trial.)

(emphasis added)

59 In practice, whether it is against the "interest of justice" to use the new fact-finding powers will often coincide with whether there is a "genuine issue requiring a trial". It is logical that, when the use of the new powers would enable a judge to fairly and justly adjudicate a claim, it will generally not be against the interest of justice to do so. What is fair and just turns on the nature of the issues, the nature and strength of the evidence and what is the proportional procedure.

[18] There is no substantial or any aspect of the custody and child support claims advanced by Ms. McEown that requires a trial, and nothing suggests that more or better evidence could be made available at a full hearing. In fact, Mr. Parks conceded custody to Ms. McEown in his submissions, grudgingly describing her as “suitable.” A final order will go granting the applicant the sole custody of Audrey. Similarly, Mr. Parks and his counsel admitted formally at the settlement conference May 31, 2016 that his annual income was $33,280 for support purposes. A final order will go requiring monthly table amount child support of $284, commencing June 1, 2016 pursuant to the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 [as amended]. The Clerk is directed to complete and sign the necessary support deduction order directed to Grecos Grill and Wine Bar, 167 Princess Street, Kingston, Ontario K7L 1A9 as required by ss. 10(1) and 11(4) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, S.O. 1996, c. 31 [as amended].

[19] I am satisfied that the evidentiary record before me is sufficient to allow a fair resolution of the access issue without a more extensive hearing. Mr. Parks is not in a position to quarrel with the great majority of the assertions made against him in the affidavit evidence offered by Ms. McEown. There is no genuine issue requiring a trial in the sustained persecution of Ms. McEown carried out by Mr. Parks, the threats directed to her father, the obsessive continuing social media onslaught by Mr. Parks and his regularly flouting the judicially imposed curbs on his conduct.

[20] Ms. McEown submits that no access order should be made. Certainly, Mr. Parks’ present motion must be dismissed as totally unmeritorious. His proposal to have four-year-old Audrey transported five or six hours to Kingston for a short visit, then return, is quite obviously unrealistic and would be inimical to her best interests.

[21] Mr. Parks has had absolutely no contact with Audrey for over one year – a situation he brought on himself by his egregious misconduct. His demeanour during his submissions was quite revealing: he appeared somewhat unstable, and jerked from one aspect of the discussion to another. He was over-reactive and emotionally quite labile, while displaying both a concerning lack of ability to accept responsibility and a pronounced tendency to blame others – particularly Ms. McEown who he said in his material was “an alienator” who possessed an “ulterior motive” and acted out of “spite.” Mr. Parks fails to realize that he has been his own worst enemy and the sole cause of his separation from his daughter.

[22] I am sure that he has no insight into the abject fear he has caused Ms. McEown by his constant harassment and unrelenting criminal behaviour, but the Victim Impact Statement she included in her material speaks for itself.

THE LAW CONCERNING DENIAL OF ACCESS

[23] In Jennings v. Garrett, 2004 17126 (ON SC), 2004 CarswellOnt 2159 (Sup. Ct.), Blishen J. undertook a full review:

128 There is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children. The right of a child to visit with a non-custodial parent, to know and maintain or form an attachment to a non-custodial parent is a fundamental right and should only be forfeited in the most extreme and unusual circumstances. To deny access to a parent is a remedy of last resort. See Jafari v. Dadar, [1996] N.B.J. No. 387 (QL).

129 A review of the case law reveals that there are no standard criteria for termination of access within the best interests test. Madam Justice Abella noted at para. 34 of M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.) (1992), 1992 8642 (ON CA), 42 R.F.L. (3d) 349 (QL) (Ont.C.A.):

It is not a question of what standard should be used to deprive a parent of access, it is a question of what standard should be used in deciding what form of access, if any, should be ordered. The answer is clear from the statute: the standard is the child's best interests.

130 In that case, the court dismissed the appeal from the trial judge's decision to terminate access by the father to the child and stated:

In the absence of any, let alone a significant demonstrable benefit to the child, and based on the solid evidence of four years of harassing, insensitive, disruptive, and harmful behaviour from the father, Wright J. made no error in terminating access by the father to the child based on the material change reflected in the child's stress.

131 The majority of the court held that access must be for the benefit of the child and the father's biological relationship should not be allowed to override the child's welfare. It is important to note, in that case, there was "solid evidence" of significant, ongoing harassment and harmful behaviour from the father. There was also evidence that the child was suffering from stress. In the case at bar, there is no evidence that V.S.G. is suffering from stress. Although Mr. L.J.G.'s reports to the Children's Aid Society are of concern, there is no evidence of ongoing harassment of Ms. V.S.J. and the parties have had little, if any, contact during the last two years.

