COURT FILE No.12-73974-00
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
VINCENT WATKINS
Self-represented
Applicant
- and -
CHERYL ANN WATKINS
Self-represented
Respondent
- and -
Office of the Children’s Lawyer
W. Todd Moore
Respondent
HEARD: January 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 2014
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice Thomas A. Bielby
INTRODUCTION
1The parties are husband and wife. They started living together in September, 1994, and were married on October 4, 1997.
2The parties separated from each other on May 1, 2011 and there is no chance of reconciliation.
3There are four children of the marriage; Shannon Nicole Watkins, born October 12, 1995, Chantel Allysha Watkins, born December 29, 1996, Colton Ryan Vincent Watkins, born April 16, 1999 and Chandra Caitlyn Watkins, born June 27, 2002. All of the children have resided with their mother, the respondent, since separation. At present no access is being exercised.
4As is often the case in matrimonial litigation, each of the parties blames the other for the separation and everything that is wrong in their lives. It is clear the children have sided with their mother in this matter, jointly deciding not to visit with the applicant father.
5The testimony of both the applicant and respondent gives rise to real credibility issues. For example, the applicant has over time provided a number of different values as to the level of his income, whether in regards to his court financial statements or statements he has made to various financial institutions in order to obtain mortgage and credit financing. At any given time, it seems, the applicant provides an income figure which will best serve his interests.
6With respect to the respondent, she denies that she discouraged the children from visiting their father but the evidence lead by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) suggests otherwise. As well, when cross-examined by the applicant, the respondent’s response was often long and rambling with little regard to providing a direct answer to the question.
7The issues to be decided are:
Child and spousal support;
Equalization of net family properties;
Access; and
Divorce.
BACKGROUND
8The parties have been before the courts on numerous interim motions. As a result, there are numerous interim orders. A review of these proceedings is necessary to provide context.
9By consent order, dated April 5, 2012, the respondent was granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, 3044 Workman Drive, Mississauga, Ontario, a property registered solely in her name. Prior to this the respondent was successful on an ex parte motion for a restraining order. When the matter was returned to court, on notice, in July 2011, it was heard by Ricchetti J. The learned judge would not extend the restraining order and was of the opinion that the motion was no more than an attempt to get the applicant out of the home.
10The next order is dated April 20, 2012, and allowed access Saturdays 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and Tuesdays 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and ordered the applicant to pay $1,500 in child support. It is noted in the endorsement that the applicant, to that point, had done little to support the children.
11The motion was adjourned to May 18, 2012, to allow access to be re-established and to allow the filing of updated financial statements. A restraining order was also placed against the applicant who was ordered not to contact the respondent with the exception of arranging access and to stay away from the respondent except to attend mediation.
12By order dated June 7, 2012, the respondent was given interim custody of the children and the applicant was to continue access two days per week.
13Seppi J. imputed an income to the applicant of $70,000 per annum and ordered child support of $1,617 per month effective September 1, 2011. The retroactive support owing from September 1, 2011 to June 1, 2012 was stated to be $16,170 and was ordered to be paid in installments as follows:
$2,000 forthwith;
$600 per month in addition to the current monthly support; and
the applicant was given credit for $1,400 that he had already provided to the respondent.
14Interim spousal support was set at $1,200 per month commencing September 1, 2011. The June 2012 payment was to be made immediately with the balance of the arrears to be credited to the respondent from the applicant’s equalization share.
15The support orders were made without prejudice on the filing of better financial evidence.
16On June 7, 2012, Seppi J. ordered the applicant to deliver to the respondent the family boat, described as a 21 Sunbird Bowrider.
17The matter was back before Seppi J. on July 13, 2012, and the respondent sought to have the application struck so she could proceed with her claims on an uncontested basis. The learned judge determined that the applicant was not complying with orders and stated that his manner before the court was extremely abusive.
18Seppi J. made an order striking the application but stayed the order for two weeks to July 27, 2012, to permit the applicant to retain counsel.
19On July 27, 2012, Donohue J. directed that the order of Seppi J., dated June 7, 2012, be amended retroactively, and ordered the applicant to pay spousal support of $373 per month.
20In regards to the striking of the application, the stay was extended until August 14, 2012.
