COURT FILE AND PARTIES
COURT FILE NO.: C-773-10
DATE: 2014-01-02
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: KAREN TRASK, KEVIN TRASK, ERIC TRASK and JEAN TRASK, Plaintiffs
AND:
GROVES MEMORIAL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant
BEFORE: The Honourable Justice D.A. Broad
COUNSEL: Randall K. Thomson - Counsel, for the Plaintiffs
Frank E.P. Bowman and Muriel Moscovich - Counsel, for the Defendant
HEARD: June 20 and 21, written submissions completed September 26, 2013.
endorsement on reference
The Parties
[1] The Plaintiffs are the former owners of a 105 acre parcel of land consisting of Part of Lot 8, Concession 14, Broken Front Concession, Geographic Township of Nichol, now in the Township of Centre Wellington (the “Township”) in the County of Wellington, Ontario, as more fully described in the pleadings. The property is located on Beatty Line lying to the west of the urban area of Fergus and east of the urban area of Elora-Salem in the Township.
[2] The Defendant is a corporation operating a public hospital in the Township pursuant to the laws of Ontario.
Background
[3] The Plaintiffs entered into an Option Agreement with the Defendant dated November 27, 2007 granting the Defendant an option to purchase all or part of the 105 acre parcel (the “Option Lands”) within the option period specified in the agreement. The purchase price was to vary depending on the size of the parcel to be purchased by the Defendant according to a formula set forth in the Option Agreement.
[4] The Option Agreement provided that, to the extent permitted by applicable laws, the Defendant would provide the Plaintiffs on closing with a charitable donation receipt for income tax purposes for an amount equal to the difference between the Purchase Price for the lands being purchased and the fair market value of those lands, calculated as of the date of the issuance of the Purchase Notice by the Defendant exercising the option to purchase. The fair market value of the land to be purchased was to be evidenced by an appraisal report, completed at the sole cost and expense of the Plaintiffs, by a "reputable appraiser" approved by the Defendant, acting reasonably.
[5] The Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into an Amending Agreement to the Option Agreement dated March 21, 2008 dealing with, inter alia, release of the option price, description of the property, payment of the purchase price and terms under which the Defendant could sell the Option Lands to the County of Wellington (the “County”) or to other parties.
[6] On July 31, 2008 the Defendant entered into an agreement with the County (the “County Agreement”) granting to it the option to purchase approximately 75 acres (the “County Lands”) of the Option Lands for a purchase price of $3,650,000. The Defendant and the County subsequently entered into an agreement amending the County Agreement on November 26, 2008 fixing the area of the County Lands at 71.15147 acres and amending the purchase price to $3,456,435.
[7] On December 1, 2008 the Defendant exercised its option to purchase the Option Lands from the Plaintiffs and the transaction subsequently closed in two stages. The first closing involved the transfer of title of the County Lands from the Plaintiffs to the County on December 19, 2008 for the sum of $3,456,435.20. The second closing involved the transfer of title to the remaining portion of the Option Lands, comprising approximately 34 acres (the “Subject Lands”) to the Defendant for a price of $1,193,564.80. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into a Payment Schedule Agreement, as contemplated by the Option Agreement, providing for the County Lands to be conveyed by the Plaintiffs to the County at a price of $3,456,435.20 or approximately $48,682 per acre.
[8] It appears from the pleadings that the Plaintiffs, rather than proposing a "reputable appraiser" to the Defendant for approval in order to conduct an appraisal of the Option Lands, presented the Defendant with a completed appraisal report, and an addendum to that report, prepared by an appraiser retained by them, Mr. Bruce Youngblood. A dispute arose between the parties respecting a precondition to the Defendant approving the Plaintiffs’ appraiser, namely that the reports be placed on the letterhead of Royal LePage Royal City Realty, the real estate brokerage with which Mr. Youngblood was associated (the “Brokerage”).
[9] On the closing of the conveyance of the Subject Lands the Defendant delivered an Undertaking to issue a charitable donation receipt to the Plaintiffs for an amount representing the difference between the fair market value of the Option Lands and the aggregate purchase price thereof, provided that the Plaintiffs delivered, by March 25, 2009, either (a) the appraisal reports of Mr. Youngblood on the letterhead of the Brokerage, or (b) an appraisal report issued by a reputable and professional appraiser approved by the Defendant acting reasonably, the cost of such appraisal report to be paid by the Defendant (the “Undertaking”).
