CITATION: Tremblay v. Tremblay, 2016 ONSC 588

OTTAWA COURT FILE NO.: FC-13-2136

DATE: 2016/01/27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Catherine Tremblay

Applicant

– and –

Jeffrey Tremblay

Respondent

Philip W. Augustine and Kaitlin A. Bradley, for the Applicant

Gordon E. Sheiner, for the Respondent

HEARD AT OTTAWA: September 29, 2015 – October 6, 2015

AMENDED REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The text of the original judgment was amended on January 27, 2016 and the description of the amendment is appended

K. PHILLIPS J.

[1] The parties met as teenagers in 1991. They moved in together in October of 1992 and married October 12, 1996. Their union produced two children: a son, Nicholas, born in 1998, and a daughter, Taylor, born in 2001. They separated October 12, 2012.

[2] The Court is called upon to determine how to fairly share the considerable wealth which accumulated to this couple during their marriage. In particular, the issues in dispute are:

1. determination of the value of shares in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. and Nictor Holdings Inc. and whether that share value should be included in the Respondent’s Net Family Property (NFP);

2. a determination of the taxation and other disposition costs associated with the disposition of the Nictor and MH Tremblay Holdings so that a discount may be applied;

3. a determination of whether the Respondent may exclude the value of the Nictor and MH Tremblay Holdings from his NFP as having been received by him via gift;

4. whether the Respondent may deduct the sum of $130,345 from his NFP as representing a loan he owed on valuation day;

5. a determination of the Applicant’s income;

6. a determination of the Respondent’s income;

7. quantification of child support, including whether it should be retroactive;

8. quantification of any spousal support payable, including whether it should be retroactive;

9. valuation of the matrimonial home as of October 12, 2012.

Background Facts:

(a) The Parties:

[3] When the parties met, the Respondent, Jeff Tremblay, was a high school dropout working a variety of low-paying, menial jobs. To his great credit, early in their relationship he decided to return to school to pursue a career as an electrician, like his father. He completed his high school diploma in June 1993. On February 8, 1993, prior to completing school, he started paid work as an electrician’s helper as part of a co-op program and began his formal apprenticeship with his father’s business, T&M Electrical Ltd.. Mr. Tremblay has worked for T&M Electrical Ltd. ever since. He received his electrician’s license in 1999. In September 2006, he wrote and passed the examination to qualify as a Master Electrician, the highest designation an electrician can achieve. His career accomplishments and reputation have been such that he has been repeatedly elected by his industry peers to sit on the Board of the Ottawa Electrical Contractors Association.

[4] For her part, after graduating high school, the Applicant, Catherine Tremblay, held a series of jobs in the service industry. She worked as a sales clerk at Lady Footlocker, a file clerk at a plumbing supply outfit and as a waitress. In 1993 she got a job as a receptionist at Great West Life. She obtained a diploma in Office Administration from Algonquin College in 1996 and in 1997 started employment with The Cooperators as a client services representative. She was employed with The Cooperators when, about a month before the birth of the couple’s first child in June 1998, she left on maternity leave. She returned to work for about two months in 1999 before leaving again to remain home on a full-time basis. In 2004, Ms. Tremblay began courses to obtain a real estate agent’s license. She started a career as a real estate agent in December 2005. She currently works as a buyers’ representative with RE/MAX Metro City Realty.

(b) The T&M Group of companies:

[5] The Respondent’s father, Michael Tremblay, is the founder of the T&M Group of Companies. He worked for about two decades as an electrician in the employ of others before deciding it was time to work for himself. He is now 65 years of age.

[6] T&M Electrical Limited was incorporated in 1987 by Michael Tremblay and a partner. A sister business, 170335 Canada Inc., was incorporated in 1988 so that bids could be made on government contracts in Québec. In 1993 Michael bought out his partner’s interest in both T&M Electrical Ltd. and 170335 Canada Inc. and began to run it with the very able assistance of his wife, Heather Tremblay. In 2001, Michael Tremblay incorporated MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. and ownership of T&M Electrical Ltd. and 170335 Canada Inc. was transferred to that new entity.

[7] By 2002, Jeff Tremblay had been working in the family business for nine years (including his time as an apprentice). In that year, he was made director and vice president of T&M Electrical Ltd. and 170335 Canada Inc. He was also made vice president of MH Tremblay Holdings Inc.

[8] In 2008, Synergy Data Centers Inc. was incorporated as a joint venture between Jeff Tremblay, Michael Tremblay and another individual. Jeff Tremblay was made president and director of that company.

[9] In 2009, Michael Tremblay implemented an estate freeze which involved another corporate reorganization. As outlined by the family’s corporate lawyer, Donald Brazeau, this was done to reflect that there was going to be an increased role for the Respondent going forward. The desire was to restructure the ownership of MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. to allow growth to accrue 50% to the benefit of Jeff Tremblay’s family and 50% to Michael Tremblay’s. Accordingly, two new holding companies and three new trusts were created. The new holding companies were MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. (same name as before but a different entity) and Nictor Holdings Inc. (“Nictor”) and the new trusts were the MH Tremblay Family Trust No.2, the Jeffrey Tremblay Family Trust No.1 and the Jeffrey Tremblay Family Trust No.2.

[10] MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. continues to own the shares of the operating companies, but, as a result of the freeze, ownership of the common shares of MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. is now equally held by the MH Tremblay Family Trust No.2 and the Jeffrey Tremblay Family Trust No.1. Ownership of the common shares of Nictor is held by the Jeffrey Tremblay Family Trust No.2.

[11] Additional corporate titles and consequent powers and responsibilities were given to Jeffrey Tremblay as part of the estate freeze, including president, secretary-treasurer and sole director of Nictor.

[12] It is important to note, however, that Jeffrey Tremblay holds no voting power in the corporate structure. All voting shares are owned exclusively by Michael Tremblay. Indeed, Mr. Brazeau’s evidence was that Michael Tremblay had directed him to ensure that in implementing the estate freeze Michael was to retain sole voting control over the corporate entities. Despite the titles given to the Respondent described above, ultimate voting power with respect to the corporations continues to rest with Michael Tremblay. Jeffrey Tremblay serves in all his corporate positions at the pleasure of his father.

