COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-497725
DATE: 20140627
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ACACIO BATISTA
Applicant
– and –
MASON’S MASONRY SUPPLY LIMITED
Respondent
Saul Jonas, for the Applicant
Neal H. Roth, for the Respondent
COURT FILE NO.: 62723/91Q
BETWEEN:
MASON’S MASONRY SUPPLY LIMITED
Plaintiff
– and –
LUCIANO DA SILVA and ACACIO BATISTA COB as GLOBE BRICK
Defendants
Neal H. Roth, for the Plaintiff
Saul Jonas, for the Defendant Acacio Batista
HEARD: June 9, 2014
REASONS FOR DECISION
JUSTICE W. MATHESON
[1] Two matters are before me, both arising from the same default judgment signed by the Registrar on February 4, 1991, now 23 years ago:
(i) an application brought by Acacio Batista seeking a declaration that the above default judgment against him has been discharged as a result of his bankruptcy later in 1991, and related relief; and,
(ii) a motion brought by Mason’s Masonry Supply Limited, the plaintiff in the original action, for a declaration that the above default judgment survived Batista’s bankruptcy, and alternative relief seeking a determination of allegations of breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act, S.O. 1983, c. 6.
[2] The dispute centers on whether or not the 1991 default judgment was founded on a misappropriation of trust funds and survived Batista’s 1991 bankruptcy by virtue of s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (“BIA”). Section 178 sets out a number of situations in which liabilities of a debtor survive the debtor’s discharge from bankruptcy. Under s. 178(1)(d) a discharge does not relieve a bankrupt from “any debt or liability arising out of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” In this case, the alleged misappropriation arises under the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act.
[3] The default judgment is for $13,386.84 bearing interest at the rate of 18%, as well as costs.
[4] As a preliminary matter, Mason’s counsel noted that Batista required a Portuguese interpreter for his cross-examination. On the cross-examination, Batista indicated that he did not fully understand all the English in his affidavits, but he explained that his lawyer read them out to him and he confirmed them. Mason’s counsel submitted that this language difficulty should be taken into account in assessing Batista’s evidence, and I have done so.
Circumstances giving rise to dispute
[5] The original action arose from a failed home rebuild. Batista was one of two partners carrying on a bricklaying business under the name Globe Brick, which was a substantial business at that time. Batista and his partner were also two of three people who formed a company called Dalsa Investments Inc. to purchase a property in Toronto, demolish the existing house, and build a new one. Each of them advanced capital. In 1989, Dalsa purchased the property for $315,000, financed in large part by two mortgages on the property totaling $270,000. In late May 1990, a third mortgage was taken out on the property in the amount of $125,000.
[6] Batista attests that the recession dashed the company’s plans. The mortgages exceeded the property value. The rebuild in progress was abandoned. Ultimately, the shares in Dalsa were transferred to a third party, who was also a carpenter on the job. No money was received for the shares. The rebuild was finished by the new owner of Dalsa, who also lost substantial money on the project.
[7] In and before May 1990, Globe Brick ordered bricks and other materials for the new house from Mason’s, which were delivered but not fully paid for. The bricks and other materials were apparently used.
[8] Mason’s did not proceed to place a lien on the property. On January 4, 1991, it commenced an action on the unpaid invoices. In addition to that claim, the statement of claim contained a general allegation that monies received by or owing to Globe Brick constituted trust funds within the meaning of s. 8 of the Construction Lien Act, and alleged wrongful appropriation or conversion of those funds. Facts regarding the alleged misappropriation or conversion, such as the amount of trust funds allegedly received and the amount allegedly misappropriated or converted, were not pleaded.
[9] The 1991 statement of claim sought the following relief:
(i) judgment for the price of goods sold and delivered in the amount of $13,178.86;
(ii) a declaration that all monies payable to or received on account of the construction project in the sum equal in amount to the amount of all monies payable by Globe Brick to Mason’s constituted trust funds within the meaning of s. 8 of the Construction Lien Act and as such were required to be paid to Mason’s;
(iii) an accounting of the funds received, receivable, paid out or payable;
(iv) judgment for the sum found to be due to Mason’s as a result of the above accounting, or, in the alternative, damages in the amount of $13,178.86 for breach of trust;
(v) damages in the amount of $13,178.86 for unjust enrichment; and,
(vi) costs and interest.
