Dickson v. Wright 2016 ONSC 1901
CITATION: Dickson v. Wright 2016 ONSC 1901
COURT FILE NO.: FS-13-1769-00
DATE: 2016-03-17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
LINDA DICKSON
Jane A. Connon, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
JAMES WRIGHT
S. Whitzman, agent for William Fanjoy, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: July 3, 2015, at Brampton, Ontario
Price J.
Costs Endorsement
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
[1] Linda Dickson, 59 years old and undergoing treatment for cancer, received income of $72.233 in 2014, including withdrawals from her R.R.S.P. She claimed temporary spousal support from James Wright, who separated from her following their 30 year common law relationship.
[2] Mr. Wright stated that his income from his company, Wright Industries, had declined from $407,947 in 2012 to $150,381 in 2014, and that he was currently earning only $38,600. He further stated that he had been forced to seek creditor protection for the company because of its financial difficulties. He argued that:
a) The decline in his income made it impossible for him to continue paying the expenses of maintaining the home that he and Ms. Dickson had shared until their separation, and that Ms. Dickson has occupied since then;
b) He could not afford to secure a professional valuation of his shares in his business, which the court had ordered him to obtain and produce two years ago;
c) The amount of spousal support he was required to pay to Ms. Dickson should be based on the income he was earning from his company now.
[3] The court concluded that it should not permit Mr. Wright to use his control of information about his income to incapacitate Ms. Dickson from effectively asserting her claim to the support she was owed. It noted that even apart from the business he owned, Mr. Wright had substantial assets, including the home where he currently resided, which was worth approximately a million dollars, the parties former conjugal home, the equity in which was estimated at $175,000, and R.R.S.P.s that were worth a further $600,000. Based on the Mr. Wright’s three-year average income of $294,019 and Ms. Dickson’s 2014 income of $47,233.96, Mr. Wright’s support obligation ranged from a low of $7,712 to a high of $10,261, with a mid-point of $8,997.
[4] In reasons dated September 4, 2015, the court ordered Mr. Wright to pay temporary spousal support of $8,500 per month to Ms. Dickson, beginning June 2015, when she had filed her motion, from which Ms. Dickson would pay the costs of maintaining the former conjugal home, where she resided. Additionally, the court ordered Mr. Wright to produce a valuation of his interest in Wright Instruments Limited and the income he had received from the company since January 1, 2012, and that he attend at an Examiner’s Office to answer questions arising from evidence he had given in January and February 2014, and to be questioned about his June 24, 2015, financial statement.
[5] The parties have been unable to agree on who is responsible for the costs of the motion and as to what amount of costs should be paid. This endorsement will address that issue.
ISSUES
[6] The court must determine whether one of the parties should be ordered to pay the other’s costs of the motion and, if so, the amount of the costs.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
[7] Ms. Dickson claims her lawyer’s fees and disbursements of $20,000 on a full recovery basis. She relies on her success in the motion and Mr. Wright’s bad faith in breaching court orders requiring him to make timely financial disclosure.
[8] Mr. Wright asks that the costs of the motion be reserved to the trial judge, or to a judge hearing a motion that he proposes to make to vary the temporary support order based on the income valuation he was ordered to produce. In the alternative, he asks that no costs be ordered, on the grounds that:
a) Success was divided;
b) He made an Offer to Settle, it was not more favourable to Ms. Dickson than the outcome of the motion; and
c) Payment of costs would result in undue financial hardship to him, having regard to his company’s insolvency.
ANALYSIS AND LAW
a) Deferring costs to the trial judge
[9] Mr. Wright argues that the issue of costs should be reserved to the trial judge. Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules requires that costs be decided at each step in the case. I am in as good a position as the trial judge will be to determine the costs based on the outcome of the motion and the reasonableness of the parties. For these reasons, the issue of costs should be determined now, not be reserved to the trial judge.
[10] Mr. Wright argues that the outcome of the income valuation that he was ordered to provide will show that his current income is less than the three-year average on which the court based the amount of support he is required to pay. He argues that the endorsement “contemplated, at paragraph 24, that he can then use that report to rebut the presumption that an average of 3 years of income should be utilized” and that, on this basis, the costs of the motion should be deferred.
[11] For reasons stated below, in the discussion of unreasonable conduct, I do not agree that the court contemplated that the support amount would be varied based on the outcome of an income valuation, or that this is a reason to delay the determination of the costs of the motion.
