ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: CR-13-2809-MO

DATE: 20140630

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

– and –

MASON JENKINS
Applicant

Robert H. MacDonald and Heather S. McIntyre, for the Crown

Howard L. Krongold, Mark Rieger and Jeffrey Schroeder, for the Applicant

HEARD: Written Submissions

Ruling re: judicial screening of an application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code

Pomerance J.:

Introduction

[1] On January 6, 1998, Mason Jenkins (the applicant) murdered his sister, Jennifer Jenkins, in their family home. He shot her five times at close range - three times in the head and twice in the chest – reloading the gun before each shot. Jennifer’s body was found at the bottom of the basement stairs, having been dragged there from the upstairs family room. The murder was driven by greed. The applicant planned to kill both of his parents as well as his sister, in order to inherit the family’s money. To this end, he forged two documents purporting to be his parents’ wills, naming himself as the sole beneficiary of their estates.

[2] The applicant was convicted of the first degree murder of his sister on January 12, 2001. An appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed in 2005 (R. v. Jenkins, [2005] O.J. No.282 (C.A.)).

[3] The applicant denied involvement in the crime for nine years, claiming that four men broke into the house and killed his sister. Initially, he told police that he was abducted by the men and managed to escape. At trial, he admitted to lying about the abduction. However, he insisted his sister was killed by men who broke into the house.

[4] The applicant now acknowledges that he caused his sister’s death and that he planned to kill both of his parents as well. However, he continues to conceal information about the crime. He maintains that the shooting was accidental. This assertion flies in the face of the evidence at trial, and the jury’s verdict of first degree murder.

[5] Mason Jenkins has applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, for a reduction in his 25 year parole ineligibility period. The Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice has designated me to screen the application and determine whether it should be considered by a jury. Pursuant to s. 745.61 of the Code, I must determine whether the applicant has shown “on the balance of probabilities, that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed.”

[6] This statutory threshold has not been met. The applicant has failed to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that his application has a substantial likelihood of success. The basis for this conclusion will be set out in the reasons that follow.

Materials Filed on the Application

[7] Voluminous document briefs were filed by both the applicant and the Crown. Correctional Services Canada (CSC) elected not to file its own brief, though many of its records have been filed by the Crown and defence.

[8] This case has an unusual twist, in that the record includes a documentary film, produced by Canadian film maker John Kastner, entitled “Life with Murder”. The film, which met with critical acclaim, revolves around the murder of Jennifer Jenkins and its impact on her family. The film contains interviews with the applicant, his parents and other family members. A DVD copy of the documentary, and a transcript of it, were filed as part of the Crown’s brief. At the behest of the Crown, and with the consent of the applicant, I watched the film as part of my review. Various statements made by the applicant and others are germane to this application and I will refer to them in my reasons.

Parallel Proceedings

[9] In a parallel proceeding, the applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code. The challenge was based on a 2011 amendment, which made the screening test more stringent. Before the amendment, s. 745.61 required the screening judge to consider whether it was shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the application had a “reasonable prospect” of success. Now, the applicant must show, on the balance of probabilities, that the application has a “substantial likelihood” of success. The applicant argued that the retrospective application of the new test to his case violates s. 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

[10] In reasons delivered on May 29, 2014, I dismissed the Charter application, ruling that s. 745.61, as amended, was constitutionally valid (R. v. Jenkins, 2014 ONSC 3223). I have applied the provision, as currently enacted, in determining whether the applicant’s case should be heard by a jury.

The Screening Test

[11] Section 745.61 provides:

745.61 (1) On receipt of an application under subsection 745.6(1), the appropriate Chief Justice shall determine, or shall designate a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction to determine, on the basis of the following written material, whether the applicant has shown, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed:

o (a) the application;

o (b) any report provided by the Correctional Service of Canada or other correctional authorities; and

o (c) any other written evidence presented to the Chief Justice or judge by the applicant or the Attorney General.

(2) In determining whether the applicant has shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed, the Chief Justice or judge shall consider the criteria set out in paragraphs 745.63(1)(a) to (e), with any modifications that the circumstances require.

