Ronald Mr. De Jesus v. Linamar Corporation a.k.a Camcor Manufacturing, 2016 ONSC 4383

COURT FILE NO.: CV-226-14

DATE: 20160718

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Ronald Mr. De Jesus

Plaintiff

– and –

Linamar Corporation a.k.a

Camcor Manufacturing

Defendant

R. Konduros, counsel for the Plaintiff

M. Mackillop and T. Weisberg, counsel for the Defendant

HEARD: May 24,27,31 and June 1,2,7,10, 2016

Justice Mossip

judgment

Introduction

[1] The plaintiff, Ronald Mr. De Jesus, brought an action for wrongful dismissal against the defendant, Linamar Corporation, a.k.a. Camcor Manufacturing.

[2] Mr. Mr. De Jesus was a production supervisor at Camcor, a division of Linamar, which manufactured car parts for various customers.

[3] At the time Mr. De Jesus’ employment was terminated, he was 50 years old and had worked for Linamar for 19.4 years. In the year ending December, 2012, he had earned $86,788.78.

[4] Linamar pleads it had just cause to terminate Mr. De Jesus’ employment for any one of/or a combination of the following reasons:

i. The production of 1500 camshafts with roping marks on Mr. De Jesus’ shift on September 27/28, 2013 (“roping incident”);

ii. Mr. De Jesus’ dishonesty during the investigation as to his role in the production of the 1500 camshafts and the continuation of that dishonesty up to and including the trial; and

iii. Mr. De Jesus’ total employment history, including prior disciplinary matters, combined with the roping incident.

[5] Mr. De Jesus pleads he was terminated without cause and is entitled to damages equivalent to 20.4 months’ pay in lieu of notice. In addition, if I find Linamar acted dishonestly with respect to the roping incident, Mr. De Jesus seeks punitive damages in the amount of $15,000. Mr. De Jesus also claims his costs of this action.

Evidence at Trial

[6] The evidence at trial may be summarized as follows:

Mr. De Jesus’ evidence focused on refuting the precipitating grounds for his dismissal, namely the allegation that 1500 defective camshafts were produced on his team’s shift on September 27/28, 2013; and
The evidence on behalf of Linamar was lead to prove that 1500 defective camshafts were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. In addition Linamar presented evidence as to the seriousness of this misconduct and the plaintiff’s dishonesty about this misconduct during the investigation and up to the trial. Lastly, Linamar presented evidence setting out prior disciplinary action against Mr. De Jesus which it says added to the grounds for dismissal.

Plaintiff’s Witnesses

Mr. De Jesus

[7] Mr. De Jesus testified on his own behalf. He also called a former Linamar employee Suhel Pir, and a current Linamar employee, Sergio Sousa, as witnesses in his case. Counsel for Mr. De Jesus read in certain questions and answers from the Discovery of Bill Smith, a supervisor at Linamar.

[8] Mr. De Jesus outlined his employment history with Linamar. He was transferred as a production supervisor to Camcor in May 2010, and stayed there until he was terminated on October 8, 2013. Mr. De Jesus was the production supervisor for the TIVCT3 Line (the T3Line”) which produced camshafts for the car manufacturer, Ford Motor Company.

(i) Prior Disciplinary History

[9] Mr. De Jesus went through his prior disciplinary record, and was cross-examined on this record. Although he disagreed with some of the disciplinary action taken, and called some of it “petty”, he did not argue with the evidence that the following progressive discipline was recorded on his employment file. He did try to explain the circumstances giving rise to the discipline and challenged some of the evidence.

First written warning dated May 24, 2011, which related to manipulating the payroll system. Mr. De Jesus agreed he manually recorded different times than the hand-scanner recorded for his times in the computer. Mr. De Jesus testified that the time differences were minor, that he could not remember the exact times and estimated his time when asked to do so, and did not think it made any difference because he was not paid overtime and so any errors in time-recording, did not financially impact on Linamar. This warning also related to his failure to follow the proper call-in procedure for reporting absences, specifically on May 25, 2011. Mr. De Jesus could not remember the conduct as to his failure to follow proper call-in procedure for reporting absences.
The second warning was for Mr. De Jesus’ failure to remove two gauges from the line, and for not correctly completing the Operator Check Sheets (“OCS”). Mr. De Jesus testified that it was not his responsibility to fill out the data sheets, but agreed he was responsible for ensuring the operator filled out the report. He agreed he left two gauges out on the line. He testified that no one was in danger and that his discipline for this conduct was “petty” on the part of Linamar.
On April 17, 2013, Mr. De Jesus received corrective counselling for an incident involving his supervisor Bill Smith when Mr. De Jesus got angry and threw his pager on the ground in front of his operators. Mr. De Jesus denied he threw his pager in front of his operators on the line, but acknowledged being angry, throwing his pager, and storming off to speak to someone in Human Resources.
Mr. De Jesus received a suspension letter on July 22, 2013, which was related to his absences from work on July 16, 2013 and July 19, 2013 without authorization and without contacting his supervisor/manager to advise of the absence. Mr. De Jesus explained that he lost all his money gambling in Niagara Falls with his girlfriend. Eventually he used his girlfriend’s phone and called into Linamar and left a message that he would not be into work on the above dates.
Mr. De Jesus received a second suspension letter on August 16, 2013. This was for unprofessional conduct, specifically yelling and not listening to fellow employees. Mr. De Jesus disagreed he was yelling. He testified that because it was a noisy environment, some discussions might seem like yelling, when they were not.

[10] Mr. De Jesus acknowledged receipt of letters from Linamar describing the above conduct for which he was disciplined. The letters all stated that if there was anything Linamar could do to assist him, he should ask. He was also advised of the Employee Assistance Program and was given a phone number to access the program.

[11] In the two suspension letters Mr. De Jesus was told that any further incident, or failure to meet his job responsibilities, could result in further disciplinary action, including termination of employment. The second suspension letter set out that this was a “final warning” and that his conduct as a supervisor was giving Camcor “serious cause for concern”.

(ii) Duties of a Production Supervisor

[12] Mr. De Jesus agreed with counsel for Camcor that the duties of a production supervisor are set out in the job description for this position which he was aware of when he was promoted to the position of production supervisor at Camcor in 2010.

[13] Mr. De Jesus further agreed that it was part of his job responsibility to ensure that the machines on the production line were working properly; that his team on the line were doing their jobs properly, and that his line was producing quality parts.

