COURT FILE NO.: CR-14-30
DATE: 20141210
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Ms E. Barefoot, for the Crown
- and -
MICHAEL SHAWN PATRICK
Ms M. Hewitt, for the Defence
Defendant
HEARD: December 9, 2014
REASONS FOR DECISION ON DEFENCE CHARTER APPLICATION
Conlan J.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Illegal drug activity? Charter-infringing police conduct? This case gives rise to these questions. The latter is the subject matter of this decision.
[2] On a four-count Indictment, Michael Shawn Patrick (“Patrick”) is being tried before me, without a jury, in Owen Sound.
[3] The Defence has brought a Charter Application, seeking (i) leave to cross-examine the police officer affiant on confidential information relied upon in support of the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (“ITO”) sworn on August 24, 2012 and (ii) pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, exclusion of evidence obtained by the police pursuant to alleged violations of the accused person’s section 7 (life, liberty and security of the person) and 8 (freedom from unreasonable search or seizure) Charter rights.
[4] The Notice of Application does not expressly cite section 9 of the Charter. Having said that, beyond arguments that the search of the motel room which led to the police seizure of the evidence relied upon in this prosecution was invalid, the Defence does raise issues related to the lawfulness of the arrest of the accused. Thus, it is clear to me that section 9 (freedom from arbitrary detention) is in play.
[5] The Search Warrant for the motel room was issued under section 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. It was authorized by a Justice of the Peace and executed on August 24, 2012.
[6] It is alleged that, upon execution of the Search Warrant in the motel room, the police found in Patrick’s luggage cocaine (four ounces), marihuana (eight grams), cannabis resin (four grams), a digital scale, packaging material and money ($3000.00).
[7] The accused and a young female had been arrested at the motel prior to the Search Warrant being granted.
[8] The uncontroverted chronology of events is as follows: the police investigated Patrick for many months based on tipster information, surveillance and tracking warrant data; police surveillance of Patrick’s motel room continued on the morning of the arrest (August 24, 2012); police commenced the drafting of the ITO that morning to obtain judicial authorization to search the motel room; Patrick and the young female were then arrested by the police after exiting the motel room and before the ITO was completed; police then finished the ITO and obtained the Search Warrant in the early afternoon on August 24, 2012; and execution of the Warrant then immediately occurred inside the motel room.
[9] On the Charter voir dire, the Crown kindly agreed to call the witnesses. The Defence did not call any evidence, although all of the police officers were cross-examined by counsel for Mr. Patrick. The following persons testified: Detective Constable Craig Matheson (“Matheson”) of the Owen Sound Police Service (one of the lead investigators), Detective Constable Mike Holovaci (“Holovaci”) of the same Police Service (one of the lead investigators and the affiant of the ITO) and Detective Constable Bill Ringel of the same Police Service (the Exhibits Officer for the search of the motel room).
[10] The entire voir dire lasted about ½ day at Court on December 9, with submissions by counsel the morning of the 10th. I reserved my decision and delivered these Reasons at Court in the afternoon on December 10.
II. THE CHARGES AND THEIR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
[11] Although not strictly necessary for an understanding of my decision on the Charter Application, I will set out here the charges against Patrick and what the Crown must prove for each offence, beyond a reasonable doubt.
[12] Patrick is charged with possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking (count 1 on the Indictment). The formal charge reads:
Michael Shawn Patrick stands charged that, on or about the 24th day of August, 2012 at the City of Owen Sound in the County of Grey in the Judicial Region of Central West, did possess a substance included in Schedule I to wit: Cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
[13] For me to find Patrick guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, Crown counsel must prove each of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
i. that Patrick was in possession of a substance;
ii. that the substance was cocaine;
iii. that Patrick knew that the substance was cocaine; and
iv. that Patrick had possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking in it.