(3) If the Chief Justice or judge determines that the applicant has not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed, the Chief Justice or judge may

o (a) set a time, no earlier than five years after the date of the determination, at or after which the applicant may make another application under subsection 745.6(1); or

o (b) decide that the applicant may not make another application under that subsection.

(4) If the Chief Justice or judge determines that the applicant has not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed but does not set a time for another application or decide that such an application may not be made, the applicant may make another application no earlier than five years after the date of the determination.

(5) If the Chief Justice or judge determines that the applicant has shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the application will succeed, the Chief Justice shall designate a judge of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction to empanel a jury to hear the application.

1996, c. 34, s. 2;
2011, c. 2, s. 4.

[12] Subsection (2) directs the screening judge to consider “the criteria set out in paragraphs 745.63(1)(a) to (e), with any modifications that the circumstances require”. Section 745.63(1) identifies the criteria to be applied by a jury on a faint hope hearing:

745.63 (1) The jury empanelled under subsection 745.61(5) to hear the application shall consider the following criteria and determine whether the applicant’s number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced:

a. (a) the character of the applicant;

b. (b) the applicant’s conduct while serving the sentence;

c. (c) the nature of the offence for which the applicant was convicted;

d. (d) any information provided by a victim at the time of the imposition of the sentence or at the time of the hearing under this section; and

e. (e) any other matters that the judge considers relevant in the circumstances

[13] In my decision on the constitutional issue, I commented on the inherent conceptual difficulties in the statutory test in para. 27:

The new test is an awkward formulation, combining, as it does, two different concepts of probability – balance of probabilities, on the one hand, and substantial likelihood, on the other. Moreover, while standards of proof usually apply to questions of fact, here the matter to be proved on the balance of probabilities is itself a standard of probability (a substantial likelihood). The term “substantial likelihood” imports its own vagaries, though this phrase does appear in other Criminal Code provisions. It would seem fruitless to try to assign a numerical value to the concept of substantial likelihood proved on a balance of probabilities. The concept is better understood as melding notions of quantitative and qualitative assessment. The applicant is to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there is a concrete or tangible likelihood of success.

[14] I reviewed the decisions in R. v. Poitras, 2012 ONSC 5147; R. v. Gayle, [2013] O.J. No. 4124; and R. v. Morrison, 2012 ABQB 619, 551 A.R. 149, which offer helpful guidance on the interpretation of s. 745.61. In addition, I offered my own observations. I will not repeat the analysis here. The central points may be summarized as follows:

a. A substantial likelihood of success is a more stringent standard than a reasonable prospect of success, though it is difficult to concretely define the difference between the two;

b. In applying the standard, the judge must take into account that, while screening is based on a paper review, the jury will be presented with oral testimony, which tends to be more evocative than documentary evidence;

c. The judge must consider the broad discretion of the jury to grant clemency. The jury is to consider the five statutory criteria, but is not to apply any specific legal standard in assessing whether the period parole ineligibility should be reduced;

d. Given the breadth of the jury’s discretion, the role of the judge is not so much to assess whether an application will succeed, but rather, whether it should succeed. As I explained in para. 46 of my decision on the constitutional issue:

…in faint hope cases, it is always open to the jury, as a matter of law, to allow an application. This flows from the breadth of the jury’s discretion. The question for the screening judge is not whether it is open to the jury to reduce parole ineligibility. That option is available in every case. Nor is the question what a jury will actually do in a given case. That requires a level of prescience that no judge can claim. What we are really asking as judges is whether a jury should allow the application. It remains open to a jury in any case to allow an application, but Parliament has stemmed the tide of cases that will make it to that stage. It has built a judicial dam at the front end of the process.

e. Under the old “reasonable prospect” test, the question was whether there was some evidence on which a reasonable jury could properly reduce the offender’s parole ineligibility period. Under the new test, the question is whether there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, acting judiciously, would be substantially likely to reduce the offender’s parole ineligibility period.

[15] I will apply these principles in examining the evidence in this case.

The Character of the Applicant

[16] The character of an offender is not immutable. It is not forever defined by the homicide that brought the offender before the court. The faint hope process is predicated on the notion that persons can change over time. As stated by Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. Sweitlinski, 1994 71 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 481, at para. 12: “the primary purpose of the s. 745 hearing is to call attention to changes which have occurred in the applicant’s situation and which might justify imposing a less harsh penalty upon the applicant”. Past events, including the offence, are important in the assessment of character, but their relevance may be attenuated by changes in the offender’s life.