[10] The Plaintiffs did not provide the appraisal reports prepared by Mr. Youngblood on the letterhead of the Brokerage, nor did it deliver any other appraisal report by an alternate appraiser by the date stipulated in the Undertaking. There is no indication that they proposed an alternate appraiser to the Defendant for approval. The Defendant subsequently commissioned its own appraiser, Mr. Steve Hasyj, to conduct an appraisal of the Subject Lands. Mr. Hasyj submitted his report to the Defendant on August 6, 2009.
[11] The Option Lands (105 acres) were valued by Mr. Youngblood, according to his addendum report, at $5,445,000, or $51,857.14 per acre, as of December 1, 2008. The Subject Lands (34.033 acres) were valued by Mr. Hasyj at $35,000 per acre, rounded to $1,200,000 in the aggregate, as of January 7, 2009.
[12] The Defendant took the position that the fair market value of the Subject Lands did not exceed the purchase price thereof, based upon the appraisal report of Mr. Hasyj and has therefore refused to issue a charitable donation receipt to the Plaintiffs.
Nature of the Action and the Reference
[13] The Plaintiffs brought an action against the Defendant by Statement of Claim issued on September 2, 2010 seeking damages in the sum of $500,000 for failure of the Defendant to issue a charitable receipt to them arising from the sale of the Option Lands for the difference between the aggregate fair market value and the aggregate sale price thereof.
[14] The Defendant has defended the action on the basis that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the conditions required for the issuance of a charitable donation receipt in relation to the sale of the Option Lands. Specifically, the Defendant states that the Plaintiffs failed to deliver a proper real estate appraisal of the lands within the established time frame stipulated by the Option Agreement. Moreover, the Defendant has pleaded that the purchase price paid for the Option Lands exceeded its fair market value, which, by law, precludes the issuance of a charitable donation receipt by the Defendant.
[15] On December 20, 2012 the Honourable Justice Sloan made an Order, on consent of the parties, directing a reference to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to determine the issue "what was the fair market value of the property purchased by the Defendant from the Plaintiffs on 7 January, 2009”. The Order of Justice Sloan further provided that the ruling on the reference shall take the form of an Order (rather than a report contemplated by sub-Rule 55.02(19)) and that there be no costs of "the trial of this issue," presumably meaning the reference hearing.
[16] The reference hearing was conducted on June 20 and 21, 2013 and, at their joint request, the parties delivered written submissions, which were completed on September 26, 2013.
Evidence
[17] The evidence on the reference consisted of an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Key Documents” as well as the viva voce evidence of the parties' appraisal experts, Mr. Youngblood for the Plaintiffs and Mr. Hasyj for the Defendant. On consent of the parties the written reports of their respective experts were admitted into evidence, comprising:
the appraisal report prepared by Mr. Youngblood December 12, 2008;
Mr. Youngblood’s addendum report dated December 24, 2008;
the appraisal report prepared by Mr. Hasyj August 6, 2009; and
an e-mail prepared and transmitted by Mr. Hasyj dated November 26, 2009, responding to certain questions put to him by Mr. Jerome A. Quenneville, the President and CEO of the Defendant.