[14] If Crown counsel has not satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find the accused not guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[15] If Crown counsel has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find the accused guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[16] Further, Patrick is charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance (counts 2 and 3 on the Indictment). The formal charges read:
Michael Shawn Patrick stands charged that, on or about the 24th day of August, 2012 at the City of Owen Sound in the County of Grey in the Judicial Region of Central West, did unlawfully possess a substance included in Schedule II, to wit cannabis, contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
Michael Shawn Patrick stands charged that, on or about the 24th day of August, 2012 at the City of Owen Sound in the County of Grey in the Judicial Region of Central West, did unlawfully possess a substance included in Schedule II, to wit cannabis resin, contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
[17] For me to find Patrick guilty of possession of cannabis/cannabis resin, Crown counsel must prove each of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
i. that Patrick was in possession of a substance;
ii. that the substance was cannabis/cannabis resin; and
iii. that Patrick knew that the substance was cannabis/cannabis resin.
[18] If Crown counsel has not satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find Patrick not guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
[19] If Crown counsel has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find Patrick guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
[20] Further, Patrick is charged with possession of proceeds of crime (count 4 on the Indictment). The formal charge reads:
Michael Shawn Patrick stands charged that, on or about the 24th day of August, 2012 at the City of Owen Sound in the County of Grey in the Judicial Region of Central West, did have in his possession proceeds of property, $3,135 in currency, of a value not exceeding five thousand dollars knowing that all of the proceeds of the property was obtained by the commission in Canada of an offence punishable by indictment contrary to section 354(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
[21] For me to find Patrick guilty of possession of proceeds of crime, Crown counsel must prove each of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
i. that Patrick was in possession of proceeds (in this case, money);
ii. that the proceeds were obtained by crime; and
iii. that Patrick knew that the proceeds had been obtained by crime.
[22] If Crown counsel has not satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find Patrick not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime.
[23] If Crown counsel has satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt of each of these essential elements, I must find Patrick guilty of possession of proceeds of crime.
III. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Crown
[24] In a nutshell, the Crown argues that the arrest of Patrick was a lawful one in that it was made with reasonable and probable grounds. There was no violation of section 9 of the Charter.
[25] In terms of the search of the motel room, the Crown argues that there were sufficient grounds outlined in the ITO such that the Warrant could have been issued.
[26] In terms of whether the Warrant itself has a defect, the Crown submits that it does not, but if it does it is valid in any event.
[27] There was no violation of section 8 of the Charter.
[28] I will indicate now that I disagree with the Crown that the Warrant contains no error and that the search of the motel room would reasonably have afforded evidence of the offence as described in Appendix B. I fail to see how a search of the motel room in Owen Sound would have afforded evidence that Ms. Wright was in possession of cocaine in Allenford.
[29] The Crown’s better argument is that the Warrant is valid despite the error in Appendix B.
The Defence
[30] At the commencement of the Charter voir dire, which counsel agreed would precede the trial proper (rather than conduct a “blended hearing”), counsel for Patrick made it clear that section 7 was only a peripheral issue – the main attack by the Defence was the lawfulness of Patrick’s warrantless arrest by the police (whether there were reasonable and probable grounds) and the legality of the search of the motel room.
[31] Succinctly put, the Defence argues that the arrest of Patrick was arbitrary and a violation of section 9 of the Charter in that it was made without reasonable and probable grounds.
[32] Further, the search of the motel room was unreasonable and a violation of section 8 of the Charter because of the defect in Appendix B of the ITO and the Warrant itself and/or because there were insufficient grounds outlined in the ITO such that the Warrant could reasonably have been issued.
IV. ANALYSIS
Section 9 of the Charter
[33] There is no question that Patrick was arrested by the police without a warrant.
[34] The issue is whether the warrantless arrest was a lawful one.
[35] In terms of the governing legal principles, much of the following is borrowed from my recent decision in R. v. Dhillon, [2014] ONSC 6287.
[36] An arresting police officer must subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds to make the arrest. In addition, those grounds must be objectively justifiable. In other words, a reasonable person placed in the position of the officer must be able to conclude that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. What is not required is anything more than reasonable and probable grounds, and in particular, the police are not required to have a prima facie case for conviction before they can make an arrest. R. v. Storrey, 1990 125 (SCC), [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, at paragraph 17.
