Court File and Parties

BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: FC-15-199-00 DATE: 20160607 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

SIMCOE MUSKOKA CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES aka SIMCOE MUSKOKA FAMILY CONNEXIONS Applicant – and – C.G.; M.M.; BEAUSOLIEL FIRST NATION Respondents

Counsel: Jeffery Hustins, for the Applicant Society Meaghan P. Smith, for the Respondent Mother C.G. No-one appearing for the Respondent Father M.M. Shelley Monague, for Beausoliel First Nation

MOTION HEARD: June 2-3, 2016

Publication Restriction Notice

Pursuant to subsection 45(8) of the Child and Family Services Act, there is a ban on disclosing the name of any person involved in the proceedings as a party or a witness or any information likely to identify any such person. This judgment complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

Out of respect for the parties, the copy of the Ruling released to them uses their names.

Ruling on Summary Judgment Motion

EBERHARD J.

[1] Nobody wants J.M. to live life in foster care: not the mother who herself has been in foster care and is a former crown ward; not her mother whose child and many family members have endured foster care; not mother’s counsel who agreed to provide legal representation in April for a mother destined to face legal process to permanently extinguish her parental rights, and provided excellent material and advocacy in those circumstances to assist her; not the band representative who, tearfully regrets that the Beausoliel community of the Ojibway First Nation of the mother’s background, is unable to find in its midst a caregiver to help J.M. while also giving the mother time to ready herself for resuming his care; not the Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services (the “Society”) whose mandate it is to protect J.M., explore whether mother or her family or her band can assume his permanent care or find someone who can; not the Legislature who has made it law that an infant cannot be in care more than one year, and J.M. has been in care almost two years, before putting a permanent plan in place; and not me.

[2] The Applicant Society seeks Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, ordering Crown Wardship with no access for the purpose of adoption of the child J.M. born […], 2014, in care since August 8, 2014.

[3] The Respondent Father did not participate.

[4] Though the child has been in care these many months by a Temporary Care Agreement on August 8, 2014 and many extensions, there has never been a finding of need for protection. The evidence is, and I find:

(a) The subject child is J.M., born […], 2014. (b) The child is non-Catholic and is of First Nations heritage and is a member of the Beausoliel First Nation. (c) The child has been in the Society’s care since August 8, 2014, approximately 650 days which is significantly longer than the time permitted by the Act. (d) The child’s mother is C.G. (hereinafter the “mother”). (e) The mother is also of First Nations heritage and is a member of the Beausoliel First Nation. (f) The child’s father is M.M.

[5] I do not have evidence of the mother’s age but she is young, described as a “former” crown ward, and concerns about her parenting came to the attention of Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services through her own Child and Youth Service worker. It may not be surprising that there were concerns at the outset in relation to the parents’ ability to maintain housing, connecting with community supports, adult conflict, ability to care for a child and substance use. When J.M. was brought into care by agreement it was due to lack of appropriate housing, lack of follow up with the child’s physician, lack of finances to meet the needs of the child and substance use. By the September 2014 agreement, when the parents were separating, the observed concerns had expanded to include domestic violence and adult conflict, parenting skills, insecure housing. Details of conduct supporting these concerns are in the Society’s affidavit. In her responding affidavit, the mother acknowledges past domestic violence [1]; difficulty in maintaining a consistent place to live [2]; substance abuse issues [3]; inconsistent attendance for access due to health [4]; mental health issues [5]; immaturity [6]. While not expressing acknowledgement of anger management issues and parenting issues she has begun attending Cool Solutions which addresses such concerns. [7]

[6] Although the Society disputes some of the mother’s claimed response to these acknowledged concerns there is no triable issue that such concerns have substance. To the extent and at such time as they impacted on the mother’s parenting, J.M. was indeed a child in need of protection, certainly when he was taken into care and, by inference, for some acknowledged period thereafter. That there is dispute raised that mother has sufficiently overcome the concerns does not detract from the acknowledged fact that the concerns have existed.

[7] Though referring to a different assertion that new developments could also support a finding even if there were doubt about need for protection at the outset, Nelson J. stated the obvious [8]:

[12] One of the grounds on which the society relies in its amended application is the risk that the children are "likely to suffer emotional harm demonstrated by serious anxiety, depression, withdrawal ... resulting from the actions ... on the part of the parents." The word "risk" suggests to me that a court might consider past, recent and current actions having impact on the children. To restrict evidence to the time of apprehension would be to restrict the court's mandate. [emphasis added]

[8] On the criteria for Summary Judgment, which I will address hereafter, at least partial Summary Judgment that the child is in need of protection pursuant to s. 37(2)(a)(ii), (b)(i) and (ii), and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 [9] must issue as it is undisputed and indisputable that the parenting concerns presented by the parents together and then mother alone constituted a risk of physical and emotional harm.