[13] Finally, in 2012, T&M Mechanical Ltd. was incorporated with Jeffrey Tremblay as president and director. This represents the fourth operating company with 100% of its shares held by MH Tremblay Holdings Inc.

[14] The best way to summarize all of this is to rely on the adage that a picture is worth a thousand words. The corporate structure looks like so:

[15] Another way to understand the structure is to follow the money. The operating companies engage in a variety of business. When those companies end up with excess cash, they pay a dividend to their 100% shareholder, MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. While MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. will sometimes lend the money back to the operating companies as a secured loan for creditor proofing purposes, the effective result is that MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. ends up with the funds on its books. MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. can either hold the funds or, if the funds get to the level of excess earnings, a decision can be made to dividend them out to its shareholders.

[16] It was to receive dividends from MH Holdings Inc. that Nictor was created (Nictor is an amalgam of the names Nick and Taylor, the parties’ children). To get to Nictor, the dividend funds first flow through Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.1, where they are allocated to Nictor as a beneficiary. That way, Nictor receives the funds tax free as a related corporation and the funds are not held in the trust, a result that would attract taxation at the top marginal rate. The Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 is the only shareholder of Nictor entitled to receive dividends from Nictor. As mentioned above, Jeff Tremblay is the sole director of Nictor and, as such, has the sole power to issue dividends (he had that power on valuation day and has it still). That said, Michael Tremblay, while unable to receive dividends through his preferred shares, has through them voting power over Nictor, including, of course, the composition of its board and officers.

[17] In February 2012, $1,810,000 (net of corporate tax) was distributed by dividend through the trusts of the Respondent and his father to their respective personal holding companies. Accordingly, as of that date, $905,000 ended up in Nictor Holdings Inc. The en bloc valuation day adjusted net book value of those funds is agreed to be $891,200.

[18] On valuation day, October 12, 2012, there was $2, 237, 900 in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc.

Issue #1: The determination of the value of shares in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. and Nictor Holdings Inc. and whether that share value should be included in the Respondent’s Net Family Property (NFP)

(i) MH Tremblay Holdings Ltd.

[19] The Applicant submits that the common shares in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. held by Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.1 should be valued at $540,440.

[20] The Respondent takes the view that the question is not so much what the value of the MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. shares are, but whether the Respondent had any actual ability to cause any of that value to end up in his hands.

[21] The Applicant points to the evidence that the purpose of the estate freeze in 2009 was to allow for future profits of the operating companies to accrue 50% to the benefit of Jeff’s family and 50% to the benefit of Mike’s. In this sense, she argues that the intention of all concerned was that any profits that make it up to MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. are meant to be evenly shared as between father and son.

[22] While I agree that the parties may have expressed their intentions that way, that is not what they actually did. There is nothing automatic with respect to profit sharing in the way MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. is set up. The shareholders agreement makes clear that Michael Tremblay controls the composition of the board of directors. In fact, quorum exists only in so far as Michael Tremblay is present. Importantly, the agreement provides that no dividend or other distribution of assets of the corporation may be made to any shareholder without Michael’s consent. This rule applies even if Michael should happen to find himself for some reason in a minority on the board of directors. The bottom line is that the shareholders agreement makes clear that control of MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. rests in the hands of Michael Tremblay in all meaningful respects, including and especially with respect to the dispersal of funds.

[23] Monies making their way into MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. do not necessarily flow to the common shares. Those funds could be used to redeem the preferred share value held by Michael Tremblay. They could also be allocated to bonuses, which could be done in an unequal manner. The funds could also be held as a contingency reserve with respect to the needs of the operating companies. I find those all to be legitimate business reasons for the funds to possibly stay in MH Tremblay Holdings or to be dispersed in ways other than through dividend.

[24] I find that when funds are in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. they are entirely under the control of Michael Tremblay. As such, I find that the Respondent does not have an interest in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. as defined by section 4 of the Family Law Act. The shares held by Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.1 do not have any value beyond their nominal face value. The larger funds in MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. are not the Respondent’s property and need not be included in his NFP.

(ii) Nictor Holdings Inc.

[25] I accept the evidence that Nictor was intended to be a holding company for the Respondent to hold his 50% share of any profits that Michael Tremblay would actually disburse from MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. Once funds are in Nictor they are irreversibly on Jeffrey Tremblay’s “side” of the structure. Jeff Tremblay is the sole director of Nictor and has unfettered, autonomous discretion with respect to the issuance of dividends. While Michael Tremblay could remove Jeff Tremblay as director, or constrain his autonomy in that position, he never has. His disinclination to do any such thing is indicative of willing deference to the Respondent’s discretion over the Nictor holdings. I find that it was always intended by all involved that Jeffrey Tremblay be able to direct the Nictor funds as he saw fit. In particular, I find that it was intended that it be open to Jeffrey Tremblay to cause dividends to issue to the common shares held by Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. This is as true today as it was on valuation day.

[26] However, even if the Respondent compelled dividends to issue from Nictor, dispersing all the funds in that holding company to its one common shareholder, it remains that the recipient of the money, the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2, receives it to hold in trust. The Respondent is both a trustee and a beneficiary in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. The question is: does his beneficial interest in that trust constitute property as defined in section 4 of the Family Law Act?

[27] Traditional trust law principles are clear that a person who is the object of trustee discretion to pay out capital in his favour does not have an existing property interest. From a pure property law viewpoint, he has only what is termed an “expectancy”. He has the right to be considered by the trustees as a recipient under the trust in accordance with its terms and for the trustees to consider this issue acting in good faith in accordance with their fiduciary duty. As such, he has rights which constitute equitable “choses in action”.

[28] An important related question is this: what value, if any, can be put to what is a mere expectancy? A discretionary power may never be exercised in one’s favour, and one does not have the right to compel that result. Moreover, the right to be considered by the trustees is not assignable by the right-holder since there is no proprietary interest to transfer. It is exclusive to the person named as the object. How can such an interest possibly have value?