[17] Character is a broad concept. It overlaps with other criteria, such as the nature of the offence. In this case, I will consider the applicant’s character as it is reflected in the following:

a. the applicant’s criminal antecedents;

b. the circumstances of the murder; and

c. the applicant’s level of remorse/acceptance of responsibility;

Criminal Antecedents: The Applicant’s Early Years

[18] The applicant began exhibiting anti-social behaviour at an early age. In his youth, he was seen as controlling, manipulative and difficult to manage. An assessment done when he was 12 years old described his childhood as “oppositional”, noting that he would “often triangle his parents against each other to achieve his desired gain or to avoid punishment for his misbehaviour”. He acted out in contemptuous and dysfunctional ways, for example, urinating on his bedroom floor, and sitting on the roof of the house for an extended period. He displayed aggression toward his parents who described him as being “completely out of control” during this period. These behaviours soon began to manifest at school as well.

[19] Before long, the applicant turned to criminal behaviour. He stole his parents’ car and was placed in a group home when he was between 10 and 12 years of age. This was the first of many offences. The applicant amassed a total of 31 convictions/findings of guilt between 1990 and the time of the murder in 2001.

[20] Throughout this period, the applicant’s parents, concerned about their son’s behaviour, sent out pleas for help. They wrote letters to officials seeking intervention. They wrote letters to the applicant himself. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to orchestrate a change in the applicant’s behaviour. It is difficult to know whether the system failed Mason Jenkins, or whether he failed himself. It is probably a bit of both. At the time, supports were likely inadequate to address the applicant’s erratic behaviour. At the same time, the applicant rebuffed the assistance that was offered to him, leaving the programs arranged by the Children’s Aid Society, and Project DARE.

[21] The crimes committed by the applicant in advance of the murder were largely property offences. Nonetheless, an undercurrent of violence was evident.

[22] In May of 1994, the applicant was released two weeks early from a detention facility because of his “exemplary conduct” in the institution. Within a week of returning to the community, he reverted back to criminal activity, stealing a car, driving dangerously, and failing to stop for the police during a high speed chase. There was extensive damage to the vehicles, and two police officers were hurt. After the applicant was boxed in by two police vehicles, he continued to ram the vehicles, shouting “shoot me, kill me, you know who I am”.

[23] The applicant’s parents wrote a letter to the judge presiding over the applicant’s sentencing hearing, expressing frustration over the lack of support available to the applicant, and the potential for future violence:

Our biggest fear is that someday Mason will hurt himself or someone else and then it will be too late. Perhaps then someone will say we should have listened.

[24] The probation officer assigned to the applicant in 1997 offered a similar caution:

Probation cannot serve any useful purpose for this young man. He will not avail himself of treatment opportunities and continuously re-offends, making treatment in the community virtually impossible…

Mason Jenkins has demonstrated a pattern of irresponsible behaviour and a pattern of criminal offences that to date have only led to minor injury and damage to vehicles. However, if he continues with the same type of offences someone could be seriously hurt in the future. [Emphasis added.]

The Offence

The days leading up to the murder

[25] On December 18, 1997, 25 days before the murder, the applicant was released from custody on charges of two counts of possession, one count of drive while prohibited, one count of breach of recognizance. His father, Brian Jenkins, signed as surety. Following his release, the applicant breached several bail terms, including his curfew and the requirement that he abstain from consumption of alcohol.

[26] During this time, the applicant also committed further offences. Among other things, he stole cheques and his mother’s bank card, which allowed him to withdraw money from the bank account that his mother managed for her father. He also broke and entered into a farm where he stole the firearm that he later used to kill his sister.

[27] On January 5, 1998, the day before the murder, Leslie Jenkins discovered that her ATM card was missing. Upon searching the applicant’s room, she found a number of cheques from a joint account that she shared with her father. Upon being confronted by his parents, the applicant admitted that he stole money from the joint account, transferring the funds to a new account that he had recently opened. The applicant agreed to close the new account, and his father took him to the bank in order to do so. His mother gave him back the bank card, so that he could return the stolen funds. Instead of returning the money, as he had promised, the applicant used this opportunity to steal another $300 from the account.

