CITATION: John v. Peel Police, 2016 ONSC 2012

COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-3761-00

DATE: 2016 03 24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

DARREN JOHN

Self-Represented

Plaintiff

– and –

CITY OF TORONTO, GLEN NICKELS, GEORGE RADJUNOVIC

– and –

COLLISION WORLD, KALJIT DAALIWAL

– and –

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES BOARD, DETECTIVE FINNIE DABGE #3111

– and –

THE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR, GERRY MCNEILLY

– and –

Fred Fischer for the defendants, City of Toronto, Glen Nickels and George Radjunovic

Rafal Szymanski, for the defendants, Peel Regional Police Services Board and Detective Finnie Badge #3111

Heather McKay for the defendants, the Office of the Independent Review Director and Gerry McNeilly

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD, DETECTIVE MEIRIK BADGE #588, SERGEANT GROVER BADGE #6311, DETECTIVE ELLIOTT BADGE #4554, CHIEF BILL BLAIR AND 4 UNKNOWN OFFICERS

Fred Fischer for the defendants, Toronto Police Services Board, Detective Meirik Badge #588, Sergeant Grover Badge #6311, Detective Elliott Badge #4554, Chief Bill Blair and 4 Unknown Officers

Defendants

HEARD: June 17, 18, 2015, and February 16, 2016

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice Thomas A. Bielby

INTRODUCTION

1The defendants herein have before the court, motions, seeking an order striking the Statement of Claim herein for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action and/or for being frivolous and vexatious. There is also a motion for summary judgment. The defendants submit that it is plain and obvious the claims cannot succeed. It is also submitted there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

2The defendants rely on Rules 20.01, 21.01(1)(a), 21.01(1)(b), and 25.11.

3The motions in relation to this action are just a few of many. Mr. John has issued a number of Statements of Claim and the defendants to those claims are also seeking to have the claims struck. These motions were heard by me individually, one after the other.

4Mr. John, at the commencement of the motions, sought an adjournment to seek counsel. He submitted that his lawyer was recently disbarred and had not released his file.

5Counsel for the moving parties objected to an adjournment. These motions, for the most part, were served and filed in October, 2014 and the week of June 15, 2015, was set for the hearing of the motions. Counsel for the defendants submits that in an email sent in November, 2014 Mr. John advised counsel for the defendants that he was going to change lawyers. It was submitted that delay is part of the strategy of Mr. John. No materials had been filed on behalf of Mr. John.

6After hearing the argument for an adjournment I advised Mr. John that if I were to adjourn the motions I would consider making an order for costs against him.

7Mr. John advised that if the adjournment would result in a cost order against him he wished to proceed with the motions. As a result, I proceeded with the motions.

8The submissions on the motions, in this particular action, commenced on June 19, 2015, and were completed on February 16, 2016.

9On February 16, 2016, Mr. John asked the court to adjourn the matter at 12:00 noon because he had an appointment to meet with his lawyer, on an unrelated criminal matter, which was set for trial for February 29, 2016. He explained that he was required to take public transit to get to his lawyer’s office and the trip would take a couple of hours. He was intent on keeping the appointment.

10When I adjourned these matters to the February date, all parties, including Mr. John, agreed to the new date and the entire day was set aside.

11I advised Mr. John that his reason for seeking the adjournment was insufficient and that the matter would continue that day until completed.

12Just before noon, Mr. John started packing up his material. I advised him if he chose to leave submissions would continue. Mr. John understood that but nevertheless left the court room.

13The argument of counsel for the defendants continued until completion, in the absence of Mr. John.

THE RULES

14Rule 21.01(1)(a) and (b) of the Civil Rules of Practice state,

“A party may move before a judge,

(a) for the determination before trial, of a question of law raised by a pleading in an action where the determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the action, substantially shorten the trial or result in a substantial saving of costs; or

(b) to strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence,

and the judge may make an order or grant judgment accordingly.”

15Subsection (2) states that no evidence is admissible on such a motion.