[29] This collision between trust law and family law involves consideration of traditional trust principles against the principles of equity underpinning the fair sharing of wealth accumulated during a marriage. On the one hand, I consider that a trust is fundamentally a relationship characterized by separation. As Gillese J.A. explained in Spencer v. Riesberry [2012] ONCA 418 at para 53:

A trust is a form of property holding. It is not a legal entity or person. A trust does not hold title to property nor can it. It is the trustee who holds legal title to the trust property.

A trust is also a type of relationship, namely, the fiduciary relationship that exists between trustee and beneficiary. The foundation of the trust relationship is the separation of roles between the trustee and beneficiary with the trustee being the legal owner of the trust property and the beneficiary being the equitable owner of the trust property. The trustee holds legal title to the trust property so that it can manage, invest and dispose of the trust property solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries. A trust can only exist when there is a separation between legal ownership in the trustee and equitable ownership in the beneficiaries.

If the court were to ignore or conflate the separate entities, it would destroy the foundation of the trust relationship. Put another way, absent the separate entities, there is no trust relationship and, therefore, no trust.

[30] On the other hand, while he was admittedly speaking in a different context, I note how Cory J. generally characterized the purpose and scope of the Family Law Act division of property regime in Rawluk v. Rawluk 1990 152 (SCC), [1990] S.C.J. No.4, 23 R.F.L. (3^rd) 337 (S.C.C.) at 54:

A marital relationship is founded on love and trust. It brings together two people who strive and sacrifice to attain common goals for the benefit of both partners. When it is terminated and acquired assets are to be divided, then in this of all relationships the concept of fairness should predominate in making decisions as to ownership.

[31] In my view, the central question with respect to determining the proprietary character of the Respondent’s discretionary interest in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 is his ability to control whether distributions of trust property are made to him for his benefit. His having meaningful control in that regard would undermine the separation as between the entities.

[32] Assessing the level of control that a beneficiary actually has in respect of a trust can involve a contextual analysis, informed by the nature of the relationships as between the parties and the concept of fairness touched upon by Cory J., above. Without trying to set out an exhaustive list, this may involve consideration of the degree to which he as beneficiary can directly or indirectly control the actions of the trustees, which may include consideration of such factors as:

(i) any evidence with respect to the founding intent of the trust. Was the trust designed to effectively allow control by the beneficiary?;

(ii) the composition of the trustees, including whether the beneficiary is a trustee;

(iii) any requirement, including veto powers, that the beneficiary be part of any trustee decisions;

(iv) any history of past trustee actions which demonstrate direct or indirect control by the beneficiary;

(v) any powers of the beneficiary to remove trustees, or to appoint replacement or additional trustees;

(vi) the relationship of the beneficiary to the trustees. Are the trustees independent and at arm’s length or are they instead family members or other persons who may not act independently?

[33] None of those factors are necessarily determinative. The weight to be assigned to each will vary on a case by case basis.

[34] While it is important to recognize that trust law is trust law, whether in a commercial relationship or a family one, it is equally important to recognize that none of the transactions involved were arm’s length. I find that the fundamental purpose of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 was to provide for the Respondent’s family in both the near and future sense. Indeed, the evidence of Michael Tremblay was that Nictor itself was meant to enhance the lives of Nicholas and Taylor and this intention surely extends to the intended recipient of the Nictor funds, the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. The fact that this intention was not meant only for the distant future is demonstrated by the fact that the Respondent caused $130,345.00 to be paid to himself from the trust as recently as October 1, 2012 to pay for Nicholas’ then ongoing private school education as well as other family living expenses.

[35] The Applicant, the Respondent and the two children constitute the beneficiaries of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. Unless the children are over 18, there can be no distribution to them so long as either Jeff or Catherine are alive. I take from this an intention on the part of the trust that so long as the children are minors, their parents, the other two beneficiaries, would be entrusted to act in their best interests.

[36] The Respondent and his two parents, Michael and Heather Tremblay, are the trustees. While decisions in the discharge of the trustees’ fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries are made by majority rule, the Respondent has the sole ability to appoint more trustees. I find that his ability to name additional trustees is, in a practical sense, an ability to control the trust, at least insofar as an ability to cause the trust funds to come into his hands should he deem that to be in his and the other beneficiaries’ best interests. While I acknowledge that each added trustee would have a personal fiduciary obligation, in my view, practically speaking, the Respondent’s ability to select additional trustees’ amounts to an ability to ensure his wishes about the best interests of his family will ultimately carry the day. In fact, it would appear that in giving him alone the ability to increase the trustee roster, such a result was intended from the beginning. It is, after all, the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust. The overwhelming evidence is that the larger Tremblay family is close and has a history of cooperatively sharing their considerable wealth. Even if that close relationship were ever to break down the Respondent has the ability to appoint additional trustees with the result that he could prevail over any dissent.

[37] I find that in all meaningful respects, the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 was set up in a way that would allow the Respondent to access funds even though his interest is only a beneficial one. The bottom line is that the particular way he is positioned as trustee effectively allows him to direct the dispersal of the trust funds. Indeed, history shows that he as trustee had a direct ability to control the trust in his favour - he was able to swiftly access $130,345 from the trust when he determined that supplementation to his ordinary income was needed.

[38] The degree of control that the Respondent has over the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 elevates his expectancy into something more like a certainty. I find that degree of control to amount to the Respondent having a present property interest in the property held in Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. As such, the holdings of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 are to be considered property in the context of section 4 of the Family Law Act.

Issue #2: A determination of the tax cost and other limitations to be associated with the disposition of the Nictor holdings so that its value may be discounted

[39] As a starting point, I find that the fundamental intention of the trust was to provide the Respondent with something of a reserve fund accumulated in a tax-advantageous way to access when needed to support his family and his lifestyle generally. I draw this inference from the fact that the trust was established in the first place as repository for the Respondent’s 50% share of the T&M Group’s profits from the estate freeze onward. As well, this intention is exemplified by circumstances surrounding the October 1, 2012 accessing of the $130,345. In my view the nature of the trust in that regard calls for a “value to owner” valuation. That is, what would the Respondent pay to not lose the interest, discretionary though it is? I find that he would pay a dollar for a dollar and I assign value to the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 commensurate with its full adjusted net book value: $891,200. Alternatively, I see no difference between the funds in Nictor and a defined contribution pension account, or even a sort of tax free savings account. Every dollar in Nictor is the Respondent’s share of the profits from the T&M Group which he contributed toward generating. In any event, I value the Nictor shares at $891,200.

