Cheryl Wright v. Gary Lavoie
COURT FILE NO.: 12266-11
DATE: 2014-11-19
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Cheryl Wright
Applicant
– and –
Gary Lavoie
Respondent
Applicant Self-Represented
Respondent Self-Represented
HEARD: November 10, 12 and 13, 2014
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GAUTHIER J.
Overview:
[1] The Applicant (“Wright”) seeks spousal support from the Respondent (“Lavoie”), from September 1, 2011, and onward, based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. The Respondent opposes the claim for spousal support on the basis of entitlement.
Facts:
[2] The parties who are aged 58 and 56 years, respectively, lived together in a common law relationship for a 22 year period from August 1988 until October 2010, when Lavoie advised Wright that he no longer wanted to be in the relationship. There are no children from the parties’ union, although Wright’s two children from a prior marriage did reside with the parties while they were dependents.
[3] At the time of the separation, Wright changed the lock on the parties’ residence. Lavoie resorted to residing with his sister for a period of time.
[4] It is agreed that, during their cohabitation, the parties had a joint bank account into which their paycheques were deposited and from which household expenses were paid. Each of them had their own pension plan and sick time plan. They co-owned real property being a residence which they occupied and a rental property.
[5] At the time of the separation, Wright was employed by the Greater Sudbury Police Service (“G.S.P.S.”) as a Communications Supervisor earning $75,000 per year, including overtime. She had been employed by the G.S.P.S. since February 1986, some two years before the parties commenced their cohabitation.
[6] Lavoie held the rank of Sergeant with the G.S.P.S. At the time of the separation, he was earning approximately $100,000 per year.
[7] After the separation, the parties sold the real property that they jointly owned and they shared the net profit equally, after having paid out all of their joint debts. According to the parties’ respective financial statements, sworn early in the proceedings, Wright had credit card debt in the amount of $2,600 and an outstanding debt relating to the purchase of her vehicle (amount unknown) as of the date of separation. Lavoie had debt in the amount of $12,841, inclusive of credit card charges, and a personal loan in the amount of $11,000.
[8] Wright had some emotional issues, relating to the breakdown of the relationship, which resulted in her being off work and in receipt of disability payments for two periods of time, late fall of 2010 and again in January 2011 until June of 2011.
[9] In August 2011, Wright’s employment with the G.S.P.S. was terminated for cause. Wright had conducted a number of unauthorized NICHE/CPIC queries for personal reasons and had falsified police records in the course of the search or searches.
[10] The Application for spousal support was issued on September 29, 2011, almost one year following the separation.
[11] On December 12, 2011, the parties consented to a Temporary Order, the terms of which follow:
On a without prejudice basis, the Respondent shall provide the Applicant with spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 a month, commencing on January 1, 2012 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter.
In the event that the Applicant receives a monetary award through arbitration the amount of the award will be divided on a per month calculation pro-rated to her pre termination income in order to determine the number of months compensation from the Greater Sudbury Police Services was received for. For example, should the Applicant receive $35,000.00 as an award, it is the equivalent of 6 months income.
The Applicant will indemnify the Respondent with a lump sum payment, the equivalent of $800.00 for each month that compensation was received by her from the employer as calculated above and for which time spousal support was received.
The indemnity set out in paragraph 3 will be paid by the Applicant to the Respondent in one lump sum payment. This lump sum payment will not be included in the Applicant’s income nor be deducted from the Respondent’s income as spousal support. If the CRA reassesses this payment with income tax consequences then the parties will indemnify each other as a result of any additional income tax paid by the party, including related interest and penalties.
Terms of the within Order are without prejudice to the Applicant’s claim for retroactive spousal support and the Respondent’s denial of the Applicant’s entitlement.
Either party is at liberty to return the matter to Court for a determination of the issue of spouse support, retroactive spousal support, and entitlement.
[12] Following her termination, Wright secured work with Health Sciences North as a housekeeper, working casual hours. She continued working there until she was reinstated by the G.S.P.S. in May 2013, albeit at a lower paying position, being that of a property clerk earning $57,357 per year. Wright did not receive any arbitration award from her employer in connection with her dismissal. It was Wright’s evidence that, because of her dire financial circumstances, she was forced to abandon the arbitration process and accept re-employment at a lower level job.
[13] On September 7, 2011, Lavoie was suspended from his employment for alleged misconduct. It is Lavoie’s position that his suspension was a direct result of allegations made by Wright against him to the G.S.P.S.
