Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: 9-80/16 DATE: 20160503

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - SEAN ARRINDELL OVID

Counsel: David Morlog, for the Crown James Miglin, for the accused

HEARD: March 30, 2016

K.L. Campbell J.:

Reasons for Sentence

A. Overview

[1] On February 18, 2016, at the conclusion of a two-week jury trial, the accused, Sean Arrindell Ovid, was found guilty of the offence of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. The offence was committed by the accused in Toronto on March 11, 2013. On that date, the police discovered the accused in the possession of a total of approximately 305 grams of cocaine (including both powder and crack cocaine).

[2] At the trial of this matter, there was never any issue that, if the accused was in possession of the cocaine, he possessed it for the purposes of trafficking. However, the accused contended that he did not knowingly possess the cocaine the police found in his bedroom. More specifically, the defence argued that the cocaine had, unbeknownst to the accused, been surreptitiously deposited in his bedroom earlier in the day by a friend, and then spread around his bedroom in various location by the police when they later came to execute the warrant. By their verdict, the members of the jury clearly rejected this position, and rejected the testimony adduced in support of it, and were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed the cocaine in his room – and possessed it for the purpose of trafficking. The accused now appears for sentencing.

[3] The Crown argued that, given the gravity of the offence, based upon the quantity of the cocaine and its street value, and the personal circumstances of the accused, including his prior criminal record and prior conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the accused should be given a penitentiary sentence of approximately 5½ years duration. The Crown conceded, however, that such a global sentence should be reduced by the appropriate credit to the accused for his pre-sentence custody and the restrictive terms of his bail conditions.

[4] On the other hand, defence counsel contended that given the quantity of the cocaine found in the possession of the accused, and the mitigating personal circumstances of the accused, the appropriate range of sentence in this case spans from a low penitentiary sentence up to a maximum of approximately 4 years imprisonment. Defence counsel also argued, however, that once the accused is appropriately credited for his pre-sentence custody and the restrictive terms of his various bail orders, the accused should actually receive a sentence in the range between maximum reformatory term of imprisonment and a 3 year term of penitentiary incarceration.

[5] The parties agree that certain ancillary sentencing orders should also be made.

B. The Facts of the Offence

[6] On March 11, 2013 members of the Toronto Police Service executed a telewarrant at 2014 Martin Grove Road, unit 56, where Mr. Ovid lived with his mother. This was a four-floor, split-level townhouse, with a basement. Mr. Ovid lived in the upstairs bedroom on the fourth-floor. This unit was part of a larger townhouse complex in the vicinity of Martin Grove and Albion Roads in Toronto. It was inside Mr. Ovid’s locked bedroom of this unit that the police discovered the various quantities of powder and crack cocaine (as well as approximately 92 grams of marihuana) and some drug-trafficking paraphernalia. More particularly, during their search of the bedroom of the accused, the police discovered all of the following:

• In the mini-fridge the police found four large plastic zip-lock bags of marihuana, which contained a quarter-pound of marihuana. Other smaller bags of marihuana, and some loose marihuana, were also discovered in the bedroom. As I have indicated, the accused has yet to be sentenced for the commission of this offence.
• On the floor of the bedroom the police discovered a quantity of crack cocaine on top of a piece of brown paper. Other pieces of crack cocaine were found on the surrounding carpet. The police also found, under the bed, 24 small plastic bags of pre-packaged cocaine. These quantities of cocaine totaled approximately 58.5 grams.
• On the floor in the bedroom, the police discovered a large plastic bag of powdered cocaine, which contained just over 247 grams of cocaine.
• In the accused’s bedroom the police also found digital scales and large “triple beam” weigh scale, a quantity of plastic baggies (some small bags identical to the bags containing the pre-packaged cocaine found under the bed), a grinder, a spoon, and $350 in Canadian currency.

[7] As I have already indicated, at trial, the accused admitted that these quantities of cocaine were inconsistent with personal use, and that it was possessed for the purpose of trafficking.

[8] As to the “street value” of the drugs in this case, at trial Staff Sgt. Kay testified that if the powder cocaine was sold at the gram level, it could be purchased in Toronto for approximately $80 to $100 per gram. That would mean that the approximately 250 grams of powder cocaine in this case would be worth somewhere between $19,000 and $27,000. However, if it was sold in the commonly sold “eight ball” quantities (of approximately 3.5 grams), at approximately $200 to $250 per “eight ball,” the powder cocaine would have a total street value of between $14,000 and $17,000. Further, if it was sold at the ounce level, where it would be valued at approximately $1,000 to $1,300 per ounce, the powder cocaine would be worth a total of between approximately $9,000 and $11,000. Accordingly, in summary, the officer testified that the street value of the powder cocaine in this case was worth between approximately $9,000 and $27,000, depending upon how it was packaged and sold.