[14] Mr. De Jesus agreed that it was also part of his job description to ensure that all quality safeguards instituted by Linamar were being followed by his team on the line.

(iii) The Issue of Roping/Steps Taken for Prevention

[15] There was a great deal of evidence from several witnesses as to what “roping” is on a camshaft. At its simplest, it is lines on a camshaft made during the grinding process. There can be several reasons why these lines get on a camshaft during the manufacturing process. The most common reason is when there is a problem with the diamond head on the grinder.

[16] All of the witnesses testified that these lines can be easily seen when looking at a camshaft.

[17] There was a difference between the plaintiff’s witnesses and the defendant’s witnesses as to the effect of roping marks on a camshaft.

[18] The plaintiff and his witnesses testified at trial that roping on a camshaft happened all the time and that they were used to dealing with this problem. Mr. De Jesus testified that although Ford did not like camshafts with roping on them, roping was not dangerous, and it did not affect the operation of the camshaft. Mr. De Jesus testified that roping does not make a part defective; it is a “cosmetic” problem. He did agree that if roping was found on a camshaft, the line had to be stopped to solve the problem.

[19] Moreover, Mr. De Jesus was referred to the following series of questions and answers from his discovery on February 25, 2015.

Q. And the roping issue will cause the part to be defective?

A. Yes.

Q. You cannot send a part with a roping issue to a customer?

A. Yes.

Q. So you became aware that this roping issue caused roping marks on the part that rendered that part unfit for production, correct?

A. I was told, yes.

[20] The defendant’s witnesses all testified that roping is a very serious problem; it makes the camshaft defective. The roping marks on a camshaft can cause vibration and noise from the engine. Ford considered camshafts with roping on them a defective part. Ford would send back, at Linamar’s costs, any parts that had roping on them. The delivery of parts to Ford with roping marks on them could affect Linamar’s quality rating with Ford, and ultimately affect its financial bottom line in a negative way.

[21] In any event, all the witnesses agreed that roping required the camshaft to be re-processed to get rid of the marks. Further, if the marks were not removed during the re-processing in a way that left the part in tact as to its required specifications, the part had to be scrapped. Ford was the major purchaser of Linamar’s camshafts and insisted that there be no roping on the parts.

(iv) Mr. De Jesus’ Version of What Happened on September 27/28, 2013

[22] Mr. De Jesus testified that there was roping on camshafts, caused by one of the grinders, at the beginning of his shift on September 27, 2013. The problem was fixed and there were no further “major” roping problems during his shift until the end of his shift, when the other grinder was causing roping on camshafts on the line. His report at the end of his shift set out that the next shift would have to deal with this grinder problem.

[23] Mr. De Jesus testified that he did not talk to the day shift production supervisor, John House, at the end of his shift because there was no issue with roping from his shift that he needed to discuss.

[24] Mr. De Jesus categorically denied that his shift produced 1500 parts with roping on them; he testified that was impossible.

Suhel Pir

[25] Suhel Pir testified for the plaintiff. He had worked for Linamar for 10 years until he left the Camcor division in October 2015. He worked on the line as the set-up person on September 27, 2013.

[26] He was told about a roping issue on one of the grinders when he arrived. He testified that this roping issue was normal. Once it was addressed on the grinder, the line produced “good” parts.

[27] He testified that he visually inspected the parts every hour. He testified that he saw Mr. De Jesus checking parts during the night.

[28] He testified that when he was told on his next shift that his prior shift had produced 1500 parts, of which 600 had to be scrapped, he asked to see them, but was told they were thrown out.

[29] Mr. Pir agreed he signed a discipline letter with respect to the events of the September 27/28, 2013 shift. He acknowledged in this letter that he did not follow Linamar’s procedure that was in place to deal with roping issues. He further acknowledged in this letter that there were 1500 parts found with roping issues, of which 750 had to be scrapped. Mr. Pir added in his own writing on the “Corrective Counselling Form,” that he did not “see” the 750 pieces that were scrapped.

[30] At the trial, Mr. Pir testified that it was impossible to re-process 1500 parts on one shift because it takes too long.

[31] Mr. Pir agreed in cross-examination that his primary job as the set-up person was to fix the machines. He does tape checks, which is the method to manually check for roping on the parts, if he is asked. He did do tape checks on that shift but does not remember who asked him.

[32] He did not see any skids of defective parts, nor was he told about defective parts that night. He said he would have seen skids with defective parts in the pack-out area if there had been that many defective parts scrapped.

Sergio Sousa

[33] Sergio Sousa has worked for Linamar for five years. He is a machine operator in the Camcor division.

[34] He testified that the problem with roping on the production line existed prior to him being at Camcor, and still exists today.

[35] At each shift meeting, he testified that Mr. De Jesus told his team to watch for roping. The roping checks were increased from every hour to every 30 minutes.

[36] Mr. Sousa testified that he did not see roping issues on the camshafts throughout the relevant shift; there were some roping problems, but when they occurred, they stopped the machine, addressed the problem, and carried on with production.

[37] Mr. Sousa testified that when he heard John House talking about the number of defective parts produced on their shift, he thought that it could not be right, as it would have been almost 100 percent of their production that night.

[38] He testified that he asked to see the defective parts and was told they had been removed from the building. He said that this was not true as scrap was moved out on Monday’s.

[39] Mr. Sousa also testified that it was not possible to re-work 1500 parts on a shift; they could possibly re-work 300 to 400 parts on a shift.

[40] Mr. Sousa testified that roping was a visual problem and that Ford did not like it, but that it could not cause an engine to malfunction. Mr. Sousa testified in cross-examination that he was aware of a roping problem at the beginning of his shift, but that there were no further roping problems to his knowledge.

[41] He testified that the plaintiff did not tell him about roping problems on his machine at the end of his shift.

[42] The issue of tape checks for roping was explored with Mr. Sousa. In examination-in-chief, he testified that he never did manual tape checks and that he was not told to do them every 15 minutes or at all. He uses a polishing machine to check for roping, and did not check for roping by doing manual checks.

[43] He agreed in cross-examination that he signed a form, stating he did manual tape checks every 15 minutes. He agreed with counsel that if he signed that form stating he did tape checks every 15 minutes, then what he said to Mr. De Jesus’ counsel, in examination-in-chief, namely, that he never did manual tape checks, was not true.

Defendant’s Witnesses

Ms. Patel

[44] Ms. Patel has worked at Camcor for five years as a pack-out operator. She is currently a machine operator.