[14] In August 2012, Lavoie suffered an emotional breakdown and was hospitalized for a brief period. He had had suicidal ideation and he received counselling.
[15] Lavoie was once again hospitalized for stress and anxiety in October 2012.
[16] Lavoie testified that he had been receiving numerous abusive anonymous texts, and that someone had set up a Facebook account, purportedly in his name, on which insulting and abusive messages about him were posted. The suggestion is that Wright was behind the abusive texts and Facebook messages. She denies any involvement in such conduct.
[17] In January 2013, Lavoie purchased the home he now occupies with his wife. They moved in together in January 2013, and married in June of that year.
[18] Wright had been residing alone in rented premises after the sale of the jointly-owned residence the parties had occupied until the separation, but in November 2013 she moved out of that residence and into her mother’s home. She testified that by November 2013 she could no longer afford to pay rent; she had incurred much debt as a result of Lavoie unilaterally ceasing to pay the court-ordered spousal support from May 2013 until October of 2013, when the F.R.O. began enforcing the December 2011 Order.
[19] Lavoie admitted having failed to make the support payments in accordance with the Order, but explained that he believed his obligation to pay the support had been terminated when Wright resumed employment with the G.S.P.S.
[20] In any event, he did enter into a repayment agreement with the F.R.O. in October 2013, and has been paying the court ordered support, plus $300 per month, toward the arrears since that date.
[21] On November 7, 2013, he was found guilty of the misconduct and immediately terminated as an employee of the G.S.P.S., although he continued to (and still does) receive his employment income.
[22] Lavoie appealed his dismissal. The appeal has been heard, but to date no decision has been rendered.
[23] In March 2014, Wright consolidated and paid out her debts by way of a $28,786 loan from the Sudbury Credit Union. The following debts were retired:
(a) Legal fees to Wright’s lawyer $ 2,500
(b) American Express $ 6,832
(c) President’s Choice MasterCard $ 5,642
(d) Nissan $ 9,896
(e) Loan #30 Lively Branch $ 3,266
[24] As of October 31, 2014, Wright has the following indebtedness:
(a) Sudbury Credit Union $29,427
(b) Revenue Canada for capital gains owing $12,222
(c) Revenue Canada for income tax owing for 2012 $ 972
(d) G.S.P.S. Pension buy-back $10,000
[25] Wright’s Financial Statement sworn October 31, 2014, discloses assets valued at $29,000, consisting of the Nissan vehicle and a 2007 Prowler Trailer.
[26] Lavoie’s Financial Statement sworn October 28, 2014, lists assets totalling some $316,000, consisting of his residence, a 2012 Ford F-150 truck, a 2013 Puma Travel Trailer, and bank accounts in the amount of $1,743. His debts exceed his asset value by approximately $61,000, and are the following:
(a) Sudbury Credit Union $263,802.01
(b) Sudbury Credit Union $ 18,360.76
(c) Sudbury Credit Union $ 36,496.52
(d) Royal Visa $ 8,031.06
(e) Canadian Tire $ 3,374.72
(f) CIBC Visa $ 2,540.73
(g) Cheryl Wright $ 5,000.00
(h) Trailer Payment $ 33,000.00
(i) Clayton Ruby $ 2,260.62
(j) Joe Lavoie $ 16,000.00
[27] The parties’ respective incomes since separation, based on the income tax documentation, is as follows:
Wright:
[28] 2010: Employment income including overtime $ 75,000
2011: Employment income (to August) $ 59,168
Disability Benefit payments $ 25,516
Vacation payout $ 20,000
Capital Gains (from sale of the properties) $ 33,723
Total income: $138,407
2012: Employment income $ 31,736
Spousal support $ 12,000
Total income: $ 43,736
2013: Employment income $ 45,713
Spousal support $ 5,281
Total income: $ 50,994
[29] Wright projects that her 2014 income will be $57,000. This would accord with the information from her October 31, 2014, pay stub.
Lavoie:
[30] 2010: Employment Income $102,000
2011: Employment Income $101,735
2012: Employment Income $104,117
2013: Employment Income $106,782
[31] Wright lives in her mother’s home and indicates that she cannot afford to get a place of her own without receiving spousal support.
[32] As indicated above, Lavoie has married and his spouse has two young children for whom she receives child support; she also receives spousal support from her former spouse. The evidence about the quantum of support received by Leanne Lavoie is contradictory. According to Wright, Leanne Lavoie receives some $1,200 per month in spousal and child support. Lavoie maintains that his wife receives $600 per month for the children, and $400 per month in spousal support.