[9] With respect to the “street value” of the crack cocaine in this case, Staff Sgt. Kay testified that if it was sold in “stones” valued at approximately $20 per stone, it would have a total value of approximately $12,000. If it was sold at the gram level, at approximately $80 to $100 per gram, it would be worth somewhere between $5,000 and $6,500. Accordingly, the total value of the crack cocaine, depending upon how it was sold, ranged between $5,000 and $12,000.

[10] In summary, the accused was found in possession of approximately 305 grams of cocaine (powder and crack) with a street value of between approximately $14,000 and $39,000. The accused possessed this cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. This was, accordingly, a very serious offence.

C. The Personal Circumstances of the Offender

[11] Mr. Ovid was born in Trinidad on December 19, 1969. Accordingly, he is now 46 years of age. He came to Canada when he was five years old, and is now a Canadian citizen. He graduated from Martin Grove Collegiate high school, and then attended the Devry Institute of Technology where he studied electronic technological engineering. He now does renovation work and construction. He is able to perform a variety of trades work, including dry-walling, tiling, plumbing, and electrical. He is a member of a labour union. He now does some work for a moving company.

[12] Mr. Ovid admitted that he has a criminal record, commencing in March of 1989, and this record includes a finding of guilt and conditional discharge for theft under $1,000 (1989), and convictions for public mischief (1989), obstructing a peace officer (1989), impaired driving (2003), failing to comply with a recognizance (2007), trafficking in marihuana and possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking (2007) and, most recently, possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking (2015). As to sentencing dispositions, the accused has been given probationary dispositions connected to the conditional discharge and a suspended sentence. The accused has also received a fine, and a short term of imprisonment. His longest previous sentence was for his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking in 2007, for which he received a suspended sentence and probation, after having served some 162 days of pre-sentence custody. The accused has not yet been sentenced in relation to his most recent 2015 conviction for possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. That conviction was for the accused’s admitted possession of the 92 grams of marihuana found in the mini-fridge in his bedroom on March 11, 2013. The accused was convicted of that offence in a separate trial.

[13] In the three “character reference” letters that have been provided by family members, the accused is described as “very responsible and reliable” in that he lives with, and cares for, his medically infirm mother, who has suffered two strokes, suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure, and needs the assistance of a walker. He is also described as leading a “very positive lifestyle” with his mother and other family and friends, and volunteers at the GYM youth center in his neighbourhood. One of these letters indicates that the accused has expressed his “remorse” and has promised to “amend his ways” if he is “given a chance.” In the additional letter from the moving company “Vanman,” the accused is described as one of the firm’s “standby-on call helpers” who is a good employee in that he is always on time, performs his duties responsibly, follows the instructions and applicable rules, and is always “neat, professional and courteous.” The company representative indicated that, accordingly, they “will always be willing to have him on any move that requires the extra lifting help.”

[14] Mr. Ovid is the father of two teenage daughters, who are now 15 and 16 years old. Mr. Ovid is separated from their mother, and his daughters live with their mother. In the past, Mr. Ovid has provided some financial support for his daughters, but there is now some pending litigation between Mr. Ovid and his former spouse surrounding custody and support.

D. The Governing Sentencing Principles

[15] According to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the “fundamental purpose” of sentencing is to contribute to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society” by imposing “just sanctions” that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community.

[16] Further, according to s. 718.1 of the Code, the “fundamental principle” of sentencing is that a sentence “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”

[17] Section 718.2 of the Code also dictates that, in imposing sentence, the court must also take into account a number of principles, including the following:

• A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;
• A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
• Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
• An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and,
• All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

[18] Without restricting the generality of these Criminal Code provisions, s. 10(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act states that the “fundamental purpose” of any sentence for an offence under Part I of the act is to “contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society” while “encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment” of offenders and “acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community.”

[19] As to the legislatively provided range of potential sentences, according to the terms of s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the accused is liable, by virtue of his earlier convictions in 2007 for “designated substance offences,” to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment, and to a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. However, recently the Supreme Court of Canada held that this mandatory minimum sentence is unconstitutional in that it violates s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and is not saved as a “reasonable limit” on the right to be free from the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishment” under s. 1 of the Charter. See R. v. Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13. Accordingly, there is now no applicable mandatory minimum term of imprisonment in the circumstances of this case.