[45] Ms. Patel’s job is to pack the parts coming off the line. She checks them as she is packing them. There are three pack-out operators on the line. As they pack the parts, they are looking for roping marks, which can be seen on the camshafts. If roping marks are found on the camshafts, they are put off to the side on what is called a “trigger rack”. If they get four or five in a row, they are instructed to tell the production supervisor. It is the supervisor’s job to fix the problem and the pack-out operator has no further involvement.

[46] Ms. Patel testified that on the shift on September 27, 2013, she noticed parts with roping on them coming off the line. At some point, she had filled up the trigger racks with the defective parts with roping.

[47] Ms. Patel testified that she told Mr. De Jesus about the number of defective parts with roping, and he told her to keep those parts separate. She testified that she spoke to Mr. De Jesus about the problem more than once; all of the packers told him about the roping problem that night.

[48] Ms. Patel testified that Mr. De Jesus came and spoke to them about the roping problem in the first half-hour of the shift.

[49] She testified that there were about 30 to 40 trays of defective parts on one skid piled to about her mid-section. She said that Mr. De Jesus saw those trays.

[50] Ms. Patel told the court that she recalled Mr. De Jesus was told three times by packers about the roping marks. At the end of the shift, there continued to be parts with roping marks. She had never seen that many parts produced on a shift with roping marks. At the end of her shift, she remembers there were roped parts on trays on a skid that were piled to her height, about five feet.

Warner Meuller

[51] Mr. Meuller was the supervisor on the high feature line at Camcor. In September 2013, he worked the day shift.

[52] On September 28, 2013, John House called him around 7:10 a.m. to tell him there was a roping issue on one of the grinders, 60.31, and that he had to stop the line to look at the work in progress (“WIP”).

[53] Mr. Meuller testified that he went to the line around 7:20 a.m. to check it out. He saw parts with roping marks on them. He does not recall seeing Mr. De Jesus when he went to the line. He described the roping marks as some of the worst he had seen. He said the line was full of bad parts.

[54] They stopped the line and investigated. They found the diamond head in one of the machines was worn out to the point that there was no diamond left. That problem would create roping.

[55] He saw two skids full of roped parts. He saw approximately 450 x 2 (900) parts on two skids set aside with roped parts when he left his shift. He randomly inspected the parts on the skids and saw roping.

[56] The parts on the line (WIP) was from Mr. De Jesus’ shift. The day shift had stopped the line and nothing new was produced by that shift until the repair was completed and the defective parts re-processed. It took approximately 10 minutes to fix the problem.

[57] Mr. Meuller testified that he sent an email to Mr. De Jesus on September 28, 2013 about the major roping problem found on the parts from his shift, and asked for an explanation. Mr. De Jesus did not respond to that email.

[58] Mr. Meuller said that roped parts should be re-worked right away to see what can be salvaged. He testified that roping is a problem for the customer and it could damage the engine.

[59] Mr. Meuller told the court that it is the supervisor’s responsibility to ensure that the parts coming off the line are of good quality.

[60] Mr. Meuller testified that based on his experience at Camcor with Mr. De Jesus, it was his opinion that Mr. De Jesus had a bad attitude in the work place, was not engaged with his team, and that he was a poor supervisor of his team.

Bill Smith

[61] Mr. Smith has worked at Linamar for 29 years. He has been a general supervisor for seven years and worked at Camcor for seven years. At the time of these events, he was Mr. De Jesus’ direct supervisor.

[62] Mr. Smith was the person who decided that Mr. De Jesus should be terminated. He testified Mr. De Jesus was not trustworthy, he was not engaged with his team, and was not motivated as a leader; he was distracted in carrying out his supervisory functions with his team. He did not appear to know exactly what was happening on the line he was supervising. He testified that Mr. De Jesus had been given many chances in the past, as his discipline record demonstrated. Mr. De Jesus had received corrective counselling for his misconduct and his poor performance but it had not helped. Mr. Smith testified that he did not trust him with the people on his team because he appeared distracted. He was concerned that if Mr. De Jesus was not paying attention to quality of the parts coming off the line, he might not pay attention to the safety of his team on the line.

[63] Mr. Smith gave a lot of background information with respect to the production of camshaft parts, what to do about parts with roping, the role of the production supervisor, and other evidence on the production of camshafts that I do not need to set out here.

[64] Mr. Smith went through the ‘Quality Alert’ document that was in place on September 27/28, 2013. He set out what the supervisor’s job was with respect to that ‘Alert’, which was to ensure that the action set out in the Alert was being followed by his team.

[65] Mr. Smith set out clearly that, from Linamar’s perspective, roping on camshafts was a serious problem. It could have significant financial consequences for Linamar if such defective parts got shipped to their customers.

[66] Mr. Smith testified as to how important it was for Linamar to maintain the quality rating, (“Q₁”), that it had with Ford Motor Company. Ford made up 70 to 80 percent of Camcor’s sales of camshafts. Linamar did not want any parts with roping on them to get shipped to Ford. If this happened, it could cause Linamar to lose its Q₁ status and Linamar could lose business with Ford. It could also cause vehicle recalls by Ford which could potentially have severe financial consequences for Linamar.

[67] Mr. Smith testified that he, along with others in management, decided to issue the Quality Alert at the beginning of September 2013, because roping was such a serious issue. A Quality Alert remains in place for 30 days. Mr. Smith described the efforts Linamar made to ensure this problem was being dealt with. He also testified as to his personal involvement with the work Linamar employees did with Ford both at their plants in Guelph, and at Ford test plants in the United States, to make sure this problem was being addressed in the production process. Ford demonstrated in the test plants the effects of roping on a camshaft. These tests showed that roping could cause vibration and noise in an engine; both problems are unacceptable to Ford.

[68] Mr. Smith was not working Saturday, September 28, 2013. He was phoned by John House at his home, sometime between 7:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. and told there was a severe roping issue on the line. Mr. House told him there was a couple of skids at pack-out with bad parts, and that the line was full of bad parts. Mr. Smith was very concerned upon receiving this information for several reasons, one of which was that Linamar was scheduled to ship camshafts on Monday to Ford. He asked John House if the bad parts were salvageable, and told John to start re-processing the defective parts.