[40] I am bound by Sengmueller v.Sengmueller 1994 8711 (ON CA), [1994] 17 O.R. (3d) 208. That case stands for the proposition that, generally, disposition costs should be deducted in determining the value of an asset for equalization purposes unless it is unclear when, if ever, the value of the property will be realized. Accordingly, if the evidence is such that it is apparent that the asset will need to be liquidated in order to pay the equalization amount, the value of the asset for equalization purposes is the net value after tax and other disposition costs.

[41] I am asked to consider two kinds of discount: one for taxation, another to recognize alleged illiquidity of the funds in question.

[42] I do not agree that the funds are illiquid. To my mind, given the nature of the asset it is not a question of what the fair market value is of the interest in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. The interests of the beneficiaries are non-transferrable. Although they are held in a trust, that trust is for all meaningful purposes controlled by the Respondent. He could access those funds in short order if he wanted to; he alone is authorized to execute all cheques, notes and other instruments with respect to them. Indeed, in doing so he would be acting entirely in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Liquidity of the asset is therefore a question entirely in the hands of the Respondent. I decline to discount the value of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 due to illiquidity.

[43] Taxation, on the other hand, is an inescapable consequence of realizing upon the trust funds. I accept that the tax liability in doing so would be $290,521 and that the funds should be discounted accordingly. The $891,200 then becomes $600,679.

Issue #3: Whether the Respondent may exclude the value of the Nictor Holdings Inc. shares held by the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 from his NFP as having been received by him by way of gift

[44] Section 4(2) of the Family Law Act provides in part as follows:

Excluded Property – The value of the following property that a spouse owns on the valuation date does not form part of the spouse’s net family property:

1. Property, other than a matrimonial home, that was acquired by gift or inheritance from a third person after the date of the marriage.

[45] I have already determined that because of the degree of control the Respondent has over the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2, his beneficial interest in it constitutes property as defined in section 4(1). Determination of whether that interest should be excluded pursuant to section 4(2) requires answers to two questions: first, whether the interest in question came to the Respondent by way of gift; and secondly, whether he in fact owned that interest on valuation day.

[46] The Ontario Court of Appeal set out the law with respect to gift in McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533:

Elements of a gift

[23] Although the term "gift" is not defined in the Family Law Act, a gift, generally speaking, is a voluntary transfer of property to another without consideration: Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999), at p. 696; Birce v. Birce (2001), 2001 8607 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 226, [2001] O.J. No. 3910 (C.A.), at para. 17. A transfer of property by contractual agreement involves a mutual exchange of obligations ("consideration"), but a transfer by way of gift involves a gratuitous, unilateral transaction: Mary Jane Mossman and William Flanagan, Property Law: Cases and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2004), at p. 439. As McLachlin J. observed in Peter v. Beblow, 1993 126 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, [1993] S.C.J. No. 36, at p. 991-92 S.C.R., "[t]he central element of a gift [is the] intentional giving to another without expectation of remuneration".

[24] The essential ingredients of a legally valid gift are not in dispute. There must be (1) an intention to make a gift on the part of the donor, without consideration or expectation of remuneration, (2) an acceptance of the gift by the donee and (3) a sufficient act of delivery or transfer of the property to complete the transaction: Cochrane v. Moore (1890), 25 Q.B.D. 57 (C.A.), at pp. 72-73 Q.B.D.; Mossman and Flanagan, supra, at p. 441, Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2010), at p. 157.

[47] There could be no dispute that the property in question was accepted by the Respondent and that the creation of the estate freeze structure is a sufficient act of transfer. In that regard, I accept the evidence of Donald Brazeau to the effect that the Respondent was aware of what he was getting by way of the estate freeze and that the intention of all was that the overall structure, including the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2, was a mechanism by which the Respondent’s family could receive a share in 50% of the T&M Group’s profits going forward.

[48] I also find that Michael Tremblay intended that the Respondent receive the benefit of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 as a gift. While there were various motivations at play, including recognition of the Respondent’s past contribution to the company and a general expectation that he would one day take it over, all intertwined with complex taxation considerations, the underlying intention was that he receive a stake in 50% of the future profits as a gift from his father. This intention is confirmed by the trust agreement itself, paragraph 9.14 of which reads as follows:

9.14 Any gift or benefit, whether as to income or capital, to which any person shall become entitled in accordance with the provisions of this agreement, shall not fall into any community of property which may exist between any such person and his or her consort, but shall remain the separate property of such person, free from the control of his or her consort. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it is expressly declared that the property and income from property to which any person shall become entitled in accordance with the provisions of this agreement shall be excluded from such person’s net family property as defined for the purposes of the Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3, or any successor or similar law which may govern this agreement, or, which may govern any beneficiary.

[49] The principal area of dispute here is with respect to whether the Respondent received his interest in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 without consideration. The applicant points out, correctly, that the Respondent participated along with the other trustees in the payment of a nominal sum to subscribe for the shares in Nictor Holdings Inc. I accept the evidence of lawyer Brazeau to the effect that the nominal subscription price was paid by the trustees by funds loaned to the trust by him, to be repaid later by a dividend. This was done to avoid taxation consequences from attribution rules. The Applicant argues that the Respondent cannot pay consideration to avoid taxation and simultaneously deny payment of consideration when it suits him in the family law context.

[50] It is important, however, not to conflate the actions of the Respondent as trustee with the genesis of his beneficial interest as beneficiary. The purchase of the shares in Nictor Holdings were of the nature of an investment made by the trustees on behalf of the trust. Those decisions and actions came after the creation of the trust which gave rise to the beneficial interest in question. In this regard, I am guided by the text authored by L.H. Wolfson, A.N. Black, and E.Hubling entitled “Family Trusts Under Canadian Family Law” (2013 32 C.F.L.Q. 275) at p.19:

In the trust context, it is important to remember that the property gifted is the interest in the trust, not the property settled on the trust, or transferred to the trust or acquired by the trustees. The interest in the trust is acquired when they trust is settled in the beneficiary is identified, even if only as a member of a class or only with a contingent interest.