132 In Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, [1997] S.J. No. 211 (QL) (Sask.Q.B.), there was a request to terminate the father's access under the Divorce Act. There was evidence that the father physically and verbally abused the mother during the marriage, which was observed by the child. He continued with an ongoing pattern of abuse towards the women in his life, carried out in the child's presence. The father also continued to express negative views of the mother. The child refused to see his father and clearly expressed his intention to ignore any order for access. There was evidence of a psychologist who indicated that it would be extremely harmful for the court to force the child to see his father. Finally, although the father at trial indicated he was prepared to attend for counselling, the court was not convinced of the father's sincerity. Under all the circumstances, the court terminated the father's access to the child. These facts are considerably different than that of the case at bar.

133 In Jafari v. Dadar, supra, Graser J. considered termination of access where the father had a history of violence and alcohol abuse. Once again the court focuses on the dominant consideration of the best interests of the child.

134 In considering access, Graser J. states:

[30] There has been in the past a limited access order with respect to the respondent and subsequently, because of the most recent of events, a no access order. The Court has been presented with no evidence of a convincing nature to the effect that the respondent can control his alcohol and drug abuse and his violent actions. Unquestionably the potential for violence could lead to fearful consequences with respect to the children and/or the applicant.

[31] To deny access to a parent is a remedy of last resort.

[32] Most of the time children will benefit from having access to both of their natural parents. However there are cases when access may be against the best interests of the child. (See Theriault v. DeHaitre [(1991), 1991 12396 (NB QB), 117 N.B.R. (2d) 402 per Boisvert J.]).

[33] I am satisfied in all of the circumstances and considering the evidence of the witnesses that the respondent has a history of abuse of alcohol and drugs in the extreme and that he is a man with a tendency to be volatile, violent and unpredictable. In such circumstances there is justification for fearing for the safety and well-being of the children. I therefore have concluded that it is in their best interests that the respondent be denied access and I so Order.

135 In considering these cases and others, the factors most commonly considered by the courts in terminating access are the following:

1. Long term harassment and harmful behaviours towards the custodial parent causing that parent and the child stress and or fear. See M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.), supra; Stewart v. Bachman, [2003] O.J. No. 433 (Sup.Ct.); Studley v. O'Laughlin, [2000] N.S.J. No. 210 (N.S.S.C.) (Fam.Div.); Dixon v. Hinsley, 2001 38986 (ON CJ), [2001] O.J. No. 3707.

2. History of violence; unpredictable, uncontrollable behaviour; alcohol, drug abuse which has been witnessed by the child and/or presents a risk to the child's safety and well being. See Jafari v. Dadar, supra; Maxwell v. Maxwell, [1986] N.B.J. No. 769 (N.B.Q.B.); Abdo v. Abdo (1993), 1993 3124 (NS CA), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (N.S.C.A.); Studley v. O'Laughlin, supra.

3. Extreme parental alienation which has resulted in changes of custody and, at times, no access orders to the former custodial parent. See Tremblay v. Tremblay (1987), 1987 147 (AB KB), 10 R.F.L. (3d) 166; Reeves v. Reeves, [2001] O.J. No. 308 (Sup.Ct).

4. Ongoing severe denigration of the other parent. See Frost v. Allen, [1995] M.J. No. 111 (Man.Q.B.); Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra.

5. Lack of relationship or attachment between noncustodial parent and child. See Studley v. O'Laughlin, supra; M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.), supra.

6. Neglect or abuse to a child on the access visits. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, supra.

7. Older children's wishes and preferences to terminate access. See Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra; Frost v. Allen, supra; Dixon v. Hinsley, supra; Pavao v. Pavao, [2000] O.J. No. 1010 (Sup.Ct.).

136 None of the above cited cases deal with one factor alone. In every case, there are a multitude of factors which must be carefully considered and weighed in determining whether to terminate access is in the best interests of the child.

[24] Blishen J. went on to discuss the alternative of supervised access in a case where termination of parental access is sought:

137 Most of the factors listed above would also be relevant to a consideration of supervised access. As the termination of access is the most extreme remedy to be ordered in only the most exceptional circumstances, the court must carefully consider the option of supervision prior to termination. It is possible through a supervision order to do the following: protect children from risk of harm; continue or promote the parent/child relationship; direct the access parent to engage in programming, counselling or treatment to deal with issues relevant to parenting; create a bridge between no relationship and a normal parenting relationship; and, avoid or reduce the conflict between parents and thus, the impact upon children.