Wright’s Position:
[33] Wright is seeking spousal support, based on the low end range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 as follows:
2011 $1,630 per month ($6,520);
2012 $1,990 per month ($23,880); and
2013 $1,678 per month ($20,148).
[34] She has calculated the above based on her earnings for those years: $59,168 for 2011, $31,737 for 2012, and $45,714 for 2013.
[35] Wright further seeks ongoing spousal support from January 1, 2014, based on the Guidelines, however she has not specified what that amount would be.
[36] Wright relies on the long duration of the spousal relationship and indicates that she and Lavoie had been planning their retirement and were financially secure. They had planned to live in the cottage at the French River, which Wright referred to as “our retirement home”.
[37] While the parties cohabited, they enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle, in keeping with their combined income of some $175,000.
[38] Lavoie chose to end the relationship and this caused financial hardship to Wright, in particular after her employment was terminated.
[39] She had to take casual work as a housekeeper for Health Sciences North in order to survive after her termination. This was low paying work with irregular hours.
[40] Lavoie’s unilateral withholding of the spousal support for the period from May to October 2013 was financially devastating to Wright. She relied heavily on her credit cards and depleted the funds received from the sale of the co-owned properties.
[41] At the age of 59, there is little chance of significant career advancement for Wright. She will not ever be able to earn enough from employment to replicate the lifestyle she enjoyed with Lavoie.
[42] Wright maintains that she is entitled to continue the lifestyle the parties enjoyed while together. She requires spousal support to permit her to leave her mother’s home, secure her own accommodation, and start her life anew, just as Lavoie has done.
[43] She further maintains that the litigation has been dragged out by Lavoie and he should be responsible for her legal fees in the amount of approximately $18,000.
[44] Wright points out that, since the separation, Lavoie has been able to purchase a new home, a new vehicle, a new trailer, as well as having been able to take trips with his new wife, who is employed on a full-time basis and who also receives spousal and child support from her former husband.
Lavoie’s Position:
[45] While Lavoie recognizes that if Wright truly required financial assistance, it would be his legal as well as his moral duty to provide same, he submits that Wright is self-sufficient, earning close to $60,000 per year. She does not require, nor is she entitled to spousal support.
[46] Lavoie disputes Wright’s claim that she has suffered economic hardship as a result of the breakdown of the relationship.
[47] Lavoie acknowledges that the parties lived well when they were together, but points out that they were heavily indebted while maintaining that lifestyle. Retirement was neither discussed, nor likely possible in the foreseeable future.
[48] Lavoie‘s position is that Wright is solely responsible for having lost her employment and having to subsequently accept lower paying employment. She is the “author of her own misfortune”. He had nothing to do with her termination.
[49] If Wright had not conducted unauthorized NICHE and CPIC searches, she would now be earning $80,000 in accordance with the Collective Agreement between the Greater Sudbury Police Services Board and the Sudbury Police Association.
[50] In any event, according to Lavoie, Wright should be earning $59,591, effective July 1, 2014. No explanation was provided regarding the difference between what she earns ($57,000 according to her pay stub) and what the Collective Agreement provides for, for her category of civilian employee ($59,591).
[51] Wright explained that, although her agreement with the Greater Sudbury Police Services Board was that she was being rehired as a property clerk, she was subsequently re-assigned as a Transcriber.
[52] According to the Collective Agreement, a Transcriber is a lower paid category than a Property Clerk. For the year 2013, a Transcriber would have earned, according to Exhibit 10, a yearly income of $53, 724, and not $58,046, being the income of a Property Clerk.
[53] According to Lavoie, Wright was instrumental in having him suspended from his employment. His suspension and the legal proceedings relating to her complaints and his suspension caused him to incur some $70,000 of legal fees, plus a further $30,000 expense in office supplies for his defence, without counsel, at the first instance.
[54] Lavoie points out that by November 2013, when Wright alleges she had to move in with her mother for financial reasons, she had already been back at work at the G.S.P.S. since May of 2013 and had received in excess of $84,000 from the sale of their jointly-owned realty.
[55] Lavoie submits that Wright is motivated not by need, but rather by revenge. He described the proceedings as her “pay back”.