[28] In his testimony at the trial, the applicant admitted to manipulating the situation so that he could steal more money. He said that he: “sort o’spun a story to see if it would work, to get that bank card back in my possession”.

The day of the murder

[29] The murder was carried out on January 6, 1998. The applicant was meticulous in his plan to ambush his parents, to gain financially from their deaths, and to divert suspicion away from himself.

[30] According to the applicant, he planned to kill his father while he was home with him that afternoon, and then kill his mother when she arrived home later. The applicant has said that, while he spent the afternoon with his father, he couldn’t go through with it. His father left the residence at one point, and Jennifer came home from school. It was while the two were alone in the house that the applicant shot her five times. Jennifer was killed while sitting in a chair in the living room. The applicant dragged her body to the basement and covered the chair so that the blood would not be visible. The inference is that the applicant did not want his parents to see the body and be deterred from entering the house.

[31] After the murder, the Applicant fled the residence, broke into a house, and finally made his way to his cousin’s farm, where he stole a horse and rode away on it. He subsequently stole a Ford Bronco and was arrested the following morning.

[32] During the documentary, the applicant acknowledged that he was motivated by greed to kill his family. He wanted money and he decided that this was the only way to get it at the time. As he put it:

MASON: So that whole time was a confusing period of time in my life for me because it’s Christmas time, there’s a lot of pressures from family members and there was a lot of questions in my mind of, you know, certain things were going to be successful, or certain people I saw were being successful and I wasn’t achieving what I wanted to achieve. So in my mind I thought about...and I hate to admit, but I did think about killin my parents. That was a thought…

…And that’s…it was something in my head that seemed like that was the only alternative for money at the time or...it was just like at a very confusing time. If I do this I’ll get the money and then I’ll get the respect and then…you know, things will sort themselves out. And I thought about it and I thought about it,…I planned it, it was… nothing with my sister though. And that afternoon, that’s why the gun was there. That’s why the will…

[33] And at p. 43‑44 of the transcript:

MASON: I was failing at life… I was failing… I didn’t feel that I was being successful. I saw all my friends moving on and moving forward. It just… I felt like a failure. And then my parents would say stuff over the phone that would sort of tick me off and it was at that point that I actually … the thought had entered into my head. Well one way of … one way of dealing with the problems is to kill them. and that would give me the money and that would give me a fresh start…

Remorse/acknowledgment of responsibility

[34] Over the years, the applicant has offered several different accounts of Jennifer’s murder. In his initial statement to the police, he told them that he was abducted by the men that killed his sister, but managed to escape. The applicant abandoned that story at trial, but still insisted that his sister was killed by four armed men that forcibly entered the house. The applicant testified that he believed that the men were there either to punish him for a drug debt, or for having given London police information about a murder investigation. The applicant testified that he took a .22 rifle, which he had earlier stolen from a farm, and tried to stop the men, but they disarmed him. The applicant testified that he ran away from the house, believing that the men would not hurt his sister.

[35] Clearly, the jury did not believe his testimony.

[36] Nine years into his sentence, the applicant finally acknowledged some responsibility for the crime. However, the story continued to change. During the documentary, the applicant offered different accounts of the shooting to a correctional officer. In the first version, he stated that the gun went off accidentally, killing his sister. He stated that he checked her and she was dead. He then decided to shoot her four more times to make it look like she was murdered by intruders. After the officer intimated that this was not a convincing account, the applicant offered a different version. In this one, the first shot was accidental, but did not kill his sister. He stated that she was still alive but was “in pain”, “like some sort of wounded animal”. On this version, he shot her four more times to “stop the pain”.

[37] Significantly, in both of versions, the applicant asserted that the first shot was accidental. He has never stated otherwise. An accidental shooting is not consistent with the evidence at trial, or the jury verdict. Nor does it coincide with the applicant’s admitted plan to kill his parents and become the sole beneficiary of their estates. One can infer that the applicant has tailored this account in order to minimize his culpability.