[69] Mr. Smith testified that he arrived at the plant at approximately 10:00 a.m. He verified that there were defective parts on the line. He randomly sampled the parts on the skids, from various levels on the skids. He confirmed there was roping on the parts throughout the skids. He also verified by looking at the time stamp, that the defective parts were done on the previous night shift, which was the shift Mr. De Jesus supervised.

[70] Mr. Smith saw defective parts on the skids ready to be shipped, on the skids where defective parts were put (scrap area), and on the parts sitting on the line, waiting to be processed.

[71] Mr. Smith testified that the extent of the roping issue and defective parts was very serious; it was “a 10 or 11 out of 10” in terms of seriousness.

[72] Mr. Smith testified that he did not count all the defective parts or the scrap parts, but understood from the next shift that the final count was that 1500 defective parts were re-processed, and of those, 600 parts had to be scrapped. He testified that it was possible to re-process 1500 parts on a shift because it takes less time to reprocess a part, than to have a part go through the line in the first instance. He had never seen 1500 defective parts produced on a shift before.

[73] Mr. Smith testified that he spoke to Mr. De Jesus on Monday, September 30. He showed him the defective camshaft with the roping. He also showed him the time stamp indicating the defective part was done on his shift.

[74] Mr. Smith testified that Mr. De Jesus denied these parts were from his shift. He insisted he did not produce the defective parts. He did not believe that the defective parts had been produced on his shift.

[75] Mr. Smith testified that an investigation was carried out with respect to the defective parts produced on the September 27/28, 2013 shift. He testified that in summary, the people on Mr. De Jesus’ shift denied the defective camshafts were made on their shift. They said they did not see the roping on the camshafts. Mr. Smith testified that he felt like he was getting the run around and could not get a straight answer. Some of the operators said they were doing the checks for roping; others said they were not. At one point Mr. De Jesus denied there was any roping problem, and then he said that they reprocessed defective parts during his shift. He testified that Mr. De Jesus said that he was doing checks every half hour and he did not see any roping issues when he examined the parts.

[76] Upon completion of the investigation, based on what Mr. De Jesus and others on his team told management, and based on what John House and his team told management, there was no doubt in his mind that the 1500 defective parts had been produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. Based on his past disciplines, the production of 1500 defective parts, and his dishonestly in talking to him and management about his involvement in producing those defective parts, he made the decision to terminate Mr. De Jesus’ employment with Linamar.

John House

[77] John House was the production supervisor who took over Mr. De Jesus’ production line on the morning of September 28, 2013. He saw Mr. De Jesus when he arrived for his shift. Mr. House asked him if everything was “squared away” and Mr. De Jesus said everything was fine; he did not say anything about there being any roping issues on his shift.

[78] Mr. House had the “kick off” meeting with his team and he was told by his operator that the two grinders, 60.31 and 60.32 had roping issues. As a result, he stopped the line and looked at the parts. He saw roping on the parts that were on the line.

[79] Mr. House contacted Mr. Meuller at approximately 7:25 a.m. He and Mr. Meuller walked the line and saw the defective parts. Mr. House saw defective parts on the line and in the shipping area. He saw defective parts on the skids ready for shipping. He met Mr. Meuller at the pack-out area and showed him the defective parts.

[80] Mr. House called Mr. Smith around 9:00 a.m. and told him about the defective parts on the line. Mr. Smith came into the plant to the pack-out area and walked the line with them and saw the defective parts.

[81] Mr. House personally checked the date stamp and saw that it was Mr. De Jesus’ shift that had made the defective parts. Mr. Smith also checked the date stamp. Mr. House described the roping marks on the camshafts as bad and very visible to the eye.

[82] Mr. House testified that it took five to six hours to sort through the defective parts that had been produced. He counted about 1500 defective parts; 144 boxes – 900 short camshafts and 600 long camshafts.

[83] He testified that he tried to re-work all the defective parts, but some were “out of spec,” after being re-worked, and had to be scrapped. He cannot recall how many were scrapped; he was focused on re-working parts. He did not count or record the number of those scrapped parts on a scrap sheet. He told Mr. Meuller that it was not a priority to count the scrapped parts. At some point Mr. House was told that there were 604 scrapped parts from the 1500 parts his team re-processed.

[84] When he started work that day, he testified that he was checking the line, sorting the defective parts. Both grinders were stopped and had to be fixed. The diamond grinders on both machines had issues and were damaged; they had to be replaced. It was the problem with the diamond heads that had caused the roping on the camshafts.

[85] Mr. House testified that he usually produced 2400 parts in a 12 hour shift. On his shift on September 28, 2013, he produced 1224 new parts in addition to re-working the 1500. It takes less time to re-work the part because the re-work starts further down the line.

[86] Mr. House testified that when Mr. De Jesus came in for his next shift, he told him that 1500 of his parts had to be re-worked because of roping. He testified that Mr. De Jesus said “Yea, okay; no problem. I’ll talk to my people”. He testified that Mr. De Jesus did not deny it or act surprised. Mr. House physically showed Mr. De Jesus one of these defective parts while he was in his kick-off meeting with his team. Mr. House heard Mr. De Jesus tell his team that the day shift had found defective parts, he believes he said 1500 parts, and “we need to deal with it.”

[87] In cross-examination, Mr. House testified that the scrap report he completed for his shift following Mr. De Jesus’, said there were 109 scrapped parts. However, this number had nothing to do with the scrapped parts from the 1500 parts his team reprocessed. He knows it was 1500 parts, (900 short, 600 long), because he counted through the boxes of the defective camshaft’s with his operators.

Analysis and Findings

[88] The leading Canadian case on dishonesty as a basis for termination of the employment contract is McKinley v. BC Tel, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 161, 2001 SCC 38. Both counsel referred to this decision in their submissions and referenced the principles in that case, to the evidence in this case, to support their submissions.

[89] McKinley was referred to in a decision from our Court of Appeal, which was released on June 14, 2016, after the parties had made submissions, namely [^1] Fernandes v. Peel Educational and Tutorial Services Limited (Mississauga Private School), 2016 ONCA 468. This decision did not in any way change the law as set out in McKinley, so it was not necessary to hear from counsel about this decision. Fernandes was helpful in setting out a framework as to how the McKinley legal principles should be applied to the evidence in a wrongful dismissal case.

