Introduction

1Teaghan Elizabeth Robinson, born December 12, 2010, is the subject of this case. The applicant mother seeks sole custody, permission to move with her to Sydney, Nova Scotia, and child support. The respondent father opposes the move. He seeks joint legal custody with increasing parenting time on a graduated basis given that his access to Teaghan is currently only for one supervised hour each week. He is agreeable to paying child support, however is seeking an award below the table amount for his income based on undue hardship. The court will also be required to determine his income.

2The parties separated on August 29, 2011. The applicant removed herself and Teaghan to a shelter. She commenced a court application the next day. Her position then was that the father should have no access or, at best, supervised access. On August 30, 2011, not knowing the whereabouts of the applicant or child, the respondent attended at a police station seeking advice. He was arrested, charged with assaulting and threatening the applicant and held overnight. The next day he was released on terms that included no direct or indirect contact with the applicant and access to Teaghan, only as may be approved by the Children’s Aid Society (the “CAS”).

3An investigation was done by the CAS which was completed by October 25, 2011. The CAS confirmed that Teaghan had been exposed to adult conflict but did not confirm that she had been exposed to physical violence between her parents. The CAS did not take any position on custody or access. It cautioned the parents not to expose their child to adult conflict and referred them to family court to resolve their dispute. Despite that report, the father did not see Teaghan until June 2012 when supervised access commenced. Since then, he has seen Teaghan weekly for a one hour supervised visit. Teaghan has become re-familiarized with her father and the visits go well. The supervisors describe father and daughter as comfortable and affectionate with each other.

4In June 2012, the respondent was given notice that his employment would terminate on August 15, 2012. He was laid off as part of downsizing by his employer. His severance package was such that his salary was in effect paid to year-end. His annual income in 2012 will actually be somewhat higher than his salary due to an enhancement he received as part of the severance package. Nonetheless, he stopped paying child support in August 2012. To date, he has not re-employed. He says he has one iron in the fire for January but at a much lower salary than he previously earned.

5The applicant is employed by the federal government. She has been on sick leave and plans to return to work at some point but as yet has no fixed date. She wants to relocate to Sydney, Nova Scotia where she grew up and where her parents and brother still reside. She believes that she could transfer her employment with the federal government or, if not, she could obtain alternate employment in her previous field teaching school. She amended her claim to seek permission to move the child to Nova Scotia about one week prior to trial.

6The respondent shares joint custody of his two daughters from his marriage to Shannon Farrell. Since January 2009, those children have resided in alternating weeks with each parent. In October 2011, Ms. Farrell was contacted by the CAS worker who was conducting the investigation relating to Teaghan. As a result, she applied to change the parenting arrangements for her daughters. That case is still before the court, awaiting a report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

7The respondent’s criminal charges are scheduled for trial in January, 2013.

Sole vs. Joint Custody

8This application is under the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter C.12 (the “CLRA”). The decisions to be made with respect to parenting arrangements for Teaghan are governed by section 24 which provides as follows:

(1) The merits of an application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best interests of the child, in accordance with subsections (2), (3) and (4). 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1).

Best interests of child

(2) The court shall consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, including,

(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,

(i) each person entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,

(ii) other members of the child’s family who reside with the child, and

(iii) persons involved in the child’s care and upbringing;

(b) the child’s views and preferences, if they can reasonably be ascertained;

(d) the ability and willingness of each person applying for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessaries of life and any special needs of the child;

(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child’s care and upbringing;

(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;

(g) the ability of each person applying for custody of or access to the child to act as a parent; and

(h) the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between the child and each person who is a party to the application. 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1); 2009, c. 11, s. 10.

Past conduct

(3) A person’s past conduct shall be considered only,

(a) in accordance with subsection (4); or

(b) if the court is satisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to act as a parent. 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1).

Violence and abuse

(4) In assessing a person’s ability to act as a parent, the court shall consider whether the person has at any time committed violence or abuse against,

(a) his or her spouse;

(b) a parent of the child to whom the application relates;

(d) any child. 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1).

Same

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), anything done in self-defence or to protect another person shall not be considered violence or abuse. 2006, c. 1, s. 3 (1).

9In a case where there has not been a prior final determination of custody as between the parents, and where the case includes a request by one parent to relocate with the child, the Ontario Court of Appeal has ruled in Bjornson v. Creighton, (2002) 2002 45125 (ON CA), 62 O.R. (3d) 236, that the trial court should determine custody first and mobility second. The court stated at para. 39:

39 I noted in paragraph 19 that in delivering judgment the trial judge dealt with mobility before dealing with custody and that appeared to me to be the wrong sequence. Had he decided the question of custody first, he could then have properly factored that finding into his decision of the mobility question.

10This case is similar to Bjornson to the extent that there is no serious doubt about the resolution of primary residential custody. Teaghan’s current best interests clearly involve continuing to reside primarily with her mother. This is not challenged by her father.

11Rather, he seeks joint legal custody on the basis that joint decision making by the parents would be in the child’s best interests. In support of his claim, he points out that in the short time the parents were together after Teaghan’s birth, they agreed to have her immunized, selected a daycare provider and had also agreed on whether or not to educate her in a French immersion program when she reached school age.

12The respondent also relied on unilateral steps taken by the applicant and her failure to keep him notified of important developments in Teaghan’s life as underlining the need for a joint custodial award in order to protect his position as a father to Teaghan. In this regard, he relied on Terris v. Terris, (2003) 2003 3320 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 112, where the mother had unlawfully retained the children in Australia without the father's consent or authorization by court order. Her unilateral conduct and the disregard it showed for the father’s relationship with the children was an important factor in the award of joint legal custody in that case.

13Here the applicant removed Teaghan from the family home without notice to the respondent. She took her to a shelter. The respondent acknowledges that the applicant did leave him a voicemail indication that she and Teaghan were away from the house but that the details were vague. The next day, the applicant commenced a court application which set out all the details she relied on in terms of her sudden departure. The respondent was served in a timely way. Unlike Terris, this is not a case where the mother acted unilaterally by taking the law into her own hands.

