Aivars Oskalns v. Anita Oskalne, 2016 ONSC 1676

CITATION: Oskalns v. Oskalne, 2016 ONSC 1676

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: FC-14-47104-00

DATE: 20160824

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Aivars Oskalns

Applicant

– and –

Anita Oskalne

Respondent

Counsel for the Applicant, A. Abramian

Counsel for the Respondent, S. Duggan

HEARD: November 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 2015, February 22, 23, 24 and April 20, 2016

JARVIS J.:

Reasons for decision

[1] Aivars Oskalns (“the husband”) and Anita Oskalne (“the wife”) were married in Riga Latvia on July 2, 1987, later divorced, then remarried each other on January 21, 2006. They separated for a final time on October 12, 2014.

[2] There are three children of the parties’ marriage R.O.#1 (26 years), R.O.#2 (20 years) and R.O.#3 (16 years) all of whom reside with their mother in the matrimonial home. The older two boys work together and help support the household in which they reside. The youngest was diagnosed in June 2014 with a number of developmental disorders, including autism.

[3] The husband started this proceeding shortly after the parties separated. The trial issues involve custody and access of the youngest child, equalization of the parties’ net family properties and child and spousal support. A report was delivered by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer which recommended that the wife have sole custody of the youngest child (the “OCL Report”). The father accepts the access recommendations made in the OCL Report.

[4] The principal dispute involves whether the parties entered into a marriage contract in Latvia and whether that precludes any equalization payment. Less trial time involved the issue of support.

Background

[5] The parties were born, and met, in Latvia. They married in Riga in 1987. She was 21 years old and the husband 27. He had a high school education, served in the military for two years, then worked as a driver for several different employers. He drove for a local factory when the parties married. The wife also had a high school education, then worked briefly as a hair stylist.

[6] After their marriage, the parties lived in Riga with the husband’s mother. About four months after their first son was born in 1989, the wife says they moved to her mother’s apartment due to issues involving the husband’s sister. The wife’s parents were able to exchange their apartment for two apartments, one for them and the other for the parties and their son. Some consideration was paid.

[7] The husband worked, the wife says sporadically, as a taxi driver. When their son was about three years old (this would be 1992/1993) the parties started a wholesale distribution business, mostly clothing apparel and footwear.

[8] Shortly after their second son was born in 1995, the parties moved to a three room apartment at 104 Augusta Deglava Street in Riga (“Augusta Deglava”). The evidence was unclear about what happened to their business but the parties agreed that it was around this time that they started another business selling food products. It was unprofitable and eventually closed down in 1998.

[9] The parties became involved in another wholesale distribution business. This was called Gratuss. It was incorporated in 1998 as a limited company specializing in the distribution of food, beverage and tobacco products. A relative of the husband, Leontine Vlastelica, was identified as the incorporator. The parties dispute the nature and extent of Ms. Vlastelica’s involvement. The husband claimed that he and the wife really operated the business. This is what Ms. Vlastelica and another witness, Sergejs Sinkars, confirmed in their testimony. Not disputed is that Gratuss was the primary source of the family’s income, although not initially.

[10] Shortly before the birth of the parties’ third son in March 1999 the husband left the family. Periodically he would return to visit the children.

[11] There were two significant developments in 2000. In late March the wife purchased the Augusta Deglava apartment. Title was registered in her name alone. On May 23, 2000 the parties were divorced following proceedings started by the husband. No arrangements were made for support.

[12] The parties’ evidence about their respective circumstances between early 2000 to late 2002 is confusing and contradictory. The husband testified that the parties continued cohabiting after their divorce: the wife disputed this, testifying that the husband had told her that he wanted to start a new life in another country and she knew that he did not want to pay support. What is clear is that the husband remarried in 2001 and later emigrated with his new spouse to Canada in October 2002. About three months later he returned to Latvia. Alone. He and that spouse were divorced in Latvia in 2003.

[13] The husband testified that he returned to Riga because the wife had contacted him about their middle son who had been seriously injured and because she needed his help. According to him, the parties began cohabiting: the wife denied this. She testified that she had no idea where the husband was living, that he would drop by the apartment irregularly to see the children.

[14] In September 2003 the wife purchased an unfinished home located at Lives Street 2B in Riga (“Lives 2B”) for 94,464 LVL (about $200,000 CDN at that time). Title was registered in her name alone. The wife testified that her parents gave her the money for the purchase. The parties dispute whether they cohabited there. A neighbour (Ralfs Balceris) testified. He resided next door and operated a commercial garage on his property. According to Mr. Balceris, Lives 2B was uninhabitable when he first met the husband, who was working there. The husband borrowed tools from Mr. Balceris and sometimes sought his technical advice. The family moved into the property several months after its purchase. Mr. Balceris met the wife about a month afterwards.

[15] The wife retained, and rented, the Augusta Deglava apartment.

[16] The Latvian Government Commercial Register identifies Ms. Vlastelica as transferring to the husband a fifty percent interest in Gratuss on December 5, 2003. The Commercial Register also recorded the husband as being the company’s managing director with “Right of Sole Representation.” There was no evidence as to what this phrase means, although its import is inferentially obvious.

[17] Despite the conflict in the parties’ evidence, it is more probable than not that the parties cohabited after the husband returned to Latvia. At the very least they continued their business relationship.

[18] In 2005 Gratuss obtained an operating line of credit which was secured against title to the wife’s Augusta Deglava and Lives 2B properties. Later, in June 2005, Ms. Vlastelica transferred her remaining fifty percent in Gratuss to the wife. It was around this time that the husband again left for Canada, this time to Toronto. He testified that he made this move in order to preserve his landed immigrant status and to learn English. The wife was left raising the children and operating Gratuss. There was no evidence whether any arrangements had been made for the husband to contribute to the family’s support before or after his departure.

[19] In August 2005 the wife made a 5000 LVL deposit (about $10,020 CDN) on a property located at 9 Litrinu Street in Riga (“the Litrinu property”) having a completion date of January 30, 2006.

[20] The parties kept in contact with each other. In January 2006 the husband returned to Riga. According to the wife, the husband suggested that the parties remarry. She agreed. They remarried on January 21, 2006. The Litrinu property was acquired several days later on January 30, mostly funded by a mortgage.