[90] The following paragraphs from McKinley are helpful in setting out the test and the findings that I must decide:

48 In light of the foregoing analysis, I am of the view that whether an employer is justified in dismissing an employee on the grounds of dishonesty is a question that requires an assessment of the context of the alleged misconduct. More specifically, the test is whether the employee’s dishonesty gave rise to a breakdown in the employment relationship. This test can be expressed in different ways. One could say, for example, that just cause for dismissal exists where the dishonesty violates an essential condition of the employment contract, breaches the faith inherent to the work relationship, or is fundamentally or directly inconsistent with the employee’s obligations to his or her employer.

49 In accordance with this test, a trial judge must instruct the jury to determine: (1) whether the evidence established the employee’s deceitful conduct on a balance of probabilities; and (2) if so, whether the nature and degree of the dishonesty warranted dismissal. In my view, the second branch of this test does not blend questions of fact and law. Rather, assessing the seriousness of the misconduct requires the facts established at trial to be carefully considered and balanced. As such, it is a factual inquiry for the jury to undertake.

[91] There are therefore, based on the above legal dicta, two main issues to be decided by me at this trial.

Did 1500 camshafts come off the production line that Mr. De Jesus was responsible for with roping marks on the nightshift on September 27/28, 2013?
If the answer to question one is “yes”, was that fact alone, or in conjunction with Mr. De Jesus’ disciplinary history, or in conjunction with a finding that Mr. De Jesus was dishonest with respect to the investigation of the roping incident, sufficient for Camcor to terminate Mr. De Jesus’ employment for cause?

Question 1: Did 1500 camshafts come off the production line Mr. De Jesus was responsible for with roping on September 27/28, 2013?

[92] Mr. De Jesus’ version of events cannot sit beside Camcor’s version. Someone is lying; both versions cannot be true. Either 1500 camshafts with roping marks came off Mr. De Jesus’ production line during the night shift of September 27/28, 2013 or they did not.

[93] Mr. De Jesus’ position is “show me”; both the 1500 camshafts with roping, and the 600 camshafts that had to be scrapped because they did not meet Ford’s specifications after they were re-worked to try to get rid of the roping marks on them.

[94] It is not disputed that there were no pictures taken of the 1500 roped parts, nor of the 600 or so scrapped parts. Nor did Camcor produce pictures of the time-stamp on the defective parts which were alleged to have been produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. None of the “hold” tags on the trays with the defective parts were saved or produced to Mr. De Jesus, or at this trial.

[95] Mr. De Jesus’ submission both at the time of the investigation and at this trial was to the effect, “if I cannot see it; it does not exist”.

[96] I reject this submission made by Mr. De Jesus. There is reliable evidence that 1500 defective camshafts were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift, even without the forensic evidence Mr. De Jesus insists should have been available to him at the time and at the trial.

[97] There is the evidence of the two supervisors/managers above Mr. De Jesus, the production supervisor of equivalent rank as Mr. De Jesus, and the pack-out employee on the line Mr. De Jesus supervised on that shift. All of these witnesses testified they saw numerous, defective parts. Some specifically testified that they counted, or “calculated,” that there were 1500 defective parts, of which 600 were scrapped after re-working.

[98] None of these witnesses were shaken on cross-examination in their testimony as to the extent of the camshafts that were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift with roping. Bill Smith was challenged with respect to his evidence on discovery and at trial on the issue of the number of scrapped parts. I will discuss this below.

[99] The case of the plaintiff rested on his denials, on the lack of forensic evidence, and on the suggestions put directly and indirectly, to the defendants’ witnesses that they had made up the fact that there were 1500 defective parts made on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. The latter suggestion was completely denied by all of the defendants’ witnesses. The lack of forensic evidence was explained by witnesses who are involved in the manufacture of car parts, not criminal investigation detectives tasked with preserving evidence at a crime scene.

[100] Bill Smith’s answers on discovery were read into evidence as part of the plaintiff’s case. These questions and answers suggest that Bill Smith got the 604 number for the scrapped parts from the scrap sheets that are completed after a shift is over. The documentary evidence shows that cannot be true, as the scrap sheet completed on the shift following Mr. De Jesus’ shift did not set out 604 scrapped camshafts as a result of roping. The evidence suggests that the number of scrapped parts from the 1500 parts re-worked was not recorded on the scrap sheets by any of the shift supervisors as is the usual procedure. On the evidence, Bill Smith was wrong in his answers on his discovery as to where he got the information that there were 600 (plus or minus) scrapped parts. But that does not mean there were not 600 scrapped parts. At trial, plaintiff’s counsel chose not to pursue this issue in cross-examination of Bill Smith. According to jurisprudence plaintiff’s counsel brought to the court’s attention, he was entitled to do so even though he had read in his discovery answers on this subject as part of the plaintiff’s case. This discrepancy, as to the source of his knowledge of the 600 scrapped parts, did not undermine my acceptance of other parts of Mr. Smith’s evidence which he gave clearly and without any real challenge. I may believe some, none, or all of any particular witnesses’ testimony. In this case, based on all of the evidence and on the rest of Mr. Smith’s testimony, I accept his testimony as to his observations and conclusions that there were the 1500 camshafts with roping marks produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift.

[101] The witnesses produced by Mr. De Jesus did not assist him on this issue. Firstly, Mr. Pir’s testimony was the same as that of Mr. De Jesus; if he could not see the defective parts (scrapped at that point), they did not exist and there was a conspiracy by employees of the defendant to fabricate this evidence. He asked to see the scrapped parts and was told they were thrown out. He checked the scrap area and could not see any parts, therefore since no one could produce these defective parts, there were not 600 scrapped parts.

[102] Mr. Pir also testified that it was not possible to re-work 1500 parts in one shift because it takes too long. Re-processing defective parts, he testified, takes double the time than initially processing a part. This testimony directly contradicts that of John House whose evidence, for reasons set out below, I prefer. I accept that Mr. House’s team re-worked the 1500 parts on the shift following that of Mr. De Jesus.

[103] Mr. Pir was a set-up person on the line; his primary job was to fix the machines, not check the parts as they went through the line.

[104] I find that Mr. Pir had limited, and selective, knowledge of what was happening throughout the production line on September 27/28, 2013. For example he did not know about problems on grinder 60.31 that were causing roping on the parts that night. The fact of that problem was accepted by Mr. De Jesus in his testimony.

[105] Mr. Pir also did not know about Ms. Patel telling Mr. De Jesus about defective parts during the night, and said he did not see any defective parts in the pack-out area where Ms. Patel worked. Again, Ms. Patel’s evidence of having told Mr. De Jesus about defective parts was not seriously refuted by him. When asked in cross-examination about this, Mr. De Jesus testified that Miss Patel “probably” told him about defective parts; and agreed that Ms. Patel “could have told him” about defective parts on the shift.