14The respondent notes that, unbeknownst to him, the applicant did travel to Nova Scotia with their child and stayed there with her for about two months. At that point in time, the mother had advice that she did not need his permission or a court order to take the child out of the province on a visit. She was in touch with the CAS, as required, during this period so that its investigation could be carried out. Since the release terms precluded the respondent from having any access to Teaghan until the CAS approved, he was not prejudiced by the fact that the child was out of Ontario. It is troubling that the mother said that she did not tell him because she was not required to, but her conduct does not compare to that of Ms. Terris who unlawfully retained her children in Australia and only returned them when required to by court order.

15Nor am I persuaded that the fact that the applicant continued to insist on supervised access after the CAS had reported on October 25, 2011 is a reason why I should award joint legal custody to these parents. I disagree with her decision; however, the father did not bring a motion to court seeking unsupervised access. The disagreement between the parties appears to have focused on who should supervise the access and where it should take place. I find both parents were responsible for some of the delays in getting the supervised access started.

16The applicant did not tell the respondent that she had placed Teaghan in daycare. She should have. At the same time, the respondent ought reasonably to have assumed that daycare had been arranged. He knew the daycare provider, who had been tentatively agreed upon prior to separation, and he did not say that he contacted her to find out if she was caring for his daughter.

17The respondent also submits that the desire of the applicant to move to Nova Scotia with Teaghan reflects an attitude that will depreciate his role with their daughter. I did not reach that conclusion about the applicant. I find that she did support a relationship between the father and Teaghan. She has complied with the court ordered access. Teaghan has adjusted well to access with her father which is not indicative of a residential parent who is discouraging the relationship. The applicant also offered extended access periods to make up for the missed visits when she was on holiday with Teaghan out of town.

18In my view, the applicant is a person who has and will comply with the law and with court orders. I am not persuaded that she lacks an appreciation for the importance of the father’s role in Teaghan’s life such that an order for joint legal custody is necessary to protect that relationship. Nor is this a case where the parents have demonstrated a pattern of co-operation and communication in relation to parenting their child that would support an award of joint custodial decision making. They have had no communication since separation. The lack of trust between them is palpable. This reality existed before the criminal release terms prohibiting the respondent from contacting the applicant. Both parents told the CAS social worker about arguments between them prior to separation. The social worker determined that there had been adult conflict in the home and that Teaghan had been exposed to their verbal arguments.

19The lack of trust between the parents has also been contributed to by the respondent. I accept that he was physical with the applicant on or about August 27, 2011, that he pushed her and she fell onto the bed on which Teaghan was lying. The respondent denied these events. Despite his denial, I prefer the applicant’s description of the event for these reasons. The respondent did admit that a cooling off period was necessary and that this was why he took his other daughters camping and left the applicant and Teaghan home alone for the weekend. He admitted to spitting on the applicant on one occasion but said it was mutual. The applicant says that he spit on this occasion and I find that this was the occasion both were referring to. The applicant did not take advantage of the respondent’s absence from the home over the weekend to move out, or to lock him out of the house. In my view, this enhances her credibility. Later, I will discuss other aspects of both parties testimony. Overall, I found the applicant the more reliable witness of the two, and I have also taken this into account in assessing their versions of what did or not happen on August 27, 2011.

20In addition, the respondent failed in his paternal responsibilities to Teaghan when he failed to let the applicant know in June 2012 that he had been laid off, when he failed to provide advance notice that he was discontinuing child support payments and, most egregiously, by making no child support payments for the duration of 2012 despite that fact his annual income would actually be higher than usual on account of his severance package. The respondent’s omissions in this regard have a significant impact on the applicant’s ability to rely upon him as a co-parent to their child.

21The respondent has relied on the existence of his joint custodial relationship with Ms. Farrell as proof that he can effectively co-operate and communicate in that capacity. The continuation of that arrangement is challenged in another court proceeding. Ms. Farrell testified that co-parenting with the respondent is very difficult. In addition, each case is different. The parents are different and have unique relationships. The children are different. In Teaghan’s case, she was very young when her parent’s separated. They had not established an enduring track record of parenting her successfully as a couple by that time. Since the separation, the parental relationship has been ruptured.

22The applicant has been the child’s primary caregiver throughout her life. Her role as the child’s primary residential parent is not challenged in this action. The respondent’s contact with the child has been very limited since separation. By all accounts, Teaghan is doing well. In my view, the child’s best interests are met by her mother exercising the custodial decision making authority subject to the father’s rights to access to information from her and from all third party service providers to the child in accordance with the terms of section 20(5) of the CLRA.

23Sole custody of Teaghan is awarded to the applicant mother.

The Relocation Issue

24The governing case is Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 where the Supreme Court of Canada held that there is no presumption in favour of a custodial parent being able to relocate with a child. The relevant factors are set out in para. 49:

49 The law can be summarized as follows:

The parent applying for a change in the custody or access order must meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a material change in the circumstances affecting the child.
If the threshold is met, the judge on the application must embark on a fresh inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child, having regard to all the relevant circumstances relating to the child's needs and the ability of the respective parents to satisfy them.
This inquiry is based on the findings of the judge who made the previous order and evidence of the new circumstances.
The inquiry does not begin with a legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, although the custodial parent's views are entitled to great respect.
Each case turns on its own unique circumstances. The only issue is the best interest of the child in the particular circumstances of the case.
The focus is on the best interests of the child, not the interests and rights of the parents.
More particularly the judge should consider, inter alia:

(a) the existing custody arrangement and relationship between the child and the custodial parent;

(b) the existing access arrangement and the relationship between the child and the access parent;

(d) the views of the child;

(e) the custodial parent's reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where it is relevant to that parent's ability to meet the needs of the child;

(f) disruption to the child of a change in custody;

(g) disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, and the community he or she has come to know.

25This case is an initial application not an application to change an existing order. Accordingly, the relevant factors are those set out at paras. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

26The applicant proposes to move to Sydney, Nova Scotia with Teaghan. Her parents and one brother still reside there. The plan is to move in with her parents for a period of time and to then obtain her own accommodation. The applicant has made inquiries and believes that she will be able to obtain a transfer of her employment with the Federal Government from Ottawa to Sydney in a short period of time. She testified she may have to take a small pay cut but this would be offset by the lower cost of living in Sydney. She has an alternate plan, namely to return to supply teaching on a temporary basis. The applicant only put forward the plan to move away from Ottawa a little more than a week before this trial commenced. In that short period of time, she did look into housing and daycare in Sydney and is satisfied that both could be easily arranged. She also testified that her parents support this plan and will provide for her and Teaghan until she is able to get back to work. Neither parent testified at trial. The applicant stated that her mother intended to but had become ill and could not travel.