[21] The parties planned to emigrate to Canada. Not long afterwards the husband returned to Toronto and applied to sponsor the wife and their children to Canada. This was approved on August 31, 2006.

[22] In late 2006 the parties’ eldest child came to Quebec as an exchange student. In early 2007 he began residing with his father in Toronto. He completed high school and later began attending Ryerson College. His father had started his own furniture moving business and registered his son and him as owners. The father dealt with the business’ Russian speaking customers and the son, whose English comprehension was better than his father’s, handled the paperwork, answering phone calls, and online marketing. He often did this during breaks between classes. Much of the business was conducted on a cash basis.

[23] In October 2007 the wife sold the Augusta Deglava property. The husband was obliged to return to Latvia to sign the sale documents. On November 2, 2007 the wife alleges that the parties signed a marriage contract in order, she testified, to protect her property. Soon afterwards the Litrinu property was sold and the wife and two younger children moved to Toronto.

[24] The net proceeds of sale from the Augusta Deglava and Litrinu properties were transferred to Canada and were used in May 2008 to purchase a family residence in Thornhill, Ontario. Title was registered in the wife’s name. Around this time the eldest son discontinued his studies. He had struggled with school, was juggling his studies with work and was depressed. The furniture moving business and remaining proceeds from the Latvian property sales supported the family. There were many arguments between the father and this son. In early 2011 the son started his own carpet cleaning business.

[25] The husband suffered a stroke and was hospitalized for about a week. He was unable to work for an indefinite period and when he did return to his business he tired easily. The evidence of the wife and the parties’ two eldest children was that the husband was, if not before his stroke then certainly afterwards, an alcoholic. And abusive.

[26] In August 2011 the Thornhill property was sold because the family, according to the husband, needed to downsize. Another property was purchased, title to which was also registered in the wife’s name and was subject to a mortgage. This is the residence in which the wife and the children live.

[27] In December 2012 the Lives 2B property was sold and its net proceeds transferred to the wife in Canada. These proceeds were used to discharge the outstanding mortgage on the matrimonial home. It is unencumbered.

[28] Between August 2011 and when the parties separated on October 12, 2014 the family was supported by the husband and the parties’ oldest sons, the second son joining his older brother in his business on a part-time basis in late 2011/early 2012. He was attending a local college and was juggling his studies and work too.

[29] On October 12, 2014 the husband was charged with uttering threats against the wife and removed by police from the matrimonial home. He was intoxicated. The evidence of the wife and elder two sons was that the husband was often intoxicated and abusive. The husband was left essentially destitute. He had no savings, the truck that he used for his business was inoperable and he had nowhere to live except a homeless shelter.

[30] In December 2014 the second son had to discontinue his studies to work full-time with his brother in supporting the family.

[31] The father lived in a shelter until August 2015 when he was able to rent accommodation in a rooming house. He was acquitted after trial in March 2015 of the criminal charge. Nothing has been paid for support since the parties separated and the evidence about the husband’s income since then is unsatisfactory.

Credibility

[32] Each party challenged the other’s credibility. The husband claimed that the wife’s testimony was confusing, contradictory, that it lacked reality and was undermined by her failure to provide relevant documentary evidence. The wife described the husband’s evidence as implausible and opportunistic.

[33] In Christakos v. De Caires, 2016 ONSC 702, Nicholson J. (at para 10) adopted as helpful MacDonald J.’s following outline in Re Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283, 269 N.S.R. (3d) 84:

[36] There are many tools for assessing credibility:

a) The ability to consider inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’s evidence, which includes internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony and the testimony of other witnesses.

b) The ability to review independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness’ testimony.

c) The ability to assess whether the witness’ testimony is plausible or, as stated by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 252 (BC CA), 1951 CarswellBC 133, it is “in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical [and] informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”, but in doing so I am required not to rely on false or frail assumptions about human behaviour.

d) It is possible to rely upon the demeanour of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language, but it should be done with caution (R. v. Mah, 2002 NSCA 99 [at paras.] 70-75).

e) Special consideration must be given to the testimony of witnesses who are parties to proceedings; it is important to consider the motive that witnesses may have to fabricate evidence. R. v. J.H. 2005 253 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 39 (OCA) [at paras.] 51-56).

[37] There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’s testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’s evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’s evidence (See R. v. D.R. [1966] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. supra). [Emphasis in original.]

[34] Neither party was a very credible witness.

[35] On important dates and events, the husband was often vague, lacking detail about, for example, the structure and operations of Gratuss. So too was evidence about his income, especially for the years in Canada before and after the parties separated. He operated a cash business. He declared an average 2012-2014 line 150 income of only $13,216. The evidence about his post-separation employment circumstances and prospects was thoroughly unsatisfactory.

[36] The wife was equally unpersuasive. Her evidence about the parties’ cohabitation at Lives 2B and the parties’ involvement in Gratuus was contradicted by the witnesses Balceris (Lives 2B) and Sinkars and Vlastelica (Gratuus). Most puzzling too, as already noted, was her failure to produce a copy of the signed marriage contract on which her case pivoted even though she travelled before trial to Latvia to obtain relevant documents and to have her marriage date realty appraised – an oversight she attributed to misunderstanding her lawyer’s instructions.

[37] One incident which occurred during a break in the trial is noteworthy.

[38] An Order excluding witnesses was made at the outset of trial and explained to the parties. Ms. Vlastelica, a seventy-eight year old pensioner whom the husband intended to call as a witness, was contacted by R.O.#1 who had travelled to Riga and visited her. The wife’s parents had contacted R.O.#1 and told him that she wanted to see him. There were three visits. During the second visit R.O.#1 testified that Ms. Vlastelica told him that she was receiving many telephone calls from the husband and his lawyer. He saw a sheet of paper that posed three questions relevant to these proceedings. The third visit was prompted by a call from Ms. Vlastelica which, afterwards, the son understood had followed a contact by the husband’s extended family in Latvia arranging to take her away from Riga for an indefinite period.

[39] Ms. Vlastelica testified. She confirmed the contacts between R.O.#1 and her and that she had been contacted by the husband and his lawyer. There were many calls. She also recalled that there were three questions that she would be asked (there were many more, of course, when she testified). Ms. Vlastelica said that she did not speak about the case with the son. Importantly, given the conflict in the parties’ positions about her caregiving of the parties’ children and her involvement in Gratuus, Ms. Vlastelica’s evidence clearly supported the husband’s narrative.

