COURT FILE NO.: FD1662/11

DATE: February 12, 2013

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

FAMILY COURT

RE: Diane Andrea Dymon, applicant

AND:

Rick Amar Bir Singh Bains, respondent

BEFORE: MITROW J.

COUNSEL: Brenda D. Barr for the applicant

Terry W. Hainsworth for the respondent

HEARD: December 7, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] The applicant brings a motion seeking interim child support (both table amount and s. 7 expenses), interim spousal support, transfer of 243 East Rivertrace Walk in London (“Rivertrace”) to the joint names of the parties, and an order requiring the respondent to maintain the applicant as irrevocable beneficiary of his OMA life insurance.

[2] The applicant and respondent are both medical doctors. They have two children, Owen, age 12, born June 2, 2000, and Kathryn, age 10, born April 8, 2002.

[3] The parties began to cohabit in 1995, they were married on May 2, 1998 and they separated on April 30, 2010.

[4] Shortly after separation, the parties retained Ms. Lene Madsen to conduct mediation. This resulted in two agreements being signed in June 2010, one agreement dealing with custody and access and the other agreement dealing with support and property issues.

[5] In relation to custody and access, that agreement provided that the applicant has sole custody of both children and that the respondent’s time according to the regular schedule with the children would include alternate weekends, afternoons and/or evenings, and other times as agreed. The parties have abided by this agreement with there being no child or custody issues identified on the motion.

TRANSFER OF RIVERTRACE TO JOINT NAMES

[6] After the date of separation, the parties continued to live separate and apart under the same roof at the matrimonial home (128 Chantry Place). Although the applicant would have preferred to stay in the matrimonial home with the children, it was her evidence that the respondent would not agree to moving. As a result, the parties searched for an appropriate residence for the applicant and the children and Rivertrace was purchased, with the applicant and the children moving into that property on the closing date near the end of June 2010.

[7] At the time of closing, title to Rivertrace was registered in the respondent’s name. However, pursuant to an interim without prejudice separation agreement dealing with support and property (the “support and property agreement”) that was signed just before the closing of the Rivertrace purchase, the parties agreed that Rivertrace was to be transferred to the joint names of the parties within 30 days of the signing of the support and property agreement (see paragraph 5.6 of this agreement). Also, the mortgage was to be “transferred to the names” of both parties within 30 days of the signing.

[8] Paragraph 5.7 of the support and property agreement provided that the respondent holds Rivertrace in trust for the applicant, that the applicant was entitled to the beneficial ownership of Rivertrace and that it was the intention of the parties that Rivertrace would be transferred to the applicant’s “name alone prior to or concurrently with the equalization of the family assets.”

[9] The respondent had refused to transfer Rivertrace to the joint names of the parties as required by paragraph 5.6. His factum refers to the applicant’s “claim that [Rivertrace] should be transferred from” the respondent to the applicant. The argument advanced by the respondent was that the support and property agreement was contradictory because paragraph 5.6 requires a transfer within 30 days, whereas paragraph 5.7 requires a transfer to the applicant’s name “prior to or concurrently” with the equalization of property.

[10] The respondent’s position was perplexing as it misstates the relief sought by the applicant. The applicant’s request was to transfer Rivertrace to their joint names (paragraph 5.6), not the applicant’s sole name (paragraph 5.7). There is no conflict between paragraphs 5.6 and 5.7. When this issue was explored during oral argument, Mr. Hainsworth conceded (quite properly, in my view) that it was appropriate to transfer Rivertrace to joint names, subject to the understanding that the applicant would thereafter be responsible for all expenses for Rivertrace to be paid out of the support payments that will be ordered. The applicant took no issue with this request. Given that the respondent was obliged to pay the taxes on Rivertrace (as required by the support and property agreement), there was no issue taken by either party that the respondent would be responsible for the property taxes up to the effective date of the spousal support and child support order. This was also the case with the mortgage payments for Rivertrace.