138 Supervised access is seldom viewed as an indefinite order or long term solution. In M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.), supra, Abella J.A. states at para. 33:

The purpose of supervised access, far from being a permanent feature of a child's life, is to provide "a temporary and time-limited measure designed to resolve a parental impasse over access. It should not be used ... as a long-term remedy": Norris Weisman, "On Access after Parental Separation" (1992), 36 R.F.L. (3d) 35 at 74. ...

139 There may be occasions, however, where medium or longer term supervised access is in the child's best interests. Professor Martha Bailey of the Faculty of Law at Queen's University questions what she considers to be the doctrinaire approach which assumes that long term supervised access is not in the best interests of the child and notes that this approach may undermine the child's right to maintain personal contact with the parent except where contrary to the child's best interests. In her article, "Supervised Access: A Long Term Solution?" 37 Family and Conciliation Courts Rev. 478 (October 1999), she states the following at p. 480:

The issue of whether long term supervised access is in the best interests of the child must be determined on a case by case basis, taking into consideration all circumstances relevant to the best interests of the child. The question then is whether there are any circumstances under which long term supervised access will be in the best interests of the child, even where unsupervised access is not a future option.

140 In my view, supervised access, whether short, medium or long term, should always be considered as an alternative to a complete termination of the parent/child relationship. Clearly, if there has been an attempt at supervised access which has proven unworkable, such as where the child remains hostile to the father during the visits; the child reacts badly after visits; or, where the access parent continually misses visits or is inappropriate during the access then termination must be considered. See Studley v. O'Laughlin, supra; Worthington v. Worthington (2000), 2000 22469 (ON SC), 13 R.F.L. (5th) 220 (Ont.Sup.Ct.); Lacaille v. Manger, 1994 CarswellOnt 2089; Dixon v. Hinsley, supra. If the purpose of supervised access is for the access parent to attend treatment or counselling and there is a refusal or unwillingness to follow through, then, to continue supervised access may not be viable option. See Pavao v. Pavao, supra; Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra.

141 In this case, Mr. L.J.G.'s access to V.S.G. has been supervised, first by Ms. V.S.J., then by the maternal grandparents and, most recently, by the Supervised Access Program. This supervision has been ongoing for the past three and one-half years, since the August 2000 allegations of sexual abuse. Mr. L.J.G. did not object to supervision and has consistently attended his access visits other than he was on call. The visits, according to the grandparents, went well and V.S.G. appeared to enjoy playing and interacting with her father. There are no reports, either positive or negative, from the Supervised Access Program, which commenced in February 2004. Ms. V.S.J. had no objection to supervised access and, in fact, up until the receipt of the social work assessment from Ron Stewart, she was agreeable to continuing supervised access as long as Mr. L.J.G. received counselling or treatment as was recommended by the report from the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

142 At this time, are the circumstances such that it is necessary and in V.S.G.'s best interests to terminate her access to her father?

143 Such an extreme measure warrants the most serious consideration. It is necessary to weigh and balance numerous factors in the context of V.S.G.'s best interests, including:

1. The maximum contact principle;

2. The right of a child to know and have a relationship with each parent;

3. A limitation of a consideration of parental conduct to that conduct which impacts on the child;

4. The risk of harm: emotional, physical and sexual;

5. The nature of the relationship between the parents and its impact on the child;

6. The nature of the relationship and attachment between the access parent and the child; and,

7. The commitment of the access parent to the child.

[25] In my view, taking a chance on supervised access in this case would be a waste of time. When Fryer J. ordered the parties to pick up and drop off Audrey at the Merrymount Children’s Centre, Mr. Parks sabotaged the scheme by being so rude and hostile to the staff that the Centre soon declined to be involved. While I appreciate the concern and empathy demonstrated by Ms. Kish in her willingness to be involved, I am far from satisfied that her assistance as a potential supervisor would alleviate my very real concern about Mr. Parks using Audrey to continue his campaign against Ms. McEown, as he did despite the direct and cautionary terms of the original temporary order of Fryer J. which was so quickly ignored.

[26] A final order will go suspending Mr. Parks’ right of access to Audrey Jody-Lee Parks, pursuant to ss. 20(4), (5) and (7) of the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.

COSTS

[27] Mr. Curran will have 45 days to deliver point form submissions with respect to costs to my assistant. Mr. Parks will have 45 days for his respondent costs submissions, after which Mr. Curran will have 15 days for a brief reply.

“Justice Henry Vogelsang”

Justice Henry Vogelsang

Date: October 28, 2016