[40] Both of the parties breached the exclusion Order made. The most logical inference is that the wife initiated through her parents contact between Ms. Vlastelica and R.O.#1, who was estranged from his father and supported his mother. The husband responded in kind. The significance of this incident to this trial is that it underscores the court’s reluctance to accept without qualification either party’s evidence and has made the fact finding task more difficult. The husband was more unreliable, the wife less believable.

[41] What did emerge from the evidence though is that the wife was far more focussed on the family than the husband and that he was an unreliable partner and provider for the family. This will impact how the court will deal with any equalization payment and the parties’ support obligations.

[42] No adverse inference is drawn with respect to the contact made by the husband’s counsel with the witness.

Issues

[43] The issues to be determined are:

(a) parenting;

(b) whether the parties entered into a marriage contract and, if so, whether it excluded the equalization provisions of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“the Act”).

(d) what are the parties’ incomes and what support, if any, is payable?

Parenting

[44] On January 16, 2015 McGee J. made an Order appointing the Office of the Children's Lawyer (“OCL”) to represent the youngest child of the parties. R.O.#3 was born March 30, 1999 and has always resided in the primary care of his mother and, when the parties cohabited, with them. R.O.#3 has significant health challenges, having been diagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder, developmental delay, selective mutism, learning disorder, hypothyroidism and social difficulties.

[45] The OCL undertook an investigation and delivered a report dated November 27, 2015. The clinical investigator (Saini) was not called as a witness. The husband accepted the Report’s recommendations with respect to access. Including custody (which the father did not contest) those recommendations were thoughtful and well supported by the narrative of the investigation undertaken as disclosed in the Report, and the evidence at trial. That evidence included the fact that for over a year after his parents separated there had been no physical contact between R.O.#3 and his father. An observation visit between the son and his father was held on October 26, 2016 (sic). The investigator observed that the child appeared to have “a negative view of his father” but did not completely reject him. The father reported, as he confirmed at trial, that he felt that the child was being prevented by his mother from seeing him. He wished no contact with his older sons whom he blamed for his arrest the year earlier. The investigator also recorded the father as telling his son that he might move to Riga and asking whether R.O.#3 would visit him there.

[46] The Report described the child’s situation in these terms,

R.O., age 16, is currently caught between his parents’ dispute of custody and access. This dispute is characterized by a longstanding acrimonious relationship between the parents, allegations of substance abuse, emotional harm, the parents’ inability to shelter the child from their toxic conflict, the parents’ involvement of the child in the middle of this dispute and by putting R. in a position that he is expected to take sides in the dispute.

R. remains in need of consistency, security, safety and an environment free from conflict. Although R. has been routinely exposed to his parents’ conflict, it seems that he is currently functioning well in his school environment and he is well supported by the teachers and special educators at his school.

[47] It is noteworthy that no recommendation was made with respect to an access schedule. Despite their significant interpersonal difficulties, both parties agreed that the child’s relationship with his father should be re-established, facilitated by a third party professional, or therapeutic, counselling. This is the background to the Report’s fourth recommendation,

…It is clear that the father-child relationship is strained but there could be benefit in attempting to repair the relationship. In order to re-establish contact between the father and the child, a third party facilitator should assist so to maximize the opportunity for repair. Given the limited financial means of the family unit, it would be unrealistic to involve a private therapist to facilitate the reintegration. Instead, it would be beneficial for Mr. Oskalns to participate in R.’s counselling services to be arranged by the York Support Services Network. Using a third party professional to assist in re-establishing contact and addressing the child’s current negative views of the father has the advantage of increasing the likelihood that future contact will be beneficial and long lasting. The challenge of this approach is that the plan for access falls on the responsibility of the third party professional to decide when time should be increased or decreased based on the child’s experiences with the contact. One possible solution is for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to reinvestigate the matter once the father-child contact has been established with the assistance of the third party professional. [Emphasis added]

[48] The Report also concluded that until “the child and parents receive counselling, no substantial change in the parenting arrangement will improve the current situation”. I agree. Custody of, and access with, R.O.#3 shall be in accordance with Schedule “A” appended to these Reasons (this is slightly modified from the Report’s recommendations).

Marriage Contract

[49] The wife alleges that the parties signed a marriage contract on November 2, 2007 shortly after the sale of the Augusta Deglava apartment. The husband testified that he had no recollection of signing any such document but he did acknowledge that the parties saw lawyers and later attended a notary. The wife contends that the contract was primarily intended to protect her property from the husband: he says that if he did sign such a document then it was only intended to allow the wife to sell property in Latvia in his absence.

[50] Translated from Latvian, the document is identified as a “Marriage Contract.” Paragraph 1 of that contract, upon which the wife relies as dealing with spousal property rights in the event of separation, declares that “without mistake, fraud or duress” the parties,

Anita Askalne (sic) and Aivars Oskalns stipulate separate ownership in place of lawful property relations of the spouses – and thus it is established that all the property which has been acquired by the spouse prior to the marriage and which is and will be acquired by the spouse during the time of marriage or subsequent to the marriage shall be regarded as a separate property of the spouse who has acquired or brought the property in the family life, and this spouse shall be entitled to act in regard to that property independently of the other spouse. The parties entering into this Contract shall be entitled to purchase and sell or dispose of in any other manner the immovable property and other movable property that belongs to them, to enter into all forms of lawful obligations and sign promissory notes without the consent of the other spouse, to conclude all forms of contracts and deeds, to make deeds and wills, to issue bills of exchange, debentures, to manage household independently, in addition the parties entering into this Contract especially underline that the wife Anita Oskalne shall not be held liable for debts and obligations of the husband Aivars Oskalns and, vice versa, the husband Aivars Oskalns shall not be held liable for debts and obligations of the wife Anita Oskalne.”

[51] The contract also contains a number of more general provisions such as restricting each party's ability to deal with the other spouse’s property without that spouse's consent and for the payment of “family and joint household expenses according to his or her material circumstances.”