[51] I find that the respondent acquired his interest in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 when the trust was settled and he was identified as a member of the class of beneficiaries. There is no evidence even suggesting that the Respondent paid any consideration to be included in the class of beneficiaries. I find that his beneficial interest came to him by way of a gift.

[52] Did the Respondent own the property in question on the valuation date? Ownership of trust property is split between a trustee and a beneficiary. Legal ownership is vested with the trustee, while a beneficiary has what could be called equitable ownership. In this case, the Respondent is both trustee and beneficiary. In each respect he shares those interests with others. He holds legal title alongside his parents. More importantly, he is a beneficiary along with his wife (and his children once they turn 18). By including the Applicant in the class of beneficiaries, it was intended from the outset that she be a co-beneficiary and thus a co-equitable owner.

[53] I draw this approach from McNamee v. McNamee, supra. The result of the appeal in that case was that property conveyed to the husband by way of an estate freeze was determined to have been transferred by way of gift. However, rather than finally dispose of the matter, the Court of Appeal sent it back for trial on the issue of whether the wife had an equitable interest in the property by way of constructive trust from unjust enrichment. I take from this that if the wife could prove such a beneficial interest she would have a beneficial ownership stake in the property that could be said to compete with the interest held by the husband. The result would be that he then would not “own” the property, at least not exclusively, and he would be therefore unable to exclude the property from equalization through section 4(3) of the FLA.

[54] It seems to me that the Applicant is as much of an equitable owner of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 as is the Respondent. While I have found his interest to amount to property as contemplated by section 4(1) of the FLA, that finding does not equate to a finding of ownership. The proposition that ownership leads to a property interest does not necessarily work in reverse.

[55] I conclude that the Respondent has not discharged his onus under section 4(3) of the Family Law Act to exclude his interest in the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 as property owned by him on valuation date acquired by gift.

Issue #4: Whether the Respondent may deduct the sum of $130,345 from his NFP as representing a loan he owed on valuation day

[56] In late September 2012, prior to separation, the Respondent needed money. Within days, on October 1, 2012, a cheque was issued to the Respondent from the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 in the amount of $130,345. On the memo line of the cheque was written “shareholder loan”.

[57] On valuation day, that alleged loan had yet to be repaid to the trust by the Respondent. Ultimately, it was repaid in September 2013 by the Respondent’s father to avoid the tax consequences.

[58] I am not persuaded that the Respondent ever had any intention to repay the $130,345 to the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2. There is no evidence of any agreement, written or otherwise, on his part to do so. It was said only that there was some sort of ”understanding” that he would do so and that he has now a “moral obligation” to repay his father. I draw an adverse inference against his assertion of loan from the fact that he has not to this day made any effort at repayment. Moreover, I find the fact that Michael Tremblay repaid the amount consistent with the history of inter-familial generosity and sharing of the T&M Group’s considerable resources generally.

[59] I find that the decision to characterize the cheque as a shareholder loan was made solely by the T&M Group comptroller who appreciated the taxation consequences of an ordinary disbursement. The funds were repaid to the trust by Michael Tremblay who also appreciated those taxation consequences. However, I conclude that as far as Jeff Tremblay was concerned, those funds were simply a withdrawal from the trust for the purposes for which it was created and that he had no intention to repay them.

[60] Nonetheless, the consequence of that October 1, 2012 cheque is that on valuation day the value of the Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2 was diminished by $130,345. The only way the value of the trust can be said to amount to $891,200, therefore, is if the $130,345 is added back in. In other words, for the trust to be valued at $891,200, the $130,345 must be considered a receivable or debt owed. It seems to me that the Applicant cannot both insist on a valuation of the trust at $891,200 and deny the Respondent the ability to claim a deduction for the $130,345 he would have on valuation day been implicitly expected to repay to replenish it to that full amount. The October 1, 2012 depletion of $130,345 by the Respondent was in accordance with the fulfillment of his obligation to support his family. The repayment by Michael Tremblay was a post-separation event.

[61] Fairness dictates that the Respondent be allowed to deduct the amount of $130,345 from his NFP as a debt owed on valuation day.

Issue #5: A determination of the Applicant’s income

[62] I accept that the Applicant’s income from employment over the past five years has averaged approximately $35,000 per annum.

[63] I disagree that the Applicant is deliberately underemployed such that additional income should be imputed to her.

[64] I am persuaded that the Applicant’s income is modest as a direct result of the sacrifices which she made throughout the marriage giving priority to the raising of the children and to the management of the matrimonial home and related properties. Her work in this regard enabled the Respondent to devote himself to his work. This was the arrangement agreed to all along between the parties.

[65] Moreover, I find that the Applicant’s ability to increase her work output is presently impaired by increased needs of the children arising out of their parent’s divorce. I heard evidence with respect to difficulties that the children are having adjusting to the new circumstances. It would appear that both children are having problems, and relations between them and their father are in serious jeopardy. I accept that the Applicant has effectively become the sole parent dealing with the children who have become somewhat needy in the circumstances. As such, it is unreasonable to expect the Applicant to increase her work commitments beyond what she has been engaged in over the past five years.

[66] However, I must conclude that the Applicant receives income from her parents as a result of their rental of the in-law suite. I cannot see how those funds can be characterized in any other way. While I agree that her parents contribute meaningfully to the operation of the very large matrimonial home, thereby offsetting any savings they accrue by their decreased rent, the fact remains that they do pay money to their daughter in rent. Those funds, amounting to $12,000 per annum, should be added to the Applicant’s income.

[67] I am aware both that the $12,000 should arguably be grossed up to reflect its before tax value and also that the Applicant would likely have various deductions to make against that income. Given the dearth of evidence on either point, I am inclined to treat those positions as mutually offsetting.

[68] I set the Applicant’s annual income at $47,000.