[37] The totality of the circumstances must be considered in examining whether there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. Intuition or a good hunch on the part of the police is not enough. A lawful arrest cannot be based on speculation or a mere possibility. R. v. Malapan, [2013] A.J. No. 1484 (Q.B.), at paragraphs 38-39.
[38] Where the arrest is based in part on information supplied to the police by tipsters, one must examine the value of that information. The value of that information for purposes of a warrantless arrest is assessed in the same manner as one would examine the value of tipster information to justify a warrantless search. We look to the “three Cs” – how credible is the information from the tipster(s); how compelling is that information; and to what degree was that information corroborated?
[39] Whether dealing with the lawfulness of an arrest or the legality of a search, there is no rule or expectation that more than one informant will be required. For example, in R. v. Rocha, 2012 ONCA 707, the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the information relied upon for the search warrant was sufficient even though it depended almost exclusively on (extremely detailed) information supplied by one confidential informer (paragraphs 4 and 25).
[40] Where the arrest is based in part on police surveillance of the accused, as here, the Court may ask itself whether the police actually observed the accused engage in any hand-to-hand transaction. Further, the Court may inquire whether person(s) and/or motor vehicle(s) that the accused came in to contact with was/were associated with criminal activity, drug trafficking or drug use. R. v. Quach, [2014] A.J. No. 116 (Prov. Ct.), at paragraphs 244-247.
[41] I find that the arrest of Patrick was a lawful one. There were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, subjectively and objectively.
[42] The accused has failed to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that his section 9 Charter right to be free from arbitrary detention was violated.
[43] In the circumstances, there is no need for me to address at length section 24(2) of the Charter. Suffice it to say that I would have admitted the evidence even if there was found to be an arbitrary arrest. The seriousness of the Charter-infringing police conduct was relatively low. The impact on Patrick’s Charter-protected interest was relatively minimal. And society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits is high, given the importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case and the seriousness of the charges facing the accused. Overall, exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice in to greater disrepute than if the evidence was admitted.
[44] Subjectively, both lead investigators, Matheson and Holovaci, believed that they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Patrick on August 24, 2012. They each testified to that sincere belief on the voir dire.
[45] Objectively, putting aside the issue that this is all somewhat of a red herring because the police had the authority to arrest Patrick on the outstanding warrants, I have no hesitation in concluding that there were ample reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, without a warrant, for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[46] First, the police had cogent information from five tipsters that provided evidence in support of the belief that Patrick was trafficking cocaine in Owen Sound. Four of those five informants were proven and thought to be reliable. Collectively, their information was credible. Further, their information was fairly compelling in that it was detailed and timely (as recent as the day before the arrest). And it was generally first or second-hand information from persons who had obtained narcotics from Patrick or from persons who had been supplied by Patrick. And it was relatively consistent over many months between February and August 2012.
[47] In addition, in material respects, the tipster information was corroborated by the police investigation. For example, police verified through the tracking warrant data and surveillance that there was circumstantial evidence to support a connection between Ms. Mclean and Patrick and a link between Ms. Wright and Patrick.
[48] Second, quite apart from the tipster information, the police had plenty of ammunition to arrest Patrick without a warrant. They had the tracking data that Ms. Mclean had visited a residence in Toronto associated with Patrick and then was stopped by police afterwards and found to be in possession of cocaine and marihuana. They had Patrick’s criminal history of drug convictions in Canada and the United States of America. They had the brief visit by Ms. Wright, a known drug offender, to the motel where the police knew Patrick was staying on August 23, 2012. They had the very suspicious brief rendez-vous between the young female, apparently visiting or staying in Patrick’s motel room, and the male across the street from the motel on the morning of August 24, 2012.