[52] Both parties agree that they consulted lawyers in Latvia and that they attended a notary. The husband's evidence was unclear why it was necessary to see a notary but the wife testified that notarized copies of the signed contract were required for various government and land registry purposes. According to the wife, three copies of the contract were signed and, in particular, registered on title to the Lives 2B and Litrinu properties. The property abstracts for both of those properties record the registration of a Marriage Contract on title dated November 2, 2007. It is puzzling though that at no time has the wife ever produced a copy of the Marriage Contract signed by both parties, this despite the fact that after a broad disclosure Order was made by McGee J. in January 2015, the wife went to Latvia to obtain documents relevant to the issues in this case and to obtain property appraisals.

Analysis

[53] The provisions of the Act, which are engaged by the parties’ dispute on this issue are sections 52, 55(1), 56(4) and 58 (a) and (b).

(1) Two persons who are married to each other or intend to marry may enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective rights and obligations under the marriage or on separation, on the annulment or dissolution of the marriage or on death, including,

(a) ownership in or division of property;

(b) support obligations;

(c) the right to direct the education and moral training of their children, but not the right to custody of or access to their children; and

(d) any other matter in the settlement of their affairs.

(2) A provision in a marriage contract purporting to limit a spouse’s rights under Part II (Matrimonial Home) is unenforceable.

(1) A domestic contract and an agreement to amend or rescind a domestic contract are unenforceable unless made in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed.

56 (4) A court may, on application, set aside a domestic contract or a provision in it,

(a) if a party failed to disclose to the other significant assets, or significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the domestic contract was made;

(b) if a party did not understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract; or

The manner and formalities of making a domestic contract and its essential validity and effect are governed by the proper law of the contract, except that,

(a) a contract of which the proper law is that of a jurisdiction other than Ontario is also valid and enforceable in Ontario if entered into in accordance with Ontario’s internal law;

(b) subsection 33 (4) (setting aside provision for support or waiver) and section 56 apply in Ontario to contracts for which the proper law is that of a jurisdiction other than Ontario.

[54] There is no question that the document challenged by the husband was a Marriage Contract. It dealt with property rights within the marriage and, however rudimentary, support obligations. While the husband has no recollection whether he signed it, I find that in fact he and the wife did - what other reason was there to attend lawyers and, afterwards, a notary? Why too would the title abstracts for the Lives 2B and Litrinu properties record the registration of a Marriage Contract?

[55] Section 58 deals specifically with domestic contracts made outside of Ontario. In Mittler v. Mittler 1988 8645 (ON SC), [1988], 17 R.F.L. (3d) 113, [1988] O.J. No. 1741, [1988] 12 A.C.W.S. (3d) 125 (Ont. S.C.) McKinlay J. (as she then was) observed that,

The introductory portion of s. 58 states the basic common law conflict of laws rule that the proper law of the contract (in this case Quebec law) governs the manner and formalities of making a domestic contract and its essential validity and effect.

[56] Despite the fact that the Marriage Contract was registered on title, there was no evidence from either of the lawyers consulted by the parties or the notary involved in the contract, and no expert evidence, about the law of Latvia governing domestic contracts. Absent any such evidence, Ontario's internal law, as codified by sections 55 and 56 of the Act, governs the validity and effect of the parties’ Marriage Contract.

[57] The husband's argument that the contract is unenforceable because it does not comply with the formal requirements of section 55 (1) of the Act fails in light of the court’s finding that it was in writing, the parties signed it and their signatures were witnessed by the notary as evidenced by the registration of the contract on title.

[58] As for section 56 (4) of the Act, it is not necessary to consider the two-part test for setting aside a domestic contract as identified by the Court of Appeal in LeVan v. LeVan, 2008 ONCA 388, 90 O.R. (3d) 1. No evidence was led that required any such inquiry. Rather, the husband’s position is that even if this court determined that the parties had entered into a Marriage Contract its language was insufficient to exclude the property of each of the spouses, in particular the realty of the wife, from the equalization provisions of the Act.

[59] In Bosch v. Bosch, 1991 7177, 6 O.R. (3d) 168 (Ont C.A.) the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the provisions of a marriage contract made in the Netherlands excluded a matrimonial home brought by the husband to the marriage (and which he owned on the valuation date).

[60] The marriage contract provided,

“…That all property, money, and rights of every nature and kind held by the parties hereto, whether held at the time of the marriage or obtained afterwards, shall remain the property of the respective parties but each shall contribute equally to the upkeep and maintenance of the household (and children). If both parties contribute to the purchase of any property for purpose of the household it shall be deemed to be held jointly in equal shares, and not in proportion to their respective contributions.”

[61] The court focused on the sufficiency of the language in the contract. That language must clearly and cogently, whether directly or by necessary implication such as a general reference to the equalization provisions of the Act, evidence the parties’ intentions to exempt substantial property rights,

The entitlement of spouses in Ontario to equalization under the Family Law Act, 1986 is a new substantive right, quite independent from any right of ownership, which can be ousted by a domestic contract, even one that pre-existed the Act. However, in order for a pre-existing contract to have that effect, it must deal, explicitly or by necessary implication, with “a matter” akin to the equalization provisions of the Act. An agreement as to ownership of property, without more, is insufficient. For the marriage contract to prevail over the equalization provisions of the Act, the contract must contain provisions which address, in their intent if not in their explicit language, the relative economic position of the parties upon the dissolution of the marriage, through the distribution of assets between them on the basis of ownership or otherwise. This can be done either through an agreement that a given property be excluded from a spouse’s net family property, under s. 4 (2) 6 of the Act, or through an agreement in a domestic contract which deals with equalization-type rights so as to bring s. 2 (10) into effect [emphasis added] (p. 183).

[62] In Lay v. Lay 2000 5669, 47 O.R. (3d) 779 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2000 Carswell Ont. 4309, general reference in an impugned contract to the provisions of the Family Law Reform Act, predecessor to the Act, dealing with property rights was sufficient evidence that the parties had “directed their minds to whether the property would be subject to - or exempt from - the governing statutory regime” (paragraph 15).

[63] In this case the husband testified that he understood that the Marriage Contract was intended to allow the wife to sell property in his absence. Whether or not that was, in fact, the purpose of the contract, nowhere in it can I find the kind of direct and cogent language which addresses, explicitly or by necessary implication, the relative economic consequences of dissolution of the parties’ marriage as referenced in Bosch. The November 2, 2007 Marriage Contract does not exclude either party's property from the equalization provisions of the Act. It is not necessary to consider whether any of the judicial oversight provisions of the Act apply.

