COURT FILE NO.: 2605/12
DATE: 2014/09/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Mary Ann Peggy Andrews
Self-represented
Plaintiff
- and -
Oakdown Holdings Inc. o/a Ballantry Homes and Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc.
Robert B. Macdonald, for Oakdown Holdings Inc. o/a Ballantry Homes
Alistair Riswick, for Weston Hardwood Design Centre In.
Defendants
HEARD at Welland, Ontario:
August 29, 2014
The Honourable Justice T. Maddalena
DECISION ON MOTION
The Issues
[1] There are three main issues for adjudication by the court on this long motion. They are as follows:
• Should the court permit the plaintiff’s Small Claims Court action commenced at Welland to be transferred to the Superior Court of Justice at Welland?
• Is the relief sought by the plaintiff in her proposed Statement of Claim in the Superior Court of Justice statute-barred by operation of the Limitations Act, S.O. 2002?
• Should the court permit the plaintiff’s request to add Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. as a defendant to the proposed Superior Court of Justice Statement of Claim?
Background
[2] Ballantry Homes is engaged in the business of home building in Ontario.
[3] On April 23, 2009, the plaintiff and her husband purchased a newly built home from Ballantry Homes. The municipal address of the property is 208 Galloway Trail at Welland, Ontario.
[4] Prior to closing, on April 20, 2009, the plaintiff and her husband participated in an inspection of the home with Tarion Warranty Corporation. Tarion prepared a pre-delivery inspection report which included the plaintiff’s complaints. These complaints included exterior landscaping, drywalling, mortar work, venting, scratched windows and vapour barriers.
[5] The plaintiff Mr. Andrews assigned all his rights in this action to his spouse, Mrs. Andrews.
[6] Additionally, by May 24, 2009, the plaintiff complained to Ballantry Homes regarding leaks in her windows.
[7] By April 22, 2009 the plaintiff submitted a year end form of remaining deficiencies to Tarion Warranty Corporation.
[8] The 2009 Tarion deficiency list included additional complaints of the plaintiff such as scratched windows, irrigation system problems, landscaping issues, brick and mortar work and improper installation of the roof.
[9] On March 30, 2011 the plaintiff issued a claim in the Welland Small Claims Court seeking $25,000 in damages from Ballantry Homes. However, the Small Claims Court action was only restricted to issues dealing with the installation of the hardwood floor, and not the other matters raised by her.
[10] On the cross-examination of the plaintiff held on June 6, 2014 the plaintiff stated she did not deliberately pursue claims for other than the hardwood flooring since she stated she preferred to issue additional claims in Small Claims Court for each additional class of damages.
[11] On July 25, 2012 the plaintiff served a motion returnable December 21, 2012 seeking to have her Small Claims Court action transferred to the Superior Court of Justice in Welland. She sought leave to issue a new statement of claim containing new causes of action and increased damages.
[12] At the hearing of the motion on December 21, 2012, counsel for the plaintiff requested an adjournment in order to introduce new and additional evidence regarding alleged damages. The adjournment was granted by the court, provided documentation to substantiate the further new evidence claimed by the plaintiff was to be delivered on or before January 31, 2013.
[13] The new evidence filed by the plaintiff consisted of two volumes of documents, comprising answers to the plaintiff’s undertakings given at the plaintiff’s cross-examination of November 9, 2012.
[14] Nothing further was done by the plaintiff until the current motion before the court was served in May 2014 and returnable June 11, 2014. This motion was heard before me on August 29, 2014.
[15] The Small Claims Court action is sitting in abeyance pending the outcome of the current motion before the court.
The Position of the Plaintiff
[16] Since the plaintiff’s Small Claims Court action was prepared, the plaintiff has claimed that she has discovered and suffered additional damages. The damages have increased to such an extent that the Small Claims Court action is no longer the appropriate jurisdiction.
[17] The plaintiff has also stated that she was unaware that her claim would be issued in Small Claims Court when it was and she no longer wishes to limit her claim for damages to $25,000.
[18] Further, the plaintiff states that she has obtained information that has caused her to conclude that she has additional claims against Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. for the hardwood flooring.