E. Analysis

1. The Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

[20] The aggravating circumstances of this offence are clear. First, there is the sheer gravity of the offence. The accused was in possession of a very large quantity of cocaine (both powder and crack) for purposes of trafficking. This quantity of cocaine had a very significant street value, somewhere between $14,000 and $39,000, depending upon how it was packaged and sold. The accused was in possession of this large quantity of cocaine for precisely that reason – to profit economically on its sale. Indeed, as the state of the accused’s bedroom suggested, and as the jury concluded by its verdict, when the police executed their search warrant, the accused was in the process of packaging his cocaine for market. He had a large bag of cocaine that he was weighing and measuring into smaller bags of cocaine for sale. He also had a significant quantity of crack cocaine. Moreover, the total quantity of this drug supports the view that the accused is a “mid-level” supplier of cocaine, and is not simply a “street-level” seller or supplier. See R. v. Haye, [2013] O.J. No. 6493 (S.C.J.), at paras. 11-12, affirmed, [2014] O.J. No. 6575 (C.A.).

[21] The sentence to be imposed in this case must proportionally reflect the gravity of this offence, denounce its commission, and deter others from engaging in similarly serious drug trafficking activity. I note in passing that the accused was also in possession of a significant quantity of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, although he has yet to be sentenced for that additional offence. The fact remains, however, that the accused had a somewhat diversified drug trafficking operation.

[22] Second, the accused has a significant criminal record. His past criminal conduct is not only significant in the number of prior convictions, but also in the nature of those convictions. The accused has prior convictions, in 2007, for trafficking in marihuana and possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. While he received a suspended sentence and probation for these crimes, that sentence was imposed after the accused served some 162 days of pre-sentence custody. Given that the generally accepted formula for credit for such custody was, at that time, applied at a ratio of 2:1, this was effectively a custodial sentence approaching 11 months in duration. While this was the longest sentence ever received by the accused, it was ineffective in convincing him to stop his drug-dealing activities. Accordingly, the sentence in this case must provide a more meaningful and effective level of specific deterrence. The accused must be made to clearly understand that if he continues to traffick in dangerous drugs like cocaine, he will receive increasingly more significant terms of imprisonment in the result.

[23] In this regard, I note that, according to s. 10(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, if a person is convicted of a “designated substance offence,” for which the court is not required to impose a minimum punishment, the court imposing sentence “shall consider any relevant aggravating factors” including that the person was “previously convicted of a designated substance offence.” In short, the fact that the accused has been previously convicted of a designated substance offence, is a statutory aggravating circumstance in this case.

[24] At the same time, the case is not without its off-setting mitigating circumstances. The accused is an educated individual with a high school and college education. He also appears to have maintained a relatively consistent history of employment. He also provides personal care for his mother and, in the past, has provided financial assistance to his daughters. He continues to enjoy the support of his family members. In addition, it is important to keep in mind, with respect to the details of his criminal record, that many of the earlier entries are now somewhat dated, and that his longest previous sentence was in 2007 for trafficking in cocaine, and amounted to 162 days of pre-sentence custody, a suspended sentence and a term of probation.

[25] As defence counsel conceded, however, the accused does not have the benefit of the mitigating factor of remorse. The accused did not plead guilty to the offence, but rather had a jury trial, at which he aggressively challenged the Crown’s evidence – as he was fully entitled to do. I do not mean to imply that his plea, or the conduct of his defence, is in any way aggravating circumstances in this case. I make this observation only to illustrate that the accused did not in any way accept responsibility for the offence, or reveal any suggestion of genuine remorse for the offence the jury concluded that he committed. While one of the character letters filed on behalf of the accused briefly indicated that the accused had “expressed … his remorse” to the author of the letter (his aunt), the accused expressed no such remorse in court. Indeed, when given the opportunity to personally speak to the issue of sentence, the accused steadfastly maintained his innocence and offered no hint of remorse. Again, to be clear, I do not mean to suggest that this absence of any apparent remorse could be, or should be, viewed as an aggravating circumstance in this case. The law is very much to the contrary. I simply observe that remorse does not provide the accused with any mitigation in the circumstances of this case. See R. v. Kozy (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 500 (Ont.C.A.), at pp. 505-506; R. v. Anderson (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (B.C.C.A.), at pp. 535-536; R. v. Brown, [1993] O.J. No. 624 (C.A.); R. v. Valentini (1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 262 (Ont.C.A.), at para. 80-85; R. v. L.(C.), 2013 ONSC 277, [2013] O.J. No. 114, at paras. 80-81.