Equalization

(a) Value of assets owned on the valuation date

[64] The parties agreed before trial that the value of the matrimonial home was $630,000. Where they differed was the value to be attributed to their household contents, the wife’s automobile and the modest amount on deposit in a joint bank account. No evidence was led with respect to any of these assets except as baldly referenced in the parties’ Financial Statements. In light of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidentiary record, the court must estimate these values based on what evidence has been tendered: Lampron v. Lampron (2003), 50 RFL (5^th) 98, 2003 69342 (ONSC); additional reasons of 2004 CarswellOnt 2517 (S.C.J.); aff’d at 12 RFL (6) 391 (Ont CA), 2005 788 (ONCA).

[65] The value of the household contents, all of which were retained by the wife, and the value of her automobile shall be the average of the parties’ estimates. No value shall be attributed to the husband for the value of the funds that the wife maintained were in the parties’ joint bank account and which she, most probably, used. Schedule “B” accompanying these reasons sets out the values attributed.

[66] The wife claimed $31,500 for notional disposition costs relating to the matrimonial home. In cross-examination, she testified that she did not understand what that entry meant, that she relied on her lawyer when completing and signing her financial statement. Her lawyer argued that given the wife’s lack of income and assets, a sale would be the inevitable consequence of the court awarding the husband an equalization payment, and so a notional deduction was appropriate.

[67] In Bortnikov v. Ratikova, 2016 ONCA 427, one of the issues before the Court of Appeal involved the deduction of notional real estate fees where there was no evidence that the prospect of a property sale was reasonably likely. The Court summarized the proper approach to be taken,

[11] As a general rule, in determining whether disposition costs should be deducted from an asset's value, the analysis should take into account evidence of the probable timing of the asset's disposition. It is appropriate to deduct disposition costs from net family property "if there is satisfactory evidence of a likely disposition date and if it is clear that such costs will be inevitable when the owner disposes of the assets or is deemed to have disposed of them": Sengmueller v. Sengmueller (1994), 1994 8711 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 (C.A.), at pp. 216-17. An allowance for disposition costs from net family property should not be made in the case "where it is not clear when, if ever, a sale or transfer of property will be made": McPherson v. McPherson (1988), 1988 4732 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (2d) 641 (C.A.), at p. 647. However, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether the disposition of the assets is inevitable; rather, the court should determine on the basis of the evidence whether it is more likely than not that the assets would be sold, at which point disposition costs would inevitably be incurred: Buttar v. Buttar, 2013 ONCA 517, at para. 20.

[68] The Court observed that since “there was no clear and satisfactory evidence that [the owner] was contemplating a possible sale…in the foreseeable future” no deduction was permissible for notional real estate fees.

[69] There was no evidentiary foundation in this case that sale of the matrimonial home was likely in the foreseeable future. There was no evidence that the operating expenses of the residence (to which, according to the wife, the husband had not been contributing anyway) were in arrears. For example, nothing was owing on account of realty taxes or utilities. The evidence did indicate that the wife was able to afford the property with the assistance of the parties’ two older sons. It is also unencumbered, and mortgage rates are historically low. While the property may need to be sold at some point in time and, in all likelihood some expense for real estate fees incurred, these are speculative. No deduction shall be allowed for this notional expense.

(b) Value of property owned on the valuation date

[70] The value of property owned by the husband on the valuation date was $5,925 and the value of the wife’s property $655,652.

[71] The parties dispute the value of each other’s property when they remarried. Their principal assets comprised Gratuss and the realty owned by the wife or in which she held an interest (i.e. the Litrinu property). Despite the fact that the company’s line of credit was secured by collateral mortgages registered against title to the wife’s Lives 2B and Augusta Deglava properties neither party undertook a valuation of Gratuss – the evidentiary record of this asset’s ownership and value was woefully inadequate. Whether deliberate or not this oversight was the responsibility of both parties and unnecessarily lengthened this trial.

(d) Gratuss

[72] Gratuss was incorporated as a limited liability company in 1998 specializing in wholesale food, beverage and tobacco products. While the parties dispute the actual involvement of a family friend, Leontine Vlastelica, who is identified as the company’s director after incorporation, what is not disputed is that from December 5, 2003 to June 14, 2005 the husband was identified in the Latvian Government’s Commercial Register as “Managing Director” with “Right of Sole Representation.” There was no evidence as to what this last phrase means. Nothing like what in Ontario would be described as a corporate Minute Book was tendered in evidence, although the Commercial Register recorded that on December 5, 2003 and later on June 14, 2005 Ms. Vlastelica transferred ownership of Gratuss to, respectively, the husband and wife in equal shares. This is the best evidence, in my view, of the company’s ownership when they remarried. The Commercial Register also notes that as of November 8, 2007 the husband owned 100 percent of the company.

[73] The evidence also discloses the following facts:

(a) on February 22, 2005 SEB Latvian Unibanka (“SEB”) and Gratuss agreed to a 120,000 LVL line of credit for the company secured by a collateral mortgage registered on title to the Lives 2B property;

(b) on May 16, 2005 the line of credit was increased by 40,000 LVL to 160,000 LVL and, as additional security, a collateral mortgage was secured against the wife’s Augusta Deglava property in favour of SEB;

(d) the 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports for Gratuss filed with the Latvian Government indicate that as of January 1, 2006 the company’s long term liabilities comprised loans from credit institutions in the amount of 154,863 LVL, an increase from 6,033 LVL as of January 1, 2005;

(e) a Note from the company’s auditor confirmed the information in (d) above and added that the credit was for “supplementing current assets for storage of the company.” That “storage” mostly included finished goods and goods for service of 338,356 LVL. The company had tangible (fixed) assets worth 50,637 LVL and modest cash on hand of 665 LVL as of January 1, 2006;

(f) the wife acknowledged at trial her pre-trial questioning evidence that she mortgaged her properties to secure funding for the company because it had very little cash flow to purchase product;

(g) neither party tendered any evidence about the outstanding balance of the SEB line of credit as of the January 21, 2006 marriage date; and

(h) in his Financial Statement sworn for trial the husband did not disclose any interest in Gratuss on the marriage date. The wife disclosed in her statement a fifty percent value of $92,540, a figure which she attributed to her lawyer’s advice, nothing more.