[19] The plaintiff further stated to the court in submissions that Tarion told her that while they were negotiating with Tarion as an independent third party, the Limitations Act was not applicable. Therefore, she proposes as a reason that she did not file her proposed Statement of Claim within the limitation period was due to Tarion Warranty Corporation’s involvement as an independent third party which prevented the running of the limitation period.
[20] Secondly, the plaintiff submits that she saw only the middle section of the Small Claims Court Statement of Claim in June 2011 as filed by her counsel. She submits that she did not see the full pleading that was filed in the Small Claims Court until June 2012. Had she seen the pleading in March 2011, she would not have permitted it to be issued.
[21] Thirdly, the plaintiff submits that the defendants have acted in bad faith and they have acted fraudulently and therefore the Limitations Act is not applicable in cases of bad faith and fraud.
The Position of the Defendant Ballantry Homes
[22] The defendant Ballantry Homes submits that the plaintiff has admitted that she had knowledge of the facts pleaded in her new proposed Statement of Claim as early as 2009 and as late as July 2011.
[23] During her cross-examinations in June 2014, the plaintiff produced a 12-page damages chart particularizing all her damages. The chart is dated July 2011 and lists all new claims she seeks to assert against Ballantry Homes. In the same cross-examinations, the plaintiff admitted that all the new claims associated with the damages chart were known to her by July 2011 or earlier. Therefore, the “new claims” that the plaintiff purports to assert are statute-barred and were known to her at the earliest in 2009 and at the latest in July 2011.
[24] The defendant Ballantry Homes submits that the plaintiff deliberately and strategically chose the Small Claims Court as a forum to submit her claim. For example, in the affidavit of the plaintiff sworn May 15, 2014 the plaintiff states in paragraphs. 11, 12 and 13 as follows:
The original Small Claims Court Statement of Claim was not reviewed with me before it was issued. I was unaware that steps had been taken to commence the action. I did not become aware of the Small Claims lawsuit until June of 2011.
When I saw the Small Claims Court Statement of Claim I was very unhappy with it. I did not believe that it put forward my case as it needed to be put forward. It did not claim all of the damages that I have suffered.
In March of 2011 I did not want to limit my damages to $25,000. I had already discovered damages significantly in excess of that amount and I was still discovering further damages. Had I been consulted, I would have insisted that an action be commenced claiming all of my damages and not just $25,000.
[25] The defendant Ballantry Homes pleads that there are a series of emails provided at the cross-examination, and upon which privilege was waived, that directly contradict the position taken by the plaintiff and show that the plaintiff was completely involved in the issuance of the Small Claims Court claim. For example, on March 16, 2011, the plaintiff wrote to her then counsel Jennifer Matunin-Brown as follows:
“… Since George and my income comes from CPP and OAS, I think we can make an advance request to waive the filing fees. Also from reading the procedures for Small Claims Court we can maybe claim interest and even legal fees, if we request them.
I am not as concerned about the roof and walls right now, because I think we can file a second Small Claims for everything else but the hardwood flooring. Two roofers have said, “No” to an inspection. The other inspector is to call me back. I am filing my 2 year Tarion Deficiency Report this week, and will be documenting the things not done by Ballantry or those things done incorrectly.
Jennifer, I think that we are ready to go for Monday. I will drop everything back at your office on Friday around noon. …”
[26] An additional email for March 16, 2011 is from her then counsel to plaintiff:
“… [H]ave you been able to have someone do an estimate on the roof and walls?
I’m just trying to see if we are on track for March 21. Please let me know when you get a chance.
Because of how complex this file is and all of the issues associated, I want to make it read as simplistic as possible. I’m not going to put in a lot of detail or over explain the case as all that can be done at a Settlement Conference.
… Please note that you have a two year limitation period from the date you discovered that there were problems with the walls and roof. From our conversations, I am unsure of what this date is. Please try and think about when you noticed problems with the roof and walls, I would hate for you to miss a limitation period but I understand that you have a lot going on right now.”
