ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: 28/12
DATE: 20130131
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY TROY WOODS
Plaintiff
Anthony Troy Woods, in person
- and -
BRIANNE ELLIOT doing business as THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HURON-KINOSS
Judy Fowler Byrne, for the Defendant Brianne Elliot
- and -
RONALD MCGUIRE doing business as HURON AUTO WRECKERS
Scott Marshall, for the Defendant Ronald McGuire
- and -
ART WEBER doing business as ART’S AUTO BODY & COLLISION SERVICE LTD.
Defendants
HEARD: January 30, 2013
REASONS FOR DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Conlan J.
Introduction
[1] The Plaintiff, Anthony Troy Woods (“Mr. Woods”), has sued the Defendants for a declaration that they return to him personal property and pay damages, or alternatively, that they pay to him several million dollars.
[2] The Court action stems from a dispute that Mr. Woods had with the Defendant, The Corporation of the Township of Huron-Kinloss (“Municipality”).
[3] On October 25, 2011, Brianne Elliott (“Ms. Elliott”), the Municipality’s by-law enforcement officer, attended at the property of Mr. Woods and removed some vehicles. Further vehicles were removed on November 4, 2011. The vehicles were sold for scrap metal.
The Motion Before the Court
[4] The Municipality brings a Motion for summary judgment. An Order is sought dismissing the action brought by Mr. Woods as against both the Municipality and the Defendant, Ronald McGuire carrying on business as Huron Auto Wreckers (“Mr. McGuire”). Mr. McGuire had been contracted by the Municipality to help remove the vehicles.
[5] The other Defendant, Art Weber carrying on business as Art’s Auto Body (“Mr. Weber”), also assisted with the removal of the vehicles under hire by the Municipality.
[6] Mr. Weber has been noted in default. As there is no formal Motion before the Court to set aside that noting in default, and as Mr. Woods opposes any setting aside of such, I am not entertaining at this time any request that the action be dismissed as against Mr. Weber.
[7] The Motion was argued at court in Walkerton on 30 January 2013. I have considered carefully the submissions of counsel on behalf of the Municipality and the arguments of Mr. Woods, self-represented. I have reviewed and considered all of the materials filed on the Motion including the Motion Record and Factum on behalf of the Municipality and the “Plaintiff’s Record”, Factum, Book of Authorities and Affidavit filed by Mr. Woods.
The Law on Summary Judgment
[8] As this Motion is hotly contested by Mr. Woods, the Municipality has the burden to prove on balance that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to all or part of the Statement of Claim: Rule 20.04(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[9] In determining that issue, I shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties. And unless I decide that it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial, I may weigh the evidence, evaluate credibility and draw reasonable inferences: Rule 20.04(2.1).
[10] Where I am satisfied that the only genuine issue is a question of law, I may determine the question and grant judgment accordingly: Rule 20.04(4).
[11] I shall ask myself the following key question: can the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings be achieved by way of summary judgment, or can this full appreciation only be achieved by way of a trial? Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011 ONCA 762, Court of Appeal for Ontario, at paragraphs 44 and 49.
Analysis
[12] The Statement of Claim is, in many respects, a rambling dissertation.
[13] It is very difficult to decipher any cause of action against any Defendant that is clearly and properly pleaded.
[14] In any event, I have interpreted the Claim as generously as possible in favour of Mr. Woods.
[15] I will deal in turn with each alleged cause of action that I have gleaned from a reading, several times, of the Claim.
Theft
[16] It appears that Mr. Woods alleges that some or all of the Defendants stole his property.
[17] Ms. Elliott having found that Mr. Woods’ property did not comply with the standards prescribed in section 2.02 of the Municipality’s By-Law 99-124, the Municipality, and anyone acting on its behalf (including Ms. Elliott and Mr. McGuire), are not liable to compensate Mr. Woods by reason of anything done in the reasonable exercise of the Municipality’s powers in causing Mr. Woods’ property to be repaired or demolished: Subsections 15.2(2), 15.4(1) and 15.4(3) of the Building Code Act, S.O. 1992, C.23, as amended (“BCA”).
[18] The evidence is clear that Ms. Elliott received complaints about Mr. Woods’ property and issued an Order to Remedy. The evidence is clear that the said Order was not complied with. The evidence is clear that the attendances by Ms. Elliott and others at Mr. Woods’ property and removal of the vehicles on October 25 and November 4, 2011 were as a direct result of the Order not being complied with.