[10] Mason’s requisitioned default judgment from the Registrar on February 1, 1991. It did so on the grounds that the claim was for a debt or liquidated demand in money. It was open to Mason’s to move for default judgment before a judge and seek broader relief. It did not do so.
[11] Default judgment was signed on February 4, 1991, about a month after the action had been commenced. Mason’s requisitioned writs of seizure and sale on February 15, 1991, but otherwise took no steps to enforce its default judgment. It did not conduct a judgment debtor examination or direct the sheriff to take any steps to collect on the judgment.
[12] The default judgment was for the sum of $13,386.84 bearing post-judgment interest at the rate of 18%, and $250 for costs bearing post-judgment interest at the rate of 14%.
[13] Batista initiated bankruptcy proceedings and was declared bankrupt on May 3, 1991. Mason’s received notice of the bankruptcy proceedings through its counsel. It was listed on the statement of affairs as a creditor for the amount of $4,500, but did not file a claim or otherwise participate in those proceedings. Batista received an absolute discharge on December 20, 1991.
[14] Thereafter, Mason’s renewed its writs of seizure and sale twice but otherwise still took no steps to collect on its default judgment.
[15] Batista does not recall being served with the statement of claim or receiving the default judgment in 1991. He does recall being aware of the default judgment in 1993, when he was attempting to do a real estate transaction. Commencing in 1993, there was intermittent correspondence about the issue now before me – that is, whether or not the default judgment survived the absolute discharge. The issue arose in 1993, in 1998, in 2007 and most recently in 2010.
[16] There is no doubt that the issue about the effect of the bankruptcy discharge was known to both sides as of 1993. For example, in 1993, McCarthy Tétrault wrote to Mason’s counsel on behalf of Batista. Counsel expressed the view that, because Mason’s elected to require the Registrar to sign judgment rather than move for judgment, the default judgment was not based upon a breach of trust and did not obtain the benefits of s. 178 of the BIA. Other counsel wrote as well. Each time the issue came up, Mason’s counsel took the position that the default judgment survived the bankruptcy. Although Batista sometimes indicated an intention to go to court and have the issue addressed, neither side did so.
[17] In 2010, Mason’s missed the deadline for renewing its writs and therefore had to seek leave to do so. Batista filed an affidavit on that motion raising the issue of his absolute discharge. Master Muir granted the order for the extension of time on May 25, 2011, and indicated that Batista was free to bring an application in the bankruptcy proceedings on the issue of whether or not the default judgment survived the absolute discharge. Ultimately, that led to this application. In turn, it led to Mason’s motion.
[18] Thus, both sides were aware of the dispute between them about the default judgment as early as 1993, and neither side took steps to have it resolved until recently. Further, other than the maintenance of its writ, Mason’s has taken no steps to enforce the default judgment in the 23-year period since the default judgment was obtained.
[19] Both parties have filed extrinsic evidence to address some of the relief sought on this application and motion. Various affidavits and a cross-examination of Batista have been filed.
[20] Mason’s focuses on the third mortgage as the source of the alleged trust funds. The evidence on cross-examination is that the mortgage funds were advanced to Dalsa, and it used the funds to pay its bills from providers of goods and services. On the subject of receipt of trust funds by Batista, he attested both in his affidavits and in his cross-examination that he did not receive any monies from Dalsa, nor was he directly involved in determining who would be paid from the proceeds of the third mortgage obtained by Dalsa. In cross-examination he indicated that his partner and the accountant dealt with questions about who would be paid, not him. However, he agreed in cross-examination that among others, employees of Globe Brick received payments.
[21] Counsel to Batista submits that Batista will be prejudiced if Mason’s is permitted to look behind the default judgment and attempt to litigate the alleged breach of trust at this late stage. Not surprisingly given the passage of time, certain key documents have long since been destroyed, such as Dalsa’s business records and Batista’s own bank records from decades ago. An inquiry of the Bank of Montreal revealed that it retained records for eleven years only. As well, the accountant who handled relevant financial matters died in 2012 and his children destroyed his books and records.