27The applicant reached the decision to move because she was finding it too emotionally and financially stressful here in Ottawa. She has been off work since September 20, 2012 with reduced income. The respondent has not been paying child support. She has an aunt and uncle nearby who are supportive of her, and one close friend, but feels she would have more family support back in Sydney with her parents.

28The applicant has considered the impact of her proposed move on the relationship between the respondent and Teaghan. She proposed that there could be four visits each year between them, three in Sydney and one in Ottawa. Her plan was to deduct the costs of travel, up to $1,000.00 per visit, from the respondent’s child support and that she would pay for the fourth visit and bring Teaghan here herself. She outlined how the visits would get started, and then be extended. She also discussed using telephone and Skype in the intervals in order to keep up the relationship.

29The applicant acknowledged the strong bond between Teaghan and her sisters who reside equally with the respondent and Ms. Farrell. She has become a very good friend with Ms. Farrell. Both of them testified as to how they would keep the girls in touch with each other by telephone and Skype, and also were hopeful for face to face visits at least once per year. Ms. Farrell testified that Ms. MacDonald was welcome to stay with her when she was in Ottawa.

30Teaghan has the ability in Ottawa to continue seeing her father on a regular and increasing basis. Despite the interruption in their relationship, Teaghan knows her father and now calls him Daddy. Remaining here would facilitate the resumption of a complete father/daughter relationship. The respondent is very concerned that this cannot happen at such a distance as exists between Ottawa and Sydney and with infrequent visits. In his view, the relationship has already been broken once and this should not happen again.

31The respondent believes that Teaghan’s close relationship with her sisters should not be severed. Now, they are together several times each month. In his view, the contact amongst them would preferably only increase and become more beneficial to Teaghan when she is allowed unsupervised access to her father which could then also include her sisters. The respondent hopes that ultimately all the girls could reside with him on an alternating weekly basis.

32He has no plans to change Teaghan’s daycare should she continue to reside in Ottawa.

33The respondent has his parents and a sister in Ottawa. His mother testified. It is clear that she is a devoted, involved grandmother to her son’s other daughters. She sees them two or three times in the weeks when they reside with their father, however has had no contact with Teaghan since the separation. The respondent’s sister did not testify but was described by him and his mother as a loving aunt who also enjoyed regular contact with her other nieces, including sleepovers for them at her home. The respondent testified that he has a warm, loving family here in Ottawa ready to resume their relationship with Teaghan; however, his mother expressed reluctance to be alone with Teaghan, apparently for fear that the applicant would make unfounded allegations against her.

34The applicant countered by noting that the paternal family had not contacted her at all asking to see Teaghan and that she would have permitted this had she only been asked. I accept the paternal grandmother’s testimony that she had in fact telephoned the applicant several times as soon as she learned of the separation. She testified that she got no response and stopped calling. This is consistent with the applicant’s acknowledgement that for the three weeks she was in the shelter, she was required to keep her cell phone off. The paternal grandmother also testified that she drove by the house several times but it was apparent no one was living there. I accept that she did so.

35I do not accept the applicant’s testimony that she would have allowed contact between Teaghan and her paternal relatives if only she had been asked. This testimony is inconsistent with her refusal to accept the paternal grandparents and aunt as access supervisors even when the access was proposed to take place at a public location. Although there is no evidence that the grandparents or aunt asked for access independently from their proposed role as access supervisors, it would be understandable had they felt that by rejecting the one, the applicant was also rejecting the other.

36Ms. Young also testified. She is the respondent’s partner. She has seen him with his other children and attested to his fine parenting abilities. She has not yet been able to meet Teaghan but is looking forward to forming a relationship with her. Ms. Young is an experienced school teacher. She impressed the court as a well rounded individual, very experienced and capable with children.

37The applicant’s plan appears to have been put together on very short notice. In December 2011, her counsel advised that she had no intention of relocating, that she had a very good job here and was not leaving Ottawa. The fact is that, at present, she does not have a job in Sydney. She testified that the government department that employs her is growing in Nova Scotia. This hearsay testimony was not backed up by any direct evidence. She testified that she had been told that if something comes up in Sydney, she will get it. This is also unsubstantiated hearsay. She testified that she would feel better in Sydney than she does here and so be able to get back to work more quickly. In her view, this would reduce her financial stress and be beneficial for Teaghan. However, there is no medical evidence before the court as to why she is off work or what would assist her in returning to work. The only report consists of two lines written by her family doctor in September 2012 simply stating that she is off work for medical reasons and will be re-assessed on a regular basis. The applicant testified that she has recently applied for long term disability but again, none of the supporting documents were presented to the court.

38The applicant did not have any confirmation from her employer that she would be able to transfer her employment to Sydney or according to what timeframe. The court only has the applicant’s own account of what someone in the government said to her. This is by no means a commitment to transfer her. Similarly, the applicant says she has spoken to some former contacts in Sydney about supply teaching but, again, any information she received from them is not properly before the court and is not an assurance of even regular part-time employment.

39The respondent submitted that the relationship between the applicant and her mother had been strained for some years. He doubted that they could get along well enough to enable the applicant and Teaghan to reside there for very long, if at all. He produced an email that the applicant had sent to her mother and to him in March 2011. In it, she asks her mother if they can stay with her when they come to visit. In her forwarding email to the respondent, she describes this as “forcing the issue”, “giving them a week to make the decision”. She says: “They either want to work toward it getting better, or continue to avoid contact and perpetuate the negativity. Hard to call bluff, but necessary to move past this. One way or another I am moving on from this ridiculous BS”. The applicant’s explanation is that her mother never liked the respondent and the negativity was directed at him, not at her or Teaghan. I find that the email could be consistent with either version of the relationship.

40The respondent’s mother also testified that the applicant had told her several times that she and her mother fought a lot and that they did not get along. I accept this testimony as true. The paternal grandmother impressed me as an honest and candid witness. She acknowledged that she felt hurt that the applicant had cut off contact with her. She acknowledged that her son needed what I describe as some “ timeouts” during family get-togethers. I found her realistic in describing him as a “fairly involved father” and in stating that her concern in relation to his ability to care for Teaghan was that he “works a lot”.