16Rule 25.11 states,

“The court may strike out or expunge all or part of a pleading or other document, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that the pleading or other document,

(a) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action;

(b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

(c) is an abuse of the process of the court.”

MOTION OF PEEL POLICE SERVICES BOARD AND DETECTIVE FINNIE BADGE #3111

17The plaintiff seeks damages of $14,000,000 and in regard to the Peel Police Services Board (Peel Police) and Detective Finnie, claims they failed to perform an adequate investigation that would have resulted in the recovery of a car that was held by Collision World and/or Kaljit Daaliwal, for the non-payment of fees.

18The plaintiff also alleges a conspiracy between unnamed members of the Peel Police and the Toronto Police and between the Peel Police and the Office of the Independent Review Director (OIPRD).

19Counsel for the Peel Police submits that his clients owed no private duty of care to the plaintiff and for that reason the action must fail. Further, it is argued there is no evidence of any conspiracy. Counsel submits that this claim is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.

20It appears that at some point in time the plaintiff’s motor vehicle was taken to the premises of Collision World where it was stored. When the plaintiff attended at Collision World to collect his vehicle, Collision World refused to release the car until the storage fees were paid.

21As a result the plaintiff, on or about April 14, 2013, reported to the Peel Police that his vehicle was stolen. The report was passed on to Detective Finnie.

22On or about September 8, 2013, because Collision World was located in Toronto, the plaintiff was directed to report the matter to the Toronto Police.

23Toronto Police investigated the matter and located the vehicle. The Toronto Police called Detective Finnie and advised him that the vehicle had been located. Acting on the information provided to him, Detective Finnie removed the stolen car report from the system.

24The plaintiff pleaded that the Peel Police and Officer Finnie made no attempts to recover the vehicle and were negligent in their investigation of his report of a stolen vehicle.

25The plaintiff alleges that the Peel Police, along with the Toronto Police are guilty of a conspiracy and acted in bad faith.

26It is also pleaded that the Peel Police and the OIPRD were guilty of conspiracy in that the Peel Police decided not to investigate the matter and when the plaintiff filed a complaint with the OIPRD, a decision was made not to investigate the actions of the Peel Police.

27I find that the claim by the plaintiff against the Peel Police and Officer Finnie for negligent investigation does not disclose a cause of action.

28The Peel Police owed no private duty of care to the plaintiff and have discretion in regards to what complaints are to be investigated.

29R. J. Sharpe J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Wellington v. Ontario, 2011 ONCA 274, stated, at paragraph 20,

“While the police owe a duty of care to a particular suspect under investigation and to warn a narrow and distinct group of potential victims of a specific threat (see Jane Doe), there is now a long list of decisions rejecting the proposition that the police owe victims of crime and their families a private law duty of care in relation to the investigation of alleged crimes.”

30At paragraph 33, R. J. Sharpe J. A. stated,

“Mr. Thompson, like the respondents in this case, was no doubt keenly interested in the outcome of the police investigation concerning allegations of criminal allegations of criminal harm perpetrated against his children. But a parent’s desire for a thorough police investigation does not give rise to a relationship of proximity sufficient to ground an action for damages in tort.”

31To succeed with a claim of negligent investigation against the Peel Police and any of its officers, the plaintiff would have to establish a duty of care owed to him and no such duty of care exists.

32Accordingly, a claim by the plaintiff of negligent investigation has no reasonable chance of success and is to be dismissed against these defendants pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b).

33In doing so I am guided by the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. 2011 SCC 42, 2011 S.C.C. 42, at paragraph 20,

“Striking out claims that have no reasonable prospect of success promotes litigation efficiency, reducing time and cost. The litigants can focus on serious claims, without devoting days and sometimes weeks of evidence and argument to claims that are in any event hopeless. The same applies to judges and juries, whose attention is focused where it should be, on claims that have a reasonable chance of success. The efficiency, gained by weeding out unmeritorious claims in turn contributes to better justice.”

34I conclude as well, that in regards to the allegation of conspiracy, the claim against the Peel Police has no chance of success as the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action on the facts or lack of facts pleaded.