[22] As well, Batista has provided an explanation for why he did not proceed to have the issue decided until now. He indicated that he did not have the financial resources to devote to the court proceedings until recently. He also indicated that he has been unable to have any dealings with his property for 23 years, which has caused him financial harm.
[23] Mason’s counsel submits that Batista’s explanation for why he did not bring his application sooner is weak. In cross-examination, Mason’s counsel was provided with financial information showing that Batista had an income of about $48,000 in 2001, rising to about $56,000 in 2009 and $74,000 last year. Batista was able to put modest amounts in an RRSP and purchase a vacation property for $12,000 in 2007.
[24] However, Mason’s itself puts forward no explanation for its failure to take any steps to resolve the issue in the more than two decades since the issue was raised.
Issues
[25] The main issue in both the application and the motion is whether or not the default judgment granted in 1991 survived Batista’s absolute discharge later that same year by virtue of s. 178 of the BIA. The various issues that then arise are the following:
(1) whether the default judgment already reflects the alleged misappropriation of trust funds based upon the combined effect of the statement of claim and the deemed admission of its allegations of fact;
(2) if not, whether the court should look behind the default judgment and determine if the debt arises from misappropriation based upon the extrinsic evidence filed now and with what result;
(3) whether the default judgment is subject to variation under Rule 19.08 or amendment under Rule 59.06 (1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194; and,
(4) whether there should be a trial of an issue to determine the allegations of breach of trust and misappropriation.
Nature of the default judgment based on the pleading admissions alone
[26] Under Rule 19.02(1)(a), Batista is deemed to admit the truth of the factual allegations in the statement of claim. Mason’s argues that these deemed admissions mean that the default judgment “already reflects the misappropriation of the trust funds.” Considering the specific pleading and its factual allegations, I conclude that it does not.
[27] The statement of claim contains a straightforward claim for unpaid invoices, with all the necessary particulars, for which no finding of misappropriation is required. In the ordinary course, that claim falls squarely within the ambit of a requisition for default judgment from a Registrar. It was certainly not necessary to prove anything other than goods delivered and unpaid, and wrong to suggest that the default judgment reflects any determination of misappropriation by the Registrar.
[28] The other relief sought in the action, including a declaration of breach of trust and an accounting and damages in relation to breach of trust, would have required a finding of breach of trust but could not have been granted by the Registrar.
[29] In any event, assuming that a default judgment could reflect a breach of trust or misappropriation, the statement of claim here would be insufficient. As set out in Rule 19.06, a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment merely because the facts alleged in the statement of claim are admitted. The admitted facts must entitle the plaintiff to the judgment. Here they do not.
[30] The allegations in the statement of claim regarding breach of trust, misappropriation and conversion are very general. Fundamental facts required to prove these allegations were not pleaded and have therefore not been admitted, such as the amount of trust funds Batista allegedly received and the amount he allegedly misappropriated or converted. This is not a criticism of the pleading per se – Mason’s likely did not have the necessary information at that stage – but it remains the case that the deemed factual admissions are insufficient. Even if Mason’s had brought a motion for default judgment in front of a judge back in 1991, additional evidence would have been needed to obtain a finding of misappropriation within the meaning of s. 178 of the BIA.
[31] This is not a case like Toro Aluminum Ltd. v. Revah (1999), 1999 14847 (ON SC), 3 C.L.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. S.C.), where the only claims asserted were for a declaration that the defendant and others were trustees and for damages for breach of trust. In that case, the court found that the default judgment (granted by a judge) necessarily reflected a determination of breach of trust.
[32] I therefore conclude that the default judgment obtained in 1991, which was based upon the statement of claim only, did not incorporate or reflect a finding that brought the default judgment within s. 178 of the BIA.
Extrinsic evidence
[33] Mason’s submits that I can look behind the face of the default judgment to determine if the debt arises from a breach of trust, and in doing so have regard for extrinsic evidence. The cases put before me regarding this proposition arise in different circumstances, but some do involve a default judgment.