[11] The respondent also relied on the fact that the support and property agreement was “without prejudice” and that the respondent had terminated this agreement (pursuant to written notice, as he was entitled to do, as discussed in more detail below in relation to support). However, neither of these facts affected the respondent’s obligation to comply with paragraph 5.6.

[12] Finally, the respondent advanced an argument that Ms. Madsen had omitted a provision in the support and property agreement. This alleged omitted provision, according to the respondent, required two deeds to be drawn within 30 days, whereby the respondent relinquished his interest in Rivertrace and the applicant released her interest in the matrimonial home. The applicant denied that anything was omitted in the support and property agreement. The respondent’s email to Ms. Madsen dated June 22, 2010 is clear that title to Rivertrace is to be joint (along with the mortgage). There was no credible evidence adduced on the motion to support the respondent’s position that clauses were omitted from the support and property agreement.

[13] I find the respondent’s refusal to comply with paragraph 5.6 was founded not on any cogent legal principle, but rather was based on his misguided and somewhat callous sentiment towards the applicant, expressed in the respondent’s threatening email to the applicant sent October 22, 2012 (found at Ex. C to the applicant’s affidavit sworn October 23, 2012) that reads, in part, as follows:

As always, you can do what you want, but rest assured, you (sic) days of support and working the equivalent of 15% the (sic) capacity are gone soon. And, you will never ever own Rivertrace without buying it from me. Your cross examination and my witness affidavits will bring you to your knees. You have felt so entitled, it really is disappointing and insulting I am sure to other women professionals. You are a great special woman. Great role model for Kacie – a professional woman who doesn’t know how to support herself …

[14] The parties agreed during oral argument that the spousal support and child support payments to be ordered should start effective December 1, 2012. The respondent agreed that, pending release of this decision, he would continue the status quo, with credits being given for all payments made on or after December 1, 2012.

THE APPLICANT’S INCOME

[15] The support and property agreement provided that either party could terminate that agreement on 60 days notice. The respondent exercised that right in May 2012 but this agreement was effectively extended to permit the parties time to file motion material and argue the motion.

[16] The respondent pursued rather aggressively in his material, including his factum, the position that the applicant was intentionally under-employed and that income should be imputed to her at this interlocutory stage.

[17] It was the applicant’s evidence that she pursued family medicine as this would give her more flexibility, taking into account that the parties planned to start a family soon after marriage. The applicant obtained her designation in family medicine in 1997 and began working with the Family Planning Clinic at the Middlesex Health Unit (the “Clinic”) that focused on areas of female sexually transmitted disease, birth control and gynaecological problems.

[18] The applicant deposes that the parties agreed she would work part-time, that the respondent would be the “bread winner” and the applicant would care for the family and manage the household.

[19] For his part, although the respondent strongly disputes any suggestion that there was a “greater plan,” he deposes (paragraph 13) “I undertook to be the bread winner and the applicant could pursue whatever she wishes.”

[20] Even allowing for disputed facts, I find that the evidence on the motion raises a strong inference that the applicant worked part-time because she structured her schedule around the children’s schedules and activities, particularly in light of the respondent’s significant work schedule.

[21] The respondent deposes that the parties engaged a nanny “four days per week” but the applicant responds that a nanny was used to care for Owen on the days that the applicant worked part-time (usually Monday to Wednesday) and at times on any additional day that the applicant worked.

[22] In support of his position regarding the applicant’s alleged under-employment, the respondent filed the affidavit of Dr. Catherine Faulds, a family physician for 35 years in London. Dr. Faulds opines that the “average” female physician, who is part of a family health group, with approximately 1300 patients, is capable of billing $300,000 annually with overhead somewhere in the range of $60,000 to $90,000. For her part, the applicant disputes the assumptions of Dr. Faulds (who, the applicant points out, is married to Tom Faulds, the latter being in business with the respondent via a partnership in Faulds-Bains Holding Corporation).

[23] The applicant deposes she has worked 14 years at the Clinic, finds it an excellent place to work because all the positions are female and the practice is restricted to female patients.