[56] Lavoie requests that spousal support be terminated. In the event that this request is not granted, he requests that whatever support is ordered automatically terminate if he is dismissed from his employment, or if he retires.
[57] Lavoie accuses Wright of living beyond her means and of spending foolishly since the separation. He points out that although Wright received just over $84,000 between May and December of 2011, by June of 2013 there was nothing left.
Obligation of spouses for support
[58] Section 30 of the Family Law Act sets out the above obligation:
Every spouse has an obligation to provide support for himself or herself and for the other spouse, in accordance with need, to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so.
Objectives and determination of entitlement to and quantum of spousal support pursuant to the Family Law Act
[59] Subsection 33(8) of the Family Law Act sets out the purposes of an Order for spousal support:
(a) recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;
(b) share the economic burden of child support equitably;
(c) make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and
(d) relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).
[60] Subsection (9) goes on to provide guidance to the court in the determination and duration, if any, of a spousal support order:
In determining the amount and duration, if any, of support for a spouse or parent in relation to need, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the parties, including,
(a) the dependant’s and respondent’s current assets and means;
(b) the assets and means that the dependant and respondent are likely to have in the future;
(c) the dependant’s capacity to contribute to his or her own support;
(d) the respondent’s capacity to provide support;
(e) the dependant’s and respondent’s age and physical and mental health;
(f) the dependant’s needs, in determining which the court shall have regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together;
(g) the measures available for the dependant to become able to provide for his or her own support and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependant to take those measures;
(h) any legal obligation of the respondent or dependant to provide support for another person;
(i) the desirability of the dependant or respondent remaining at home to care for a child;
(j) a contribution by the dependant to the realization of the respondent’s career potential;
(k) Repealed: 1997, c. 20, s. 3 (3).
(l) if the dependant is a spouse,
(i) the length of time the dependant and respondent cohabited,
(ii) the effect on the spouse’s earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation,
(iii) whether the spouse has undertaken the care of a child who is of the age of eighteen years or over and unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,
(iv) whether the spouse has undertaken to assist in the continuation of a program of education for a child eighteen years of age or over who is unable for that reason to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,
(v) any housekeeping, child care or other domestic service performed by the spouse for the family, as if the spouse were devoting the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and were contributing the earnings to the family’s support,
(v.1) Repealed: 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (12).
(vi) the effect on the spouse’s earnings and career development of the responsibility of caring for a child; and
(m) any other legal right of the dependant to support, other than out of public money.
Applicable Principles:
[61] The circumstances to be considered in determining the entitlement to and quantum of spousal support, pursuant to subsection 33(9) of the Act, are to be considered in the context of the objectives of the Family Law Act and the purposes of a spousal support order. No objective or purpose is paramount.
[62] The preamble to the Family Law Act sets out its objective, that is, “to provide, in law, for the orderly and equitable settlement of the affairs of the spouses upon the breakup of the partnership, and to provide for other mutual obligations in family relationships…”
[63] The statutory objectives are to be examined with a view to achieving equitable sharing of the economic consequences of the relationship, or of its breakdown: see Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813.
[64] Marriage and also common-law spousal relationships are to be regarded as joint endeavours; the longer the duration of the relationship, the greater the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon its dissolution. (Moge).
[65] The Court of Appeal in Lynk v. Lynk (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 1 outlined the principle that the standard of living that a recipient spouse is entitled to is a standard equal to that which he or she would have enjoyed had the relationship continued through to the payor’s retirement.
[66] The parties’ accustomed standard of living is specifically referred to, in subsection 33(9) as a circumstance to be considered.
[67] Even where a spouse has the capacity to be self-sufficient, if the spouse’s ability to enjoy the same standard of living as during the relationship has been adversely affected as a result of the breakdown of the relationship then support, compensatory support, is appropriate to ensure that the economic impact of the breakdown is equitably shared.
[68] One final principle, before I embark upon the analysis of this case, relates to the applicability of the provisions set out in sections 15 to 20 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, to matters involving spousal support.
[69] The starting point in determining whether one spouse requires support, and whether the other spouse has the ability to pay such support, is the determination of the income of each of the parties.
[70] The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines state clearly, at Chapter 6, that the starting point for the determination of income under those Guidelines is the definition of income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.
[71] Income, for spousal support purposes is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total Income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency.
[72] The Guidelines go on to provide that, in considering the fairest determination of a spouse’s income, the court may consider patterns of income, fluctuation in income, or receipt of a non-recurring amount of income. See section 17.