[38] During the documentary, the applicant acknowledged that he has yet to tell the whole truth about the murder. The following exchange took place with the director of the film:

MASON: My parents have said to me – we’ve had children to love and to raise, not throw away and we’ll be there for you no matter what. But in the back of my mind I’m … like if I admit that … that I murdered my sister, will they still be there for me? And that’s something I’ve struggled with and sort of at different stages I’ve told a little bit more and little bit more and a little bit more. And you know, as a liar, it’s hard for me to tell the truth and on top of it, I lose the only support that I have left because my parents are the only support I have left. So.

DIRECTOR: So there is still some truths to come out about what you did.

MASON: Yeah, there is truths to come out.

DIRECTOR: You still haven’t told the whole truth about the murder.

MASON: No.

[39] The applicant’s protestations of innocence, his piecemeal disclosure about the crime, the inconsistencies in his accounts, his continued concealment of the truth, and his attempts to mitigate the seriousness of the crime, make it difficult to conclude that he is remorseful or that he has taken responsibility for his actions.

The Applicant’s Conduct While Serving His Sentence

[40] The applicant has been incarcerated at five institutions since his conviction. His experience in institutions has been mixed. On one hand, the applicant has completed the programming required under his correctional plan and has received positive reports. He received his high school diploma in 2008 and, since 2011, has served as a certified tutor for other inmates. The applicant has a positive record within the institution. His performance indicators are “excellent”. He is said to “work well independently on approved projects”.

[41] On the other hand, the applicant has, during his incarceration, committed institutional offences. He was also convicted of possession of marijuana for purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. The CDSA charge was laid after one gram of marijuana and several hundred dollars of Canadian currency were found in the applicant’s cell. To his credit, the applicant cooperated with police after the drugs and money were found. He confessed to selling contraband to inmates and provided other “credible information that assisted [the police] investigation” (see letter of Tammy Jenkins, dated November 21, 2012).

[42] Since 2009, the applicant’s institutional record has improved. At present, he is classified as a medium security offender with ratings of moderate institutional adjustment, low escape risk and moderate public safety concerns. He has been granted escorted temporary absences for medical appointments without incident. In February 2013, the applicant was granted an escorted temporary absence by the Parole Board of Canada in order to attend a visitation for his grandmother, who had recently passed away. In allowing the absence, the Parole Board told the applicant: “it seems your behaviour improved, and we note that you have completed school, are employed as a cook, and have been receiving positive reports”.

[43] Despite these changes, troubling behaviour persists. In April 2011, the applicant was discovered to have a Facebook page in which he described himself as an “Office Manager” for “Correction Services Canada”. On January 26, 2012, the applicant was found to be in possession of various items in his cell, some of which were unauthorized, including old health care cards, identification cards, tattoo drawing/stencils and a container full a screws. In November 2012, while at Bath Institution, the applicant was alleged to have threatened an Administrative Assistant Security Intelligence Officer and to be “muscling other residents” of his unit[^1].

[44] The report of Dr. Stephen Hucker, forensic psychiatrist, dated April 29, 2011, offered the following summary of the applicant’s institutional history:

His incarceration has been marked by a number of disciplinary problems, complaints about staff and institutional regulations and procedures. Comments in the materials reviewed indicate that, in addition to providing disparate accounts of his index offense, he has also tended to change his version of events with respect to other matters that have occurred during his incarceration. He has also been alleged to attempt to manipulate situations to his advantage. There have been periods of segregation, most recently, last month. However, he was released into general population while investigation continued. His alleged involvement in sub-culture activities has been a recurring theme in his records. Indeed his 2009 conviction for drug possession for the purpose of trafficking was in connection with such involvement. However, his file suggests that there is no evidence of his being involved in this type of activity at the present time.

Psychological/Psychiatric Assessments

[45] The applicant was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder at the age of 17. He reports having attempted to commit suicide in 1997.

[46] Upon his admission to Kingston Penitentiary, a risk assessment was conducted by Dr. R.D. Hoge. This consisted of three actuarial assessments involving the Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R), the Statistical Information on Recidivism (SIR) assessment, and the Level of Service Inventory‑Revised (LSI‑R) assessment. The score on the PCL‑R suggested a “relatively low risk for re‑offending”. The score on the SIR assessment indicated a moderate to high risk of general recidivism, whereas the score of the LSI‑R spoke of a “low to moderate” likelihood of failure after release. The LSI‑R pointed to areas that the applicant could work on to further reduce his risk of re‑offending, such as education, employment, accommodations and attitude.