The objectives of a costs order
[12] Indemnification of the successful party to a proceeding is the paramount, but not the only, objective to be served by a costs order. Other objectives include encouraging settlement, discouraging unreasonable conduct and unnecessary litigation,[^1] and preserving access to justice.[^2]
[13] An appropriate costs order balances two conflicting principles:
A blameless litigant who is successful in a proceeding should not be required to bear the costs of having his or her rights tested.
Citizens should not be made to feel unduly hesitant to assert or defend their rights in court by the prospect that, if unsuccessful, they will be required to bear all of the opposing party’s costs.
[14] The ultimate objective in balancing these two principles is to ensure that the justice system works fairly and efficiently.[^3]
The Discretion to be exercised
[15] The determination as to which party, if any, should compensate the other for their costs, and as to the amount of such costs, is “within the court’s discretion.”[^4] The court must exercise its discretion having regard to the objectives of costs awards, and to Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, which sets out the factors to be considered when determining how the objectives are best attained in a particular case.
The Outcome of the motion
[16] The relative success of the parties on the issues in the motion is the starting point in determining costs.[^5] In Johanns v. Fulford, in 2010, it was held that, for the purpose of Rule 24(1), “success” is assessed by comparing the terms of an order against the relief originally requested in the pleadings and against the terms of any offers to settle.[^6] Ms. Dickson was substantially successful in her motion, having secured an order for temporary support in a substantially greater amount than Mr. Wright had offered to pay.
[17] In her motion, Ms. Dickson asked for an order requiring Mr. Wright to continue paying the carrying costs of the former conjugal residence, but instead, she was granted spousal support in an amount that will enable her to pay those costs herself. Additionally, Ms. Dickson had asked for an order requiring Mr. Wright to comply with his obligation to make financial disclosure by producing his business valuation, obtaining an income valuation, and re-attending for questioning on his new Financial Statement, and by providing the particulars of his current income and expenses. She was almost completely successful. Mr. Wright was ordered to pay spousal support, produce the valuation of his interest in Wright Instruments, provide an income valuation, re-attend for questioning, and answer undertakings.
[18] Mr. Wright argues that success on the motion was divided. While he was ordered to pay support, Ms. Dickson was ordered to complete the answers to her unanswered undertakings, and to remove a letter from the parties’ former mediator, Phillip Epstein, from her affidavit. While it is true that Ms. Dickson was ordered to do these things, Mr. Wright was ordered to do substantially more, and the outcome of the motion was much closer to the relief Ms. Dickson was seeking than the outcome Mr. Wright had requested or what he had offered.
Factors to be considered
[19] Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules lists the factors the court should consider when quantifying costs:
- (11) A person setting the amount of costs shall consider,
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;
(c) the lawyer’s rates;
(d) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witnesses, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order;
(e) expenses properly paid or payable; and
(f) any other relevant matter.[^7]
Importance, complexity, and difficulty of the motion
[20] The motion was of considerable importance to the parties. If Ms. Dickson had not been successful in it, Mr. Wright would have had little incentive to provide the disclosure she would have needed to increase her spousal support in the future. With the order that was made, Mr. Wright may consider it to be in his interests to provide the disclosure, if for no other reason than to provide an argument he can use to seek to lower his support obligation at trial.
[21] The motion was more complex than a conventional motion for temporary support because of the decline in the income Mr. Wright has reported to the Canada Revenue Agency since the parties separated, his control over the business that is the main source of his income, the incomplete financial disclosure he has provided, and Ms. Dickson’s loss of employment with Mr. Wright’s business and her own disability.
Reasonableness of each party’s behaviour – scale of costs
[22] Rule 24(4) of the Family Law Rules explicitly authorizes the use of costs orders to express the court’s disapproval of a litigant’s unreasonable conduct. It provides:
24.(4) Despite sub-rule (1) [which provides that a successful party is presumed to be entitled to the costs of a motion], a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs. [Emphasis added]
[23] Ms. Dickson seeks payment of her costs by Mr. Wright on a full recovery scale on the ground that he acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the court’s past order that he provide full financial disclosure. In Nairn v. Lukowski, in 2002, and in Piskor v. Piskor, in 2004, Blishen J. adopted the definitions of bad faith that the court formulated in Erickson v. Erickson,[^8] in 2000, and Hunt v. Hunt, in 2001.[^9] In those cases, it was held that bad faith could consist of conduct intended to deceive or mislead,[^10] or of an intentional breach of an agreement or court order in order to achieve an ulterior motive.