[106] Sergio Sousa’s testimony was also not helpful to Mr. De Jesus. Mr. Sousa was not credible, and he appeared to have an “agenda” when he testified. His overall testimony was undermined for two reasons.

[107] Firstly, he stated categorically that he never did manual tape checks to look for roping on the camshafts, and that the plaintiff never told him to do tape checks. He was then shown exhibit 26 where he signed that he did do tape checks on the camshafts every 15 minutes. When asked about the discrepancy between this signed sheet and his testimony in chief, he agreed that what he told the court earlier about not knowing what it means to do a manual tape check on a camshaft, and that he did not do tape checks, cannot be true. His testimony also conflicts with Mr. De Jesus’ testimony on this point as he testified that he did tell the operators on the line to do tape checks for roping.

[108] Secondly, Mr. Sousa testified that he did not see roping on the camshafts throughout the shift and that he was not aware of any roping marks on the camshafts from machine 60.31 at the end of the shift. Even in Mr. De Jesus’ report, filed at the end of his shift, he stated there was a roping problem from machine 60.31, which the day shift would have to deal with. Mr. Sousa’s testimony on the problem with roping from this machine cannot be true.

[109] I have no confidence in Mr. Sousa’s testimony and it was of no assistance to bolster Mr. De Jesus’ testimony that 1500 defective parts could not have been produced on their shift.

[110] As summarized above, all four of the Camcor employees came to court and testified as to their knowledge and involvement with the roped camshafts that were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. That testimony was compelling and believable. It was also largely unshaken on cross-examination. In particular the testimony of John House, when considered as a whole, overwhelmingly convinces me that there were 1500 roped parts produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. He testified that he and his operators counted the boxes with the defective camshafts. He knew how many short and long camshafts he and his team re-worked. His testimony on this point was unshaken in cross-examination. His testimony as to why he did not count and record the number of scrapped parts there were from the 1500 parts they reprocessed makes sense in the circumstances of what was going on in this crisis situation. He had more important things to do and his superior was aware that he was focussing on re-working parts, not counting scrap parts.

[111] Further, the documentary evidence at this trial went a long way in assisting Camcor in establishing that 1500 parts were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift. Certain exhibits were compelling evidence to support this finding.

[112] The emails sent between the Camcor employees, including Mr. De Jesus, speak volumes as to what actually happened on the September 27/28, 2013 shift, as does the report drafted by Mr. De Jesus at the end of his night shift at 7:00 a.m., September 28, 2013.

[113] When Mr. De Jesus was first confronted by Mr. House about the 1500 defective parts, Mr. House testified that Mr. De Jesus did not deny the fact and simply said words to the effect of he would discuss it with his team. In his email dated September 30, 2013, for the first time, Mr. De Jesus states his disbelief that there could have been that many defective parts produced on their shift. In that email he wanted “proof” of a problem of this magnitude. Much of that “proof” would have either been shipped out of the plant at that point, or been taken to the scrap disposal.

[114] The report of John House dated September 28, 2013 at the end of his shift sets out clearly that his line reprocessed 1500 parts because of roping issues from the two grinders. This report was completed contemporaneously with the events and is very compelling evidence as to what happened on Mr. De Jesus’ shift.

[115] In Mr. De Jesus’ report completed at the end of his shift the morning of September 28, 2013, he sets out there were roping issues at the beginning of the shift on grinder 60.32, which was fixed and the line continued to produce camshafts. At the end of his shift there was roping from grinder 60.31, which he left for the day shift to fix, but did not mention to John House on the shift change.

[116] There were two submissions made on behalf of Camcor that I found particularly compelling:

The Camcor plant is a manufacturing plant not a crime scene; and
The extent of the collusion and falsehoods that the Camcor employees would have to be involved in to make up the evidence about 1500 defective camshafts, would make this a conspiracy of mind-boggling proportions (my word not counsel’s).

[117] With respect to the first submission, as set out above, Mr. De Jesus did not categorically deny that his shift produced 1500 defective parts until one and one-half days had passed. Prior to that, the best evidence is he acknowledged at some level and did not immediately deny the truth of what the Camcor employees stated, which was that 1500 defective parts had been produced on his shift.

[118] By the time he did take the position that it could not have happened, the 1500 parts had been re-worked and 900 of them had presumably been re-processed, re-packed and prepared for shipping. There were no pictures taken because it was not on Camcor management’s radar that Mr. De Jesus would deny what was before their very eyes. These employees are not CSI detectives; no one at that point was thinking “save the evidence so we can use it to fire Mr. De Jesus”. The submission that forensic evidence is necessary in order for me to be satisfied as to what happened does not accord with common sense, nor with the other evidence at this trial that I do accept. This evidence satisfies me on a balance of probabilities that 1500 camshafts with roping marks on them were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift on September 27/28, 2013.

[119] Mr. De Jesus had a motive to lie about the production of 1500 defective parts. He tried at trial to distance himself from the evidence as to how serious a camshaft was with roping on it. He described roping marks as a “cosmetic” problem. He was clear on discovery that a camshaft with roping marks was a defective part and it had to be re-processed.

[120] Based on all of the evidence I do accept, I do not believe Mr. De Jesus in his denial of knowing that 1500 defective camshafts were produced on his shift.

[121] As to the scrapped parts in the number of approximately 600, I accept the testimony of John House that he had more important things he was concerned with when he first came into the plant on September 28, 2013, than counting and recording scrapped parts. He was told to set them aside by his supervisor and he did. Perhaps he thought there was going to be a special scrap record kept from re-working the 1500 defective parts. After all, it was not his shift that created the scrapped parts, why should it be on his shift’s record. In any event, I accept his evidence, along with the rest of the evidence, that even without the scrap sheet verification, there were approximately 600 scrapped parts after the 1500 defective parts were re-worked on the line.

[122] The documentary evidence defies the suggestion that there was a conspiracy to fabricate evidence in order to provide cause to terminate Mr. De Jesus’ employment from Camcor; that evidence was created contemporaneously with the events as they happened and is very compelling. That evidence, along with the testimony of the defendants’ witnesses that I accept, satisfies me on a balance of probabilities that 1500 defective camshafts were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift.

