SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-470477
DATE: 20140721

RE: ALGONQUIN CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES c.o.b. HANDS THEFAMILYHELPNETWORK.CA, Applicant

AND:

MUNICIPAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT CORPORATION and THE CORPORATION OF THE VILLAGE OF SUNDRIDGE and THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF PARRY SOUND, Respondents

BEFORE: Stinson J.

COUNSEL:
Richard R. Minster, for the Applicant

Karey Lunau, for the Respondent Municipal Property Assessment Corporation

No one appearing for the respondents The Corporation of The Village of Sundridge and The Corporation of The Town of Parry Sound, Respondents

HEARD at Toronto: July 11, 2014

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is an application pursuant to s. 46 of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31 (the “Act”) for a declaration that two properties owned by the applicant in the Village of Sundridge and the Town of Parry Sound are exempt from municipal property tax under the provisions of s. 3(1) of the Act. The primary ground relied upon by the applicant is that the properties in question qualify for exemption under s. 3(1)6.1 as they are a children’s treatment center which receives provincial aid under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.20 (the “MCSS Act”). In the alternative, the applicant claims it is exempt from taxation pursuant to paragraph 5 of s 3(1) of the Act, as a non-profit philanthropic seminary of learning and also as a non-profit educational seminary of learning.

[2] I accept that the applicable legal principles are accurately summarized in paragraphs 19, 21 and 26 of the applicant’s factum.

[3] In this case, the applicant operates various centers around the Province of Ontario at which it provides counseling, support services, therapy, coaching and skills development training, primarily to children and youth up to age 18. These facilities are staffed by, among others, child and family therapists, behaviour communication therapists, experts in intensive behavioral intervention for autistic children, communications development assistants, early literacy specialists, healthcare facilitators, other therapists and associated support staff. They provide the indicated services both at the centers and in school and community settings.

[4] Based on the service contract between the applicant and the government, the objectives of the applicant, the description of the services performed and the qualifications and job descriptions of those who performed those services, I find as a fact that treatment of children occurs on these properties. Indeed, counsel for the respondents conceded that she could not say that, based on plain and ordinary language, “treatment of children” does not occur at these properties.

[5] It is also conceded that the applicant receives the lion’s share of its funding from the province.

[6] The question thus becomes whether the facilities operated by the applicant qualified as “children’s treatment centers” as that phrase is used in s. 3(1)6.1 of the Assessment Act. The submission of the respondents is that the reference in that paragraph to “a children’s treatment center that receives provincial aid under the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act” means that the Ministry of Community and Social Services (“MCSS”) controls the definition and designation of what qualifies as a “children’s treatment center”.

[7] Among the evidence relied upon by the respondent is the fact that, for purposes of its own funding designation, the MCSS has selected 20 facilities across Ontario that it considers to be “Children’s Treatment Centers” at which rehabilitation services are delivered to children and youth. Given that the ministry has chosen that designation for those specific facilities, the argument continues, only they should be granted the exemption under s. 3(1)6.1.

[8] There is no definition of a children’s treatment center in the Assessment Act or in the Ministry of Community and Social Services Act. Rather, to the extent that the MCSS employs that terminology, it appears to be an internal “term of art” without legal status.

[9] Other paragraphs in s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act make express reference to other statutory definitions for purposes of delineating land that is exempt from taxation. For example, paragraph 4 refers to land owned by a university etc. as defined in the Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2; paragraph 7 refers to land that is used as a care home within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17; Paragraph 9 refers to land owned by a municipality as defined in the Municipal Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.46. As well, pursuant to s. 2(1) (b) of the Assessment Act, regulations may be enacted to define any word that is not expressly defined in the Act. It is therefore noteworthy that there is no formal definition of the term “children’s treatment center” found in either the Act or the regulations under the Act.

[10] The mere fact that for internal and budgetary allocation purposes, the MCSS has chosen to affix the label of “Children’s Treatment Centers” to specific institutions, does not amount to a designation for Assessment Act purposes. The legislature has conferred no such authority on the MCSS, either by statute or regulation.

[11] The ordinary and grammatical meaning of a “children’s treatment center” is a place where children are given treatment. There is nothing in s, 3 of the Act or in the context of exemptions from taxation in the Act, that would take this phrase outside of its ordinary and grammatical meaning. Had the legislature intended this section to only apply to a specified or enumerated list of children’s treatment centers, that could have been done in the statute or by regulation. It was not.

[12] In Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, 1994 58 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed this principle. In that case, the city had argued that a taxation exemption only applied to the entire institution if the institution had a certain permit. The permit requirement was not in the legislation. At paragraph 37 the court stated as follows:

If the Legislature had intended that the tax exemption of the reception center should be subject to the existence of a permit issued by the proper authority, it would have said so expressly as it did for day-care centers. The same textual argument can be drawn from s. 204(15) A.M.T. with respect to educational institutions. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

[13] In the absence of any express requirement, I conclude that the plain and ordinary language of paragraph 6.1 was not intended to require designation by MCSS (or anyone else) as a prerequisite for exemption for taxation. I therefore do not accept the submission of the respondents on this point.

[14] The evidence amply supports the conclusion that the applicant primarily treats children at the two locations in dispute. Its objects are primarily to treat children. I accept that its primary purpose both in principle and in fact is to treat children at these two locations. I therefore find that they are children’s treatment centers. Given that the applicant receives provincial aid under the MCSS Act, and no portion of the land is occupied by a tenant of the children’s treatment center, the applicant qualifies for the exemption under this section.

[15] It follows that the applicant is entitled to the declaration sought in paragraph b)(i) of the Second Amended Notice Of Application.

[16] In view of the conclusion I have reached in relation to the principal submission of the applicant, I need not address the alternative submission that the applicant is exempt from taxation pursuant to paragraph 5 of s. 3(1) of the Act.

[17] A declaration shall issue accordingly. As agreed by the parties, as the successful party the applicant is entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $8,000 payable by the respondents.

Stinson J.

Date: July 21, 2014