[24] These formulations of bad faith are consistent with the definition set out in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990):
Generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[^11] [Emphasis added]
[25] Justice Perkins gave a more extensive explanation of bad faith in S.(C.) v. S.(C.) in 2007:
…The essence of bad faith is the representation that one’s actions are directed toward a particular goal while one’s secret, actual goal is something else, something that is harmful to other persons affected or at least something they will not willingly have supported or tolerated if they had known. However, not all bad faith involves an intent to deceive. It is rare, but not unknown in family cases, for bad faith to be overt – an action carried out with an intent to inflict harm on another person or a person affected by the case without an attempt to conceal the intent.
In order to come within the meaning of bad faith in Rule 24(8), behaviour must be shown to be carried out with intent to inflict financial or emotional harm on the other party or persons affected by the behaviour, to conceal information relevant to the issues or to deceive the other party or the court. A misguided but genuine intent to achieve the ostensible goal of the activity, without proof of intent to inflict harm, to conceal relevant information or to deceive, saves the activity from being found to be in bad faith. The requisite intent to harm, conceal or deceive does not have to be the person’s sole or primary intent, but rather only a significant part of the person’s intent. At some point a party could be found to be acting in bad faith when their litigation conduct has run the costs up so high that they must be taken to know their behaviour is causing the other party major financial harm without justification.[^12] [Emphasis added]
[26] Although Mr. Wright’s failure to provide full financial disclosure as required was unreasonable and was a significant factor in the court’s reasoning in arriving at the support he was required to pay, I am not satisfied that Mr. Wright, in failing to provide a more complete disclosure, was acting in bad faith. His failure to make more complete financial disclosure may reflect, in greater part, his effort, however misguided, to conserve expenses for himself than an effort to conceal his true financial circumstances. Not every instance of unreasonable conduct attracts an order that costs be paid on a higher than partial indemnity scale. Substantial indemnity costs, like their predecessor, solicitor and client costs, are exceptional. Mark M. Orkin, in The Law of Costs,[^13] cites the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v. Young, in this regard: “Solicitor and client costs are generally awarded only where there has been reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct on the part of one of the parties.”
[27] In Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Krystal Holdings Inc., in 2009, Archibald J. stated: “Substantial indemnity costs are an exceptional award, saved for extenuating circumstances such as situations where there has been egregious conduct … or where a motion has been brought unreasonably”[^14] The same principle can apply where a motion is unreasonably opposed, but the court must be careful not to characterize every lack of success in a motion, or in the opposition to a motion, as evidence bad faith to justify an award of costs on a higher scale for a lack of success.
[28] A finding of bad faith is not a condition precedent to full recovery of costs by the other side under the FLR.[^15] A finding that the motion should not have been brought, or should not have been opposed, is sufficient to attract costs on this higher scale. The determination of costs in the present case is governed by the FLR, not by the Rules of Civil Procedure.[^16] Under the FLR, the traditional assumption that there are only two levels of costs (“party-and-party”/“solicitor-and-client”; or “partial indemnity”/“substantial indemnity”), no longer applies. The court is simply required to consider the range between a nominal amount of costs and full recovery.[^17] In a family law case, the court need not find “special circumstances” before ordering costs on a substantial or full indemnity scale.[^18] Within the spectrum of costs orders, costs on a substantial or full indemnity scale are not justified in the present case. Mr. Wright’s opposition to Ms. Dickson’s motion was intended to preserve his solvency and avoid liquidating his assets, especially his R.R.S.P.’s, and to avoid the tax penalties that would result from liquidating them. It did not reflect a conscious wrongdoing for a dishonest purpose, furtive design, moral obliquity, or ill will.
[29] Mr. Wright delivered an Offer to Settle but he failed to achieve a better outcome in the motion than would have resulted from Ms. Dickson’s acceptance of his Offer. He offered to pay only $700 per month and the property taxes and house insurance on the conjugal home. Ms. Dickson was justified in failing to accept Mr. Wright’s Offer to Settle, which was clearly less favourable than the outcome she achieved.
[30] I accept that Mr. Wright’s Offer represented a genuine effort to compromise, and to recognize Ms. Dickson’s right to spousal support. However, it fell far short of offering a reasonable amount of support, having regard to the income Mr. Wright had reported on his last three year’s income tax returns. Moreover, by failing to provide the financial disclosure Ms. Dickson was entitled to receive, Mr. Wright deprived Ms. Dickson of the ability to assess his Offer in the light of his true financial circumstances.