[74] Neither party made, in my view, a reasonable effort to value their interest in the company. This is especially troubling because the husband claimed that the realty owned by the wife and in which she held an interest was encumbered by the 160,000 LVL secured against title to the Lives 2B and Augusta Deglava properties. The wife claimed nothing was owed. Both parties ignored any possible off-setting value for their interest in Gratuss. The evidence is clear though that the company’s debt to SEB was fully repaid around the time that the Litrinu property was sold in mid-November 2007. The Latvian Government’s Commercial Register records the husband as being the “Head of the Board” with the “Right of Sole Representation” from November 8, 2007 to February 14, 2008.

[75] In light of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidentiary record about Gratuss’ value, the court must estimate that value based on what evidence has been tendered: see Lampron (above). The Annual Reports filed with the Latvian Government do not contain Revenue and Expense statements nor do anything more than present pro forma Balance Sheet Statements unaccompanied by accountant’s comments or notes. While the company is shown as having tangible fixed assets of 50,637 LVL as of January 1, 2006 no information is provided as to the basis of that value. It is simply impossible to conclude anything other than the value the company was, at least, equal to the value of the debts secured against the wife’s properties. There is no suggestion in the evidence that whatever net proceeds may have been generated by the winding-up of the company were not fully invested in the Apple Blossom Drive, Thornhill, Ontario residence acquired in the wife’s name in May 2008. Accordingly, no value shall be recorded for either party’s interest in Gratuss when they married, and no value will be recorded for the company’s debt registered against the Augusta Deglava and Lives 2B properties.

(e) 9 Litrinu

[76] The parties are agreed that the value of the wife’s down payment for this property made in August 2005 was $10,012 as of the marriage date. This property was sold in November 2007 and a portion of its net sale proceeds used in the May 2008 purchase of the Apple Blossom Drive residence.

(f) Augusta Deglava/Lives 2B

[77] The parties dispute on the value of the Augusta Deglava and Lives 2B properties owned by the wife on the date of marriage. Both tendered expert evidence, the wife through a Diana Stale who valued the properties, respectively, as being worth 55,000 LVL (i.e. $111,133 CDN) and 262,000 LVL (i.e. $524,627 CDN): the husband, through Inge Meiere who valued the properties as being worth 49,000 LVL (i.e. $98,112 CDN) and 196,000 LVL (i.e. $392,469 CDN). These witnesses delivered reports compliant with the Family Law Rules and testified via Skype using interpreters, Ms. Stale from Riga, Latvia and Ms. Meiere from Rome, Italy.

[78] Ms. Stale began her career in 1995 as a real estate agent for Latio LLC, a company having 150 employees and specializing in realty valuation and property transactions. She was certified as a real estate appraiser by the Association of Appraisers in Latvia, obtained certification in this area by the European Union of Certified Appraisers and in 2015 became a member of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, one of only seven members in Latvia. At the time of trial she was head of Latio’s division of 25 real estate appraisers.

[79] Ms. Meiere began her career in realty valuation in 1994 obtaining an Appraiser’s Certificate from the Latvian Land Service Realty Property Valuation Centre. She became a member that year in the Latvian Real Estate Valuators Association. In 1996 she was certified as an appraiser by the Latvian Association of Property Appraisers. In 2006 she became a member of the Latvian Real Estate Association. Since 2002 she has been a council member of the Real Estate Evaluation Advisory Council. At the time of trial she acted as an appraiser for an international company based in France that dealt with industrial and commercial properties for international clients, as well as acting as an appraiser and consultant in Latvia.

[80] Both experts adopted a market valuation approach, also described as a comparable sales approach. This assumes that an informed purchaser will not pay more for a specific property than for what another property of similar quality location can be, or has recently been, bought. Properties are compared to the property subject of the appraisal by adjusting their selling or offering prices according to various prevailing market factors such as location, physical description and market saturation. This list is not exhaustive. In this case, the experts task was complicated by the fact that they were being asked to appraise in 2015 the value of properties as of January 1, 2006, both sold many years earlier, and so were heavily reliant on historical data almost a decade old. Fortunately, at least with respect to the physical description of both properties, there was little difference in the information provided to the experts by the parties.

[81] A confounding complication, on which both experts agreed, was that the Land Registry records maintained by the state were unreliable in terms of accurately recording transaction values. Ms. Stale testified that in early 2006 the Latvian Government recognized that market sale values for realty sales transactions were not being properly reflected in Registry. Lesser reported transaction values impacted tax rates. As Ms. Meiere confirmed…

Q. Are you aware this was an issue?

A. Yes, I was

Q. Yes, you were. And do you agree with Ms. Stale that this was a problem, and a serious one that existed in Latvia in 2006? We were talking about 2006.

A. This problem still today.

Q. This problem exists today?

A. Yes, the problem is not maybe as – as widespread as it once was but there still is an opportunity to register a transaction if both parties agree to register it at a lesser cost.

Q. All right. So, it’s possible to falsify the information that one submits to the land registry office in Latvia, if one really wants to?

A. Yes, it is possible.

[82] This problem highlighted the importance of a more selective, and verifiable, choice of comparable properties. Both experts also relied on information maintained in their respective firm’s databases to test their assumptions.

[83] I prefer and accept the evidence of Ms. Meiere about the value of the Augusta Deglava and Lives 2B properties for these reasons:

(a) nowhere in her report, did Ms. Stale disclose the proper addresses and/or the cadestral (or PIN) information for any of the 10 properties selected as comparables. Ms. Meiere, who did provide this information in her report, testified that Latvian valuation standards required comparable property address or cadastral information, or both, to be provided. Ms. Stale acknowledged that this was “an oversight.” The practical effect, of course, is that the reader of Ms. Stale’s report would have no way of assessing the relative comparability of the properties selected to the subject properties;

(b) the values of eight of the 10 properties selected by Ms. Stale as comparable (six for Augusta Deglava and four for Lives 2B) were, according to Ms. Stale, falsely reported and recorded in Registry. She came to this conclusion based on a review of her company's database but nowhere in her report did Ms. Stale note the false reporting or provide in that report, or when testifying over several days, her company's internal information to verify the values provided. The aggregated impact of this approach resulted in Ms. Stale attributing a higher relative value to the subject properties;