[18] On the basis of the evidence led at the reference, certain facts and propositions are not in dispute. These include the following:
(a) the Subject Lands are located between the urban centers of Fergus and Elora-Salem and were not, as of January 7, 2009 (the “Reference Valuation Date”), within the urban boundary of either settlement area pursuant to either the Official Plan of the County (the “County Official Plan”) or that of the Township;
(b) the Subject Lands has a small frontage onto Beatty Line and is otherwise bounded on the North and South by former railway corridors which have been converted to walking trails and by the County facilities on the west and north;
(c) on the other side of the Credit Valley Railway corridor (now the North branch of the Elora Cataract Trail) to the north of and close to the Subject Lands is the decommissioned former Fergus landfill site. Neither expert considered the presence of this former landfill site as having any significant impact of the value of the Subject Lands and they each assumed that there were no other environmental issues affecting the value of the lands being appraised;
(d) pursuant to the County Official Plan, the Subject Lands are designated as part of the Community Planning Study Area (the “CPSA”) to be considered for future urban expansion of the Fergus and Elora-Salem Urban Centres as a source of future residential, recreational, public-service and institutional uses. Under the Official Plan, no expansion of the limits of the Fergus or Elora-Salem Urban Centres will be considered until the Township undertakes a Community Planning Study for the CPSA;
(e) the Township Official Plan required the Township to initiate the Community Planning Study contemplated by the County Official Plan for the CPSA during its next Official Plan review, which was slated to begin in 2009. This provision of the Township Official Plan came into effect by an Order of the Ontario Municipal Board on June 22, 2005. Notwithstanding this provision, the Community Planning Study was not initiated by the Township in 2009, and has not been initiated to date;
(f) as of the Reference Valuation Date, it was contemplated that municipal sewage servicing of the Subject Lands would have to be brought to the Subject Lands across or under the Grand River to the south. Both experts prepared their appraisals based upon this assumption. Although there was no direct evidence of the cost of providing this servicing, Mr. Youngblood estimated the cost of servicing lands owned by him, in the vicinity of the Subject Lands, at $12 million;
(g) as at the Reference Valuation Date, the Subject Lands were zoned “Site-Specific Agriculture” under the Township Zoning By-law and were being used as in-production farmland, and had no buildings or other improvements on them; and
(h) the Subject Lands and the County Lands are homogeneous, in that there were no different considerations applying to them in reference to their respective valuations, on the Reference Valuation Date (January 7, 2009), the valuation date utilized by Mr. Youngblood in his initial report (November 1, 2007) nor in his addendum report (December 1, 2008).
[19] The qualification of Mr. Youngblood to provide expert opinion evidence with respect to the fair market value of the Subject Lands was not opposed by the Defendant, notwithstanding that he is not an accredited appraiser of the Canadian Appraisal Institute (AACI). He testified that he has had considerable and lengthy experience as a real estate appraiser, broker and developer in the local Wellington County area and practices as a real estate consultant in that area. As such, he has appraised a wide variety of properties including industrial, agricultural, residential and vacant lands. He has also previously been qualified to give opinion evidence on real estate valuation in the Superior Court of Justice.
[20] Similarly, Mr. Hasyj’s qualification to provide expert opinion evidence on real estate valuation was not opposed by the Plaintiffs. He has held AACI accreditation since 1995 and has practiced as an appraiser since 1987, operating his own appraisal business in Guelph, Ontario since August 1999.
[21] Although the definitions of "fair market value" and "market value" utilized by Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Hasyj respectively differed slightly, they agreed that they were functionally equivalent for the purposes of valuing the Subject Lands.
[22] The more recent formulation published by the Appraisal Institute of Canada as part of the Canadian Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and utilized by Mr. Hasyj defines "market value" as "the estimated amount for which a property should exchange on the date of valuation, between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arms-length transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion".
[23] Both experts agreed that the focus for the choice of an appropriate valuation methodology depends upon the determination of the "highest and best use" of the property being appraised. Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Hasyj utilized differently-expressed definitions of "highest and best use."
[24] The definition of “highest and best use” utilized by Mr. Youngblood in his testimony was "that use which is most likely to produce the greatest net return in either money or amenities over a given period of time" and further:
it must be a legal use and within the realm of possibility, not speculative or conjectural;
there must be a demand for the use; and
the use must be profitable.
[25] Mr. Hasyj in his report stated that the “highest and best use” of a property is “that reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible and that results in the highest value." He stated that highest and best use is “an economic concept that measures the interaction of four criteria, namely, physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally productive”.
[26] Mr. Youngblood and Mr. Hasyj each agreed that the appropriate approach to valuing the Subject Property would be to use the “Sales Comparison Approach” (as termed by Mr. Youngblood) or the “Direct Comparison Approach" (as termed by Mr. Hasyj). As the Subject Lands were vacant, they agreed that neither the Cost Approach nor the Income Approach would be applicable.
[27] The Direct Comparison, or Sales Comparison, approach called for a review and analysis of recent sales of comparable properties in the relevant vicinity and the application of appropriate adjustments, based upon an assessment of their differences and similarities to the Subject Property and the circumstances and timing of the sales, to estimate the fair market value of the Subject Lands.