[9] Having found that the child is in need of protection I turn to the paramount purpose of the CFSA, which under s. 1(1) is to “promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children.” guided by s. 37(3) of the Act: [10]

[10] For summary judgment to issue, the Society must satisfy me that Crown Wardship is in the best interests of the children taking into account the relevant factors set out.

[11] The parties do not disagree on the law of Summary Judgment and cite many of the same cases so efficiently summarized in a recent case put forward by the Respondent Mother [11] subject to a typographical correction in paragraph 43 and 44 which must be read in context and as it refers to the principle in the Court of Appeal case cited. [12]

[19] First, the burden was not on the parents to show that there was a triable issue. The burden was on the CAS, the moving party, to show that there was no triable issue. See F.B. v. S.G. (2001), 199 D.L.R. (4th) 554 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 24-28; Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. K.T., [2000] O.J. No. 4736 (Ct. J.) at para. 10; Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423 at para. 27. [emphasis added]

[12] McDermot J. summarized:

38 Summary judgment may be granted where "there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence": see rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules.

39 The evidentiary requirement for a party seeking a summary judgment remedy is set out in rule 16(4):

The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

40 The responding parties to a summary judgment motion have a duty to respond. Under rule 16(4.1), the party responding to a motion for summary judgment shall not make mere denials but must provide by affidavit specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.

41 Rule 16 has recently been amended to bring it closer in wording to Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As a judge hearing a motion for summary judgment I now have new fact-finding powers. These are set out in rule 16(6.1) of the Family Law Rules. I may now weigh evidence, make credibility findings on the evidence or draw inferences of fact from the materials filed. I may also direct that a mini-trial be held on a directed basis under rule 16(6.2).

42 The Supreme Court of Canada recently considered Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in Hryniak v. Maudlin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. According to that decision, in determining summary judgment, I must firstly consider the motion without regard to the new fact-finding powers under rule 16(6.1). If on the basis of the materials filed I find a genuine issue for trial I am then to determine whether a trial can be avoided using the new fact-finding tools provided to me through the amendments to the rule.

43 The case law makes it clear that the onus is on the moving party to provide clear and cogent evidence showing that there is no [sic – my correction] genuine issue for trial: see Children's Aid Society of Halton (Region) v. A.(K.L.), [2006] O.J. No. 3958 (C.A.) at para. 19 and Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. A.(M.), 2012 ONSC 548 at para. 35. This means that the affidavit evidence provided by the claimant for summary judgment must be such that I may find, taking into account evidence provided by the responding party that there is no genuine issue for trial. Another way to put it that, where the result would be a "foregone conclusion" summary judgment should go. Otherwise the court should order the matter to proceed to trial: see Children's Aid Society of the County of Lanark and Town of Smiths Falls v. S.M., [2010] W.D.F.L. 2361 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 21.

44 The burden is on the applicant to set out evidence of specific facts showing there to be no [sic-my correction] genuine issue requiring a trial. However once the applicant makes a prima facie case the evidentiary onus shifts to the responding party. The responding party must then provide evidence of specific facts showing there to be a genuine issue for trial: Children's Aid Society of Northumberland v. K.S., 2012 ONSC 6847, 32 R.F.L. (7th) 87 (Div. Ct.) at para. 28. The respondent must put his or her best foot forward and cannot rest on mere allegations or denials: see Rule 16(4.1) of the Family Law Rules and Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. K.F., 2014 ONSC 576 at para. 37.

45 Taking into account the severity of the result, a summary judgment motion should never be a remedy as of course and must be considered by the justice hearing the matter with a great deal of caution: see Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. M.(L.), 2011 ONCJ 146 (C.J.). However a summary judgment motion is a tool to control a child's drift in litigation and allow for the permanent home for the child within a timeframe that is sensitive to the child's need. Considering the timelines set out in the CFSA, the legal process should not be used to "buy" a parent time to develop the ability to parent. See Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (C.J.) at para. 15. This is especially so in the light of the timelines set out in s. 70 of the CFSA; those timelines are crucial and where it is unforeseeable that a party will be unable to parent the child within those timelines, summary judgment should go: see Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. A.(M.), 2012 ONSC 548, at paras. 35 and 55 and Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. C.(M.), [2003] O.J. No. 6307 (S.C.J.) at para. 18.

46 Of importance to this case, the material must show some improvement in the parents' position since the apprehension; without evidence of progress of some sort summary judgment should issue: Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. A.(M.), 2012 ONSC 548. In other words there must be some evidence that the responding party has "better prospects" or some "new technique or ability" as a parent: see Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. E.L.L., [2000] O.J. No. 5869 (C.J.).