[27] The email from Peggy Andrews to Jennifer Matunin-Brown dated March 18, 2011 states:
“… I would suggest we file “A Statement of Claim” on Monday. …”
[28] The email dated May 8, 2011 from Mrs. Andrews to Jennifer Matunin-Brown states:
“… What do you think Ballantry Homes will be using as their defence position for our upcoming conference? I should try and put together the documents and witness statements necessary. Looking forward to hearing from you.” (The “conference” is referring to the Small Claims Court settlement conference.)
[29] Additional email from Mrs. Andrews to Jennifer Matunin-Brown sent May 30, 2011 states:
“… Also, I want to make an independent settlement offer to Mr. David Hill, CEO, of Ballantry Homes within this week. If I send him a settlement offer, which will be well in excess of the small claims court maximum, will that have any effect on us to continue with Small Claims? I want to keep your activity exclusively focused on Small Claims.
…. If he rejects it, or never responds (which is normal) then we just continue our current plan of Small Claims Court. …”
[30] The defendant Ballantry Homes therefore submits the plaintiff had full knowledge of this Small Claims Court action and deliberately and strategically chose the Small Claims Court forum. She was closely involved in the Small Claims Court claim and cannot be believed when she states that she only saw part of the claim in June 2011 and did not see the full pleading until June 2012, as she stated in her submissions.
[31] In addition to being entirely involved in the process, the emails confirm that the plaintiff was aware of the two year limitation period.
[32] The plaintiff’s assertion that her lawyer issued the claim and she was not fully apprised of it is simply unsupported by the evidence.
[33] Ballantry Homes further states that by the time of the plaintiff’s damages brief dated July 2011 she knew about all claims in July 2011 and therefore all her claims are currently statute-barred by her own admissions.
The Position of Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc.
[34] The position of Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. is as follows:
• On April 20, 2009 the plaintiff discovered what she felt were defects in the hardwood flooring.
• The home purchase closed on April 23, 2009.
• The plaintiff moved into the home July 23, 2009 and wrote to Tarion Warranty Corporation regarding problems by May 22, 2009.
• By September 2009 the plaintiff wrote to Tarion Warranty Corporation identifying remaining deficiencies including the hardwood floor.
• By December 1, 2009 the plaintiff also wrote to Ballantry Homes complaining about the hardwood flooring.
• On December 4, 2009 the plaintiff received a letter from Ballantry Homes advising the problem with the hardwood flooring was due to humidity levels and moisture in the home.
• By December 5, 2009 the plaintiff responded to the Ballantry letter of December 4, 2009 and it is apparent from the plaintiff’s response that she knew that Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. was the supplier and installer of the hardwood floor.
• Further, on December 7, 2009 the plaintiff forwarded an email to Ballantry Homes complaining about the hardwood flooring.
• On December 16, 2009 the plaintiff wrote to Ballantry Homes requesting Weston correct her flooring.
• By February 9, 2010 Tarion Warranty Corporation conducted an emergency onsite inspection in which the plaintiff was present as well as Weston Hardwood CEO and flooring experts, as well as the representative from Ballantry.
• In March of 2011 the plaintiff instituted legal proceedings in Small Claims Court against Ballantry Homes.
[35] It is the position of Weston that any legal proceedings against Weston at this instance are statute-barred. Weston submits that the plaintiff knew that Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. was the installer of the hardwood floor as early as March 2009, but clearly knew it no later than on the February 9, 2010 meeting where Weston CEO attended the meeting with Tarion and Ballantry.
[36] Therefore, it is the position of Weston that the plaintiff had all the necessary information to start an action against Weston by February 2010. Therefore, any action against Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. is now statute-barred.
The Law
Transfer from Small Claims Court to Superior Court of Justice
[37] The Superior Court of Justice has an inherent jurisdiction to transfer a matter from the Small Claims Court to the Superior Court of Justice. The case of Alexandrov v. Csanyi, [2009] O.J. No. 1030, the court held at para. 12 as follows:
That being said, this court does have an inherent jurisdiction to exercise a discretion to allow a claimant to transfer a claim into this court. Mrzlecki v. Kusztos (1987), 1987 4409 (ON SC), 59 O.R. (2d) 301 (H.C.J.) indicates, however, that a relevant factor in deciding whether or not to move the matter up is whether there is a new fact that changes the original basis of the claim. There was no evidence of such a fact here.