[34] Mason’s counsel focused on Perciasepe v. Smith, 2003 64259 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 6043 (S.C.), aff’d 2004 4763 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 3110 (C.A.). In that case, the plaintiff had obtained a default judgment in 1995. In 1997, the defendant declared bankruptcy. The plaintiff filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy submitting that s. 178 of the BIA applied. The accuracy of that assertion did not need to be tested in the bankruptcy proceedings. Thereafter, the plaintiff heard that the defendant had acquired property and promptly took steps to address the situation. About seven years after the default judgment, and four years after the absolute discharge, the plaintiff obtained a consent order lifting the stay under the BIA pending a trial of various issues including whether or not the matter could be reopened and if so whether or not there was a fraud. Ultimately, a summary judgment motion was brought against one of the defendants and the court concluded that it could look behind the face of the judgment to determine whether or not the debt arose from fraud.
[35] In Perciasepe, the judge observed at para. 8 that the motion before him was an “uncommon procedural circumstance” but that the action had been revived through the consent order obtained in the bankruptcy proceedings. He concluded that he was not prohibited from considering whether the debt arose from fraud and proceeded to decide the summary judgment motion on its merits. Unlike the case before me, in Perciasepe the defendant put forward no evidence in response to the motion. On the record, there was no dispute on the merits. As well, and again unlike the case before me, there was no evidence of prejudice due to delay put forward by the defendant.
[36] Metric Contracting Services Corp. v. Kepic, 2013 ONSC 7036, [2013] O.J. No. 5130 was also a default judgment and bankruptcy case. It arose from a construction lien claim that was originally defended, but default judgment was granted at a later stage. Unlike the case before me, in Metric there was a trial of the merits of the claim, albeit uncontested. As well, in Metric the plaintiff did not receive notice of the bankruptcy proceedings. As it happened, the trial took place in 2007 after the defendant had declared bankruptcy in 2006. Once the plaintiff became aware of the bankruptcy, it proceeded promptly and was granted leave to continue with its action nunc pro tunc. I disagree with Mason's categorization of this case as going behind the judgment. On the contrary, the judgment was obtained after a full trial, and the real issue was a lack of coordination with the bankruptcy proceedings.
[37] I conclude that there is some authority, in different circumstances, suggesting that I may look behind the default judgment and the pleading, and consider extrinsic evidence. I have therefore done so, but find that the extrinsic evidence is not sufficient to bring the debt within s. 178 of the BIA.
[38] While there is some extrinsic evidence before me regarding the alleged misappropriation of trust funds, there are important gaps due to the unavailability of financial records and an important financial witness, as well as lapsing memory. None of this is surprising given the passage of time. Significant inferences would have to be drawn to prove a breach of trust that falls under s. 178 of the BIA. For example, there is no affirmative evidence that any amount of trust funds was received by Batista, let alone misappropriated or converted by him for an improper use. Mason’s submits that it is sufficient to show that Batista had some direct involvement with the trust funds. There is no affirmative evidence of direct involvement either.
[39] Putting Mason’s evidence at its best, Batista has admitted in cross-examination that Dalsa received the proceeds of the third mortgage and used it to pay its bills, including payments to suppliers of goods and services, including employees of Globe Brick. Mason’s asks me to infer that Batista must have been directly involved in that process. However, Batista’s evidence is that it was his partner and his accountant (now deceased) who dealt with those matters. Further, Batista’s evidence is that he neither received the funds from Dalsa nor did he misdirect them.
[40] Even though not pleaded, Mason’s also argues that Batista is liable as an owner of Dalsa under s. 13 of the Construction Lien Act. Even if this argument could be advanced now, Mason’s would have to show that Batista assented to or acquiesced in conduct he knew or reasonably ought to have known amounted to a breach of trust. The evidence before me is insufficient to meet this requirement.
[41] Further, if the proceeds of the third mortgage were used to pay trades and suppliers who were entitled to those payments under the regime in the Construction Lien Act, there would be no breach of trust.
[42] Many of these matters would ordinarily be addressed by looking at the business records and the bank records, which are no longer available.
[43] It is Mason’s position that the gaps in the evidence are Batista’s responsibility in that, as a trustee, he ought to have preserved the necessary records. This is a circular argument. It is unfair to suggest that, in order to prove Batista was a trustee to begin with, I should assume he was one and draw an adverse inference for his failure to discharge the duties of trustee.