[24] The applicant also worked at a UWO health clinic between 2009 and 2011 (with a hiatus from March 2010 to the fall of 2010), earning approximately $8,000 annually from this source. The applicant left this position in the fall of 2011 because she felt she did not have the necessary training to deal with the numerous psychological issues posed by the patients.

[25] The evidence discloses that the applicant is substantially involved in the children’s many extracurricular activities. The respondent has indicated his support of these activities and his reliance on the applicant to transport the children to those activities at times when the children are in the respondent’s care and he is unavailable.

[26] At this interlocutory stage, given the evidence and considering some of the conflicts in the evidence, it is unrealistic to engage in a meaningful analysis of potential income imputation to the applicant. I am satisfied that considering the roles of the parties during marriage that the applicant has, since separation, continued to work to her capacity considering her duties regarding the children and their various activities. The issue whether income should be imputed to the applicant is best left to the trial judge on the basis of a full evidentiary record.

[27] After deducting spousal support, the applicant’s line 150 income for the years 2008 to 2011 is as follows:

• 2008 $36,783

• 2009 $23,123

• 2010 $41,693

• 2011 $55,935

[28] Both parties prepared Spousal Support Advisory Guideline (“SSAG”) calculations showing the incomes to be used for spousal support and child support. The applicant (see Ex. N to her affidavit sworn September 19, 2012) shows income of $55,935 for herself based on the 2011 return. The SSAGs attached to the applicant’s factum show her income at $57,277 (being her gross income in 2011 from her medical practice) less a deduction of $3,446 (being her 2011 expenses claimed for “union professional or like dues”) for a net income of $53,831. It should be noted the applicant’s total business expenses as claimed in 2011 were $11,426.

[29] In his SSAG calculations, the respondent uses $52,833 for the applicant’s income. It is not clear how that figure was arrived at.

[30] The applicant has in fact increased her income since separation.

[31] Although in 2012 the applicant did not have the income from UWO Student Health Services (losing over $8,000 income from that source), the applicant’s updated financial statement sworn December 3, 2012 noted that averaging her actual income thus far in 2012 (to September) resulted in an average gross monthly income of $6,000, average monthly expenses of $1,000, for a net monthly income of $5,000 or $60,000 annually.

[32] Although the actual income number inserted in the applicant’s financial statement used the information from her 2011 tax return, I find that the most accurate approximation of the applicant’s income on a prospective basis is the applicant’s estimate of her 2012 income at $60,000 and that is the amount that I use to calculate both spousal support and child support.

THE RESPONDENT’S INCOME

[33] The respondent is an ophthalmologist. He is a very skilled specialist and admits he is an active and busy practitioner.

[34] The parties diverge widely as to what the respondent’s current income is. The respondent submits that $450,000 should be used and the applicant submits it is $697,088.

[35] Mr. James Hoare, a chartered business valuator and a certified specialist in business valuations, was retained by the applicant to determine, on a preliminary basis, the respondent’s annual income for support purposes for the years 2009 to 2011. Mr. Hoare prepared a preliminary report that was attached to his affidavit. The respondent has ownership interests in various corporations, including Rick Bains Medical Professional Corporation, Faulds-Bains Holding Corporation, 1803383 Ontario Inc. and Privit Inc.

[36] For the years 2008 to 2011, the respondent’s line 150 income as summarized in the Hoare report was as follows:

• 2008 $345,770

• 2009 $304,500

• 2010 $380,487

• 2011 $401,570

[37] The Hoare report explains that adjustments were made to determine income available to the respondent for support purposes, including adjustments as required by s. 16 – 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“Guidelines”). There was no significant, if any, issue taken with the preliminary calculations in the Hoare report that the respondent’s income for support purposes for the years 2009 – 2011 is as follows:

• 2009 $424,676

• 2010 $427,182

• 2011 $697,088

[38] The respondent submits that 2011 represents an anomaly in his income, a “blip” as he calls it. He deposes that “generally” his income ranges around $400,000 annually. His affidavit (paragraphs 31 – 43) describes a number of events that have occurred that will cause his income to drop from its high level in 2011. This evidence can be summarized to include the following:

a) In December 2010, the respondent acquired a diagnostic unit (known as an “OCT”) to monitor the progress of macular degeneration and glaucoma – these two ailments constituting about 75 percent of the respondent’s practice;

b) The OCT allows for a substantially greater number of patients to be seen and a diagnosis can be made in much less time. The revenue from the OCT service, at $75 per patient, generated approximately $6,000 weekly gross income. Recently, however, OHIP reduced the fee to $25 per patient. The respondent states this will result in an income decrease of approximately $192,000 annually (based on working 48 weeks annually);

c) In 2011, the respondent performed approximately 725 cataract surgeries but OHIP has now capped that at 577 surgeries and reduced the fee per surgery from $441.95 in 2011 to $397.75, causing a further annual income reduction of approximately $90,912;

d) A third area of income reduction from 2011 results from a 50 percent fee cut, from $210 to $105, for monthly injections given to patients suffering from “wet macular degeneration”. The respondent estimates $25,000 annual income reduction as a result.

[39] Although the above evidence is not disputed, the applicant raises a number of concerns about the respondent’s disclosure as discussed below.

[40] The respondent’s financial statement (sworn October 10, 2012) discloses a monthly income of $10,500 (employment) and actual monthly dividends of $17,223. This translates to an annual equivalent of $332,676. The expenses shown on this same financial statement are $396,844 annually.

[41] The applicant submits that there are a number of missing expenses from the respondent’s financial statement. Firstly, the financial statement does not include interim child support ($3,732 monthly) and interim spousal support ($6,253 monthly) being paid pursuant to the support and property agreement.

[42] The respondent’s mortgage payment on his Corley Drive property (his current residence) is shown at $5,000 per month. However, the applicant deposes that the respondent saves $3,500 per month in an account for the purpose of using the saved money to make a lump sum payment towards the mortgage. This was confirmed from the respondent’s counsel in response to a question about the respondent’s bank account at Libro. This $3,500 monthly “expense” is not disclosed in the respondent’s financial statement.

[43] The applicant deposes that the respondent’s annual vacation costs are in the range of $20,000. She lists the respondent’s travel destinations in paragraph 24 of her affidavit and that includes a $10,000 golf vacation in Spain. The applicant deposes also that annual golf membership fees from the Hunt Club and Redtail are not shown in the respondent’s financial statement and the applicant estimates those annual costs to be $3,500 and $10,000 respectively. The respondent does show an annual $12,000 vacation expense. It should be noted however that the golf membership fees may have been paid by the respondent’s corporations and factored into the income shown in the Hoare report.

[44] The applicant’s affidavit attaches copies of transfers and registry office records showing that, prior to purchasing his current Corley Drive residence for $915,000 on September 15, 2011, the respondent recently purchased two other properties in London, including a property on The Parkway for $697,500 on August 27, 2010 and on Shore Road for $900,000 on April 29, 2011. There was an indication during oral argument that these last two properties have been sold. Also they are not shown on the respondent’s current financial statement.

[45] The applicant points to the respondent’s evidence in his oral questioning (conducted October 30, 2012) that between October 2011 and October 2012 the respondent completed various renovations to his Corley Drive property (including a new driveway, painting and other work) that cost approximately $75,000 and that these expenses were paid for mostly by funds in the respondent’s TD bank account.

[46] In his oral questioning, the respondent testified that he also hopes to remodel the kitchen in his Corley Drive residence and that he has received appraisals ranging from $37,000 to $112,000.

[47] The respondent also derives income from Lasik. He deposes that he does Lasik surgeries every second Friday.

[48] However, there was an issue raised by the applicant as to whether the respondent’s Lasik income had been accounted for. The applicant deposed it was her belief that Lasik income had been paid to 3914704 Canada Inc. (“3914704”) and the applicant attaches as exhibits two cheques from LasikMD, dated May 18, 2010 for $1,441.74 and May 11, 2010 for $20,191.45 payable to 3914704.