[28] Both experts also agreed that the choice of comparable sales to analyse depended upon a determination of the highest and best use of the Subject Property. In this respect it was the divergent determination of the highest and best use of the property that led the two experts to utilize completely different comparable properties in their initial reports.
[29] Although Mr. Youngblood stated in testimony that the "highest and best use" of the Subject Lands was as "future development land" for those uses itemized in the Official Plan documentation of the County and the Township, namely residential, community service, institutional and recreational, of the four comparable sales which he reviewed in his valuation, three comprised lands intended for residential development and only one was purchased for institutional use.
[30] Conversely, Mr. Hasyj determined that the "highest and best use" of the Subject Lands was institutional. He made this determination based upon the fact that, as of the date that he was conducting his analysis and preparing his report, the Subject Lands had been acquired by the Defendant as the future site of the new Groves Memorial Community Hospital to be constructed in proximity to the County Lands, which were also intended to be developed for institutional purposes namely, a new fire department, a new police station, a new municipal office building and other institutional uses. He discounted consideration of residential development as the highest and best use, considering it to have "very long term potential," based on information obtained from the Director of Building and Developmental Services of the Township, and in particular, the difficulty in extending municipal services to the site.
Analysis
[31] In my view, for the purpose of the reference, it is not appropriate to have regard to facts and conditions which were not known or available to the public or reasonably ascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence as of the Reference Valuation Date. It is noted in this respect that the Option Agreement contemplated that an appraisal report, valuing the property as of the date of issuance of the Purchase Notice by the Defendant, was to be available on closing. Such an appraisal report would, by necessity, not be informed by subsequently discovered facts and circumstances. In addition, the determination of value should be based upon what a hypothetical well-informed and typically-motivated purchaser would have paid for the Subject Lands as of the Reference Valuation Date, rather than what the Defendant would have paid for the lands in an arms-length transaction at that time for use as a site for a public hospital.
[32] In my view, a well-informed and typically-motivated purchaser would have appreciated, as of the Reference Valuation Date, that the Subject Lands were located in the CPSA and would be included in a Community Planning Study to be undertaken by the Township as part of its Official Plan review to be initiated in the near-term. In light of the direction in the planning documents that the Township was to initiate a review of its Official Plan in 2009, it would not have been reasonably anticipated that the review would be delayed as long as subsequent events have shown. Based upon a review of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, I am able to take judicial notice that a well-informed purchaser would also have appreciated that it would have the ability to take steps to try to accelerate the initiation of a Community Planning Study through consultation with the Township, or possibly by the filing of an application for Official Plan amendment.
[33] Although the ultimate designation to be applied to the Subject Lands following the completion of Community Planning Study, as between residential, recreational, public-service and institutional, was unknown as at the Reference Valuation Date, a well-informed purchaser would have appreciated that it would have the right to advocate for a designation which would maximize its financial return, through participation in the planning process under the Planning Act, including a possible appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board.
[34] Based upon the information available as at the Reference Valuation Date, a well-informed purchaser would have had to assume, as a worst-case scenario, that the Subject Lands would not be able to be developed until municipal sewage servicing was brought from across the Grand River to the south. However, I am also able to take judicial notice that a well-informed purchaser would also understand that the provision of servicing and strategies for financing such servicing would be a major component of the Community Planning Study to be undertaken in the near term by the Township. Such a purchaser would also reasonably anticipate that the capital cost of providing such servicing would likely be shared by all of the lands designated for development in the CPSA following completion of the Study and would not be borne exclusively by the Subject Lands, and a financing strategy would likely be implemented by the Township and/or the County permitting such cost to be paid for as development proceeded by means of, for instance, development charges implemented by by-law under the Development Charges Act, 1997, S.O. c. 27 or sewage rates imposed by a rating by-law under the Municipal Act,2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, or some other mechanism.