[38] Therefore, as in the case of Alexandrov v. Csanyi, the court must consider whether there is a “new fact which changes the original basis of the claim”.
[39] The onus is on the plaintiff to show new evidence which changes the original basis for the claim.
[40] The case of Mrzlecki v. Kusztos, 1987 4409 (ON SC), [1987] O.J. No. 325, provides assistance in defining what is meant by “the new fact” that would change the original basis for the claim. The court in Mrzlecki states in paras. 4 and 9 as follows:
4 In addition they received, at the end of December, a medical report. It said that the plaintiff is not able to continue his usual construction work because of a partial permanent disability. The medical report does not suggest any change in the condition of the shoulder, although it does refer to a strain to the left knee suffered at work in July, 1986, which may somehow have been caused by the weakened shoulder. The original statement of claim averred inability to work at his usual construction job, which is precisely the same problem noted in the medical report as of December 23, 1986. Although there is some change in diagnosis so far as permanence is concerned, there is no reference to deterioration in the injured shoulder or to any change in medical condition or to any new medical facts.
9 Perhaps it might be of some assistance to the parties to say that I would be reluctant on the present state of the record to move the matter into Supreme Court assuming that I did have jurisdiction. There is no significant change in the plaintiff’s medical condition since the action was brought. Even though the plaintiff now considers the injuries more permanent, there are no new objective medical facts and no evidence of deterioration. There is no new medical condition or fact that changes the original basis or complexion of the injury or the claim.
[41] The plaintiff’s motion materials further rely on s.107 and s.110 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43. Section 107 applies where two or more proceedings are pending in two or more courts. This is not applicable here since these are not two different actions commenced in two different courts.
[42] Further, s.110 of the Courts of Justice Act assists where a proceeding has been brought in the wrong court and this is not the situation here. In the case of Alexandrov in para. 9 the court states as follows in regards to this issue:
The fact that the defendants commenced a claim in the Small Claims Court seeking $10,000 in the prayer for relief while alleging damages of $1,000,000 does not make the court the “wrong court” as contemplated in s.110 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43 (see Tawfik v. Baker (1992), 1992 7724 (ON SC), 10 O.R. (3d) 569 at para. 3). Section 110 is a remedial provision which preserves the rights of litigants who may have lost them due to the lapse of limitation periods or other time deadlines by reason of having taken proceedings in a court without jurisdiction.
[43] The Limitations Act, S.O. 2002, c. 27, Schedule B, s.4 states as follows:
“Unless this Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered.”
[44] Section 5(1) and (2) states as follows:
- (1) A claim is discovered on the earlier of,
(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,
(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and
(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).
(2) A person with a claim shall be presumed to have known of the matters referred to in clause (1)(a) on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place, unless the contrary is proved.
[45] In the case of Joseph v. Paramount Canada’s Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469, the Court noted that the special circumstances doctrine and Rules of Civil Procedure did not give the court authority to allow an action to be commenced after expiry of the limitation period. Section 20 of the new Act, which preserves extension, suspension or other variation of the limitation period by or under another Act, does not refer to extension through an application of special circumstances doctrine. (Headnote)
[46] The Court stated at para. 13 as follows:
“The question to be answered now is whether the legislature intended to preserve the court’s common law discretion to extend limitation periods under the new Act by applying the doctrine of special circumstances. As a matter of statutory interpretation, I have concluded that the answer must be no.”
[47] Further, in the case of Chimienti v. Windsor (City), 2011 ONCA 16, the Court indicated in paras. 22 and 23 as follows:
22 The law governing the court’s power to relieve against the operation of a limitation period changed with the enactment of the new Limitation Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c.24, Schedule B. In Joseph v. Paramount Canada’s Wonderland (2008), 2008 ONCA 469, 90 O.R. (3d) 401 (Ont. C.A.), Feldman J.A. held that the new statute eliminated the “special circumstances” doctrine, which had previously granted courts the discretion to allow a plaintiff to amend a claim by adding parties or causes of action following the expiry of a limitation period where no prejudice to the opposing party would result and where special circumstances existed justifying the exercise of such discretion. See also Basarsky v. Quinlan (1971), 1971 5 (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 380 (S.C.C.) and Mazzuca v. Silvercreek Pharmacy Ltd. (2001), 2001 8620 (ON CA), 56 O.R. (3d) 768 (Ont. C.A.).