35The test for tortious conspiracy is set out at paragraphs 39 and 40, in Aristocrat Restaurants Ltd. (c.o.b. as Tony’s East) v. Ontario, [2003] OJ No 5331 (Ont. Sup Ct). I quote,

“Further, the pleadings in an action for conspiracy must include, with clarity and precision, particulars of:

(i) the parties and their relationship;

(ii) an agreement to conspire;

(iii) the precise purpose or objects of the alleged conspiracy;

(iv) the overt acts that are alleged to have been done by each of the conspirators; and

(v) the injury and particulars of the special damages suffered by the plaintiffs by reason of the conspiracy.”

36I have also had regard to the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Normart Management Ltd. v. West Hill Redevelopments Co. 1998 CanLII 2447 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 391, paragraph 21 and 22;

“In H. A. Imports of Canada Ltd. v. General Mills Inc. (1983) 1983 CanLII 1722 (ON SC), 42 O.R. (2d) 645 (H.C.) O’Brien J., dealing with the civil action of conspiracy as pleaded, quoted from Bullen, Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings, 12th ed. (London; Sweet & Maxwell, 1975) as follows at pp. 646-47: The statement of claims should describe who the several parties are and their relationship with each other. It should alleged the agreement between the defendants to conspire, and state precisely what the purpose or what were the overt acts which are alleged to have been done by each of the alleged conspirators in pursuance and in furtherance of the conspiracy; and lastly, it must allege the injury and damage occasioned to the plaintiff thereby. The above is still good law.”

37A party, making a conspiracy claim must plead the full particulars in support of the claim. A party must go beyond a bald assertion.

38In regards to the Peel Police and the Toronto Police, the pleadings do not identify the officers who were the parties to the conspiracy other than Detective Finnie.

39There are no facts pleaded to identify an agreement to conspire with any members of the two police forces.

40The precise purpose of the alleged conspiracy is not pleaded.

41The decision of the Peel Police to remove the stolen car report from their system, on the facts pleaded, was an independent act based on information provided by the Toronto Police. The acts of the police do not amount to overt acts as required to constitute a conspiracy.

42There are absolutely no facts pleaded to establish an agreement between the OIPRD and the Peel Police to conspire.

43The fact that the OIPRD choose not to investigate the Peel Police and its decision not to investigate the stolen car claim is not evidence on its own of a conspiracy. The pleadings do not disclose any purpose or reason for a conspiracy.

44Finally, with respect to both alleged conspiracies while the plaintiff claims damages he does not attribute any injuries and/or damages specific to the allegations of conspiracy.

45The pleadings do not provide sufficient facts on which to make a claim for bad faith. (Portuguese Canadian Credit Union v. 1141931 Ontario Ltd [2012] O. J. No. 1861, paras. 7-9.)

46A frivolous pleading has been defined as one that lacks legal basis and merit.

47A vexatious pleading is one that cannot possibly proceed (Currie v. Halton Police Services Board 2003 CanLII 7815 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 4516 (ONCA) paras. 11, 14, 15).

48Accordingly, the claims against the Peel Police can be considered frivolous and vexatious. There is no reasonable prospect of success.

MOTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR

49The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) is an administrative position created by the Police Services Act and is charged with providing civilian oversight of the police in Ontario. Gerry McNeilly is the Director.

50The OIPRD receives and considers complaints from members of the public. The complaints are individually screened after which a determination is made whether or not to investigate.

51If an investigation is warranted the complaint is referred to the police service in question or to another police service for further review.

52If a complainant is not satisfied with the investigation or lack of investigation he may then ask the Director to review the decision of the police service involved.

53With respect to the plaintiff’s complaint to the OIPRD in regards to the Toronto Police Services Board (Toronto Police), the plaintiff, in the Statement of Claim, takes issue as to how three of his complaints against the Toronto Police were handled.

54He alleges conspiracy, bad faith and extreme bias.

55One of his complaints involves an allegation of racial profiling resulting from his being questioned by Toronto Police officers in the parking lot of a McDonald’s restaurant. The OIPRD screened the complaint and directed it to the Toronto Police Service for investigation. The police found the complaint to be unsubstantiated and dismissed the complaint. This decision was investigated by the Director and confirmed.