41It is unfortunate that the applicant’s mother was not present as a witness. It was not explained what her illness was that prevented her from attending at any time during the two-week period over which the trial extended. Permission was not asked to provide her testimony by affidavit, video or teleconference. As it stands, the court could not reach its own conclusion about the relationship between the applicant and her mother, or the mother’s willingness and ability to open her home to her daughter and Teaghan for what might be an extended or unknown period of time. No reference was made as to why the applicant’s father could not or did not attend to voice support for the applicant’s proposed plan.

42The applicant relies upon Ryall v. Ryall, 2009 ONCJ 687. In that case, the mother sought permission to move with the parent’s 16 month old child to England. Ms. Ryall proposed to return to live with her mother and grandmother, who would provide the accommodation, financial assistance and daycare for the baby when she returned to work. The grandmother testified and the court found that they had already had experience living and working together as a team to care for the child. The mother’s employment was readily transferrable to England. The court stated at paras. 91 and 92:

91 The court accepts that the mother and the child will have a better life in the U.K. The mother will be financially more secure. She will not be isolated in the U.K. She will have help from her mother financially and for child care, for as long as she needs it.

92 The court accepts that the mother and the maternal grandmother have a loving and strong relationship. The maternal grandmother has repeatedly made the mother and Izabella a priority in her life (which the father and his family have not done) and she will continue to do so, particularly now, as the mother really needs her help. The mother can save money to buy a house in the U.K. She will not be struggling in the U.K. She is struggling in Toronto and will be struggling as a single mother living alone, even with full-time work at a spa in her areas of expertise and even if she is receiving the table amount of child support and the father's proportionate share contribution to day-care costs.

43Ryall is distinguishable on its facts. This court has no evidence from the maternal grandmother, nor of a track record of her and her daughter working together to look after Teaghan. Nor is there persuasive evidence of employment for the mother in Sydney that could lead to a conclusion that she will be better off financially there as compared to here in Ottawa. Here, she has a good job she can return to as soon as her medical issue is resolved. In Teaghan’s case, although she is just two years old, she has an established community here, which includes her two sisters, their mother and their grandparents, and her daycare.

44The applicant also relies on Bjornson, where the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at para. 28:

28 Moving to Alberta, where she plans to resume a well-adjusted and independent life -- a life that she worked hard for and had achieved there previously -- will, in all the circumstances of this case, enhance the best interests of the child. This is particularly true when contrasted with the potential negative effects of prohibiting Bjornson from relocating. The evidence indicates that Bjornson has neither the 12 years' seniority status that she accumulated in Alberta nor the full-time hours, self-scheduling and full benefits, including pension, which came with her lengthy period of employment there. She also does not have the support of her friends and family which is beneficial, if not crucial, to raising a child as a single parent. In this case, the child's best interests are better served and better achieved by a well-functioning and happy custodial parent, operating at her full potential.

45The applicant submits that she will be happier and better functioning in Sydney than she is here in Ottawa. Despite her views, the evidence in her case is very different from that in Bjornson where the mother would be returning to a much more advantageous work environment and independent life style. Those are not the facts here.

46McLachlin J (as she then was) stated at paras. 46 and 50 in Gordon v Goertz:

46 Finally, the proposed presumption in favour of the custodial parent may be criticized on the ground that it tends to shift the focus from the best interests of the child to the interests of the parents. As mentioned earlier, underlying much of the argument for the presumption is the suggestion that the custodial parent has the "right" to move where he or she pleases and should not be restricted in doing so by the desire of the access parent to maintain contact with the child. However, the Divorce Act does not speak of parental "rights": see Young v. Young, supra. The child's best interest must be found within the practical context of the reality of the parents' lives and circumstances, one aspect of which may involve relocation. But to begin from the premise that one parent has the prima facie right to take the child where he or she wishes may unduly deflect the focus from the child to its parents.

50 In the end, the importance of the child remaining with the parent to whose custody it has become accustomed in the new location must be weighed against the continuance of full contact with the child's access parent, its extended family and its community. The ultimate question in every case is this: what is in the best interests of the child in all the circumstances, old as well as new?

47I appreciate that serious weight and consideration must be given to the wishes of the custodial parent. So doing does not override the court’s obligation to rule in the best interest of the child. Here, the current practical reality does not support the mother’s proposed move to Sydney with Teaghan. The plan was put together very quickly with the result that the court was really left in the position of not being able to perform an independent evaluation of it. With only the testimony of the applicant, and in the absence of any supporting medical, employment or family witnesses, the court is essentially asked to accept at face value the applicant’s testimony that her proposal is in the child’s best interest. In my view, so doing would be tantamount to giving her the benefit of a presumption in favour of her entitlement to move the child, which the law does not provide.

48In support of her request to move, the applicant questions the respondent’s commitment to Teaghan. His failure to pay child support is egregious. During 2012, his income exceeded $145,000.00 yet he stopped all payments effective August 15. Both he and his mother spoke of his commitment to repay debt in terms of him being a person who does not take the easy way out. In my view, this is wrong-minded. It overlooks that his first obligation is to support his children. In relation to why he undertook the additional debt associated with 1610 Main Street, the respondent repeatedly stated that this was for the future benefit of his children. In so saying, he ignored the fact that they need his support now.

49I agree that the respondent’s financial conduct since the separation has not demonstrated that he is a man who puts his child’s financial needs before his own. Whether the applicant is in Nova Scotia or Ontario, is not likely to impact on whether he continues in this vein. Had I been persuaded that the applicant did indeed have secure employment in Nova Scotia which would enable her to return to work quickly and to set up independent living accommodations for Teaghan, I would have given considerable weight to the respondent`s financial shortcomings in relation to Teaghan.

50The applicant also questioned whether the respondent was a good father who would be committed to regular access to Teaghan. I was not persuaded that he has a pattern of relinquishing his childcare duties to other people in his life. The type of assistance and involvement of his parents is consistent with very helpful, involved grandparents, but they have not assumed a primary caregiving role for his other children. It is also true that the applicant and Ms. Young both took on roles with his other two daughters, but again, I find that this has been in a family way and not in a way whereby he relinquished his parenting responsibilities to his partner. I accept his mother’s description of him as a fairly involved father who works a lot. He clearly has maintained regular access to Teaghan once the supervised facility accepted their case. He has maintained shared residency of his older daughters since 2009. I conclude that he will continue to be an involved parent with Teaghan as well.