[49] The Hoare report noted that a list of additional information was required as set out in appendix A to the said report. This included requests for information regarding 3914704, including financial statements for 2009 to 2011 and details of all wages and benefits paid to the respondent and related parties during 2009 to 2011.

[50] In her affidavit, the applicant refers to other corporations that she believes the respondent owns shares in, either directly or indirectly, and these corporations include Annidis Health Systems Corporation and Privit Healthcare Inc. These two corporations are not mentioned in the respondent’s current financial statement.

[51] Simply including the current interim child support and interim spousal support payments adds almost $120,000 to the respondent’s expenses (in addition to those expenses disclosed in his financial statement) and results in expenses of over $516,000 annually.

[52] The applicant further points out that the $3,500 monthly saved towards the lump sum mortgage payment results in a $42,000 annual expense not disclosed in the respondent’s current financial statement. In addition, effective October 2012, the respondent signed documents authorizing a monthly transfer from his bank account to the children’s bank accounts in the amount of $500 per month per child. The applicant deposes this is another $12,000 annual expense not disclosed. Further, the applicant mentions a monthly RESP payment that the respondent pays and that is not disclosed in his expenses.

[53] I find on the evidence that the respondent’s financial statement omits many monthly expenses that he is actually paying, thereby substantially understating his expenses, the most glaring example being the interim child support and spousal support that he pays.

[54] In relation to his Lasik income, the respondent chose not to address that issue in his responding affidavit, notwithstanding that the issue was clearly raised by the applicant. The respondent could have, but chose not to, assist the court as to what extent, if any, his Lasik income has been accounted for. The respondent’s failure to deal with this issue in his affidavit material was acknowledged by Mr. Hainsworth during oral argument. Mr. Hainsworth submitted, however, that the Lasik income would have been accounted for in the respondent’s professional corporation.

[55] The complaint of the applicant is that she still does not know whether all the Lasik income has been accounted for. The respondent could easily have addressed that issue in his affidavit. I draw an adverse inference against him for his failure to do so.

[56] On this motion, it is necessary to determine the respondent’s income on a prospective basis. I adopt the following statement by Aston J. in Holtby v. Holtby, 30 R.F.L. (4th) 70 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 33:

33 In my view, the projected annual income, not historical income, is the income figure to be used for the Table amount. Past income is the basis upon which to assess future income, but support will be payable from what the payor will earn, not what the payor has earned.

[57] The determination of the respondent’s income at this interim stage, on the evidence adduced, is at best an imprecise exercise and is subject to further an ongoing financial disclosure. The task at hand is to determine the respondent’s income using his prior years’ income as a basis to assess his future income (as stated in Holtby).

[58] Furthermore, the trial judge may make a final support award at trial that commences with the date of an interim support order where, for example, the evidence at trial discloses certain assumptions underpinning the interim support order that were found to be inaccurate (see, for example, Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11 at paras. 75-80 (O.C.A.)).

[59] I find the evidence does not support the applicant’s submission that the respondent’s income should be set at $697,088. This ignores the evidence from the respondent that his recent OHIP fee reductions and caps placed on the number of cataract surgeries will have an adverse impact on future income. I also accept, at least in part, Mr. Hainsworth’s submission that some of the respondent’s expensive lifestyle is attributable to his income “spike” during 2011.

[60] The applicant argues that taking the respondent’s OHIP billings to July 2012 and prorating those billings to an annual amount shows that the respondent’s 2012 income may not be too different from his 2011 income. However, this approach ignores the fact that a number of the changes implemented by OHIP have been unfolding during 2012 and accordingly a proration of 2012 income will not be an accurate reflection of future income.

[61] It is important to remember that the interim support payments being ordered will start December 1, 2012 and will be based, on a practical basis, on the respondent’s 2013 income.

[62] I reject also the respondent’s position that $450,000 should be used for his income. The evidence does not justify a finding that all the respondent’s heightened spending was traceable to an alleged one time “blip.” I find that the spending pattern of the respondent, as discussed above, is indicative of an income greater than $450,000. I find the respondent has not been forthcoming regarding the totality of income available to him for support purposes. The respondent fails to address in any satisfactory way, if at all, the applicant’s evidence as to his current spending pattern far exceeding his actual declared expenses.