Question 2: Having found that 1500 Defective parts were produced on Mr. De Jesus’ shift; did Camcor have sufficient cause to terminate his employment?

[123] In the Fernandes decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal helpfully summarized from McKinley, how, if misconduct by an employee is found on the evidence, the court should decide if such misconduct justifies an employee’s dismissal.

[124] At paras. 103-105, the majority sets out how the misconduct must be analyzed, to assess its seriousness.

[103] The governing legal principles can be found at paras. 48-49 of McKinley. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the court, states that whether an employer is justified in dismissing an employee on the grounds of misconduct is a question that requires an assessment of the context of the alleged misconduct. More specifically, the test is whether the employee’s misconduct gave rise to a breakdown in the employment relationship. He notes that the test can be expressed in different ways: just cause for dismissal exists where the misconduct violates an essential condition of the employment contract, breaches the faith inherent to the work relationship, or is fundamentally or directly inconsistent with the employee’s obligations to his or her employer.

[104] The principle of proportionality underlies this approach: an effective balance must be struck between the severity of an employee’s misconduct and the sanction imposed: McKinley, at para. 53.

[105] In Dowling v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board) (2004), 2004 CanLII 43692 (ON CA), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 65, at paras. 49-50, this court, following McKinley, concluded that the core question is whether the employee’s misconduct was sufficiently serious that it struck at the heart of the employment relationship. To answer that question, the court must:

determine the nature and extent of the misconduct;
consider the surrounding circumstances; and
decide whether dismissal was warranted.

[125] I propose to follow the steps set out in Fernandes, which has in a helpful way, set out the questions to be asked by the court, to meet the test in McKinley.

Nature and Extent of the Misconduct

[126] In this step, as set out above, the court must determine the nature and extent of the misconduct and assess its seriousness.

[127] It cannot be disputed that there is significant harm to Linamar by the production of 1500 defective parts in one of its plants. It is hard to imagine a greater misconduct than a supervisor permitting the production of this quantity of defective parts on his shift. It is Mr. De Jesus’ failure to control the problem that is the first part of his misconduct. It was not disputed by the plaintiff that he was the person responsible, as the production supervisor, to ensure that the parts coming off his line met the quality standards required by Linamar, because that was the standard required by Ford

[128] I reject the testimony of Mr. De Jesus and at least one of his witnesses, Mr. Sousa, that roping was only a “cosmetic” issue and one that did not affect the integrity of the camshaft. As set out above, Mr. De Jesus changed his testimony on this issue from his discovery to the trial. I do not believe Mr. De Jesus’ trial testimony on this point.

[129] On this issue, I prefer the testimony of all of the defendants’ witnesses, that roping is a serious issue which causes a camshaft to be a defective part. Further, the shipping of camshafts with roping on them to Ford could have affected Linamar’s Q₁ rating with Ford, and that would have had significant negative financial implications to Linamar. I accept the evidence of Bill Smith as to the very serious consequences to Linamar of shipping out any camshafts with roping marks on them. The consequences of shipping 1500 defective parts would have been disastrous to Linamar.

[130] The evidence discloses that it would be impossible to produce 1500 defective camshafts if Mr. De Jesus had properly supervised the line and ensured that the requirements of the September Quality Alert were being followed by the persons on the line.

[131] Either Mr. De Jesus was aware of the extent of the roping problem and chose to ignore it, or he was unaware of the extent of the problem. Either way Mr. De Jesus’ misconduct went beyond mere negligence or incompetence. Allowing 1500 parts to come off the line with roping marks was serious misconduct. I find this misconduct was sufficiently serious that “it struck at the heart of the employment relationship.”

[132] In addition to the production of 1500 defective parts, the plaintiff’s misconduct in trying to cover-up his role in allowing the production of these parts, and lying about his role, constitutes serious misconduct. As I said above, the two versions of the events of September 27/28, 2013 cannot sit together. I accept the defendant’s version and the plaintiff must therefore be lying about what he did as the supervisor on that shift, what he knew about the roping problem, and what he did when the extent of the roping problem was brought to his attention. The dishonesty of Mr. De Jesus in the investigation of the production of 1500 defective camshafts demonstrated to management at Linamar that they could not trust Mr. De Jesus; there was a fundamental breakdown in the employment relationship.

The Surrounding Circumstances

[133] As set out in Fernandes, the court at this step must consider the particular circumstances of both the employer and the employee.

Employees’ Circumstances

[134] The background of Mr. De Jesus was that he was 50 years old at the time of his termination. He had worked at Linamar for 19.4 years.

[135] Mr. De Jesus had been a production supervisor for several years; he was not new to the job and he knew what his responsibilities as a supervisor were.

[136] Mr. De Jesus had been the subject of progressive discipline over the past several years, including two suspension letters in the year 2013. In both suspension letters, Mr. De Jesus was told that any further incident or failure to meet his job responsibilities could result in disciplinary action including termination of his employment. The second suspension letter set out that this was a “final warning”.

[137] Although looked at in isolation, and individually, the incidents giving rise to disciplinary action against Mr. De Jesus may seem minor, cumulatively, they demonstrate that Linamar had difficulties in the employment relationship with Mr. De Jesus prior to the roping incident on September 27/28, 2013. The problems on that shift were a much more serious breakdown of the employment relationship, but it is significant in assessing Linamar’s response to the production of the 1500 defective parts that there was a history with Mr. De Jesus that was considered by management as well. As Bill Smith testified, Linamar had given Mr. De Jesus several chances to improve his work relationship, he had been warned, and he did not correct his attitude or his job performance.

[138] I have considered the evidence of the performance reviews completed on Mr. De Jesus in the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Mr. De Jesus’ scores on these reviews were reasonably good, though Mr. Smith testified that Linamar was looking for a score of closer to 100 percent, since these were goal oriented reviews. Further, as seen in the emails in those reviews between Mr. De Jesus and his supervisors, there were still issues occurring on Mr. De Jesus’ production line and with his team members, that the company sought improvement on from Mr. De Jesus. I also have nothing to compare these scores with, that is, did other production supervisors have significantly higher scores? Finally, the fact that Mr. De Jesus had reasonably good performance reviews, does not take away from Mr. De Jesus’ misconduct that had led to disciplinary action.

[139] Mr. De Jesus testified at trial as to certain personal issues that he said affected his job performance, such as his marital breakdown, some health issues from stress, and a gambling problem.