(c) in her valuation of Lives 2B Ms. Meiere cross-referenced the values recorded in the Land Registry database to her firm’s internal database in order to determine whether, within a limited range, the values were reasonable. She attached her firm’s database records to her report;

(d) while, in many respects, the experts agreed on the relative adjustment ratios comparing the selected properties to the subject properties, Ms. Stale was more aggressive, the impact of which was to increase the value of the subject properties. For example, despite her report’s observation that “January of 2006 was not the most active month in the real estate market” Ms. Stale adjusted upwards by seven percent two selected Lives 2B comparable properties (Codes Street and Sipeles Street) based on November 2005 sales (these were the only two of the 10 comparable properties not falsely reported to Registry). Ms. Meiere testified that a seven percent rise in market value over a two month period was, quite simply, unrealistic. Her description of the general state of the residential real estate market in Riga at the end of 2005 was less formulaic, more informative than Ms. Stale's description;

(e) while both experts testified that they referenced their respective companies database and other external sources to assist them, only Ms. Meiere personally attended the subject properties. She was only able to view property exteriors though. She observed the adjacent property to Lives 2B on which the neighbour (Balceris) operated a commercial garage. The evidence was clear that this garage existed in January of 2006. Ms. Stale was unaware about any such garage and so did not take that into account. She never bothered to check this with the wife: the presence of a garage, she agreed, would significantly impact the value of the subject property;

(f) the term “in exploitation” with respect to Latvian residential properties is roughly equivalent to an occupancy permit in Ontario. Ms. Stale testified that before a residential property can be occupied, it must be put in “into exploitation.” This is “a physical and legal process…to ensure that all technical aspects of the building are completed…” There is a registration process. Whether a newly built property was “in exploitation” impacts property value. Ms. Stale did not identify in her report the fact that Lives 2B was not “in exploitation” which would have negatively impacted its value, but she then used two comparable properties (Codas Street and Sipeles Street) which were “in exploitation.” This would increase the value of Lives 2B; and

(g) for Augusta Deglava, Ms. Meiere chose as her comparables three apartments located on the same street as the subject property, one of which was located in the same building. Cadestral and address information were provided and all three properties were sold between March 16, 2006 and May 31, 2006 (after the marriage date) but at times when both experts agreed that that real estate market values were rising. Ms. Meiere's evidence about Augusta Deglava was not challenged.

[84] Ms. Meiere's evidence was more comprehensive and, in my view, less pro forma than Ms. Stale’s evidence. It is more reliable and, for the reasons given, I find that the values of Augusta Deglava and Lives 2B on January 21, 2006 to be $98,112 (49,000 LVL) and $392,470 (196,000 LVL) respectively.

[85] As there was no other evidence from either party about the value of their other assets when they remarried, the wife shall be allowed a $500,601 deduction for the value of her property brought to the marriage. This value includes the values for the properties referenced in preceding paragraph and the agreed value for the wife’s interest in the Litrinu property. There was no evidence about notional disposition costs.

(a) Net family property/Equalization

[86] Based on the foregoing, the husband’s net family property is $4,759 and the wife’s net family property is $148,026. She shall pay to the husband an equalization payment of $71,633.50.

Support

[87] The evidence about each party’s income, employment plans and prospects was unsatisfactory, particularly in the husband’s case.

[88] He testified that he had looked for employment after the parties separated but that he was physically unable to do the lifting and loading needed to move furniture. There was no corroborating medical evidence. Despite living in Canada since, at least, early 2006 and taking English lessons before then and operating a business, he claimed that he was not proficient in English. He was unemployed. He did not explain how he had managed to survive since separation. There was no evidence about any initiative undertaken to upgrade his skills or seek out alternate forms of employment that did not involve heavy physical labour. There is no compelling reason why he should not have imputed to him an income equivalent to the annual minimum wage of $20,700.

[89] The wife has no discernible source of income. When she came to Canada, she took and completed English language lessons. She took a hairdressing course but later enrolled in a local community college to pursue a nursing degree. She obtained OSAP funding but withdrew from her studies in November 2014 for reasons relating to the breakdown of the marriage.

[90] The wife also testified that the family’s expenses were being funded by the parties’ oldest sons from their carpet cleaning business. No details about that business were tendered in evidence but it is not unreasonable that the sons’ earnings have been sufficient to meet the family’s modest budget. In October 2015 the wife successfully applied for $200 monthly assistance from the Ontario Ministry of Community & Social Services for R.O.#3 as a severely disabled child. It is clear that this child will be financially dependent for the indefinite future and that the caregiving challenges he presents impact the wife’s employment prospects.

[91] R.O.#2 testified that his parent’s separation forced him to discontinue his studies in December 2014 to help support his mother and younger brother. Like R.O.#1, he is estranged from his father. He had planned to complete a degree in Civil Engineering-Technology.

[92] At the conclusion of the evidence and the parties’ trial submissions, I invited submissions from counsel about the husband’s obligation to financially assist R.O.#2 (there is no question that he is obliged to support R.O.#3). The husband argued that he had no obligation to support R.O.#2 because that child had caused the estrangement between them and that his son should be held accountable. The trial evidence, which I accept, is that the husband was verbally abusive to the wife and children, often intoxicated and, after trying to strike R.O.#2 (there were frequent arguments in the house, and between them) his son lost all respect for his father. At the time of separation, the husband was living in separate quarters in the home and bought groceries only for himself. While R.O.#2 demonstrated antipathy towards his father, his evidence about the family’s circumstances in the several years leading up to his parents’ separation was consistent with the evidence of his mother, his older brother and echoed in the OCL Report narrative. There is no question that this child’s decision to interrupt his post-secondary education was a direct consequence of his parents’ separation.

[93] It is not possible, however, on the evidentiary record to determine the support issues relating to this child, and so no Order will be made with respect to R.O. #2 at this time.

[94] The overall financial circumstances of this family are grim. The children’s futures and whatever net worth the parties have in Canada have been profoundly prejudiced by a trial neither party can afford. I am concerned that the husband will return to Latvia. This is what was recorded in the OCL Report. He left the wife and children in late 1999/2000 without making any arrangements for their support, left his previous spouse after only a short time in Canada when he returned to Latvia in 2002, does not appear to have made any arrangements for the family’s support while he was in Canada in 2005 nor after he returned to Ontario from Latvia in early 2006 after the parties remarried. He has not contributed to any of his dependants’ support. He has no assets, no verifiable employment plans and no incentive to remain in Canada. The disposition I propose to make will recognize his entitlement to an equalization payment from the wife but balance that against his support obligations.