[63] I fix the respondent’s income at $550,000.

CHILD SUPPORT – TABLE AMOUNT

[64] In relation to the table amount, the respondent concedes his obligation to pay table based child support and does not rely on s. 4 of the Guidelines. This concession is well founded in light of the jurisprudence, in particular Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250 (SCC).

[65] The table amount is $6,572 based on an income of $550,000 and that amount shall be paid effective December 1, 2012.

CHILD SUPPORT – S. 7 EXPENSES

[66] The respondent concedes (but only for the purpose of this motion) that all health related expenses and the Matthews Hall private school expenses are proper s. 7 expenses.

[67] The health related expenses are claimed but not quantified (other than an anticipated cost estimate made by the applicant). These expenses are for glasses, dental and orthodontics for both children. The order below requires those expenses to be shared proportionate to income after adjustment pursuant to s. 3.1 of Schedule III of the Guidelines.

[68] Regarding private school expenses, the SSAG calculations submitted by Mr. Hainsworth used $22,000 as an annual cost but the applicant’s uncontradicted evidence is that those annual costs are $29,970. Accordingly, I use that amount.

[69] Mr. Hainsworth also argued that in high income cases the support payor is at a disadvantage because the support payor’s share of net disposable income (“NDI”) is substantially lower than the support payor’s proportionate share of s. 7 expenses. In the present case, utilizing the SSAG calculations tendered by the respondent, at the midpoint SSAG amount for spousal support, the respondent had 42 percent of the NDI and was responsible for 68 percent of the s. 7 expenses. Accordingly, the respondent proposes that the private school expenses should be equally shared to ameliorate this alleged unfairness.

[70] Absent some authority, and considering also that this is an interim order, I am not prepared to accede to this submission. All s. 7 expenses should be shared on an interim basis proportionate to income in accordance with the guiding principle as set out in s. 7(2) of the Guidelines.

[71] The applicant’s claim for s. 7 expenses for hockey, tennis, skiing/snowboarding and summer camps are dismissed. I agree with the respondent’s submission that these expenses would already be accounted for in the table amounts pursuant to s. 7(1.1)(a) and are not extraordinary (see Kase v. Bazinet, 2011 ONCJ 718 (Ont. C.J.) at para. 40).

[72] This leaves the s. 7 piano expenses for both children and Kathryn’s dance expenses.

[73] The applicant’s affidavit evidence is that the piano expenses are $2,000 annually per child but schedule B to her most recent financial statement confuses this information, as it shows the piano expense for “both children” at $2,000 annually (suggesting the combined annual expense is $2,000). I find that the piano expense, even if it is $2,000 per child, is not extraordinary and the applicant’s claim for same is dismissed for the same reasons as set out above.

[74] Kathryn’s dance expense is estimated by the applicant to be $5,000 annually. The respondent takes no real issue with the amount but submits that this expense also is not extraordinary. I find in applying s. 7(1.1)(a) of the Guidelines that 50 percent of this expense is covered within the table amounts and that 50 percent should be shared. Accordingly, the sum of $2,500 shall form an extraordinary extracurricular s. 7 expense.

[75] After considering the amount of spousal support (as discussed and ordered below), the s. 7 expenses are to be shared 69.5 percent by the respondent and 30.5 percent by the applicant.

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

[76] I find that the respondent should pay spousal support in the amount of $10,500 per month effective December 1, 2012.

[77] The various amounts to be paid by the respondent for the benefit of the applicant pursuant to the support and property agreement should not affect the result on this motion, as all payments were agreed to be on a without prejudice basis.

[78] I have considered the factors and objectives in s.15.2(4) and s.15.2(6) of the Divorce Act in the context that this case deals with an interim order and there is incomplete financial disclosure from the respondent. The economic consequences of the separation have impacted the applicant much more than the respondent given the significant income disparities. The needs of the applicant are an important factor to consider until trial. The amount of spousal support should take into account the standard of living enjoyed by the applicant during the marriage.