[49] In totality, the information from the tipsters (outlined in detail in Exhibit 1 on the voir dire – the ITO) and the other items described above provide ample justification, on an objective basis, for the warrantless arrest of Patrick. The arrest was not based on a simple hunch or speculation. It was based on thorough information from several proven informants and a multitude of other indices that Patrick had cocaine in his possession, whether in the outbuilding at the motel or more probably in his motel room, and that he intended to traffic in it.
[50] I do not accept the Defence submission that Patrick’s arrest was a ruse for the police to simply supplement their grounds to obtain a search warrant for the motel room. I believe Matheson and Holovaci that the police decided to arrest Patrick when they did for other legitimate reasons and not for the purpose of bolstering the grounds to obtain a warrant to search the motel room.
[51] I do not accept the Defence submission that whether the police had grounds to arrest the young female is relevant to whether they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Patrick. There is no link between the two.
[52] I do not accept the Defence submission that I ought to draw an adverse inference against the credibility of the police based on their failure to obtain a warrant to arrest Patrick and their apparent practice of virtually never doing so in drug cases. Our law authorizes warrantless arrests in certain cases. Unless that changes, it is no legitimate argument that the police could have obtained a warrant to effect the arrest.
[53] I see no particular relevance to the issue of why the police did not simply arrest Patrick on the outstanding warrants. The fact that they did not has nothing to do with whether they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[54] I do not accept the Defence submission that the police surveillance was too limited here. No surveillance at all was strictly required, however, what surveillance there was, especially on August 23 and 24, 2012, added to the grounds for the arrest of Patrick.
[55] Finally, I reject the Defence argument that the police should be criticized for not using the tracking warrant that had been issued for a motor vehicle operated by the accused. I accept Holovaci’s explanation that there was no good opportunity to install the device.
[56] In conclusion, the arrest of Patrick was a lawful one. It was not arbitrary. It was not a breach of Patrick’s section 9 Charter right.
Section 8 of the Charter
[57] It was conceded by the Crown that Patrick has standing to argue the section 8 issue.
[58] The Defence sought leave to cross-examine Holovaci who swore the ITO.
[59] The granting of such leave is in the discretion of the trial judge. Leave should be granted where the Court is satisfied on balance that cross-examination is necessary to enable the accused to make full answer and defence. A basis must be shown by the accused that cross-examination will likely elicit evidence tending to discredit the existence of a precondition to the granting of the Warrant, such as the existence of reasonable and probable grounds. R. v. Garofoli, 1990 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 at page 1465.
[60] The Crown withdrew its initial opposition to leave being granted in this case, and thus, I permitted the Defence to cross-examine Holovaci on the ITO.
[61] The application for a search warrant by the police is a delicate procedure. It is done ex parte and almost always on the basis of written materials alone. Thus, it is critically important that the applicant disclose for the reviewing Justice the material facts in a full and frank manner. Not every minute detail of the investigation needs to be outlined, however, material facts both in support of and adverse to the authorization sought must be disclosed. R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 at page 1015.
[62] It is important for me to remember that this is not a hearing de novo. It is not for me to simply substitute my views for that of the issuing Justice and decide whether, on the same information presented, I would have granted the Warrant. R. v. Gyles, [2005] O.J. No. 5513 (C.A.) at paragraph 10.
[63] The question for me is whether, on the record before the issuing Justice as amplified by the evidence on the voir dire, there remains a sufficient basis upon which the issuing Justice could have granted the Warrant.
[64] I answer that question in the affirmative. It follows that I find that the search of the motel room was done pursuant to a valid judicial authorization.
[65] The accused has failed to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that his section 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure was violated.
[66] In the circumstances, there is no need for me to address in detail section 24(2) of the Charter. Succinctly put, I would have admitted the evidence in any event, for similar reasons as indicated above.
[67] There is a problem with the ITO and with the Warrant itself (Exhibit 2 on the voir dire). Holovaci conceded that in his testimony. The problem is that the offence described does not mention Patrick at all – it alleges that Alicia Wright, at Allenford, Ontario (not Owen Sound) possessed cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (see Appendix B).