[73] The court may also impute income to a spouse, in appropriate circumstances, including where a spouse’s underemployment is self-induced, for example, where the spouse is terminated for cause. See Favero v. Favero, 2013 ONSC 4216, [2013] O.J. No. 2882.
[74] The principles that apply in determining whether to impute income are the same in both child support and spousal support cases. Favero, para. #94.
[75] Although that case dealt with a payor spouse in the context of child support, the principle is applicable in the case before me as it relates to the determination of whether or not a spouse requires spousal support. Put another way, the principles applicable in determining a spouse’s ability to provide support to a dependent, are equally applicable to determining what, if any, support is required by the dependent.
[76] Whether or not a spouse requires support is related directly to “the dependent’s capacity to contribute to his or her own support”, (s.33(9)(c) of the F.L.A.) which, in turn, is relevant when considering the spouse’s “obligation to provide support for himself or herself…to the extent that he or she is capable of doing so.” (s. 30 of the F.L.A.).
Analysis:
[77] Lavoie’s argument that Wright was not and is not entitled to spousal support fails. This was a long term relationship in which there always was an income differential. Both parties benefited from their combined incomes. They enjoyed the lifestyle that such combined income could provide. Wright cannot now, nor is it reasonable to predict that she may ever be able to replicate that lifestyle on her income.
[78] As mentioned earlier in these Reasons, the longer the duration of the relationship, the more compelling the claim to equal standards of living for both spouses.
[79] Wright’s income does not permit her, without spousal support, to approximate the lifestyle to which she was accustomed.
[80] Lavoie, on the other hand, continues to benefit from his higher income and from the approximately $40,000 that his wife earns from her employment as the Executive Director of a local charity, and some $3,900 from the two businesses she is involved in. There is also the matter of the spousal support being received by Leanne Lavoie.
[81] Wright did suffer financial hardship as a result of the termination of the long-standing relationship when she was in her mid-fifties. Her present earning capacity is not likely to increase significantly in the remaining years she has to be employed.
[82] Lavoie has the capacity to provide support to Wright. His wife is employed on a full-time basis, and her former spouse is providing support both for herself and the children. Lavoie has no present legal obligation to provide support to his wife’s children.
[83] A spousal support order is required to recognize the economic consequences to Wright of the termination of this long standing common law relationship.
[84] In her opening statement, Wright advised the court that she was seeking retroactive support from September 1, 2011, onward.
[85] As of September 1, 2011, Wright was without employment, having been terminated in August of 2011. She could no longer rely on her $75,000 income to meet her needs. Thus the Application for spousal support issued on September 29, 2011
[86] While she no longer had employment income for the balance of 2011 that, on its own, does not provide an adequate picture of Wright’s actual circumstances. A review of her income tax return shows that, excluding the capital gains income attributed to her by virtue of the sale of the jointly-held property, Wright did in fact receive $104,684 in actual monies during the year 2011. This figure is made up of the employment income, disability benefit payments, and the vacation payout. Her income would have exceeded that of Lavoie.
[87] That income would have permitted her to continue to live in the style in which she had been living while cohabiting with Lavoie. Given that income, together with the $16,523 Wright received from the sale of real property in May 2011, and (to a lesser extent given the timing) the $67,561 also from the sale of real property received in December 2011, Wright would not have suffered any financial hardship as a result of the breakdown of the relationship, at least for the year 2011.
[88] Wright would not have been entitled to any spousal support for the year 2011.
[89] The situation changed drastically for Wright in 2012. Her employment yielded modest income of $31,736. Such a sum would not allow her to even approximate her earlier lifestyle while living with Lavoie. She would have been entitled to continue to enjoy that lifestyle, given the long duration of the relationship.
[90] And, while Lavoie points out that the parties were heavily indebted while enjoying that lifestyle, the reality nonetheless is that the parties were living well on a combined income of some $175,000. They may well have been heavily financed however there is no suggestion that there were bankruptcy or insolvency concerns during the latter years of the cohabitation.
[91] Wright no longer had the benefit of Lavoie’s income. And, while it is true that she did receive, as Lavoie did, a significant amount of money from the sale of their properties, and perhaps could and should have managed those funds in a better way than she did, that is not a complete answer to the claim for compensatory support based on accustomed lifestyle, or needs based support, given her modest income from employment.