Issue #6: A determination of the Respondent’s income

[69] It is the position of the Applicant that the Respondent’s income should be fixed for support purposes at $547,814 as per the expert opinion evidence in the form of the Income Determination Report of David Clarke of Collins Barrow.

[70] The Respondent takes the view that he earns $85, 473 per year as a salary from T&M Electric Ltd. He notes that his 2014 Line 150 income was reported as $74,200.

[71] I respectfully disagree with both the Applicant and the Respondent on the outcome of this issue.

[72] Where I am in agreement with the Respondent is that the business in question is somewhat volatile, affected by fluctuations in the Ottawa construction market. It is therefore difficult to use past averages over any period of time to project future earnings or income. I accept the evidence from Michael Tremblay and the comptroller Courtney Turner to the effect that business is currently in something of a downturn. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Respondent will soon earn $1,651,094 like he did in 2009 just as the $74,063 earned in 2014 is also an anomaly.

[73] I agree with the Applicant that the Respondent is a very valued and valuable member the T&M Group. I assume that all corporate directors will act in accordance with their fiduciary obligations. As such, I take the bonuses, titles and responsibilities extended to the Respondent to have been entirely well deserved and commensurate with his abilities and impact. The corporations would not have been dispersing their funds or naming their officers indiscriminately. I take it that the Respondent earned and deserved by his contribution to the T&M Group every penny he received from it.

[74] In fact, it is impossible not to conclude that the Respondent plays an integral role in operating the T&M Group. All of the evidence - the compensation paid, the corporate roles and titles assigned, as well as the rationale of the estate freeze in the first place - point to the Respondent being groomed to succeed his father. I find that by the time of the separation, meaningful progress had been made toward achievement of that goal. The Respondent was for all intents and purposes a partner with his father in the T&M Group.

[75] In addition to the Respondent’s reported income for 2014, I consider section 17 of the Child Support Guidelines. That section provides that if a determination of income based on the most current year’s income would not be the fairest determination of income, the court may look to income history. The court “may have regard to the spouses’ income over the last three years and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a nonrecurring amount during those years”. The Respondent’s disclosed income over the past three years was $329,423 in 2012, $119,629 in 2013 and $74,220 14.

[76] Section 18 of the Child Support Guidelines deals with the imputation of corporate income. Section 18 provides:

18(1) where a spouse as a shareholder, director or officer of the Corporation and the court is of the opinion that the amount of the spouses annual income as determined under section 16 does not fairly reflect all the money available to the spouse for the payment of child support, the court may consider the situations described in section 17 and determine the spouses annual income to include:

(a) all or part of the pre-tax income of the corporation, and of any corporation that is related to that corporation, for the most recent taxation year; or

(b) an amount commensurate with the services that the spouse provides to the corporation, provided that the amount does not exceed the corporations pre-tax income.

[77] In applying section 18, I am guided by the decision of Justice Linhares de Sousa in Brophy v. Brophy (2002) 2002 76706 (ON SC), 32 R.F.L. (5^th) 1 (Ont.S.C.J.). That case distilled a list of questions and considerations to be taken into account in determining whether discretion under section 18 should be exercised:

1. Because of the separate legal entity of the Corporation, should there be a general reluctance by the court to automatically attribute corporate income to the shareholder?

2. Is there a business reason for retaining earnings in the company?

3. Is there one principal shareholder or are there other bona fide arm’s-length shareholders involved?

4. What is the historical practice of the Corporation for retaining earnings?

5. What degree of control is exercised by the spouse over the corporation?

[78] In the result, applying the criteria set out above, I accept the expert evidence to the effect that during the years 2009 to 2013 the T&M Group earned approximately $3.7 million in aggregate. Of that amount, approximately 1.1 million of pre-tax corporate earnings, or approximately 31% of aggregate pre-tax corporate income, was distributed to Nictor via dividend.

[79] In my view, the Respondent can be expected to receive a 31% distribution of earnings in the future. That was his share in the recent past. Such a distribution allowed nearly 40% to remain available to the operating companies and would be a ratio that is likely to be replicated. The overall corporate structure, the Respondent’s role within it as well as the relationships among all involved remains unchanged.

[80] In addition, I consider whether annual investment income earned by MH Tremblay Holdings Inc. could be distributed. I share the view of expert witness David Clarke that since the investment income is earned on funds not actively engaged in the operations of the corporate group, 100% of those earnings are distributable.

[81] Accordingly, I agree in part with the evidence given by expert accountant David Clarke and determine that the income presently available to the Respondent for support purposes is $242, 148.

[82] As a final point on this issue, I shall make clear that I also accept the evidence from Mr. Clarke that the $242,148 is roughly commensurate with what the T&M Group would pay to replace the Respondent with a third party. I agree that the Respondent has significant responsibilities in the corporate group in a CEO equivalent or senior management position and that a reasonable third-party wage for his position would be in excess of $225,000 per year.

Issue #7: Quantification of child support, including whether it should be retroactive

[83] At a case conference held November 18, 2013, it was ordered on consent that the Respondent pay child support in the amount of $1258 per month commencing September 1, 2013. He has paid that amount every month since.

[84] It is agreed that the November 18, 2013 order was premised on the parties sharing custody of one child with the other living full time with the Applicant. Soon after the order was made, both children began to live exclusively with the Applicant. The Respondent did not increase his monthly support when this happened.

[85] In accordance with the applicable Federal Child Support Guidelines the Respondent should pay $2,012 plus 1.14% of any income over $150,000. Based on an annual income of $242,148, his monthly obligation amounts to $3062.49. He has therefore been underpaying $1,804.49 per month.

[86] The Applicant asserts that the Respondent should pay arrears back to the date of separation. She points out that child support is the right of the child and that the obligation would have crystallized the moment the Respondent left. At the very least, the Applicant says he should pay arrears in support from the time soon after the November 18, 2013 case conference when both children elected to live with her full-time.

[87] The Respondent argues that he has paid more toward the support of his children than is reflected in the child support payments looked at in isolation. For instance, he notes that he alone continued to cover the full amount of the interest costs on the joint line of credit which was used for the support of the children and the maintenance of the family assets generally. These payments have averaged $664 per month. In addition, he points to some $50,000 he left in a joint savings account on separation. Those funds were drawn down as needed by way of transfer into the family operating account to cover the expenses of the Applicant and the children.