[13] The real dispute in this motion for Summary Judgment is whether the applicant, Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services, has presented a prima facie case such that the evidentiary onus shifts to the responding party. The responding party, here the Respondent Mother, must then “put her best foot forward” by providing evidence of specific facts showing there to be a genuine issue for trial.

[14] I find the Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services has presented a prima facie case based on certain inescapable realities.

[15] In the passage of time between the birth of the child and April 2016 the mother showed almost no progress in addressing the concerns which I have found rendered J.M. a child in need of protection:

[16] Mom continued to move from one unstable residence to another, sometimes by reason of outbursts of her anger, sometimes landing back at the maternal grandmother’s house from whence she then left after altercation requiring police assistance in January 2015, and in December 2015 when she was removed by family after an altercation with the maternal grandmother involving a knife. As late as her May 17, 2016 affidavit mother was still waiting to hear back from a rental Application.

[17] As to parenting, anger and mental health issues, after identifying goals with family resource worker Janis Sylvester-Gorman “to work on parenting skills, routine, nurturing, feeding and learning the cues of the infant, on domestic violence education and have the mother participate in trauma recovery programs through Enaahtig Healing Lodge and Learning Centre. The mother attended the healing lodge in November 2014 for intake and never again. She declined further therapeutic access services at a January 27, 2015 planning circle.

[18] Although the mother is credited for the love she demonstrates to J.M. and her competence in engaging him with age appropriate language and play, her access has, during several periods, been infrequent and inconsistent. There were numerous conflicts with the Society concerning access arrangement for which I do not fault her since the complaint is so commonplace. But she also had escalating conflict with the foster mother when pickup and delivery brought them into contact and reacts poorly to recommendations about care and feeding during access. In the period from January to March 2016 there was a hiatus in access. Since March her attendance has been regular.

[19] Although domestic violence with the father has resolved because he is not on the scene, by her own admission he has not been her only violent partner and, more significant, she is herself volatile in temperament.

[20] The mother has a demonstrated history of disengagement with services and has not provided consents for the Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services to inquire about resources she states she has recently accessed. A recent re-engagement with Chigamik to work on housing progress has been positive in the two visits she has attended.

[21] There is no evidence, besides her assertion, of sobriety since January. The general improvement in her well-being and conduct would no doubt demonstrate itself over time if the assertion is true.

[22] And there we have the insurmountable reality that forms the basis of the Applicant Society’s prima facie case. The precious time when the mother needed to be demonstrating the improvement needed to care for J.M., with the concerns about her care under control, has elapsed and is gone. Since the disposition for J.M., whether now or by trial is already beyond the legislated timelines which I hasten to add are supported by strong child development theory, it was necessary for the mother to begin to demonstrate progress or at least a plan that could be implemented, towards caring for the child sufficient for the child to end his period in care. Thus far, it has been insufficient even to graduate beyond supervised access at the Society offices.

[23] There is ample case law on the effect of the passage of time sufficiently referenced by quoting from the cites in the Applicant’s factum:

The genuineness of the issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable motion discernible from the parent’s evidence that they face some better prospects than what existed at the time of the removal of the child, and has developed some new ability as a parent. [13]

If there is no genuine issue, the court must make a final order accordingly. The motions judge does not have discretion to do otherwise, even if he or she feels that the party should have his or her day in court. [14]

Summary judgment is a tool to control a child’s drift in litigation and allow for a permanent home for the child within a time-frame that is sensitive to the child’s needs. The legal process should not be used to “buy” a parent time to develop the ability to parent. [15]

In child protection proceedings, there is an overriding statutory imperative to ensure that the commencement of permanency planning for children is done in a timely fashion. [16]

[24] The evidence put forward by the Applicant Society demonstrated prima facie that the mother presented concerns that put the child at risk and in need of protection. Those concerns, unaltered, leave no genuine issue for trial unless, in response to the Applicant’s prima facie case, the Respondent mother puts forward evidence of specific facts which would raise a triable issue. The disputed fact must have some significance to the outcome:

[12] It is trite law that an “issue” is a point in question between the parties in a case. That point has three essential qualities:

i. relevance to the case in the sense that it bears on material facts that are critical to the decision or determination that the case demands; ii. genuineness, that is, reality and authenticity, not something spurious; and iii. sufficient importance to the outcome of the case to warrant a trial adjudication of the point in dispute. [17]

[25] In the present case, it means that to avoid Summary Judgment, there must be a fact in dispute that makes it a triable issue whether there is a viable plan for placing the child with the mother or her designate as she has suggested in her Answer and Plan of Care.