21On August 14, 2012, the matter was before Daley J., who noted that the applicant tendered a certified cheque for $3,000 payable to the respondent and had delivered a fresh financial statement.
22On that day there was a real issue as to the quantification of the arrears of child and spousal support, but it was noted by Daley J. that the applicant was still not in compliance with the orders made.
23The stay of the order striking the application was extended to September 14, 2012 to allow all of the arrears to be paid.
24When the matter returned to motions court on September 14, 2012, I was the presiding judge and I noted the multiple court attendances and the high conflict within this case. I noted the boat had not been returned to the respondent and that it was the evidence of the applicant that, prior to the order, he had sold the boat to his girlfriend for $4,000.
25I decided to continue the stay noting the applicant had made some effort to comply but noting there were still concerns in that regard. I noted the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) was involved and could sort out the issue regarding the amount of arrears.
26I requested the involvement of the OCL because of ongoing and serious access issues.
27I was concerned that the motions court was being used by the respondent as a collection agency and ordered the matter to go a case/settlement conference on January 8, 2013 and that all outstanding motions were to be adjourned indefinitely.
28I ordered the boat to be maintained in good repair and that it was not to be disposed of.
29Finally, the applicant was ordered to obtain health and medical insurance for the respondent and the children.
30Notwithstanding my order, the respondent brought a motion before Price J. on December 6, 2012, to find the applicant in contempt for not complying with orders.
31The court categorically rejected the applicant’s evidence as to cash payments he made to the respondent and ordered that the receipts, produced by the applicant and allegedly signed by the respondent, be delivered to the Peel Police to investigate whether or not the receipts are forgeries. To date there has been no decision made by the police on this issue.
32In regards to the applicant’s sale of the boat, the court noted that in his financial statement of January 23, 2012, the applicant had valued the boat at $10,000, whereas in his financial statement of June 7, 2012, the applicant valued the boat at $4,000. The applicant alleged he sold the boat to pay his lawyer. The court ordered that the respondent’s interest in the boat amounted to $5,000 and was to be credited to her on equalization.
33Price J. held that the applicant was in contempt in regards to Seppi J.’s order, dated June 7, 2012, to return the boat and with respect to support arrears.
34Price J. made further orders in regards to disclosure and health insurance and fixed the total support arrears at $18,196 and ordered the arrears to be paid at the rate of $600 per month.
35Child support was to continue at the rate of $1,617 per month.
36Price J. dealt with the matter again, on January 25, 2013, and his order included a consent portion identified as Schedule A of the order. Therein a child psychiatrist was to be retained and counselling arranged for the children and the parties regarding access.
37The matter was again before the court on March 7, 2013, and Edwards J. made an order striking the applicant’s pleadings for failing to obtain health insurance and for not making the required disclosure, however, the order was stayed until March 21, 2013.
38On March 14, 2013, the applicant brought before the court a motion for contempt against the respondent alleging access was being denied and that the respondent was not co-operating in regards to arranging counselling.
39The motion was dismissed because of the respondent’s impecuniosity caused by the failure of the applicant to pay support.
40Motions continued throughout the spring of 2013 in regards to disclosure and the non-compliance with past orders. Ultimately, the matter was placed on the January 2014 civil blitz list for trial.
41In reviewing the history of this litigation and after hearing the evidence, it is apparent that the respondent had a need to control and possess all of the assets the family had at the date of separation. She fought to have the boat returned to her. There is evidence that the respondent placed the motorcycle that was registered in her name, but only operated by the applicant, in the neighbour’s garage in an effort to hide it from the applicant. She ultimately sold the motorcycle. She sought exclusive possession of the matrimonial home which was registered solely in her name. The respondent maintained possession of most of the contents of the home and the parties’ personal property. The respondent sold a number of the applicant’s tools arguing she was desperate for money.
42The respondent even brought a motion to obtain possession of the applicant’s pick-up truck alleging she and the children needed it. The relief sought was denied as the motion judge correctly ruled that the applicant required the vehicle for work.
43I agree with the comments of Van Melle R.S.J. in her endorsement of May 10, 2013, in which she stated, “This file is out of control.” It is with this litigious background that I conducted the trial and have rendered this judgment.
(continues verbatim with the remaining paragraphs and order exactly as in the source text)
Justice Thomas A. Bielby
Released: May 28, 2014