[88] I agree that the Respondent is entitled to credit for the amount he has paid over and above the support as ordered on November 18, 2013. Those amounts shall include $916 per month from October 2012 to November 2013 as representing the after-tax contribution made by the Respondent via the money left in the joint savings account. That amount over those 13 months adds up to $11,908. In addition, the Respondent is credited the amount of $664 per month from October 2012 to the present, representing the full amount of the interest costs on the joint line of credit which was used to support the children. That amount over the 38 months involved adds up to $25,232.

[89] The question remains whether the Respondent should have to pay the amount of his underpayment on a retroactive basis and if so to what date. Retroactive awards implicate the balance between certainty and flexibility in the area of child support law. Parties are to be encouraged to settle their own differences. Courts should be reluctant to disturb resolutions arrived at through negotiation. That said, the ultimate goal in the area of retroactive awards is to ensure that children benefit from the support they are owed at the time they are owed it. In addition, the court must strive to eliminate any incentive for payor parents to be deficient in fulfilling their obligations in a timely fashion.

[90] I find the Respondent’s monthly payment of $1,258 to be meaningfully far off the mark. I have found his income to be more in line with a monthly payment of $3,062.49, well more than twice as much. I cannot help but find that he failed to fulfill his obligation to support his children in a manner commensurate with his income. The amount of $1,258 would have been arrived at on an income of $87,100. That is a significant understatement of his income and he would have known that. I find that the Respondent would have known all along that his available income for support purposes was considerably more than he had used in negotiating the interim without prejudice child support order.

[91] I find that the Respondent should pay retroactive child support in the amount of $3,062.49 per month back to the date of separation. That was when he both began to have an obligation to support his children in line with his available income and when he began to fail to fulfill that obligation. Any amounts owing shall be reduced by the credits outlined above as well as the amount of child support paid since November 2013.

[92] In any event, the Respondent shall henceforth pay the amount of $3,062.49 per month in child support. In addition, the Respondent shall pay his proportionate share of section 7 expenses.

[93] I agree with counsel that the Respondent shall provide in his will that he will provide total life insurance coverage of $300,000 to the applicant in trust for the children to secure his child support obligation. Finally, I agree that the Respondent should ensure coverage for the children under his employment-provided extended health insurance plan for as long as they qualify for coverage under the plan’s terms.

Issue #8: Quantification of any spousal support payable, including whether it should be retroactive

[94] Spousal support is a statutory concept, set out in section 15.2 of the Divorce Act. In making such an order, a court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including the length of time the spouses cohabitated and the functions performed by each spouse during their cohabitation. In addition, any order for spousal support should:

• recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

• relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

• insofar as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[95] The parties cohabitated for a period of four years before their marriage on October 12, 1996. Their relationship, therefore, spanned a period slightly longer than 20 years. From the outset, it was a joint endeavor. The Applicant would have provided the bulk of the couple’s financial resources during the early years while the Respondent attended school. Before the children came along, both strove to earn as much money as they could working as much as they could. Both demonstrated a sound work ethic and an industrious interest in self-improvement.

[96] I find that when the children were born it was decided that the Applicant would withdraw from the workforce. The decision to put her career on hold to focus primarily on child rearing was a joint one.

[97] I find that the Respondent benefited greatly from that joint decision to have the Applicant take care of the home front. He was able to devote himself almost exclusively to his career. I accept the evidence that he worked very hard, often staying out late, entertaining clients and staff. While he may not see it this way, I find that his career success is attributable to a significant degree to the contributions made by his wife. Had he had to engage in half the child care and other domestic chores he would simply not have had the time nor the energy to devote to the business that he did.

[98] There is significant economic disparity between the couple now that the marriage is over. After equalizing their impressive array of assets it remains the fact that he makes $242,148 per annum while she earns $47,000.

[99] I find that the Applicant has suffered economic disadvantage as a result of the marriage and I agree that she is entitled to compensatory spousal support. I infer as much from the Applicant’s need as shown by the drastic disparity in the pair’s present economic positions. To paraphrase Bastarache J.A. (as he then was) in Ross v. Ross (1995) 1995 6228 (NB CA), 16 R.F.L. (4^th) 1 N.B.C.A. at 7, need and standard of living can serve as proxy measures for ascertaining loss of economic opportunity arising from a long traditional marriage.

[100] I accept that given the length of the marriage and its traditional character, the goal of spousal support is to provide the Applicant with a reasonable standard of living judged in light of the marital standard of living. As the Supreme Court of Canada made clear in Moge v. Moge 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 870: “as marriage should be regarded as a joint endeavor, the longer the relationship endures, the closer the economic union, the greater will be the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution”.

[101] With respect to quantum I take guidance from the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. In particular, I have reviewed section 9 entitled “Using the Ranges”. In doing so, I consider that the “with child support” formula used by the Guidelines has a compensatory element built-in.

[102] Nonetheless, I find the compensatory entitlement to be high here. For the bulk of the couple’s 20 year relationship the Applicant served in a support role, prioritizing the Respondent’s career interests over her own. Her withdrawal from the workforce cannot simply be measured by the years she did not work outside the home. I find that the nature of the marriage caused the Applicant to refocus her energies, to primarily focus on the children and the considerable domestic responsibilities inherent in the couple’s impressive properties. That refocusing has had a long-term and significant effect on her earning ability and prospects.

[103] That said, there are some elements which point to spousal support at the low end of the range. For instance, I note that the Applicant is, after equalization, the owner of considerable assets. Furthermore, I note that the Applicant has training in a potentially lucrative field and already has employment in it. While she will not attain self-sufficiency, at least at the level of the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage, she is poised to soon increase her career efforts at a fairly young age.

[104] In the result, recognizing that the Guidelines are not binding, I decide not only to use them but determine the quantum of spousal support to be in accordance with the midrange they suggest. Given the length of the marriage and the degree of compensatory support arising therefrom, I conclude that spousal support should be awarded on an indefinite basis.