[140] There was no evidence at this trial that Mr. De Jesus asked Linamar for any assistance with his personal issues, or asked for time off to deal with personal issues, or asked for accommodation for any personal issues. Mr. De Jesus testified that he told the General Manager about his problems, but there was no evidence of that, other than Mr. De Jesus saying so. I find this evidence incredible as I do not believe Linamar would not have recorded important personnel issues, such as accommodation requests, in Mr. De Jesus’ file. There was no evidence as to such a conversation with the General Manager, or any other documentary evidence of problems Mr. De Jesus suffered from. In all of the discipline letters issued to Mr. De Jesus there were offers of help made by management and human resources. There simply was no credible evidence proffered by Mr. De Jesus that he had personal issues to the extent that they would have affected his ability to carry out his job responsibilities.

[141] I do not accept that there was anything of major significance going on in Mr. De Jesus’ personal life which distracted him from fulfilling his supervisory responsibilities at Linamar. Further, there was no evidence that if Mr. De Jesus did have such issues going on in his life affecting his job performance, that he told Linamar management or human resources about these issues or that he asked for any assistance with them.

[142] The lack of an explanation for the significant misconduct of being the supervisor on the line that produced 1500 defective parts, is of course compounded by Mr. De Jesus’ dishonesty to management in his outright denial that these events happened.

Employer’s Circumstances

[143] The potential impact on Linamar of shipping defective parts to Ford has been set out above. It could have been financially catastrophic to Linamar if that had occurred. As set out in Fernandes at para 120, it does not matter that Linamar did not “actually suffer” any harm. “It is the severity of the potential harm that must be considered when assessing the seriousness of the misconduct,” (para. 20, Fernandes).

[144] I find that the risk of potential harm to Linamar of shipping a large number of defective parts to Ford was huge. The risk of losing their Q₁ status with Ford because of the shipping of a large number of defective parts could affect future contracts between Linamar and Ford. It could also cause a recall by Ford of cars with defective camshafts. The financial fallout of any such recall could rest on Linamar.

[145] I find that Mr. De Jesus’ failure to properly supervise the production of camshafts of September 27/28, 2013 amounted to a breach of a fundamental term of his employment contract with Linamar to ensure that camshafts produced by Linamar properly met the quality standards of Linamar and Ford.

Was Dismissal Warranted?

[146] In this step, I must consider the nature, extent and seriousness of the misconduct (step one); in the context of the surrounding circumstances (step two); to decide whether there was just cause for dismissal (see Para. 123 Fernandes).

[147] The plaintiff did not put forward an argument that being the supervisor responsible for the production of 1500 parts with roping on them ready to be shipped to Ford would not be grounds for dismissal. The plaintiff’s position is that it did not happen.

[148] As set out above I find the misconduct of Mr. De Jesus in being the supervisor on the production line that produced 1500 camshafts with roping on them was very serious misconduct. As the production supervisor Mr. De Jesus was responsible for the parts produced on his line and the quality of the parts was essential. It was the primary function of his job as production supervisor that he ensured the quality of the parts coming off his line. In addition, the further misconduct of Mr. De Jesus lying about the events and his role in this misconduct, is a significant act of dishonesty between an employee and employer. These two acts of misconduct strike at the heart of the employment relationship and give rise to its breakdown. Mr. De Jesus’ conduct was inconsistent with his fundamental obligations to his employer.

[149] Mr. De Jesus’ misconduct put into jeopardy Linamar’s continued relationship with Ford which would have a huge economic impact on Linamar. The production of 1500 defective parts on his line and lying about what happened, on their own, are sufficient grounds for dismissal, for any production supervisor. Mr. De Jesus’ poor employment record which included at least five prior disciplinary actions against him, adds to the compelling nature of Linamar’s decision to terminate his employment.

[150] Mr. De Jesus’ action for wrongful dismissal cannot succeed because Linamar had just cause to terminate his employment.

Reasonable Notice

[151] If I am wrong in my conclusion that Linamar had just cause to terminate Mr. De Jesus’ employment, I must go on to assess what damages Mr. De Jesus is entitled to; that is the appropriate notice period that Mr. De Jesus should have been given.

[152] Mr. De Jesus submitted that the appropriate notice period in his circumstances was one of 19 months.

[153] Linamar submitted that the appropriate notice period was one of 12 to 14 or 15 months.

[154] Both counsel referred to case law which they say supported their submission as to the appropriate notice period.

[155] The jurisprudence was helpful in setting out the factors a court should consider in determining what is the appropriate notice period. It is clear from the case law there is no “rule of thumb” that a court should apply in a case.

[156] At the time of Mr. De Jesus’ termination, he was employed as a production supervisor, he had 19.4 years of service, he was 50 years old, and earned in his last full year of employment, $86,788.78. Mr. De Jesus did not have a high school education, though he had taken some courses while working at Linamar.

[157] It is Mr. De Jesus’ limited education, and his almost 20 years of service with Linamar that are in my view the most compelling factors for me to consider in determining the appropriate notice period. I find in all of the circumstances of Mr. De Jesus, that an applicable notice period is one of 15 months.

[158] Linamar’s counsel prepared a Damage Chart which was attached with their written submissions. Linamar took no issue with Mr. De Jesus’ mitigation efforts. Mr. De Jesus’ counsel took no issue with the figures in the damage chart, either as to lost earnings or mitigation earnings.

[159] Assuming I have interpreted this chart correctly, and fixing the appropriate notice period at 15 months, the damages, after taking into account Mr. De Jesus’ mitigation earnings, would be $81,725.87.

Aggravated or Punitive Damages

[160] Mr. De Jesus also sought damages in the amount of $15,000 if I found Linamar acted dishonestly with respect to the grounds for termination, being the production of 1500 defective parts on the line Mr. De Jesus was supervising.

[161] Given my findings above with respect to this issue, this claim for damages must be dismissed.

[162] Further, there was no evidence of any conduct towards Mr. De Jesus, at the time of the dismissal, by Linamar, that would entitle him to any special damages.

Conclusion

[163] On all of the evidence, the plaintiff has not met his onus that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with the defendant.

[164] If I am wrong in that conclusion, the appropriate period of notice to be payable to the plaintiff is 15 months, and the damages payable would be $$81,725.87.

[165] The defendant shall have 30 days to serve and file brief written costs submission, along with a Bill of Costs.

[166] The plaintiff shall have 30 days thereafter to respond to the defendant’s request for costs.

“Justice N. Mossip”