[31] Ms. Dickson has not tendered any Offer to Settle that she made. However, the unreasonableness of Mr. Wright’s Offer suggests that had she offered to accept anything close to the amount of support Mr. Wright was ordered to pay there would have had little prospect of it being accepted by Mr. Wright. I therefore do not regard her failure to make an Offer as reflecting unreasonableness on her part.
[32] The support order that was made was based, in part, on the fact that Mr. Wright failed to provide full financial disclosure as required. In his costs submissions, Mr. Wright offers various explanations for his failure to do so. The court rejects those explanations now as it did in its determination of the support issue. Mr. Wright does not deny that he undertook to provide a copy of his shareholder account. He explains his failure to comply with this undertaking by stating that he informed Ms. Connon in June 2015 that the shareholder account, which was 70 pages long, could be e-mailed to her if she liked, and that she did not respond. It was Mr. Wright’s obligation to provide the account, and he could and should have sent it by means other than an e-mail.
[33] For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Dickson will be awarded her costs on a partial indemnity scale.
Lawyer’s rates
[34] Ms. Dickson’s lawyer, Jane Connon, was called to the Bar in Ontario in 1982. She had practiced law for 33 years when she argued the motion. In determining the appropriate hourly rates to be assigned to her, the court follows the approach taken by Aitkin J. in Geographic Resources.[^19] That is, the starting point is the successor of the Costs Grid, namely, the “Information for the Profession” bulletin from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (the “Costs Bulletin”), which can be found immediately before Rule 57 in the Carthy or Watson & McGowan editions of the Rules, sets out maximum partial indemnity hourly rates for counsel of various levels of experience.
[35] The Costs Subcommittee’s rates apply to all lawyers and all cases, so everyone of the same level of experience starts at the same rate. The court adjusts the hourly rate, or the resulting fees, to reflect unique features of the case, including the complexity of the proceeding, the importance of the issues, and the other factors set out in Rule 57.01(1). If an excessive amount of time was spent, or too many lawyers worked on the file, the court reduces the resulting amount of fees accordingly.
[36] The Costs Bulletin suggests maximum hourly rates (on a partial indemnity scale) of $350 for lawyers of more than 20 years’ experience and $80 for law clerks.[^20] The upper limits in the Costs Bulletin are intended for the most complex and important of cases. Having regard to Ms. Connon’s 33 years’ experience, and the moderate complexity of the motion, she was entitled to claim $300 per hour in 2005 and $80 for her law clerk.
[37] The Costs Bulletin, published in 2005, is now dated. Aitkin J. considered adjusting the Costs Subcommittee’s hourly rates for inflation, as Smith J. did in First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group,[^21] but the unadjusted rates of the lawyers in her case were only slightly less than the actual fees they charged, so she elected to use their unadjusted rates. Normally, however, it is appropriate to adjust the hourly rates in the Costs Bulletin to account for inflation since 2005.
[38] Based on the Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator, available online at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator/, the 2015
equivalent of the rate of $300 in 2005 is $354.13. I round that rate down to $350. The 2015 equivalent of the rate of $80 for Ms. Connon’s law clerk was $94.43, which I round up to $95.
Time properly spent on the case
[39] Rule 24(11)(d) of the FLR directs me to consider “the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witness, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order.”
[40] Ms. Connon and her law clerk spent 33.9 hours on the motion. Although Ms. Connon did not segregate the time they spent in correspondence and telephone communications from the rest of the time she spent, my best estimate is that Ms. Connon spent 2.4 hours on correspondence. As this included e-mails requesting answers to undertakings, which were one of the issues in the motion, and also included requests for dates for the motion, and discussion of an adjournment of the motion, and e-mails with my judicial secretary regarding the court’s decision on the motion and the parties’ costs submissions, this time is allowed.
[41] The time Ms. Connon and her law clerk spent also included the following:
a) 7.6 hours reviewing the transcript of questioning, preparing charts of undertakings and refusals, corresponding with Mr. Wright’s counsel in an effort to obtain Mr. Wrights’ compliance with undertakings, and, finally, asking for dates when Mr. Wright’s counsel’s was available to attend at the hearing of a motion.
b) 1.3 hours to prepare a Notice of Motion and Affidavit, and 2.5 hours to review the affidavit and revise Ms. Dickson’s Financial Statement.
c) 2 hours to attend court on June 19, 2015, to adjourn the motion, 3 hours to prepare for the motion and 7 hours to attend for the hearing of the motion. She spent a further 1.5 hours drafting a Bill of Costs, and 3.5 hours reviewing Mr. Wright’s costs submissions and preparing Ms. Dickson’s own arguments on costs.