2. The Governing Judicial Authorities – The Global Sentence Imposed

[26] As the Court of Appeal for Ontario observed in R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927, at para. 8, cocaine is an “extremely dangerous and insidious drug with potential to cause a great deal of harm to individuals and to society.” See also R. v. Daya, 2007 ONCA 693, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 367, at para. 18; R. v. Harris, [2008] O.J. No. 1976 (S.C.J.), at paras. 21-22. The law is clear that lengthy jail terms are regularly imposed upon offenders that possess substantial amounts of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

[27] For example, in R. v. Bajada (2003), 169 O.A.C. 226, 173 C.C.C. (3d) 255 (C.A.), Weiler J.A., delivering the judgment of the court, observed, at paras. 12-14, that “sentences of five to five and one half years are not uncommon for possession of a substantial amount of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking” even where the accused has entered “a plea of guilty or where the accused has no prior record.” Further, in R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, [2011] O.J. No. 1581, the court noted, at paras. 1-2, that “normally” sentences ranging from five to eight years imprisonment “would reflect the proper range” of sentence “for someone, without a record, convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking in slightly more than a pound [or 453.59 grams] of cocaine.” See also R. v. Muise, [2007] O.J. No. 5553 (C.J.), at para. 47, affirmed, 2008 ONCA 665, [2008] O.J. No. 3791; R. v. Peltier, 2013 ONCA 141, 303 O.A.C. 87, at para. 15; R. v. Italiano, 2015 ONSC 2216, [2013] O.J. No. 6459, at paras. 25-31; R. v. Feeney, 2015 ONSC 3218, [2015] O.J. No. 2584, at paras. 32-40, 44-45, 55-68; R. v. Ceballos, 2015 ONSC 720, [2015] O.J. No. 536, at paras. 2, 5-12, 21-23.

[28] In all of the circumstances of this case, in my view the effective global sentence that should be imposed upon the accused is 4½ years imprisonment. This takes into account that the total quantity of cocaine unlawfully possessed by Mr. Ovid for the purpose of trafficking is significantly less than the drug quantities under discussion in the Court of Appeal decisions in Bajada, Bryan, and Pelletier, while recognizing that Mr. Ovid was clearly involved in the commercial supply of powder and crack cocaine (as well as marihuana) to others in substantial quantities. Moreover, such a sentence is proportional to the overall gravity of the offence and appropriately denounces the specific crime committed by the accused. This sentence also reflects the various aggravating and mitigating circumstances of this case, and provides an effective measure of both general and specific deterrence. The sentence also appropriately factors the rehabilitative interests of the accused.

3. Credit for Pre-Trial Custody and Restrictive Bail Conditions

[29] The precise calculation of the pre-sentence custody served by Mr. Ovid, and the credit that he should be accorded for such custody and for the restrictions upon his liberty while on judicial interim release, in connection with the charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, is not a simple matter. There is no question, however, that the accused should be accorded the enhanced credit of 1.5 days for every day spent in custody, and a fair and appropriate credit for the “house arrest” conditions and other restrictions on his liberty while on bail. See R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at paras. 7, 32-35, 68-83; R. v. Downes (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 321, [2006] O.J. No. 555, at para: 37.

[30] The “prejudice” suffered by the accused in connection with his pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions was addressed with some specificity in the ruling already provided in relation to the pre-trial application by the accused to stay the proceedings for an alleged violation of s. 11(b) of the Charter. See R. v. Ovid, 2016 ONSC 1772, [2016] O.J. No. 1279, at paras. 39-40. In that ruling, I drew, essentially, the following conclusions regarding these various issues:

• The accused was arrested on the present charge on March 11, 2013. Thereafter, he remained in custody for a period of 11 days until he was released on bail. The accused must, of course, receive enhanced credit for this period of detention.
• The accused was released on March 21, 2013, after entering into a recognizance in the amount of $10,000 with one named surety, his mother, and upon a number of conditions, including: (1) reside with his mother at her address; and (2) remain under “house arrest” in this residence except when in the presence of his mother, or when going to and from work (the accused also had to possess a letter from his employer outlining his times and hours of work). The accused remained at large on this bail order for a period of nearly seven months between March 21 and October 15, 2013.
• On October 15, 2013, the accused was arrested on other charges, namely, two counts of failing to comply with his recognizance and one count of the unlawful possession of marihuana. The accused remained in custody on these new charges until November 5, 2013. This period of imprisonment of close to three weeks cannot properly be attributed to the charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. Mr. Ovid was detained in custody only in relation to his new charges. His judicial interim release order in relation to his old charges remained in effect.
• On November 5, 2013, the initial bail order was cancelled pursuant to an order made under s. 524 of the Criminal Code in light of the new charges. Further, it appears that a new judicial interim release order was made with respect to all of the pending charges against the accused, both the old and the new charges. This order was similar to the original order made on March 21, 2013, in that it required the accused to enter into a recognizance in the amount of $10,000 (but without any named surety), and upon a number of conditions, including: (1) reside with his mother at her address, or some other approved location; and (2) remain in his residence except when in the presence of his surety or his mother, or when travelling directly to and from work (provided he contacted a named police officer in advance). However, the accused did not, in fact, enter into a recognizance on these terms, but rather remained in custody on all charges for the four month period between November 5, 2013 and March 5, 2014. While this four month period of detention could not properly be attributed solely to the old charges for the purpose of assessing the “prejudice” to the accused under s. 11(b) of the Charter, this period of detention is properly attributed, at least in part, to the charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking for sentencing purposes. See R. v. Tsai (2005), 199 O.A.C. 244, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 533 (C.A.), at paras. 19-22; R. v. Wilson, 2008 ONCA 510, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 285, at paras. 25, 43-50.
• On March 5, 2014, the accused was released on all charges (old and new) after entering into a recognizance in the amount of $2,000, with one named surety, his mother, and upon a number of conditions, including: (1) reside with his mother at her address or an address approved by his surety; and (2) remain in this residence except when in the presence of his mother/surety, or when travelling directly to and from work (provided he contacts a named police officer in advance). While the new charges were stayed by the Crown on March 10, 2015, the accused remained at large on this recognizance for nearly 13 months, until March 30, 2015.
• On March 30, 2015, the accused entered into a new recognizance in the amount of $2,000, with one named surety, his mother, and upon a number of conditions, including: (1) reside with his mother at her address or an address approved by his surety; (2) obey a “curfew” in his residence between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 4:30 a.m. unless in the direct presence of his surety. Mr. Ovid has remained at large on this bail order for just over 13 months, until today.

[31] In summary, the accused has spent close to five months in custody at least in part as a result of the charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, has been on some form of “house arrest” in relation to this charge for approximately 20½ months, and has been on bail subject to a “curfew” for another period of approximately 13 months.

[32] I am prepared to give Mr. Ovid an enhanced credit of seven months for his period of pre-sentence detention. That credit generously assumes that almost all of Mr. Ovid’s pre-sentence custody is directly attributed to the current offence. I am also prepared to give Mr. Ovid an additional five months credit for the restrictions placed upon his liberty when he has been at large on bail. However, it is important to appreciate that, during his time on bail, the accused was, at all times, permitted to come and go from his employment, and to be outside of his residence while in the presence of his surety. Accordingly, the “house arrest” terms of his judicial interim release orders were not as onerous as the conditions imposed in other cases where greater credits have been allowed. In conclusion, in my view, the sentence otherwise imposed upon the accused should be reduced by a total of one year to properly and fairly credit Mr. Ovid for his periods of pre-trial detention, and for the restrictions that have been placed upon his liberty prior to the imposition of sentence in this case. This total is very close to the total credit that was proposed by defence counsel for Mr. Ovid.

[33] In conclusion, after the one year credit is applied to the global sentence of 4½ years imprisonment that would otherwise have been appropriate, the ultimate sentence that is now imposed upon the accused is a penitentiary term of 3½ years imprisonment.

F. Ancillary Sentencing Orders

[34] In addition, I make all of the following ancillary sentencing orders.

[35] First, pursuant to s. 16(1)(b)(ii) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, I order that all of the drugs seized and detained in this case, as well as the drug paraphernalia (i.e. scales, grinder, baggies, etc.), be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and thereafter disposed of in accordance with the law.

[36] Second, pursuant to s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code, I order that the proceeds of crime, namely, the $350 in Canadian funds, which I find as a fact to be drug money, be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada to be disposed of as directed by the Attorney General or otherwise dealt with according to the law.

[37] Third, pursuant to ss. 109(1)(c) and 109(3) of the Criminal Code, I order that the accused be prohibited from the possession of any firearm, cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for life.

[38] Fourth, given that the accused has been found guilty of a “secondary designated offence,” namely, possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, pursuant to s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code, I will make an order in Form 5.04 authorizing the taking of samples of bodily substances from the accused for forensic DNA analysis. I am satisfied that such an order is in the best interests of the administration of justice. In reaching this conclusion I have considered the accused’s lengthy criminal record, the serious nature of the drug offence committed by the accused, all of the various circumstances surrounding its commission, and the relatively minimal impact that such an order would have on the accused’s privacy and the security of his person.

G. Conclusion

[39] In summary, the accused is now sentenced to 3½ year penitentiary term of imprisonment, and is subject to all of the other ancillary sentencing orders.

Kenneth L. Campbell J. Released: May 3, 2016