23 As Joseph was firmly grounded in the interpretation of the new Limitations Act, 2002, it left open the continued operation of the “special circumstances” doctrine in cases governed by limitation periods found in statutes other than the Limitations Act, 2002. This point was expressly made by Feldman J.A. in a companion case to Joseph released on the same day, Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 468, 90 O.R. (3d) 774 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 24:
[T]he court can continue to apply the common law special circumstances doctrine, where appropriate, to extend a former limitation period when the transition provision, s.24 of the new Act, applies.
Analysis
[48] Section 4 of the Limitations Act prohibits the commencement of proceedings after the second anniversary of the date on which the claim was discovered.
[49] Section 5(2) of the Limitations Act establishes a presumption of knowledge on the part of the plaintiff on the day the act or omission on which the claim is based took place unless the contrary is proved.
[50] In the case of Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 1067 v. L. Chung Development Co., 2012 ONSC 1549, at para. 43 the court stated as follows:
MTCC had a duty to act with due diligence to be fully apprised of the material facts on which its claim is based. It must present evidence of the due diligence, as stated in a decision of this Court in the following passage:
In the recent decision of Justice Murray of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Blinn v. Burlington (City), [2010] O.J. No. 3063 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 26, the Court described section 5(2) of the Limitations Act as imposing a burden on a party ‘to establish that it did not know or could not have known with reasonable diligence before the expiry of the limitation period that the injury loss or damage… was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission of another party’.
[51] In addition to the plaintiff’s onus to act with reasonable diligence prior to the expiration of the limitation period, the plaintiff has the additional onus to show “new facts” which have come to light to warrant the change from the Small Claims Court to the Superior Court of Justice. In this regard, the plaintiff was cross-examined on June 6, 2014 based upon her affidavit sworn May 15, 2014.
[52] By her very own admissions, the plaintiff had knowledge of all those claims against Ballantry Homes which are outlined in her Amended Statement of Claim, at the latest either at the time the Small Claims Court Statement of Claim was issued in March of 2011 or in July 2011 as shown in her damages chart.
[53] The damages chart purports to list the new claims that she is proposing against Ballantry Homes in the Superior Court of Justice. However, a review of the Amended Statement of Claim and a comparison of the heads of damages in the Amended Statement of Claim, together with what the plaintiff admitted as within her knowledge in March of 2011 or July 2011 at the latest, shows no new facts.
[54] There are no new claims advanced in the draft Statement of Claim that meet the test in Alexandrov – “new fact that changes the original basis of the claim”.
[55] As well, there are no new claims advanced in the draft Statement of Claim that meet the test in Mrzlecki, i.e. where there was “no new fact that changes the original basis or complexion of the claim”.
[56] The new purported claims advanced by the plaintiff are those that the plaintiff was aware of either in 2009, 2010, March 2011, and at the very latest by July 2011. These included floors, scratched windows, masonry, drywall, HVAC, irrigation system, roof and shingles, vapour barrier, garage floor, moisture levels, high humidity, unlevel exterior stairs, drywall joint and taping in loft stairway, window water leaks, and attic insulation.
[57] Further, the plaintiff has stated that the Small Claims Court claim was filed in March 2011 essentially with her only seeing a part of the claim in June 2011 and seeing the full claim in June 2012. She has emphatically stated in her evidence that had she seen the entire claim as issued in March 2011, she would not have permitted it to be issued, given that her damages were substantially more. She has also stated that she did not know that the Small Claims Court action restricted her claim to the amount of $25,000.
[58] In light of the evidence before me, this is not credible evidence on the part of the plaintiff.