[42] All but 4.6 hours of the time were spent by Ms. Connon. The remainder was spent by her law clerk.
[43] While Mr. Wright disputes the reasonableness of the time that Ms. Connon spent, he has not delivered a Costs Outline from his own lawyer, setting out the time she spent. This court has held, on several occasions, that when one party attacks another’s costs as excessive, but does not put its own dockets before the court, the attack “is no more than an attack in the air.” In Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., (2003), Winkler J., then a motion judge, stated:
The attack on the quantum of costs, insofar as the allegations of excess are concerned, in the present circumstances is no more than an attack in the air. I note that State Farm has not put the dockets of its counsel before the court in support of its submission. Although such information is not required under Rule 57 in its present form, and the rule enumerates certain factors which would have to be considered in exercising the discretion with respect to the fixing of costs in any event, it might still provide some useful context for the process if the court had before it the bills of all counsel when allegations of excess and “unwarranted over-lawyering” are made. In that regard, the court is also entitled to consider “any other matter relevant to the question of costs”. (See Rule 57.01(1)(i). In my view, the relative expenditures, at least in terms of time, by adversaries on opposite sides of a motion, while not conclusive as to the appropriate award of costs, is still, nonetheless, a relevant consideration where there is an allegation of excess in respect of a particular matter. [^22] [Emphasis added.]
[44] In the absence of information from Mr. Wright as to the time spent by his own lawyer, I find that the time claimed by Ms. Dickson for her lawyers’ fees and disbursements is reasonable. In reviewing a claim for costs, I need not undertake a line by line analysis of the hours claimed, nor should I second guess the amount claimed unless it is clearly excessive or overreaching. I must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances and, after taking into account all of the relevant factors, award costs in a global fashion.[^23]
[45] Applying Ms. Connon’s partial indemnity rate, adjusted for inflation, of $350 to the 29.3 hours she spent on the motion, I find that a reasonable claim for fees is $10,255. Applying Ms. Connon’s law clerk’s partial indemnity rate of $95 to the 4.6 hours she spent, I find that a reasonable claim for her fees is $437. Accordingly, the total fees allowable are $10,692.
Disbursements
[46] Ms. Dickson claims for disbursements consisting of $2,818.43 for disbursements, all but $187.50 of which were paid for discovery transcripts. The balance was for photocopies and facsimiles. Mr. Wright does not take issue with the disbursements and I find them to be reasonable.
Other Relevant Matters
[47] The court must examine the overall award with a view to determining whether it is ‘fair and reasonable’ for the kind of matter involved.” In determining what is fair and reasonable, the court must take into account the reasonable expectation of the parties concerning the amount of costs.[^24]
[48] Awards of costs in motions to change custody or access vary greatly, depending on their factual complexity, the extent of the change sought, and the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct. I have considered the following costs awards made in such cases:
(a) In Vaseloff v. Leo, in 2013, Healey J. awarded costs of $8,500 for costs of a motion for temporary spousal support.[^25]
(b) In Leslie Jane Patterson v Daniel Sarafian, in 2015, McLeod J. awarded costs of $15,000.00 plus H.S.T., disbursements in the sum of $800.00 plus G.S.T. to the successful applicant for temporary spousal support.[^26]
(c) In Leslie Jane Patterson v Daniel Sarafian, 2015, Mulligan J. awarded $5,000 costs to the successful applicant in such a motion.[^27]
(d) In Punzo v. Punzo, in 2011, I awarded $8,790.83 costs to the successful applicant for temporary spousal support.[^28]
[49] The costs ordered to be paid in such cases, involving motions to change orders for custody and access, should have informed Mr. Wright’s reasonable expectation of the costs he might be required to pay if unsuccessful.
[50] Mr. Wright submits that he is financially unable to pay costs in the amount claimed by Ms. Dickson. He has not offered evidence to support a conclusion that the costs would impose a financial hardship on him.
[51] It is the responsibility of counsel to advise their clients of the fees that the other party was entitled to claim pursuant to the Costs Bulletin, adjusted for inflation, and the jurisprudence referred to above, and of the potential consequences of an adverse result before embarking on the course that will expose them to those consequences. I must assume that Mr. Wright received the appropriate advice from his counsel as to the risks he faced, and decided to proceed in spite of them, and failing to make an Offer to Settle on terms that could be expected to bring the motion to an end.