51The long period during which the respondent did not see Teaghan was, in my view, regrettable and unnecessary. The applicant insisted upon supervised access and the respondent, although he opposed the necessity, acquiesced to the concept. They both completed their application to the supervised access facility by early December 2011, which I find is reasonably timely to the receipt of the CAS report. The wait list was such that their case did not get reached until June 2012. I have already noted that both parents contributed to their inability to agree on alternative arrangements for supervised access. By the time that it did start, there was justification for supervision in view of the passage of time and the advisability of re-introducing Teaghan to her father in a gradual way. Since the access was arranged, the respondent has attended regularly, the relationship has progressed, and there not been any observations by the supervisors suggestive that access still needs to be supervised. For these reasons, I do not find that there is something remiss in the respondent’s relationship with Teaghan that supports a decision to allow the proposed move. To the contrary, the relationship needs to be facilitated and strengthened. This can best be done in Ottawa.

52For these reasons, I find that it is in Teaghan`s best interests to remain in Ottawa. I so order subject to any subsequent agreement between the parents or order of this court permitting relocation.

The Respondent’s Parenting Time

53There are two main concerns with respect to the respondent’s parenting time with Teaghan. The first is the limited nature of the access they have had exercised since the separation. Since June 2012, this has consisted of one hour each week. In my view, the best interests of Teaghan require that this be increased on a gradual basis, both as to duration and introduction of other individuals to the access. I order as follows:

The respondent shall attend two further supervised access visits with Teaghan;
He shall bring his other two daughters to the first such visit and Ms. Young shall additionally join them for the second and last supervised visit;
The next two weekly visits between the respondent and Teaghan shall extend for four hours in the community to include the same hour at which the supervised access occurred;
Pick up and drop off will occur at the supervised access facility;
Ms. Young should be present throughout these visits;
Thereafter, the respondent shall exercise full day access to Teaghan from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on four Saturdays with no restriction as to whom may be present or the location of the visits;
Next, the respondent’s access will occur on Fridays overnight, the first such visit to overlap with a Friday when his other daughters are in his home, and continuing until Saturday at 5 p.m. This shall occur on two occasions;
Thereafter, the respondent`s access shall move to take place on alternate weekends from Fridays to Monday mornings, to overlap when the other daughters are in the home, and for a mid-week visit during the other week.

54It is expected that the respondent shall also share in holidays, long weekends and special occasions such as Father’s Day. These issues were not addressed by the parties in submissions. They should turn their minds to them with a view to agreeing on additional access for the respondent with Teaghan after the preliminary visits set out above have been completed.

55The second concern is with respect to what I will describe as the respondent’s temper. Many witnesses testified to the fact the respondent does become frustrated or angry. His technique to handle this appears to be to withdraw from the situation. This sounds like a good idea on its face; however, I was concerned by testimony I heard as to the frequency with which this may occur and the effect that this may have upon Teaghan in terms of tension being created in the household. The respondent’s mother gave examples of the respondent withdrawing from family dinners in this way. So did Ms. Young. This is not an occasion where one would generally expect tempers to flare or arguments to occur. In questioning about whether her son displayed anger towards Ms. Young, the respondent’s mother answered no, that Ms. Young has a calming effect upon him. In my view, this is confirmatory that the respondent does, on occasion, need calming down.

56I also accept the testimony of Ms. Valiquette, an independent witness who is the owner of the Separation and Divorce Resource Centre. She testified that she had an intake meeting with the respondent in December 2011. After thirty minutes, she said he was not happy with how the meeting was going and “stormed out”.

57Ms. Farrell also provided testimony as to the respondent’s verbal abuse of her during their marriage. She is concerned that her own children as well Teaghan have been exposed to this. She was unaware that this type of conduct was continuing until the CAS contacted her in September 2011 in relation to the investigation into the respondent’s access to Teaghan.

58The respondent himself described his practice of stating his point of view once, perhaps twice, and then withdrawing, if it was not accepted. I had the impression from his own descriptions that this occurred with sufficient frequency and did lead to tension and conflict in the home he shared with the applicant. We know that Teaghan has been exposed to this. I also noted the respondent’s satisfaction with his own manner of handling interpersonal conflict. He did not appear to have insight into how his practice of withdrawing time and again could contribute to conflict and did not lead to resolution. In my view, Teaghan`s healthy development requires that the respondent obtain professional assistance in two aspects. The first is anger management/conflict resolution and the second is awareness of the negative consequences upon a child of exposure to parental conflict.

59Accordingly, I direct, as a condition of the respondent’s ongoing access to Teaghan, that he obtain a recommendation for a suitable program(s) to meet the above criteria from the CAS social worker and that he complete what is recommended to him within a reasonable time frame. Proof of completion is to be provided to the applicant and to the court.

60Given that there may be additional orders required to complete the access schedule and to ensure that it accommodates the best interests of Teaghan over the initial period of time, I will remain seized for a period of one year.

Determining the Respondent’s Income

61The respondent’s income tax return from 2011 shows line 150 income of $77,937.25, whereas his employment income was $116,959.13. He deducted a rental loss of $16,320.00 and a business loss of $22,701.00. The rental loss was incurred by a company the respondent had incorporated in 2009 called Versicore Group Inc. (“Versicore”). In 2010, the respondent had title to a property at 1610 Main Street, Stittsville ON transferred to Versicore. Previously, title was registered in his name and that of his former spouse, Ms. Farrell. The rental losses incurred in 2011 were incurred by Versicore, not by the respondent personally. He, however, submits that the losses were properly deducted from his personal income because he actually covered them for the company and his accountant would not have prepared an incorrect return. The accountant did not testify. In my view, this is not an appropriate deduction against employment income for child support purposes. The loss was not incurred by the respondent but by a separate legal entity. He had no legal obligation to cover the loss. He chose to purchase the other half of 1610 Main Street from Ms. Farrell’s Trustee in Bankruptcy for $10,000.00 and assumption of its liability on the registered mortgage. He was under no compulsion to do so. He knew the property was vacant. He could have sold it then. The fact that he chose to incur a loss in a company solely owned by him in the hope of future, longer term profit, is not an appropriate factor to be used in reduction of his current child support obligation. The wisdom of his decision to retain 1610 Main Street is also called into question by his own testimony that an additional mortgage of $48,000.00 had to be incurred the following year and that not a penny has yet been made through the property or the business operating out of it.