[59] The emails exchanged between the plaintiff and her then counsel (privilege was waived) show that the plaintiff was intimately involved with the issuance and drafting of the Small Claims Court Statement of Claim and she knew every detail of it. The claim specifically provided a waiver of amounts over $25,000. She specifically refers to her intent to issue several claims representing several heads of damages each limited to $25,000 in the Small Claims Court.
[60] The email between the plaintiff and her then counsel confirms the plaintiff was aware of the two year limitation period and she was so advised by her then counsel.
[61] The plaintiff had knowledge of the Small Claims Court settlement conference to which she refers. She was knowledgeable of the costs to file the claim and, indeed, even addressed the possibility of a waiver of the Small Claims Court filing fees for herself.
[62] I find it is disingenuous of her to suggest that she did not see the full claim until June 2012 or to say she did not know that the action was restricted to $25,000. On the contrary, all the evidence points to a plaintiff who was very involved with every detail of the claim and this entire litigation.
[63] Next, the plaintiff alleges that the Tarion Warranty Corporation acted as a third party intermediary and, as such, she was advised by Tarion that the Limitations Act was not applicable. This statement was supported by no evidence by the plaintiff. This is not correct in fact or law. There is no evidence before me to suggest that Tarion indeed advised the plaintiff in any capacity.
[64] Lastly, the plaintiff claims that the proposed defendants acted in bad faith and acted fraudulently, therefore the Limitations Act is not applicable. The plaintiff caused an investigation by Niagara Regional Police of the defendants. According to the evidence before me, nothing occurred as a result of the Niagara Regional Police investigation.
[65] While it is correct in law that the presence of fraud will suspend a limitation period, there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith before me in this motion.
[66] On March 22, 2011 the plaintiff commenced her Small Claims Court action against Ballantry Homes regarding the hardwood floor installed in her home. The plaintiff claimed damages of $39,439.44 but specifically waived the excess over $25,000 to ensure that it fell within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.
[67] There is no legal proceeding commenced by the plaintiff against Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc.
[68] It is clear, based on the plaintiff’s own evidence, that she was aware of the problems with the hardwood flooring in 2009 and in 2010. On February 9, 2010 the plaintiff conceded that there was a meeting with Weston’s CEO and its flooring expert. Therefore, based on the plaintiff’s own evidence, she was aware of the issue with the flooring and was also aware that Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. was the entity responsible for installing the flooring since Weston’s CEO and flooring expert were present at the meeting on February 9, 2010.
[69] Accordingly, the limitation period has expired with respect to the claim against Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. Additionally, there are no “special circumstances” permitting adding a party. It is abundantly clear that the plaintiff’s claim with respect to the flooring was discoverable by February 9, 2010 at the latest. Therefore, this is not a case for the court to exercise its discretion to permit the Amended Statement of Claim to be issued in the Superior Court of Justice and to add Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. as a defendant.
Conclusions
[70] All of the plaintiff’s enumerated claims were known to her or discoverable by July 2011. This is largely based on her own admissions made in her cross-examinations on June 6, 2014.
[71] While this court has the inherent jurisdiction to transfer a matter from the Small Claims Court to the Superior Court of Justice, I am not persuaded that this case meets the test for doing so.
[72] I find no new facts which change the original basis of the claim.
[73] I find that the plaintiff deliberately and strategically chose the forum of the Small Claims Court in which to bring her claim.
[74] The limitation period has clearly expired. She has not acted with due diligence. Her claims are statute-barred. The Small Claims Court is not the “wrong” forum for this matter.
[75] Accordingly, the motion brought by the plaintiff is therefore dismissed.
Costs
[76] Unless otherwise agreed, costs submissions shall be in writing, limited to two pages, plus a Bill of Costs. The submissions of Ballantry Homes are due September 19, 2014. Those of Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc. are due September 29, 2014. Those of the plaintiff are due October 10, 2014.
Maddalena J.
Released: September 10, 2014
COURT FILE NO.: 2605/12
DATE: 2014/09/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Mary Ann Peggy Andrews
Plaintiff
- and –
Oakdown Holdings Inc. o/a Ballantry Homes and Weston Hardwood Design Centre Inc.
Defendants
DECISION ON MOTION
Maddalena J.
Released: September 10, 2014