[105] Using the “with child support” formula, and the Respondent’s income as found to be $242,148, I calculate a spousal support obligation payable by the Respondent to the Applicant in the amount of $3951 per month.

[106] Finally, I must determine whether to make this spousal support award retroactive and if so to what date. The Court of Appeal set out guidelines with respect to the issue of retroactive spousal support in the case of Bremer v. Bremer 2005 3938 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No.608 (Ont.C.A.) at paragraph 9:

The considerations governing an award of retroactive spousal support include: i) the extent to which the claimant established past need (including any requirement to encroach on capital) and the payor’s ability to pay; ii) the underlying basis for the ongoing support obligation iii) the requirement that there be a reason for awarding retroactive support; iv) the impact of a retroactive award on the payor or and, in particular, whether a retroactive order will create an undue burden on the payor or affect the redistribution of capital; v) the presence of blameworthy conduct on the part of the payor such as incomplete or misleading financial disclosure; vi) notice of an intention to seek support and negotiations to that end viii) the appropriateness of a retroactive order predating the date on which the application for divorce was issued.

[107] None of these factors is necessarily determinative. The weight to be assigned to each varies on a case-by-case basis.

[108] I note that the Respondent has not paid any spousal support to the Applicant since separation. This is not a case, therefore, where the court ought to show deference to any agreement negotiated by the parties or ordered on consent. I find that the Applicant’s need for support would have been obvious from the outset. Similarly, it would have been obvious to the Respondent that he had the ability to pay at least something. I cannot see any basis upon which he would have fairly assumed that the Applicant could have continued at a standard of living even close to that enjoyed during the marriage without funds from him. It is not surprising that she has had to encroach upon capital in order to approximately do so. I find that his decision to not pay any support at all to be blameworthy conduct in the circumstances.

[109] The spousal support shall be retroactive to the commencement date of this action when the Respondent was put on notice that the Applicant was seeking such a result: September 9, 2013.

Issue #9: Valuation of the matrimonial home as of October 12, 2012

[110] Both parties retained the services of professional home evaluators to assess the value of the matrimonial home. I permitted each to give expert opinion evidence on that subject.

[111] The matrimonial home is a very large custom-built dream home. Importantly, it has an attached fully self-contained in-law suite housing the Applicant’s parents.

[112] The Applicant’s appraiser says the home is worth $975,000. He arrived at this value by using the Direct Comparison Approach to valuation. This involves gathering and comparing data on similar properties that have recently sold on the open market. For the purposes of the valuation in question, the Applicant’s expert located three comparable properties.

[113] The Respondent’s appraiser takes the view that the home is worth 1,027,500. He disagrees with the nature of the comparables used by the Applicant’s expert. Additionally, he takes the position that the Applicant’s expert got the home’s square footage wrong.

[114] I decide this issue mostly in favour of the Applicant. While I found each expert to be credible and persuasive in his own right, I conclude that only the Applicant’s witness used the proper comparables. I say this because he alone used properties with an attached in-law suite. I find that element of the matrimonial home to be a highly unusual feature that would restrict its marketability. Nonetheless, I cannot ignore the fact that the Applicant’s appraiser used comparables that were larger in terms of square footage. I have decided to add $25,000 to the Applicant’s appraisal in recognition of that shortcoming.

[115] I value the matrimonial home at $1 million.

Orders Granted:

[116] In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that:

1. A divorce shall issue, pursuant to the Divorce Act;

2. In accordance with the agreement reached between the parties, the Applicant shall have sole custody of the two children of the marriage;

3. In accordance with the agreement reached between the parties, the Applicant shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home located at 2714 Page Road, Ottawa, Ontario, and its contents;

4. The value of the matrimonial home is determined to be $1, 000,000.00;

5. The 1000 common shares of Nictor Holdings Inc. (owned by Jeff Tremblay Family Trust No.2), are valued at $600,679 and that full amount shall be included in the Net Family Property of the Respondent husband;

6. The Respondent may deduct the amount of $130,345 as a debt owed on valuation day;

7. The Respondent’s income for support purposes is determined to be $242,148 per annum;

8. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant retroactive monthly child support calculated using a start date of October 12, 2012 but subtracting the $11,908 and $25,232 credits outlined in paragraph 88, above;

9. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant child support in the amount of $3,062 per month, commencing on February 1, 2016;

10. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant his proportionate share of the section 7 expenses of the parties’ children pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines;

11. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant retroactive spousal support in the amount of $3951 per month, retroactive to September 9, 2013;

12. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant spousal support of $3951 per month, commencing February 1, 2016;

13. The Respondent shall maintain dental, medical and extended health coverage for the children for so long as any of them are entitled to support from the Respondent;

14. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant an equalization payment calculated in accordance with the terms delineated above.

[117] I shall rely on counsel to determine the NFP equalization given the rulings made herein. I may be spoken to should any difficulty arise which prevents achievement of that result. All issues with respect to compensation for various valuations and other initiatives undertaken in the context of this litigation will be dealt with alongside the issue of costs. Toward that end, costs of this trial, and those reserved to the trial judge within earlier endorsements, may be addressed by written submissions to be filed, by the Applicant within 20 days, by the Respondent 20 days thereafter, and reply by the Applicant 10 days later. Submissions are limited to five pages exclusive of any Offers to Settle and/or Bills of Costs. In any event, within 14 days of release of this decision, the parties are to exchange Offers to Settle the costs arising from this case.

Mr. Justice Kevin B. Phillips

Released: January 27, 2016

CITATION: Tremblay v. Tremblay, 2016 ONSC 588

OTTAWA COURT FILE NO.: FC-13-2136

DATE: 2016/01/27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Catherine Tremblay

Applicant

– and –

Jeffrey Tremblay

Respondent

AMENDED REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

K. Phillips J.

Released: January 27, 2016

APPENDIX

January 27, 2016: On page 1, the previous neutral citation has been replaced by 2016 ONSC 588.

January 27, 2016: On page 1, the name Kaitlin A. Bradley was added as counsel for the Applicant.

January 27, 2016: On page 1, the date heard of October 6, 2015 has been replaced with the dates September 29, 2015 – October 6, 2015.