Disposition

[95] The following Orders are made:

(a) A Divorce Order shall issue;

(b) Custody of, and access with, R.O.#3 shall be in accordance with Schedule “A” to these Reasons;

(c) subject to subparagraph (d), the wife shall pay to the husband an equalization payment of $71,633.50, rounded to $71,634;

(d) pursuant to section 9(1) (c) of the Act, the equalization payment shall be divided into three shares, one of which in the amount of $20,000 shall be payable on July 1, 2017. The second payment in the amount of $25,000 shall be payable on July 1, 2018. The last payment in the amount of $26,634 shall be payable on July 1, 2019. Post judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C. 43, shall accrue from the date of release of these Reasons on the entirety of the equalization payment and shall be added to the share payable on July 1, 2019. In the event that the matrimonial should be sold before July 1, 2019 then the entire balance of the equalization payment then owing shall, together with interest (as above), become due and owing on the sale completion date;

(e) the husband shall pay to the wife base child support for R.O.#3 in the amount of $174 monthly effective October 1, 2016;

(f) the husband shall pay to the wife arrears of base child support for R.O.#3 in the amount of $174 monthly for the period from January 1, 2015 to and including the payment due on September 1, 2016. Enforcement of the sum owing of $3,480 (i.e., 20 months x $174) shall be suspended until the earlier of default in payment of the monthly support set out in (e) above or July 1, 2017;

(g) the amount of the partial equalization amounts payable to the husband on July 1, 2017 and July 1, 2018 shall be subject to any unpaid child support;

(h) nothing in this Order precludes the wife from applying for security for the performance of the husband’s support obligations after July 1, 2017;

(i) no spousal support shall be payable at this time; and

(j) the amount payable to the husband on July 1, 2019 shall be subject to any outstanding arrears of child and spousal (if applicable) support.

[96] A sale of the matrimonial home at this time will represent a hardship to the wife. Payment of the husband’s equalization payment is predicated on his obtaining meaningful employment and represents a reasonable balance between his receipt of that entitlement and meeting his support obligations. It also recognizes the child R.O.#3’s need for consistency and stability which remaining in the matrimonial home will help ensure.

[97] A Support Deduction Order shall issue.

[98] Nothing shall be paid on account of pre-judgment interest.

[99] If the parties are unable to resolve the costs of these proceedings, they shall file with the Court as part of the Continuing Record their written submissions no later than September 16, 2016. Offers to Settle (if any), Bills of Costs and any authorities upon which they may be relying shall be separately filed by then too.

Justice D.A. Jarvis

Released: August 24, 2016

Schedule “A”

Anita Oskalne should have sole custody of the child R.O.#3.
Each parent should be entitled to communicate with and receive information from third parties providing care to the child such as health care practitioners, education providers, therapists, counselors etc. and should be able to review any reports, documentation or concerns respecting the child. Both parents should provide written consent to the disclosure of such information as may be required.
The child should visit with Aivars Oskalne with the assistance and as directed by the York Support Services Network.
With the assistance and as directed by the York Support Services Network, virtual contact via Skype should be established so that the father has consistent online contact with the child.
The child should remain in the current school.
Exchanges and transportation: Anita Oskalns should facilitate all exchanges, as she is to transport the child to the visits at the York Support Services Network.
Aivars Oskalns should not consume alcohol 24 hours before visits with R.
Each parent should provide the other parent with any change in emergency contact information and any change of telephone numbers.
Neither parent should use the child to relay messages, notes or any other communications, except for the communication log book to be passed between the parents.
Child’s birthdays: Each parent should plan his/her own family celebration on his or her own time with the child.
Mother’s Day/Father’s Day: Each parent should plan his/her own family celebration on his or her own time with the child.
The parents should attend post-separation/divorce counselling.
The mother shall enrol R.O.#3 in age specific counselling and shall provide to the father within one week afterwards details of the counselling to include the name of the counsellor or the counselling service, contact particulars and when the child will be attending his first counselling session. Both parents should participate in counselling as suggested by the counsellor. The counsellor chosen for the child, and parents, should be someone who is knowledgeable about high conflict divorce. The parents should allow the counsellor to use discretion to involve either parent in counselling with the child.
Parents should provide ninety (90) days’ notice to advise of any change of the children’s residency.

Schedule “B”

NET FAMILY PROPERTY

The parties’ names is are

Aivars Oskalns and Anita Oskalne

The valuation date for the following material is (date)

October 12, 2014

The date of marriage is (date)

January 21, 2006

Table 1: Value Of Assets Owned on Valuation Date (List in the order of the categories in the financial statement)

PART 4(a): LAND

Nature & Type of Ownership

(State percentage interest)

Address of Property

APPLICANT

RESPONDENT

Matrimonial Home

98 Canyon Gate, Maple Ontario

$630,000.00

Totals: Value of Land

$0.00

$630,000.00

PART 4(b): GENERAL HOUSEHOLD ITEMS AND VEHICLES

Item

Description

APPLICANT

RESPONDENT

Household goods

Average of parties’ estimates

$4,000.00

& furniture

Cars, boats,

vehicles

Husband’s vehicle is a 2003 GMC Sierra 3500: Wife’s vehicle is a 2009 Toyota RAV 4-average value used for value of wife’s automobile

$5,725.00

$12,288.00

Jewellery, art,

Computer, TV

$1,400.00

electronics, tools,

sports & hobby,

equipment

Other special

Misc. dishes, linen

$700.00

items

Totals: Value of General Household Items and Vehicles

$5,725.00

$18,388.00

PART 4(c): BANK ACCOUNTS AND SAVINGS, SECURITIES AND PENSIONS

Aivars Oskalns v. Anita Oskalne, 2016 ONSC 1676

Case Summary

Reasons for decision

Background

Credibility

Issues

Parenting

Marriage Contract

Analysis

Equalization

Support

Disposition

Schedule “A”

Schedule “B”

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Expert Witnesses

Financial Outcomes

Issues

Statutory Provisions 6

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 2