[26] Mom asserts she is sober since January 2016. Since alcohol and other substances have contributed to her past inability to parent, achieving sobriety is a significant factor in becoming ready to resume parenting. At the moment this fact is unproven but could be proven at a trial if true.

[27] Mom obtained a residence since her affidavit of May 17, 2016. This is good. But the concern is to demonstrate stable housing.

[28] Mom asserts she is enrolled at Georgian College for upgrading but declines consent to disclose records. She lists community supports she could access such as YMCA daycare, Early Years Center, Georgian Bay Native friendship Center. These are good but aspirational rather than demonstrated.

[29] All of these steps are to the good. If sustained and result in real change in mom’s functioning they bode well for mom being able to parent successfully in the future. Time will tell. For J.M., there is no time. A permanent plan must be implemented and, as of now, mom has not demonstrated sustained progress. She cannot have demonstrated sustained progress because she only just started to make these changes. The child could not be placed in mom’s care alone at this time.

[30] So, we look to the plan put forward that the supporting person would be the maternal grandmother. Some other family members put forward proposals to help at an earlier time but these have been withdrawn. So only the maternal grandmother remains as a potential placement support or to actually care for the child herself unless or until mom is ready and able to do so.

[31] Although there are several types of kin investigations that the Society implements to explore the viability of placement, in the present case all assessment was abandoned early as being completely impossible. Greater than the fact that the maternal grandmother lost the mother to Crown Wardship, that she has a teenage son with some difficulties residing with her and the fact of two separate altercations between herself and the mother when, since J.M.’s birth, mom has gone to live with the maternal grandmother between other residences, there is little evidence as to why the Applicant Society regards the maternal grandmother as unsuitable even to the extent of completing a kin assessment. They assert the conclusion rather than the reasons. There is evidence that the maternal grandmother has attended circles to discuss J.M.’s care and has attended access sometimes with the mother. She was in the court, silent.

[32] As sparse as the evidence supporting the unsuitability of the maternal grandmother may be, there is no evidence at all why she may be suitable. There is no information beyond the biological fact of her being the mother of the mother of J.M. That absence of detail leaves the fact of her suitability unchallenged. I am left with the inferences that arise from mom herself being a Crown Ward; that the maternal grandmother’s past parenting was inadequate to avoid her child being found in need of protection and the fact that she and the mother have altercations such that the support of the mother’s parenting may be unreliable.

[33] So, I must find there is no triable issue raised that mom can parent alone or that mom can parent with the help of the maternal grandmother, or that the maternal grandmother can parent J.M. alone. There is no evidence that they can. Summary Judgment is not to be denied to “buy” time for the plans to mature and thereby create a viable plan that cannot be demonstrated now.

[34] That completes the analysis as to whether there should be Crown Wardship without access for the purposes of adoption. There is no other plan.

[35] However, clouding that issue is the current adoptive plan that the Society is exploring. Very often when the disposition of Crown Wardship without access is sought there is no exploration for an adoptive family yet. Having an ideal family ready to adopt is not expected at this stage.

[36] Here, having determined there were no family members and no band members to put forward a plan, the Society has made a broader search. Relatives of the maternal grandfather were approached and one such relative is undergoing homestudy now. The mother objects to such an adoptive placement, should the family be approved, on two grounds: Firstly, there was no contact with her father’s side of the family when she was growing up; secondly, they are Oneida First Nation, not Ojibway.

[37] The Ojibway Band Representative was of great assistance to me in considering the significance of this difference. The legislation is not specific as to particular First Nations and, obviously, there is quite a variation between them. I am touched by the band Representative’s description of cultural education at the knees of the grandmothers.

[38] I find that the mother’s objections, while genuine and significant, cannot raise a triable issue here. Of course, in the legislated obligation to seek out family placements one reason would be the hope to place a child with known individuals to enhance the continuity in the child’s circumstances, but it is not a requirement. Blood ties may be valuable in enhancing commitment.

[39] Ties with the cultural heritage of a particular First Nations are important and care must be taken not to lump First Nations together as an indistinguishable mass. There are differences between one and another. But, here the band representative has already laid groundwork for a connection plan with the Oneida First Nation about J.M.’s well-being should he be placed there. Moreover, J.M. is not quite two years old. Developmentally he cannot yet have the capacity to remember in the future what he is introduced to now. In a different First Nation he will learn at the knee of grandmothers of that community. Although this may not meet the cultural objections of the mother, it is least a respectful attempt under the non-specific legislative imperatives to place J.M. in the cultural heritage through his grandfather’s side.