62The business loss was in fact personally incurred by the respondent. He was required by reason of her bankruptcy to assume full liability of a debt to the Business Development Corporation for which he and Ms. Farrell had been jointly and severally liable.

63Allowing that loss but not the rental loss results in income of $94,258.00. I find that the respondent’s income for 2011 for child support purposes is $94,258.00.

64In 2012, the respondent’s line 150 income will be $145,397.00.

65As already noted, the respondent is not currently employed. He received notice of his layoff by Hewlett-Packard in June 2012. Hewlett-Packard had employed him for several years in a managerial capacity. The description the respondent provided with respect to his efforts to find new employment was quite vague. He said that he applied “anywhere and everywhere” but had no records with him to back this up. He said he has had three telephone interviews and one in person, and that he is hopeful he may start work in January but, at most, would earn $65,000.00 per annum. He had nothing in writing to corroborate this level of income. The respondent also testified that his income with his former employer had been higher than his peers, who were paid in the $70,000.00 to $80,000.00 range. This testimony was not challenged.

66In early 2011, the respondent entered into a business relationship with Phil Bronsther. Mr. Bronsther agreed to rent 1610 Main Street month to month in order to operate a catering business. In return for the respondent not requiring a fixed-term lease, Versicore received one half of the shares in the catering business, known as Scrumptious. The respondent maintains that neither he nor Mr. Bronsther have yet to make a penny profit from the business. The respondent states that there may be a future in the business and that, in any event, Scrumptious pays sufficient rent to cover the mortgage and carrying costs of 1610 Main Street, which he hopes will be a good investment for his children in the long run. The benefit to him now is that the cost of ownership of 1610 Main Street is covered by Scrumptious’s lease.

67It is clear that the respondent performs services for Scrumptious. He attends in the shop from time to time, he attends events catered by it, including charity events it supports, and he either makes purchases for it or allows his business partner to use his credit card for this purpose. There was very little evidence by which one could quantify the value of his services. No financial statements were produced for Scrumptious even though the applicant had requested production of the financial statements for the entirety of the business history. Mr. Bronsther was not called as a witness to verify the respondent’s statements with respect to the business generating no profit for either partner. I cannot accept that Mr. Bronsther earns nothing from what is apparently his full-time occupation without the benefit of his testimony. The banking records produced did show a balance at the end of 2011 of $31,570.00 and at the end of October 2012, of $28,500.00.

68In January 2012, the respondent divested himself of his shares in Versicore by selling them to his current partner, Angela Young, for $100.00. He testified that he did this because he was in uncertain financial circumstances and wanted to protect the company from possible future creditors for his family’s long term benefit. No property valuations were tendered with respect to the current market value of 1610 Main Street. The applicant did request production of property valuations prepared in connection with the refinancing of the property and the city property tax valuation but none were provided. The respondent maintains that after selling expenses, there would be no net proceeds but he did not prove this.

69I was not satisfied that the respondent met his obligation to establish the value of 1610 Main Street or the income, if any, that he derives from Scrumptious. I find that he did not comply with the productions requested of him in this regard. Although he denied receipt of the production request from the applicant’s counsel, I did not believe this testimony. He acknowledges receipt of other emails to the same address and he forwarded his own disclosure request back to the applicant’s counsel using the same header and format. And, it is his obligation to provide adequate documentary proof in any event.

70It seems clear to me that the respondent believes that he has something to protect in 1610 Main Street, Versicore and Scrumptious. If he did not, he would not have bought the other half interest back from the Trustee. Nor would he have taken the step of divesting himself of his ownership to Ms. Young only a few months after meeting her and before they were even cohabiting.

71The respondent was not forthright about the sale transaction with Ms. Young. His explanation as to how the building could benefit his children in the long run if she owned it was simply that he trusted her to do the right thing. When Ms. Young testified, she revealed that there was in fact a written agreement prepared by a lawyer that included buy back provisions in favour of the respondent. The agreement was not produced. Ms. Young’s testimony was somewhat unclear as to the buyback terms. She testified that if they were to separate, she would transfer the shares back to him at her purchase price. She then added that she would do this if she wanted to, that it would be her decision.

72My conclusion is that the sale of shares to Ms. Young was a colourable step taken by the respondent in an effort to place any income or property value that he may have from Versicore/Scrumptious out of his hands, not only as he said in case of his bankruptcy, but also for purposes of income for child support. The applicant testified that during the winter/spring of 2011, the respondent had wanted to transfer the shares to her, for the stated purpose of putting the asset and potential income out of reach of Ms. Farrell. The respondent denied this, claiming that in fact it was the applicant who wanted to have control over the asset. I preferred her testimony. It is consistent with what he actually did with Ms. Young. Ms. Farrell had in fact issued an application against the respondent in April 2011 seeking child and spousal support. There were other aspects of the respondent’s testimony with respect to financial matters that ranged from vague to deceptive.

73The respondent’s testimony with respect to his efforts to obtain employment was unsatisfactory. He has a very good work history with a respected company. He is a high energy, enterprising person. I find, with proper efforts, he should have been able to locate full-time employment for January 2013 at least at the income he noted of $65,000.00. It is also my view that the respondent is capable of earning more than that and he should be actively and demonstrably seeking employment at least at the income level he described as previously available to his peers at Hewlett-Packard, which he said had been in the range of $70,000.00 to $80,000.00. Based on the fact that the respondent appears to have carried on his expenditures and met his obligations throughout 2012 except for child support, I infer that he was confident that he would be able to obtain employment soon after the expiry of his severance period in December 2012.

74For these reasons, I impute an annual income from employment of $65,000.00 to the respondent effective January 1, 2013 and impose the additional requirement that he provide the applicant with quarterly reports documenting his ongoing employment search.