[44] I am not prepared to draw adverse inferences against Batista due to the lack of documentation at this stage. Further, I am not prepared to disregard his evidence because there are some things he cannot remember at this point in time.
[45] The extrinsic evidence relied upon by Mason’s is insufficient to prove that there was a debt that falls within s. 178 of the BIA. I therefore grant the declaration sought in the application, to the effect that the 1991 default judgment did not survive the 1991 absolute discharge.
[46] The remedy of a declaration was also sought by Mason’s on its motion. It is not clear to me that the remedy of a declaration is available through the form of motion brought, however, that issue is academic because I would not grant the declaration requested by Mason’s in any event.
[47] Mason’s motion raises other procedural routes for alternative relief. Specifically, Mason’s moves under Rule 19.08 and Rule 59.06. Both rules are discretionary and the use proposed for each of them is unconventional. As set out below, I have denied that relief as well.
Request to vary under Rule 19.08(1)
[48] Mason’s submits that to the extent necessary the default judgment should be varied under Rule 19.08(1). It provides as follows:
19.08(1) A judgment against a defendant who has been noted in default that is signed by the registrar or granted by the court on motion under rule 19.04 may be set aside or varied by the court on such terms as are just.
[49] Mason’s concedes that this rule is ordinarily used by defendants, not by the plaintiff who obtained the default judgment in the first place. But even if the rule is available to Mason’s, I would not exercise my discretion to allow the default judgment to be varied in the manner suggested here.
[50] Essentially, Mason’s wishes to use Rule 19.08 to obtain default judgment on matters not previously adjudicated and incorporate those matters into a default judgment given 23 years ago. As set out above, the extrinsic evidence is insufficient to justify varying the default judgment. Further, in considering whether or not to exercise my discretion, I am concerned about both delay and prejudice. As I said in court, a primary consideration for me is whether or not it is possible, at this late stage, to have a fair determination of the issue of alleged breach of trust and misappropriation and conversion. I conclude that it is not, and the responsibility for that situation falls on Mason’s, which ought to have moved reasonably promptly once the dispute about the default judgment arose in 1993.
[51] Mason’s relies upon Toro Aluminum v. Sampogna, 2013 ONSC 5345, 5 C.B.R. (6th) 236 with respect to the length of the delay. In Toro Aluminum, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment years before and was seeking a declaration that the default judgment was not released by a subsequent bankruptcy. While the decision does not contain a detailed chronology, it is clear that there is a period of about 15 years between the default judgment and the disposition of the application.
[52] Toro Aluminum is materially different than the case before me. To begin with, the court that granted default judgment had found the defendant in breach of trust and personally liable. It does not appear to have been a default judgment signed by a Registrar and was not a Rule 19.08 case. Another important distinction arises because the respondent had consented to an order to make disclosure in the original action, but no disclosure had ever been made accounting for the funds. There was therefore no question that he had responsibility for producing the records. The evidence also showed that the respondent had filed an affidavit in another proceeding that contradicted his sworn evidence in this matter, causing the court to conclude that he was engaged in an active effort to mislead the court. The court concluded that the defendants, including the respondent on this application, had collectively failed to account for the relevant trust funds and therefore committed a wrongdoing sufficient to trigger s. 178 of the BIA. On the subject of delay, while there was a lengthy period of delay, there is no reference in the decision to prejudice caused by the delay.
[53] It was Mason’s that ought to have pressed this issue forward after it arose in 1993, and it did not do so. Further, Mason’s has provided no explanation for its delay. Lastly, there is actual prejudice arising from the absence of important records and an important witness.
[54] In all the circumstances, I decline to exercise my discretion to allow for the variance of the 1991 default judgment under this rule.
Request to amend under Rule 59.06
[55] Along the same vein, Mason’s seeks relief under Rule 59.06, which provides as follows:
59.06 (1) An order that contains an error arising from an accidental slip or omission or requires amendment in any particular on which the court did not adjudicate may be amended on a motion in the proceeding.
(2) A party who seeks to,
(a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made;
(d) obtain other relief than that originally awarded,
may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed. [Emphasis added.]