56Two other complaints of the plaintiff against officers of the Toronto Police Service were made in 2014. One was in regards to their handling of the alleged theft of the plaintiff’s vehicle by Collision World, as referenced above, and the other involved an interaction by a single police officer.

57Both complaints were directed by the OIPRD to the Toronto Police Service. One of these interactions resulted in the plaintiff being charged with public mischief.

58For the reasons set out in the moving parties’ motion record and factum, the OIPRD accepted the opinion of the Toronto Police Service that all but one of the complaints were unsubstantiated and that the remaining complaint would be better dealt with by the trial judge who would hear the public mischief charge which arose out from one of the complaints.

59The plaintiff claims a failure by the OIPRD in its duty to investigate his complaints in a manner acceptable to him. He also alleges bad faith and conspiracy in that the police and the OIPRD had an agreement not to investigate any complaints made by the plaintiff because of his history of complaints.

60In regards to the claim by the plaintiff against the OIPRD and Gerry McNeiily, counsel for the OIPRD submits that the claim against it ought to be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. The Director and employees have statutory immunity for acts done in good faith.

2. The claim is a pure collateral attack on the Director’s decision.

3. The claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Further it does not plead essential elements and is therefore frivolous and vexatious.

61It is submitted by counsel that the Director must review all complaints received but is not required to investigate any given complaint.

62The plaintiff submits that he has the evidence to substantiate the claims. At the very least he asks that he be allowed to amend the claim.

63I accept by virtue of section 26(12) of the Police Services Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P 15 that the Director and his employees are immune from any claim for negligence and default in the execution or performance in good faith of the power and duty imposed by the Act, assuming the Director and employees acted in good faith.

64Further, I find that the OIPRD owes no private duty of care to a complainant such as the plaintiff.

65As noted in regards to the Peel Police the pleadings against the OIRPD do not provide sufficient facts on which a claim for bad faith can stand. There is no cause of action for bias.

66I have already discussed and ruled on the claim of a conspiracy between the OIPRD and the Peel Police.

67In regards to the OIPRD and the Toronto Police, the pleadings do not disclose the substantial facts necessary to maintain a claim for the tort of conspiracy.

68The specific parties to the alleged conspiracy are not named nor do the pleadings disclose any agreement to conspire.

69The plaintiff relies on the presumption that because the claims were not properly investigated, in the opinion of the plaintiff, there must be an agreement between the OIPRD and the Toronto Police not to follow-up any complaints made by the plaintiff. Simply put the failure by the OIPRD and the Toronto Police to agree with the plaintiff are grounds, in the plaintiff’s mind, for a claim of conspiracy.

70I find that the claim, as pleaded, does not amount to a conspiracy. The pleadings lack any particulars to suggest an agreement to conspire nor do they particularize a purpose.

71Finally, I agree that the decision of the Director (OIPRD) can only be challenged by the plaintiff bringing an Application for Judicial Review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act. R.S.O. 1990 c. J (Westlake et al v. The Queen in right of the Province of Ontario 1971 CanLII 680 (ON SC), [1971] 3 O.R. 533).

72I find that the bringing of this claim is a collateral attack against the decisions of the Director.

73It is clear the claim is frivolous and vexatious and it is plain and obvious that the plaintiff’s claim against the OIPRD and the director personally cannot succeed.

CITY OF TORONTO and GEORGE RADJENOVIC and GLENN NICKELS

74In regards to the City of Toronto, the plaintiff claims that in August 2014 he made a complaint to the City’s by-law enforcement office in regards to Collision World. He pleads that he spoke to Glen Nickels, an employee of the City, and was told his complaint was out of time and that the City did not investigate by-law infractions involving criminal offences.

75The plaintiff pleads that Mr. Nickels refused to talk to him or take direction from his supervisor George Radjenovic and that Mr. Radjenovic refused to return his phone calls.