75I am also of the view that some income should be imputed to him on account of his services to Scrumptious. It makes sense that the partners would not have drawn out the balance in the Scrumptious bank account at the end of the first year of operation. In the absence of proper financial statements for Scrumptious, and in the absence of testimony from his business partner, I conclude that it is appropriate to attribute one half of the balance in the bank account at end of October 2012 to the respondent by way of income in 2013. A reasonable person in the respondent’s position would make the withdrawal in 2013 when he evidently expects to have a lower income than in 2012. Accordingly, I find that the respondent’s income for 2013 will be $79,250.00.

76I recognize that this is low in comparison to the respondent’s income at Hewlett-Packard. However, he was laid off from that employment. He has high school education and some supplementary training and education but not that lead to any diploma or certificate. I did not conclude that it would be reasonable to infer that he could be earning at his previous level based on the evidentiary record that I had.

77In reply submissions, the applicant asked the court to order that any dividend or other income earned in future by Ms. Young from Versicore should be imputed to the respondent. I am not prepared to do so. I am satisfied that the amount I have imputed to the respondent from 2012 reflects his contributions to the business, not hers. What the future circumstances may be between the respondent, Ms. Young and their contributions to Scrumptious are not known at this time.

Undue Hardship

78 Section 10 of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, states:

(1) On the application of either spouse or an applicant under section 33 of the Act, a court may award an amount of child support that is different from the amount determined under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9 if the court finds that the parent or spouse making the request, or a child in respect of whom the request is made, would otherwise suffer undue hardship. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (1).

Circumstances that may cause undue hardship

(2) Circumstances that may cause a parent, spouse or child to suffer undue hardship include,

(a) the parent or spouse has responsibility for an unusually high level of debts reasonably incurred to support the parents or spouses and their children during cohabitation or to earn a living;

(b) the parent or spouse has unusually high expenses in relation to exercising access to a child;

(d) the spouse has a legal duty to support a child, other than a child of the marriage, who is,

(i) under the age of majority, or

(ii) the age of majority or over but is unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to obtain the necessaries of life;

(e) the parent has a legal duty to support a child, other than the child who is the subject of this application, who is under the age of majority or who is enrolled in a full time course of education;

(f) the parent or spouse has a legal duty to support any person who is unable to obtain the necessaries of life due to an illness or disability. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (2).

Standards of living must be considered

(3) Despite a determination of undue hardship under subsection (1), an application under that subsection must be denied by the court if it is of the opinion that the household of the parent or spouse who claims undue hardship would, after determining the amount of child support under any of sections 3 to 5, 8 or 9, have a higher standard of living than the household of the other parent or spouse. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (3).

Standards of living test

(4) In comparing standards of living for the purpose of subsection (3), the court may use the comparison of household standards of living test set out in Schedule II. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (4).

Reasonable time

(5) Where the court awards a different amount of child support under subsection (1), it may specify, in the order for child support, a reasonable time for the satisfaction of any obligation arising from circumstances that cause undue hardship and the amount payable at the end of that time. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (5).

Reasons

(6) Where the court makes an order for the support of a child in a different amount under this section, it must record its reasons for doing so. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 10 (6).

79The respondent relies on his legal obligation to pay child support for his two daughters to Ms. Farrell and upon a sum of money, $43,334.00, which he says he contributed to his relationship with Ms. MacDonald and did not receive reimbursement for. He claims that because of the applicant’s assignment into bankruptcy, he has been with left with an unusually high level of debt. I will deal with this claim first.

80It is not disputed that $6,100.00 of the $43,334.00 was spent on furnishings and appliances which are now in the respondent’s possession. Almost $2,000.00 went to pay for utility bills, some incurred by the applicant before cohabitation, some by the couple during cohabitation, and for furniture for Teaghan. The respondent also includes $12,000.00 cash he advanced to the applicant which she used to purchase various family items. I give no weight to his submission that any of these expenditures should be considered in an undue hardship claim except to the extent that they may be included in the debts described below.

81The respondent advanced two separate amounts of $3,000.00 to the applicant in cash. One cash payment was made on February 1, 2011. The applicant’s credit card statement for January of that year shows that she had just paid $3,000.00 to the respondent’s lawyer. The respondent denied that he was in fact reimbursing her or that this was also the case with respect to the other $3,000.00. I do not accept his testimony. The timing and amount both support my conclusion to the contrary; these payments were in fact made to reimburse the applicant for the same amounts that she had put on her credit card on account of his legal fees.

82The respondent did contribute $14,000.00 to the house purchase in June 2010. Title was taken in the applicant’s name. The respondent did not receive any money when the house was sold. The sale was by foreclosure and there were no net proceeds. However, his contribution to the house purchase is not debt. The house had been purchased on the understanding that both parties would contribute to the carrying costs. After the separation, the respondent only contributed a total of $746.50. Nor did he pay any child support for Teaghan until April 2012 and, since then, has only made six payments. The house was foreclosed because the applicant could not afford to keep up the payments on her own. That the respondent did not meet his commitments was a contributing factor to the foreclosure and lack of proceeds. Accordingly, I reject the submission that the inability to recover his initial contribution to the purchase price of the house is a factor to be considered in relation to his claim for undue hardship.

83Not counting the debt he incurred for the appliances, the respondent claims debts attributable to this relationship in the range of $8,700.00 to $12,167.00 (midpoint $10,433.00). He acknowledges that the rest of the $43,334.00 is more accurately described as “depletion of money”.

84In my view, the actual debt remaining from the relationship, about $10,433.00, is a circumstance that might properly be considered as a cause of undue hardship to the respondent. But I do not regard that amount as “an unusually high level of debt” within the meaning of section 10 of the Child Support Guidelines.

85I also note that Schedule II of the Child Support Guidelines provides for adjusting an individual’s income by deducting any amount relied upon by the court as a factor that resulted in a determination of undue hardship “calculated on an annual basis”. In his standard of living calculations, the respondent deducted the full amount of $43,334.00 in each year from 2011 to and including 2013. That is not a correct approach. The amount, if any to be deducted, must be calculated on an annual basis, presumably in accordance with a reasonable re-payment plan.

86The other factor relied upon by the respondent is the amount of child support payable for his other children. The current order requires him to pay Ms. Farrell $1,190.00 per month. The respondent is also seeking, in an action between them, to reduce that amount. There has been no decision in that case and the applicant concedes that the standard of living calculations should be done on the basis of the existing order.