[52] In all the circumstances, I find that the costs claimed by Ms. Dickson are proportionate to the interests at stake in this motion and to the costs awarded for similar motions in other cases.
Conclusion and Order
[53] For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:
- Mr. Wright shall, within 60 days, pay to Ms. Dickson her costs of the motion in the amount of $14,924.77, consisting of the following:
(a) Total fees: $10,692
(b) H.S.T.: $1,389.96
(c) Taxable Disbursements: $2,818.43
(d) H.S.T.: $24.38
Price J.
Released: March 17, 2016
CITATION: Dickson v. Wright 2016 ONSC 1901
COURT FILE NO.: FS-13-1769-00
DATE: 2016-03-17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
LINDA DICKSON
Applicant
- and –
JAMES WRIGHT
Respondent
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
Price J.
Released: March 17, 2016
[^1]: Fellowes, McNeil v. Kansa General International Insurance Co. 1997 12208 (ON SC), 1997 12208, 37 O.R. (3d) 464 (ON S.C.), para. 10 [^2]: 1465778 Ontario Inc. v. 1122077 Ontario Ltd. 2006 35819 (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 757 (ON C.A.), per Feldman J.A., at para. 45 [^3]: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, at paras. 25, 26 [Okanagan]. [^4]: Courts of Justice Act, s. 131. [^5]: Butty v. Butty 2009 23111 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 1887 (SCJ) at para. 4, citing Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe 2000 22584 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 330 (SCJ) [^6]: Johanns v. Fulford 2010 ONCJ 756, at para. 13 [^7]: Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 [as amended] [^8]: Erickson v. Erickson (May 16, 2000), Doc. 00-FL-868 (Ont. S.C.J.) [^9]: Hunt v. Hunt, 2001 ONSC 39078 [^10]: Nairn v. Lukowski, (2002), 2002 78091 (ON SC), 29 R.F.L. (5th) 117 (Ont.S.C.J.), per Blishen J., at p. 120 [^11]: Piskor v. Piskor, 2004 5023 (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 796 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Blishen J., at paras. 9 to 12 [^12]: S.(C.) v. S.(C.), 2007 20279 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 2164 (Ont.S.C.J.), per Perkins J. at paras. 16 and 17 [^13]: M. M. Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2d ed., looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1987), at p. 2-46 [Orkin]; Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at p. 154, re-stated in Perri. [^14]: Empire Life Insurance Co. v. Krystal Holdings Inc, [2009] O.J. No. 1095 (S.C.), at para. 19. [^15]: Osmar v. Osmar, 2000 20380 (ON SC), 2000 20380 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 11, Aston J [^16]: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg 194 [^17]: Osmar. [^18]: Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 283 O.A.C. 287. [^19]: Geographic Resources Integrated Data Solutions Ltd. v. Peterson, 2013 ONSC 1041, paras. 7 and 11 to 16 [^20]: “Information for the Profession” bulletin (“the Costs Bulletin”) from the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee (that the Costs Sub-Committee of the Rules Committee issued to replace the Costs Grid, which it repealed in 2005). The Costs Bulletin has advisory status only and not statutory authority, as it was not included in the Regulation that repealed the Costs Grid. [^21]: First Capital (Canholdings) Corp. v. North American Property Group, 2012 ONSC 1359, 2012 ONSC 1359 (S.C.J.) [^22]: Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2003), 2003 43566 (ON SC), ONSC 43566, 64 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 10 (S.C.), per Winkler J., cited in Springer v. Aird& Berlins LLP (2009), 2009 26608 (ON SC), 2009 ONSC 26608, 74 C.C.E.L.(3d) 243 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 10-17. [^23]: Fazio v. Cusumano, 2005 33782 (ON SC), 2005 33782 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 8. [^24]: See: Boucher; Moon; Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada Ltd. v. Leveltek Processing LLC (2005), 2005 1042 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 638 (C.A.). [^25]: Vaseloff v. Leo, 2013 ONSC 6177, para. 11 [^26]: Leslie Jane Patterson v Daniel Sarafian, 2015 ONSC 7765, para. 29 [^27]: Steine v. Steine, 2010 ONSC 4728, para. 7 [^28]: Punzo v. Punzo, 2011 ONSC 7300, para. 72