[47] A psychological risk/needs assessment, carried out by Dr. Loza in 2011, found no evidence of a major mental illness on the part of the applicant. The SIR score indicated that the applicant falls into a group of offenders, 60 per cent of whom will commit an indictable offence upon release. A Self‑Appraised Questionnaire (SAQ) placed the offender in a group indicating a low‑moderate risk of violent and non‑violent recidivism over a two year span, compared to other federal offenders. The applicant is noted to be a low‑moderate risk for escorted temporary absences and a high‑moderate risk for transfer to a minimum security institution.

Victim Information

[48] The applicant’s parents offer strong support for his application to reduce his parole ineligibility period. They do so, not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their daughter. Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins assert that “Jennifer would want her brother to work hard to become a better person” and that she would support his application. According to Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins, “… we live our lives to respect Jennifer’s life. We believe she would want her brother to move forward and she would want him to have this opportunity”.

[49] The position taken by the Jenkins is obviously a relevant consideration in the assessment of the application. However, it is tempered by the unusual circumstances of this case, in which the parents of the victim are also the parents of the offender. It is understandable that the Jenkins’ loyalties would extend to both their murdered daughter and their convicted son. It is difficult to imagine the anguish they have experienced due to the loss of their daughter, and the loss of their son, through his incarceration. While they stand by the applicant, their position may say more about their capacity for grace and forgiveness, and their love of their son, than it does the applicant’s character.

[50] Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Jenkins do not know the full story surrounding the murder. They did not hear the evidence at trial, having been excluded from the proceedings as potential witnesses. The applicant has never told them, or others, exactly what took place. He has been particularly coy about disclosure to his parents. He has never disabused them of their belief that the shooting was accidental.

[51] One can understand the Jenkins’ desire to be shielded from the details of the crime. This is one way in which the family unit can continue to exist. During the documentary, Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins spoke candidly about their coping mechanisms, one of which involved limiting the information they received about the crime:

Leslie Jenkins: …So it’s how do you deal with it? I think you just go a little on blind faith. You just go with your gut instinct and your love for your children and you do it. You take a piece each time and say this much I need to know, this much I don’t need to know.

Brian Jenkins: “It’s the way we’ve handled it all the way along. Is we keep chipping away. Chipping away type of thing. So I guess being afraid of, of… in my case, of being afraid of losing the family unit, something that you don’t want to lose, regarding the family unit, regardless of the cost. And in my heart I want to still continue on with the family such as it is.

[52] Other family and community members are far less supportive of the applicant, including: Paulette Delaney (his aunt); Mark Jenkins (his uncle); Patricia Jenkins‑Close (his aunt); and Terry Jenkins and John Basden (his second cousins and owners of the farm that he broke into after the murder). These individuals have expressed concern about the applicant’s release, citing his manipulative character, his lack of empathy for others, and the danger that he still poses to his family and the broader community. Some of these individuals have not had contact with the applicant since his conviction. Others were angered by his release to attend his grandmother’s visitation.

Conclusion

[53] In the final analysis, there is little to be said in support of Mason Jenkins’ application.

[54] The applicant was convicted of a monstrous crime. He planned to kill his closest family members for money. The killing of a sibling or parent is difficult to contemplate under any circumstances. When motivated by greed, the gravity of the crime is incalculable.

[55] While no one could have anticipated Jennifer’s murder, it was, in hindsight, consistent with the applicant’s earlier behaviour. This was not an isolated act, or one that was out of character. By the time of the murder, the applicant already had an extensive history of manipulating and victimizing those around him for personal gain. In the days leading up to the murder, he stole from his mother’s bank account. From his perspective, the murder of his sister and his parents was just another way to get the money that he so desired.

[56] Of course, the offence is just one of the criteria I am to consider in assessing the likely success of the application. It has now been over 15 years since the crime was committed. I must consider the impact of any changes in the applicant’s character, lifestyle, attitudes and prospects for rehabilitation. The difficulty is that the evidence does not establish significant change. The applicant continues to be motivated by self‑interest. He continues to manipulate the circumstances, and others, in order to secure the best outcome for himself. This is nowhere more evident than in his descriptions of the crime. He has sought refu