[92] Wright would have been entitled to spousal support, based on the Guidelines, in the amount of $2,322 per month. This amount is arrived at after taking into account only the parties’ actual respective incomes for the year 2012, that is Wright’s employment income of $31,736 and Lavoie’s income of $104,117.
[93] The consideration of entitlement to and quantum of spousal support does not end there however. On the facts of this case, it is fair and appropriate to impute income to Wright given her termination for cause; she was, according to the law, voluntarily under employed, and this should impact on the assessment of spousal support.
[94] Lavoie suggests that the amount that Wright would have been earning, but for her termination, should be attributed to her in the determination of entitlement to and quantum of spousal support.
[95] I find that suggestion to be reasonable. The larger issue is the duration of the period during which such income should be imputed to Wright.
[96] There is no pre-set formula to determine the appropriate number of months for which such higher income should be imputed to a spouse in these circumstances.
[97] I have concluded that it would be fair to impute the higher income to Wright for a period of time equal to that period which would represent the period of notice that her employer would have had to provide to her if she had been terminated without cause.
[98] I do not have evidence of Wright’s career path with the G.S.P.S., but do know that she had been in its employ for 25 years before her termination and that, at the time of the dismissal, she occupied a supervisory position at the higher end of the civilian pay scale.
[99] In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable to presume that, had she been terminated without cause, her employer would have had to either provide somewhere around eighteen months’ notice, or eighteen months’ pay in lieu of notice.
[100] Applying that presumption to the facts of the case results in Wright’s entitlement to and quantum of support being based for 2012 on Lavoie having income of $104,117, and Wright being presumed to have had income in the approximate amount of $79,000 (being an amount halfway between what Wright would have been earning in 2011 and in 2013, according to the civilian pay scale set out in the Collective Agreement, plus an additional $5,000 for overtime. According to the S.S.A.G., the mid-range amount of support based on those figures would be $806 per month, for the entirety of 2012.
[101] The eighteen month time period during which Wright should have the higher income imputed to her ends as of March 1, 2013. For the months of January and February 2013 then, the amount of spousal support to which Wright was entitled would be based on her imputed income of $77,276 (Exhibit 10) plus overtime of $5,000, for a total income of $82,776 per year. For a two month period, the income would be $13,712. Therefore, for the first two months of 2013, Wright’s income, for purposes of determining quantum of spousal support, would be $70,712 per year. The mid-range spousal support for those two months would be $1,157 per month.
[102] From that date forward, Wright’s actual income is the figure that is to be used in determining the quantum of spousal support to which she is entitled.
[103] Based on her income of $45,713, and Lavoie’s income of $106,782, the mid-range amount of support payable, according to the S.S.A.G., would be $1,959 monthly.
[104] Using the parties’ respective estimated 2014 incomes, i.e. Wright $57,000 and Lavoie $106,782, the ongoing spousal support effective January 1, 2014, would be $1,597, being the mid-range amount according to the S.S.A.G.
[105] I decline to make it a provision of the spousal support order that there be an automatic termination of the order, on Lavoie’s retirement or dismissal. Given that I have attributed income to Wright for her dismissal for cause, it would be inappropriate to provide for an automatic termination of the obligation to provide spousal support if, ultimately, Lavoie himself is found to have been dismissed for cause.
Conclusion and Order:
- Lavoie shall pay to Wright spousal support as follows on the first day of every month:
(a) The sum of $806 per month, for the months of January to and including December 2012;
(b) The sum of $1,157 per month for the months of January and February 2013;
(c) The sum of $1,959 per month for the months of March through to and including December 2013; and
(d) The sum of $1,597 per month commencing January 1, 2014, and continuing on the first day of every month thereafter.
IT IS DECLARED THAT Wright was not entitled to receive, and Lavoie was not obligated to pay, any spousal support for year 2011.
The balance of the claims made in the Application issued on September 29, 2011, is dismissed.
[106] If the parties cannot agree on costs, Wright may make written submissions as to costs within 15 days of the release of these reasons for decision. Lavoie will have10 days after receipt of Wright’s submissions to respond. The written submissions of both parties are to be delivered at the Sudbury courthouse, 155 Elm Street. If no submissions are received within this timeframe, the parties will be deemed to have resolved the issue as between themselves.
The Honourable Madam Justice Louise L. Gauthier
Released: November 19, 2014
COURT FILE NO.: 11266-11
DATE: 2014-11-19
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Cheryl Wright
Applicant
– and –
Gary Lavoie
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Gauthier J.
Released: November 19, 2014