[35] On this basis, in my view, it is not reasonable to assume that the highest and best use of the property, viewed from the perspective of the Reference Valuation Date, would necessarily be institutional. Rather a well-informed purchaser, who was prepared to participate meaningfully in the planning process, would view the Subject Lands as having a reasonable potential for being considered for residential development, assuming that residential use would maximize its return on investment. However, the risk that residential development would not be permitted, following completion of the planning process, or would be delayed pending completion of development of lands already designated for residential development under the existing Official Plans, as well as the incremental cost of providing municipal servicing to the Subject Lands, would necessarily have to be factored in to mitigate the price that such a purchaser would be prepared to pay.
[36] In my view, the selection of comparable sales as part of the sales comparison approach should be focused on local properties, rather than on properties outside of the Township, or certainly outside the County. Consideration of lands for residential development by a potential purchaser would depend upon such a purchaser projecting the demand for and sale prices of residential properties in the local market, rather than a remote market, at the time that the lands would be anticipated to come on stream. Similarly, institutional uses, such as hospitals, municipal facilities, libraries, or places of worship would be expected to serve local needs, and the demand of such facilities would depend upon local conditions, rather than on conditions in remote locations. I would therefore discount the comparability of the church property in Woolwich Township and the Conestoga College property located between Cambridge and Kitchener, both in the Region of Waterloo as identified by Mr. Hasyj as properties 1 and 2 in his initial report.
[37] The third comparable property utilized by Mr. Hasyj in his report, being a 22.47 acre parcel in close proximity to the Subject Lands, purchased for institutional use as a church at $24,477 per acre (excluding the value of the building on the property) was acknowledged by Mr. Hasyj as being inferior in location and development potential. It is noted that Mr. Hasyj did not take into account the unsightly “hump” on the former land-fill site adjacent to that property, which Mr. Youngblood indicated would have a negative impact on its value. Mr. Youngblood also indicated that, in his view, up to 40% of that parcel would be considered green space and undevelopable, further mitigating its value. I would therefore not view this property as a useful comparable.
[38] In my view, the most pertinent comparable properties identified in the appraisal reports of the experts were:
Properties #2 and #3 in Mr. Youngblood’s initial report (the “Taylor-Turner Properties”), being a 52.10 acre and a 85.33 acre parcel respectively located in the southeast extremity of Fergus, purchased by the same developer in 2005 and 2004 respectively for residential development as one subdivision. These lands were purchased for an average price of $44,022 per acre prior to finalization of the Township Official Plan wherein they were designated as “Future Residential” subject to implementation of a secondary plan under the Planning Act;
Property (c) in Mr. Hasyj’s e-mailed supplementary report of November 26, 2009 being 6470 Beatty Line (the “Keating Property”), located in close proximity to the Subject Lands, comprising 35 acres of developable land purchased in 2004 (prior to the Township Official Plan Amendment (OPA) 26) for $22,875 per developable acre. Like the Subject Lands, the Keating Property is now located in the CPSA, however, it was not so designated at the time it was purchased in 2004.
Property #4 in Mr. Youngblood’s initial report (and property (a) in Mr. Hasyi’s e-mailed supplementary report) being 6586 Beatty Line (the “Brubacher Property”), a 106 acre parcel purchased on January 10, 2007 for $23,590 per acre. It is located on the north-westerly boundary of the urban area of Fergus and is not located in the CPSA.
[39] Mr. Youngblood did not utilize the Keating Property as a comparable in his valuation, even though it is similarly situated in the CPSA, whereas Mr. Hasyj, in his testimony, indicated that, of the properties intended for future residential development, it is the most comparable to the Subject Lands. In his supplementary e-mailed report, Mr. Hasyj indicated that the purchaser, Tom Keating, reported that he negotiated the purchase prior to the adoption of Official Plan Amendment 26 in the hopes that the property would be included within the revised urban centre boundary. An adjustment is therefore required to reflect the fact that the development potential of the Subject Lands, as of the Reference Valuation Date, was more certain, as it was already included in the CPSA, with the Community Planning Study, expected to be initiated imminently. I would apply an upwards adjustment of 30% to reflect this distinction, being an increase of $6,862.50 to $29,737.
[40] I agree with Mr. Youngblood’s position that a time factor should be applied to the comparable sales to reflect the fact that their purchasers would have discounted their purchase prices to reflect the lost return on the invested capital for the anticipated period prior to the lands becoming ready for development. I find the rate of 7% compounded semi-annually referred to in Mr. Youngblood’s report to be reasonable, resulting in an adjusted value for the Keating Property of $41,946.98, rounded to $42,000.