[68] This was an inadvertent error on the part of Holovaci. He had, earlier in the day on August 24, 2012, submitted a different ITO to search the residence of Ms. Wright. That application had been denied by Justice of the Peace Stafford, the same Justice who issued the Warrant to search Patrick’s motel room. Holovaci simply transposed, accidentally, the Appendix B from the earlier ITO and the earlier Warrant on to Appendices B in Exhibits 1 and 2.
[69] It was an unfortunate mistake on the part of Holovaci. He did not try to skirt the matter at Court.
[70] The following principles may be gleaned from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Genest, 1989 109 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59.
[71] First, the warrant is presumed to be valid.
[72] Second, police are not expected to know the minute details of everything there is to know about search warrants and their facial and sub-facial validity, but they are expected to know the basic requirements of a valid search warrant, including what would clearly make an authorization facially invalid, such as the absence of any naming officer or police force, or the absence of any date or time for the execution of the search, or the absence of any signature by the issuing justice.
[73] Third, in determining whether the search was authorized by law, where there is some defect on the face of the search warrant, it is relevant to ask whether the police acted in good faith and, specifically, whether the defect was readily apparent and should have been noticed by the police prior to executing the warrant.
[74] As Justice Fontana states at page 61 of his leading text, The Law of Search & Seizure in Canada (eighth edition), “[w]here a search warrant appears regular and valid on its face, issued by the proper justice, it represents, until quashed by subsequent proceedings, full authority to the officer in entering, searching and detaining goods according to its terms and directions”.
[75] Despite the inadvertent error made by Holovaci, this Warrant appears regular and valid on its face and was issued by the proper justice.
[76] Justice Fontana goes on, in the same paragraph on page 61 of his text, to say that “[t]he search warrant should, on its face, appear to be issued in the form prescribed by the statute, and issued by the proper court officer, in order for the officer to act upon it”.
[77] Despite the inadvertent error made by Holovaci, this Warrant appears on its face to be issued in the form prescribed by the statute and issued by the proper court officer.
[78] Justice Fontana gives several examples from the jurisprudence of search warrants having been held to be facially invalid. None of those examples deal with the situation here. And, generally speaking, those examples involve defects which were obvious and should have been noticed by the police before the warrant was executed.
[79] Turning to the case before me, this Warrant is facially valid. It is not argued otherwise by the Defence.
[80] It is submitted, however, that the inadvertent error in Appendices B of Exhibits 1 and 2 makes this Warrant to search Patrick's motel room sub-facially invalid.
[81] I disagree.
[82] There was no attempt to mislead or deceive the Justice of the Peace.
[83] We know that the Justice could not possibly have been misled because we must assume that His Worship acted judicially and reviewed the entire ITO, which review would have made it abundantly clear that the authorization was being sought as against Patrick.
[84] Further we can be certain that the Justice did not confuse the application with a request to search the property of Ms. Wright because His Worship had earlier that same morning refused to issue a Warrant for Ms. Wright's property. And, according to Holovaci, the Justice declined that application because it was felt that the real target ought to be Patrick.
[85] There was no bad faith on the part of the police. There was no improper conduct on the part of the police. There was no excessive force used by the police. This is not a case where the inadvertent error should have been noticed by the police prior to the execution of the Warrant.
[86] The Defence complains that the ITOs for Ms. Wright's property and for Patrick's motel room were almost identical.
[87] There is nothing improper or nefarious about that. It is understandable. This was an investigation that obviously involved multiple but related targets. Much of the evidence against Ms. Wright would inevitably be the same as that against Patrick. The fact that the Warrant was declined for Ms. Wright's property does not necessarily make it less likely that the ITO in support of the Warrant to search Patrick's motel room disclosed sufficient reasonable and probable grounds.
[88] In fact, the opposite is true in this case. There is evidence from Holovaci that, at the time of the refusal to issue the Warrant for Ms. Wright's property, the Justice believed that the more appropriate course was to go after Patrick (my words).