[79] I have considered the applicant’s expenses as set out in her most recent financial statement, including the fact that some expenses shown in the financial statement are now being paid by the respondent (including the mortgage and taxes on the Rivertrace property) and will no longer be paid by the respondent. Also, the respondent currently pays all the children’s extracurricular expenses and private school expenses and this will no longer be the case effective December 1, 2012.

[80] Using the SSAG calculations appended as exhibit N to the applicant’s affidavit, and making the necessary changes[^1] as to income and s. 7 expenses, the SSAG ranges are $10,083, $11,336 and $12,606 (low, mid, high).

[81] The amount of $10,500 falls within the lower end of the range and this is appropriate on the facts of this case considering that the SSAGs have an upper ceiling of $350,000 and also that the respondent is paying 69.5 percent of the significant private school expenses, while having 43.1 percent of net disposable income.

LIFE INSURANCE

[82] The applicant requested that she be named as an irrevocable beneficiary on the respondent’s $1 million life insurance policy on an interim basis. There were no submissions made by the respondent as to why that relief ought not to be granted. This relief is included in the order below.

ORDER

[83] For reasons set out above, an interim order shall issue as follows:

1. The respondent shall pay to the applicant child support in the amount of $6,572 per month commencing December 1, 2012 pursuant to s. 4(a) and s.3(1)(a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“Guidelines”) based on the respondent’s income of $550,000;

2. The respondent shall pay spousal support to the applicant in the amount of $10,500 per month commencing December 1, 2012;

3. Commencing December 1, 2012, the respondent shall pay to the applicant as his share of the children’s private school costs and Kathryn’s dance expenses the sum of $1,881 per month based on the respondent’s income of $550,000 and the applicant’s income of $186,000 (inclusive of spousal support) pursuant to s. 7 of the Guidelines, which results in the respondent’s share being 69.5 percent and the applicant’s share being 30.5 percent (after deducting from the respondent’s income the spousal support paid by the respondent);

4. The respondent shall transfer forthwith to the joint names of the applicant and respondent the property held in the respondent’s name and located at 243 East Rivertrace Walk (“Rivertrace”) in London, Ontario, and at the same time the parties shall sign all necessary documents to give effect to the requirement in paragraph 5.6 of the Interim Agreement (the “Agreement”) signed by the parties and dated June 25, 2010, that the mortgage on Rivertrace is to be transferred to both parties’ names. The respondent shall be responsible for all costs to effect the transfer of Rivertrace, including land transfer tax (if any) and legal fees and disbursements to prepare and/or register the transfer and any other documents;

5. The respondent shall be responsible for the mortgage payments and property tax for Rivertrace up to and including November 30, 2012;

6. All payments made after November 30, 2012 by the respondent to the applicant for child support, spousal support or to third parties for the benefit of the applicant and/or the children pursuant to the Agreement shall be credited to the respondent towards his obligation to pay child support and spousal support as set out in this order;

7. The children’s healthcare and medical expenses in relation to glasses, dental expenses and orthodontic expenses shall be shared 69.5 percent by the respondent and 30.5 percent by the applicant, after deducting from the expenses any insurance reimbursement and after allowing for any tax savings by the party who paid the expenses;

8. This order as it relates to interim child support and spousal support is made pursuant to the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) c.3 [as am. by S.C. 1997, c.1];

9. Pending the final determination of this case, an order shall issue in relation to life insurance as asked in the first sentence of paragraph 6 of the relief sought in the applicant’s motion at tab 9.

10. If the parties cannot agree on costs, the parties may contact the trial coordinator within 30 days to set an appointment before me at 9:30 a.m. to deal with costs of the motion.

“Justice Victor Mitrow”

Justice Victor Mitrow

Date: February 12, 2013

[^1]: The respondent’s income was changed to $550,000, the applicant’s income was changed to $60,000, the Matthews Hall private school expense is shown as $29,970 for the applicant, and the dance expense is shown as $2,500 for the applicant. Also, a supplementary SSAG scenario for $10,500 was generated.