[40] Be that as it may, at this stage there is no certainty and no expectation of certainty where J.M. will be placed if made a Crown Wardship without access. There is only the certainty that the Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services has the obligation to seek a permanent plan according to the standards required by law. That system is contemplated by legislation as a viable permanent plan.

[41] For these reasons, there are no grounds to restrict Summary Judgment only to the issue whether J.M. is a child in need of protection as I have already found. There is no triable issue as to disposition. There is only one viable plan, as put forward in the prima face case of the Applicant Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services. There is no triable issue that another viable plan exists.

[42] A further comment: In this, as in so many cases of an incapable but loving parent, the determinative factor is the passage of time. I have so often seen parents fail to make changes in a timely way and by the time they get around to it the legislated time is up before they can show necessary progress. A slow start can be observed for several reasons: shock, disbelief and denial; anger; bewilderment; relationship uncertainty and resulting delay until separation or reconciliation is clear; communication glitches and trust issues with the CAS; inability to surface from the effect of substances; and so many more. Early appearances are wasted while parents are lost in this state. Then they don’t really know how to go about satisfying the CAS conditions. Adjournment is granted to apply for legal aid but time after time they return with no lawyer.

[43] When counsel is in place early there is a huge difference. Counsel can insist on clarity and written commitment as to what expectations the parent must meet to make progress in access and in resuming care. Counsel can help the parent find the resources the CAS is demanding they pursue but are so often scarce, distant or expensive. Counsel can negotiate without fear of being labelled as unco-opertive, non-compliant or aggressive. Frankly, counsel can provide the life advice and advocacy that the workers may not be successfully conveying and supporters are not equipped to convey.

[44] Here, counsel came on for the mother having first seen her a month before looming Summary Judgment. In that time housing, and excellent materials referencing all the different things the mother could do if given time to try, were achieved. The mother sat quietly before me with no hint of the anger attributed to her because counsel spoke on her behalf. Mother had a legal aid certificate and says she tried three different lawyers unsuccessfully. I don’t know when.

[45] However, I do know that it might have made a big difference if mom had a lawyer in the fall of 2014. Then she would have had the time to follow advice from counsel and make the changes she had to make.

[46] The problem is multi-facetted. So few lawyers do this work. When they don’t see files until after it is too late to help, lawyers can hardly be blamed for not enjoying work that is so often futile, and always sad. Systemically, the administration of justice has simply not developed a way to get these parents the counsel they need when they need it. We should be doing better.

[47] From the prospective of truth and reconciliation, the present case provided a stark example of a First Nations band which would like to help end the cycle of foster care for this second generation mother raised in foster care but cannot find in its midst the resources to shelter a baby of their own. There are no aunties to step forward or perhaps insufficient help if they do. There is much societal discussion in government and in the media that as a society we must do better. It all sounds good in a general discussion but this is what it comes down to: one baby, one band, no plan. We should be doing better.

[48] Summary Judgment to issue for Crown Wardship without access.

EBERHARD J. Released: June 7, 2016

Footnotes

[1] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 18-19 [2] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 23 [3] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 24-25 [4] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 26 [5] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 4 [6] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 29 [7] Affidavit date May 19, 2016, para 21 and 22 [8] Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. C.(M.), [2003] O.J. No. 1271 [9] Child in need of protection (2) A child is in need of protection where, (a) the child has suffered physical harm, inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s, (ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child; (b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s, (i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or (ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child; (g) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child; [10] Best interests of child (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall take into consideration those of the following circumstances of the case that he or she considers relevant:

1. The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs.
2. The child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.
3. The child’s cultural background.
4. The religious faith, if any, in which the child is being raised.
5. The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family.
6. The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community.
7. The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity.
8. The merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent.
9. The child’s views and wishes, if they can be reasonably ascertained.
10. The effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case.
11. The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.
12. The degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.
13. Any other relevant circumstance. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 37 (3); 2006, c. 5, s. 6 (3).

Where child an Indian or native person

(4) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child and the child is an Indian or native person, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of Indian and native culture, heritage and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 37 (4). [11] Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. K.V., [2015] O.J. No. 4900 [12] Children’s Aid Society of Halton (Region) v. A.(K.L.), [2006] O.J. No. 5958 (C.A.), at para 19 [13] The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H. and M.N. [2000] Court File No. 1974/98, para 18 [14] The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H. and M.N. supra, para 14 [15] The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H. and M.N., supra, para 15 [16] Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. C.(M.), 2003 CarswellOnt 9373 (SCJ), para 18 [17] Toronto Children’s Aid Society v. F.(M.), 2002 ONSC 5881, para 12