[56] Mason’s submits that it meets the prerequisites for this rule because, if the default judgment is not itself a finding of misappropriation, it requires amendment on a matter that was not previously adjudicated. However, the rule requires that it be a matter on which the “court” did not adjudicate. Properly read, it must therefore be a court order and “court” is defined in Rule 1 to extend to a Master, but not a Registrar. In my view, this rule is not available.
[57] Further, Mason’s relies on Batista’s bankruptcy to satisfy the requirement that there be “facts arising” “after” the order was made. Again, this highlights the importance of the delay. If it wished to benefit from this rule, Mason’s ought to have moved promptly after it became aware of the bankruptcy. It received notice of the bankruptcy in 1991, and did nothing to pursue an amendment to the default judgment.
[58] I am not suggesting that a determination ought to have been sought in the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. But if relief is sought under this rule, the motion for an amendment ought to have been brought reasonably promptly after the new facts arose, and long before now.
[59] Even if this rule is available, I would decline to exercise my discretion to permit the requested amendment at this stage. The same concerns about delay and prejudice, and their impact on fairness, are at the forefront of my consideration here.
Trial of an issue
[60] In the alternative to varying or amending the default judgment, Mason’s asks for an order directing a trial of the issue, including the delivery of particulars, the exchange of affidavits of documents, examinations for discovery and trial. In other words, it is proposed that the parties now litigate that aspect of the action.
[61] There was discussion during oral argument regarding whether or not the default judgment was only a partial disposition of the action and the relief sought regarding the breach of trust allegations remained open and can be litigated now. Nothing on the face of the default judgment suggests that it is anything other than a complete disposition of the action. It was certainly open to Mason’s to abandon the other relief sought.
[62] I have some reservations about the concept that there could be a partial default judgment, but even if it was permitted, the obligation to move the balance of the action forward was on Mason’s and it did not do so. Under our rules, it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who is responsible for moving its action forward to a prompt resolution. A compelling explanation would have to be provided by Mason’s for a delay of 23 years and is absent here.
[63] Given the parties’ course of conduct, it is apparent that they both treated the default judgment as a complete disposition of the action, not a partial disposition.
[64] Even if I accepted the proposition that the allegations remained open, I cannot see how they could be adjudicated fairly now.
[65] I therefore decline to amend or vary the default judgment on this motion or direct a trial of the issue.
Orders
[66] I make the following orders:
(1) the application is granted, and in that regard the following relief is granted:
(a) a declaration that the 1991 default judgment between Mason’s Masonry Supply Limited and Acacio Batista in Court File No. 62723/91Q is discharged as against Acacio Batista by reason of his absolute discharge from bankruptcy on December 20, 1991;
(b) an order directing the Sheriff for the Regional Municipality of Peel to lift Execution No. 11–0003429 and any other executions filed pursuant to the default judgment as against Acacio Batista; and,
(c) an order directing Mason’s to write to the sheriff’s offices wherever else a writ of seizure and sale has been filed regarding the default judgment against Acacio Batista, informing them that the judgment has been discharged and requesting that any such writs be lifted, with copies of the correspondence to counsel to Batista;
(2) the motion is denied.
[67] In his application, Batista also requested a stay of the enforcement of the default judgment and an order prohibiting Mason’s from registering any further executions pursuant to that judgment. That relief presumes that Mason’s would not comply with the terms of my order. I prefer to start from the proposition that Mason’s will conduct itself lawfully. I have therefore not made those orders; however, Batista is free to seek that relief in due course if it appears necessary.
[68] If the parties cannot agree on costs, brief written submissions and cost outlines may be delivered on or before July 14, 2014, and any responding submissions on or before July 21, 2014.
Justice W. Matheson
Released: June 27, 2014
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-497725
DATE: 20140627
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ACACIO BATISTA
Applicant
– and –
MASON’S MASONRY SUPPLY LIMITED
Respondent
COURT FILE NO.: 62723/91Q
MASON’S MASONRY SUPPLY LIMITED
Plaintiff
– and –
LUCIANO DA SILVA and ACACIO
BATISTA COB as GLOBE BRICK
Defendants
REASONS FOR DECISION
W. Matheson J.
Released: June 27, 2014