76The plaintiff alleges neglect of duty and bad faith. He alleges a conspiracy to suppress his complaint. He pleads that he was denied justice as a result of neglect of duty, bias, bad faith and conspiracy.

77On a preliminary point of procedure, I grant leave to these defendants pursuant to Rule 2.02, in regards to this proceeding, concerning an irregularity to bring this motion notwithstanding their filing of a Statement of Defence.

78These defendants request that the portions of the Statement of Claim relating to them ought to be struck without leave to amend on the grounds that the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

79I concur with the submissions of these defendants. Neither the City of Toronto nor Mr. Nickels and Mr. Radjenovic owed a duty to the plaintiff to investigate and/or lay a by-law charge against Collision World. Such steps are within their discretion.

80Further, no cause of action arises from the interaction or lack of interaction between the plaintiff and Mr. Nickels and/or Mr. Radjenovic.

81The pleadings do not disclose a purpose for nor an agreement to conspire other than staff were in agreement not to investigate.

82The facts do not substantiate a claim for bad faith, breach of duty and conspiracy. There is no cause of action for bias.

83This claim is frivolous and vexatious and has no reasonable prospect of success.

TORONTO POLICE SERVICES BOARD, DETECTIVE MEIRIK, GERGEANT GROVER, DETECTIVE ELLIOTT and CHIEF BILL BLAIR

84These defendants request that the portions of the Statement of Claim relating to them ought to be struck without leave to amend on the grounds that the claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

85In regards to Chief Blair and Detective Elliott, while they are named as defendants there are no specific allegations against them pleaded in the Statement of Claim. As a result the claim against these defendants will be struck.

86The plaintiff in this Statement of Claim continues to seek a ruling which would absolve him from any criminal wrong-doing in regards to his 2005 conviction for criminal harassment. His appeal of this conviction was ultimately dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

87It is submitted by these defendants that this claim is a collateral attack against the criminal justice system and ought to be struck. Further, in any event, the claim is statute barred as being outside of the limitation period.

88In this regard and with respect to the other motions before me involving the plaintiff, I have already advised him that this portion of the claim would be struck. The matter was concluded when the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and if it was allowed to continue would amount to a collateral attack against the criminal justice system.

89The claims against Officers Meirik and Grover relate to his conviction in 2005. He alleges the officers misrepresented his age on a written police form.

90As I have already expressed, I will not permit a collateral attack on the 2005 conviction. I consider this claim to fall within the circumstances of the conviction.

91The claims against Officers Meirik and Grover are frivolous and vexatious and cannot stand.

92The plaintiff also takes issue with his arrest for public mischief in February 2014, relating to him reporting that his car was stolen, an allegation made in April, 2013. He reported to the police that he, when sitting in the car, was accosted by three men, one of whom had a gun.

93Multiple police officers responded immediately given the alleged use of a gun. There was no evidence found to substantiate the claims of the plaintiff.

94The Toronto Police were of the opinion that the plaintiff made a false report and as a result the plaintiff was charged with mischief. At the time of his arrest the plaintiff was on a recognizance so he was also charged with a breach.

95The plaintiff claims his rights, as protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights, were violated and the 2014 charge was in reprisal for the complaints the plaintiff filed against the Toronto Police Service.

96The plaintiff alleges that he was threatened but does not identify the officer who allegedly made the threat.

97He also alleges that an officer illegally searched his car and stole money found in the car.

98Counsel for the Toronto Police submits that in matters of bad faith and conspiracy the pleadings must contain full particulars. Bald allegations stating legal conclusions are not facts and are not sufficient to support a claim.

99It is submitted that without such disclosure, the claim ought to be struck.

100It is alleged that the claim is rambling and unintelligible. It alleges wilful misconduct but without particulars.

101It is submitted by defence counsel that the claim is frivolous and vexatious. It lacks any legal merit and cannot be taken seriously. It is submitted that clearly there is no chance of success.

102In regards to the alleged theft of money, the officer who is alleged to have conducted the search and stole the money is not identified. Further, the allegation is a bald statement made without any particulars.