[89] The mistake made by Holovaci was innocent. It is true that it ought not to have been made. It is, frankly, regrettable.
[90] But this specific example of carelessness in draftsmanship, on these facts, was harmless. It does not invalidate the Search Warrant.
[91] The Defence provided me with a 1977 decision of the Alberta Supreme Court, Trial Division – Alder, et al v. Attorney General for the Province of Alberta, et al, [1977] A.J. No. 756. In that decision, at paragraph 39, the Justice states that “the warrants herein are manifestly and markedly deficient in the particularization of the supposed offence and they should be completely quashed on this ground”.
[92] A lot has changed since 1977. The decision relied upon by the Defence pre-dates Genest, supra and a wealth of other jurisprudence on the validity of search warrants.
[93] More important, the facts in Alder, supra were very different than those in our case. In Alder, supra¸the Court was not confronted with a situation where there was an inadvertent error which had been explained by the affiant police officer on review. Rather, the Court was dealing with a grossly deficient description of the alleged offence. No section or sections of the Criminal Code were specified. There was no indication of what the named parties were allegedly defrauded of. Simply put, there was no offence disclosed in either the warrant itself or the information to obtain it. That is not our case.
[94] On a final note concerning this issue, I am not at all surprised that this inadvertent error was not caught by the police or by the Justice. That is because the error appears in Appendix B. The face page of the Warrant itself makes it crystal clear that the place to be searched is the motel room in Owen Sound, not the property of Ms. Wright in Allenford. The same for the face page of the ITO. The same for paragraph 4 on page 4 of the ITO. And the target in that motel room is named on page 5 of the ITO as Patrick, not Ms. Wright. The place to be searched and the target of the search are made clear again at page 8 of the ITO. And again at page 29 of the ITO. And again at page 31 of the ITO.
[95] The issuing Justice read every page of the ITO – that is evident from His Worship’s initials in the bottom right hand corner of every page. Thus, it is impossible that the Justice was under any misapprehension as to what place was to be searched (the motel room) and who the target was alleged to be in possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (Patrick).
[96] Having dealt with the issue concerning the inadvertent error in Appendices B of Exhibits 1 and 2, on the main question I say this - it is clear that there were ample grounds upon which the Warrant could have been granted.
[97] The tipster information was credible, compelling and, in some cases, corroborated.
[98] The police investigation and surveillance on August 23 and 24, 2012 placed Patrick in that motel room. Two potential drug deals had been observed by the police in the hours prior to the ITO being completed - one involving the visit to the motel by Ms. Wright on the 23rd and the other involving the young female on the morning of the 24th.
[99] The Defence complains that the police arrested Patrick simply to bolster the grounds to obtain the Warrant.
[100] I disagree. I accept the evidence of Matheson and Holovaci that Patrick was arrested when he entered the hot tub area of the motel because that afforded a good opportunity to make the arrest safely and without potential evidence being squandered.
[101] There is nothing improper with the police then including the information about Patrick's arrest in the ITO before submitting it to the Justice. It was a fact necessary to include in order to provide full, fair and frank information to the Court.
[102] In my view, the Warrant could have been granted even absent the information about Patrick's arrest. I disagree with the Defence that the Warrant would not likely have been granted but for the arrest of Patrick.
[103] In summary, the search of Patrick’s motel room was a lawful one. It was not unreasonable. It was not a breach of Patrick’s section 8 Charter right.
V. CONCLUSION
[104] For the foregoing reasons, despite Ms. Hewitt’s able submissions, the Defence Charter Application is dismissed.
[105] Unless counsel object, the evidence on the voir dire will be applied to the trial proper. I will hear from counsel whether there will be further evidence on the trial.
Conlan J.
Released: December 10, 2014
COURT FILE NO.: CR-14-30
DATE: 20141210
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
- and -
MICHAEL SHAWN PATRICK
Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION ON DEFENCE CHARTER APPLICATION
Conlan J.
Released: December 10, 2014