87The respondent delivered a financial statement sworn in October 2011. It reveals monthly debt payments totalling $2,332.00 per month for debts primarily incurred during his relationship with Ms. Farrell. It also shows a monthly expense of $1,000.00 for legal fees, discretionary expenses for meals out, clothing, vacation, etc., of another $1,000.00. It does not reflect the fact, presumably then unknown, that the respondent would receive an income tax refund of $17,937.00 for 2011 on account of the deductions claimed and discussed earlier in these Reasons. Having regard to these expenses, I am not persuaded that the hardship, if any, experienced by the respondent in the final months of 2011 was on account of his child support obligation to his other children. Rather, it appears that it is primarily related to the debt outcome of his prior relationship. In my view, that is a factor more appropriately considered in the application between Mr. Robinson and Ms. Farrell rather than in relation to child support for Teaghan. I also note that the respondent and his mother both acknowledged his preference is to work away at these debts rather than file for personal bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the law is clear that his obligation to support his children will take precedence over debt payments.

88The respondent’s actual income in 2012 precludes any finding of undue hardship in that year. Given his income in 2012, he could not establish that his household is at a lower standard of living than that of the applicant during that year, even allowing the deduction for the child support he is obliged to pay for his other two children. This will also be the case in 2013. His cohabitee, Ms. Young, has an annual income of $80,000.00.

89For these reasons, I do not find undue hardship arising from the respondent’s obligation to support the children of his prior marriage.

90The claim for undue hardship is dismissed.

91Before leaving this section, I should also comment on the respondent’s testimony with respect to his expense sharing with Ms. Young. They moved into together in August 2012. The respondent testified that he left her contribution blank on his financial statement because it was “to be determined”. His testimony was that she paid for her car, for what she had before (which I understood to refer to debt payments), and covers her own food. He added that she would be contributing to other expenses but that they have not yet figured it out.

92This is in contrast to Ms. Young’s testimony. She said that she paid one third of the rent and one half of the utilities, and that whoever picked up the food, paid for it. She explained the rent differential to reflect the fact that the respondent’s children lived with them half of the time.

93I accept her testimony and find that the respondent attempted to mislead the court as to their expense sharing arrangement.

94The respondent also has two significant monthly payments that will conclude in May 2013. These are his truck lease at $762.00 per month and the BDC loan at $750.00 per month.

Child Support Payable

95Commencing on September 1, 2011, the respondent shall pay child support for Teaghan to the applicant in the sum of $834.00 per month based on an annual income of $94,258.00, to and including December, 2011.

96Commencing on January 1, 2012, the respondent shall pay child support for Teaghan to the applicant in the monthly sum of $1,228.00 based on an annual income of $145,397.00, to and including December, 2012.

97Commencing on January 1, 2013, the respondent shall pay child support for Teaghan in the monthly sum of $718.00 based on an annual income of $79,250.00, until further order of the court.

98The respondent is entitled to credit for amounts of child support already collected by the Family Responsibility Office.

99Each year, the respondent shall provide the applicant with a copy of his personal income tax return, as filed, and his Notice of Assessment, on or before July 1. Given my findings in paragraph 72 above, I also order the respondent to produce the annual financial statements of Versicore Group Inc. and Scrumptious on or before July 1 each year.

100Both parents shall maintain a policy of life insurance on his/her life designated irrevocably to the other in trust for Teaghan. The face value of each policy shall not be less than $300,000.00. The policies shall remain in force until changed by written agreement between the parents or by court order. Proof that the required policy and designation is in effect shall be provided within 30 days.

101If a parent has medical, dental or other health insurance available to him or her through employment, then such a parent shall maintain Teaghan as a beneficiary under the plan(s) as long as she is an eligible dependent.

Daycare

102The respondent agrees to pay one half of the after-tax cost of the daycare incurred by the applicant for Teaghan as reflected in the daycare receipts filed in evidence in Exhibit 5. These cover the period up to the end of October 2012. Counsel are directed to provide an agreed upon net dollar figure to be included in the formal order.

103Each parent shall contribute his or her percentage share towards the after tax costs of ongoing daycare costs incurred by the applicant for Teaghan.

Sundry Claims

104The applicant asked for an order that the respondent reimburse her for a taxi fee incurred to deliver some of his belongings to him, for storage fees she incurred to store other of his belongings before he picked them up, and to reimburse her some expenses she incurred for Scrumptious on her credit card. The total of these claims amount to $1,762.00. These amounts were debts owed by the applicant to creditors when she made her assignment into bankruptcy. It would be improper to make any award to the applicant in these circumstances. Her counsel made some brief reference in submissions that the claim was advanced at the Trustee’s request. I am unwilling to proceed with an order in favour of the Trustee on that basis.

Costs

105If costs are requested, they shall be dealt with by written submissions. These should be limited to five pages plus necessary attachments including Offers to Settle and Bills of Costs. The applicant shall deliver her submissions by January 18, 2013 and the respondent by February 1, 2013. Thereafter, the applicant may deliver a brief reply by February 8, 2013.

J. Mackinnon J

Released: January 3, 2013

Introduction

Sole vs. Joint Custody

The Relocation Issue

The Relocation Issue

The Respondent’s Parenting Time

The Respondent’s Parenting Time

Determining the Respondent’s Income

Determining the Respondent’s Income

Undue Hardship

Child Support Payable

Child Support Payable

Daycare

Daycare

Sundry Claims

Sundry Claims

Costs

Costs

Introduction

Sole vs. Joint Custody

The Relocation Issue

The Relocation Issue

The Respondent’s Parenting Time

The Respondent’s Parenting Time

Determining the Respondent’s Income

Determining the Respondent’s Income

Undue Hardship

Child Support Payable

Child Support Payable

Daycare

Daycare

Sundry Claims

Sundry Claims

Costs

Costs

Cited By (3 cases)

M.H. v. M.D., 2019 ONCJ 735

DeGroot v. Iouguina, 2019 ONSC 2826

Corbeil v. St. John, 2018 ONSC 805

Cited By (3 cases)

M.H. v. M.D., 2019 ONCJ 735

DeGroot v. Iouguina, 2019 ONSC 2826

Corbeil v. St. John, 2018 ONSC 805