103I agree with counsel for these defendants that the plaintiff makes serious allegations of wilful misconduct without providing particulars. Included in that group are the claims for bad faith, bias, neglect of duty and conspiracy. He continues to allege a duty owed to him by the police, a duty that I have already ruled does not exist. Without such a duty a claim for negligence cannot stand.

104I have already determined the pleadings fail to disclose any conspiracy between police forces.

105In regards to the allegation of harassment, I have reviewed the authority of Guillame v. Toronto (City) 2010 ONSC 5045, [2010] O.J. No. 4114, a decision of B. A. Allen of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. From paragraph 48 I quote,

“Regarding the Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment, that allegation is deficient on a number of grounds. There is no clear authority that the tort of harassment exists. Our court in a recent decision canvassed the cases where the tort has been asserted and found that several cases held the tort does not exist [Lynch v. Westario Power Inc. [2009] O.J. No. 2927, para. 66 (Ont SCJ). Lynch, however, looked at cases where the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering was claimed and identified the following elements of that tort;

(a) flagrant or outrageous conduct on the part of the named defendant;

(b) calculated to produce harm in circumstances where it is known harm will ensue; and

(c) resulting in a visible and provable illness or injury to the plaintiff.”

106The claim as drafted does not make out a claim for harassment even if it exists. The conduct of the Toronto Police cannot be characterized as outrageous or flagrant. Nor are there particulars to suggest the harassment was calculated to result in harm. The plaintiff’s claim of harassment cannot succeed.

107I find that that the remainder of this claim as against the Toronto Police and the individual officers is in fact frivolous and vexatious. There is no reasonable chance for success.

108There are no particulars pleaded which would support a claim for bad faith. .

109Racial profiling is not an actionable tort. An allegation of discrimination is not an actionable tort (King v. Ryerson University 250 A.C.W.S. (3d) 228; affirmed 2015 ONCA 648, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 286). A claim of discrimination falls within the Ontario Human Rights Code and is to be dealt with by the Human Rights Commission.

110In regards to the allegation of theft, no particulars are pleaded. Nor is an officer named in relation to this claim.

111These defendants have also brought a motion for summary judgment submitting there are no issues which require a trial.

112The plaintiff, who is required to put his best foot forward, has not filed any responding material to this motion.

113The plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully detained but provides no particulars in that regard. The affidavit of Officer Elliott contains a digital recording of Mr. John’s 911 call. He tells the dispatcher that he was accosted by three men, one of whom has a gun. He said that one man was sitting in the car and two other men were digging the car out of the snow.

114Officer Elliott deposes that the police attended on the scene and found no evidence of three men. The car engine was cold and the snow was undisturbed. The police considered Mr. John’s report to be false and charged him with mischief.

115It is submitted by these defendants that these fact give rise to reasonable grounds for an arrest and the plaintiff’s Charter rights in regards to the arrest and detention were not violated.

116Officer Sarasua, in an affidavit, deposes that he attended the scene and that he was in the presence of Mr. John for the majority of the call. At no time did the officer see anyone else search the car or take anything out of it. Officer Sarasua inventoried the contents of Mr. John’s car. No money was found. When Mr. John was booked he was found to have $250.00 on his person, which monies were counted out in the presence of Mr. John. Mr. John made no reference to $1,255.00 which he alleges was in his car.

117Given this evidence, summary judgment is granted dismissing the plaintiff’s claim in regards to the allegation of stolen money and the allegation that the plaintiff’s Charter rights were breached. There is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

RULING

118Considering all of the aforementioned, the claim of the plaintiff has no chance of success and is struck and/or is dismissed as noted above in regards to all of the defendants except Collision World and Kaljit Daaliwal, who were not parties to these motions. There is simply no legal basis or particularization for the claim to have any reasonable chance of success. The claims are so deficient that leave to amend is denied.

COSTS

119Any submissions as to costs are to be delivered, in writing, to my office within 21 days of the release of this ruling and are to be no more than three pages in length.

120Cost submissions may be served by email.

121Plaintiff’s consent to form and content of the order is dispensed with.

Bielby J.