[41] With respect to the Taylor-Turner Properties, Mr. Youngblood applied a downward adjustment of 20% to reflect their superior location and serviceability. It is noted that, at the time that these properties were acquired, they were not yet within the urban boundary and they therefore benefitted from the subsequent OMB order including them within it. I find the minus 20% adjustment proposed by Mr. Youngblood to be reasonable, as well as the time adjustment based upon a 7% semi-annual compound rate, resulting in an adjusted value of $62,153 per acre rounded to $62,200.
[42] With respect to the Brubacher property, Mr. Youngblood noted that it is located outside of the urban boundary and is not expected to develop within the foreseeable future. He did not apply an adjustment to reflect differences in serviceability and location, but applied a time adjustment based upon a 5% semi-annual rate of return for 25 years to reflect the fact that it is a longer-term hold, resulting in an adjusted value of $81,081. In my view, it is not reasonable to assume that the $23,590 per acre purchase price is reflective of such a lengthy investment period resulting in an adjusted value 30% higher than the adjusted value of the Taylor-Turner Properties and 93% higher than that of the Keating Property. On the basis of its inferior location, I would apply a 20% adjustment, with a time adjustment based upon a rate of return of 5% compounded semi-annually for 10 years, resulting in an adjusted value of $46,385, rounded to $46,400.
[43] The average per acre value of the Keating, Taylor-Turner and Brubacher properties is $50,200. At the time that each of them were purchased, the ultimate designation they would receive under the Township Official Plan, and hence the use for which they could be developed, was uncertain, and accordingly, it is not appropriate to apply a further discount to this average value to reflect the risk that the Subject Lands would not receive a residential designation following the Community Planning Study, as the risk is already reflected in the average value of the comparable properties. Similarly the risk associated with the projected cost of servicing will already have been incorporated into the adjusted values of the comparable properties, and it is not necessary to apply a discount to the value for this factor.
[44] Mr. Youngblood, in preparing his addendum report, applied a 10% reduction from the valuation in his initial report which valued the Option Lands as of December 1, 2007 to reflect a reduction in commercial sector activity corresponding with a reduction in activity in the vacant land sector in the intervening year. He also applied a further adjustment of 5% to acknowledge the volatility of the vacant land market in reference to the credit crisis in the fall of 2008.
[45] Mr.Hasyj, in his initial report, under the heading "market overview" addressed the then current credit crisis by observing that its impact remained unknown, and that the market conditions for institutional lands appeared to remain relatively stable.
[46] I am not satisfied, based on the evidence, that a reduction in the value of the Subject Lands as of the Reference Valuation Date, to reflect the credit crisis then in existence is warranted. Mr. Youngblood's opinion with respect to the impact of the credit crisis was expressed in his addendum report while in the midst of it, without the fuller insight respecting its impact that would be available from a retrospective standpoint. He observed that the effect of the crisis was to essentially freeze the market, such that both vendors and purchasers were remaining on the sidelines, and properties were not being offered at "fire-sale" prices.
[47] I would not view the sale of the County Lands as being a useful comparable for determining the fair market value of the Subject Lands, as there was no evidence led regarding the circumstances under which the purchase price was negotiated between the Defendant and the County. The Plaintiffs were apparently not privy to the negotiation on the price, and it is not clear that the price determined by the Defendant and the County was reflective of the fair market value, within the definitions set forth above.
[48] However, the per-acre price of the County Lands of $48,682 does nevertheless provide a useful check on the reasonableness of the $50,200 per acre value referred to above.
Disposition
[49] For the reasons set forth above, I find that fair market value of the Subject Lands as of January 7, 2009 to be $50,200 per acre or $1,708,456.60 in the aggregate.
[50] Since this finding does not finally dispose of all the issues in the action, the action is remitted to the Assignment Court on February 28, 2014 to set dates for a pre-trial and trial of the remaining issues between the parties.
[51] In accordance with the Order of Justice Sloan referred to above, an Order shall issue accordingly, and there shall be no costs of the reference.
D.A. Broad, J.
Date: January 2, 2014