[19] The removal of the vehicles was a reasonable exercise of the Municipality’s powers in causing Mr. Woods’ property to be repaired so as to be brought in compliance with the By-Law.
[20] As such, neither the Municipality nor Mr. McGuire can possibly be held liable for theft: subsection 15.4(3) of the BCA.
[21] It matters not whether anyone was home when Ms. Elliott and others attended the property. It matters not whether Ms. Elliott produced proper identification as required by subsection 15.2(1) of the BCA, an issue raised by Mr. Woods during oral argument on the Motion. That subsection is irrelevant as the attendances at the property on October 25 and November 4, 2011 were not pursuant to subsection 15.2(1). The Order to Remedy had already been issued.
[22] There is no genuine issue for trial regarding the claim based on theft. A trial is not necessary for a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings.
Trespass
[23] It appears that Mr. Woods alleges that some or all of the Defendants trespassed on his property.
[24] The same analysis above applies equally to this claim.
[25] There is no genuine issue for trial regarding the claim based on trespass. A trial is not necessary for a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings.
Constitutional or Quasi-Constitutional Claims
[26] It appears that Mr. Woods asserts that some or all of the Defendants have breached his rights under “Her Majesty’s Royal Law”, the King James Bible, the “Act of Settlement 1701”, the Canadian Bill of Rights and/or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[27] I do not know what “Her Majesty’s Royal Law” is. Claim dismissed.
[28] I know very well what the King James Bible is. Claim dismissed. I cannot decipher from the Statement of Claim how any alleged violation by any one of the Defendants of some Commandment, directive, pronouncement or other principle in the Bible could possibly give rise to the remedies sought by Mr. Woods or any remedy at all.
[29] I do not know what the “Act of Settlement 1701” is. Claim dismissed.
[30] The Bill of Rights has no applicability on these facts. No discrimination on an enumerated ground is pleaded by Mr. Woods. Nor could any discrimination on any ground, enumerated or otherwise, possibly be found.
[31] The only potentially relevant part of the Charter is the protection against unreasonable search or seizure – section 8. Whether the entries on to Mr. Woods’ property by Ms. Elliott and others on October 25 and November 4, 2011 were illegal searches is a question of law. I elect to determine the question as it is simple and straightforward and not the subject of material facts in dispute. The entries were legal under the provisions of the BCA: subsections 15.2(2), 15.4(1) and 15.4(3).
[32] There is no genuine issue for trial regarding any of these claims. A trial is not necessary for a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings.
“Tort Damages” and “Tacit Contracts”
[33] There is no such thing in modern Canadian law as a “tacit contract”. The term is a rather outdated one derived from English contract law.
[34] Perhaps what is meant is an informal agreement.
[35] There cannot possibly be found a breach of contract here by any of the Defendants as there was no contract (oral or written, formal or informal) between Mr. Woods and any of the Defendants.
[36] Other than theft and/or trespass, there is no other possible tort that could ground a cause of action by Mr. Woods against any of the Defendants. Perhaps Mr. Woods intends to argue that the Defendants were negligent, but such a claim cannot possibly succeed for the same reasons indicated above regarding theft and trespass. A duty of care was owed but no breach of the standard of care could possibly be made out regarding any of the Defendants.
[37] There is no genuine issue for trial regarding either of these claims. A trial is not necessary for a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings.
Conclusion
[38] The Motion for summary judgment is granted. The Plaintiff’s action is dismissed entirely as against the Defendants, Municipality and Mr. McGuire.
[39] The Municipality is entitled to its costs. If they cannot be settled between the parties, I will accept written submissions: One page maximum on behalf of the Municipality excluding any offer(s) to settle, costs outline and/or Bill of Costs, by 4:00 p.m. on February 8, 2013; and one page maximum by Mr. Woods by 4:00 p.m. on February 15, 2013.
[40] I see no reason to award costs to Mr. McGuire. He filed no materials and made no submissions on the Motion.
Conlan J.
Released: January 31, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: 28/12
DATE: 20130131
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY TROY WOODS
Plaintiff
- and -
BRIANNE ELLIOT doing business as THE CORPORATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF HURON-KINOSS
RONALD MCGUIRE doing business as HURON AUTO WRECKERS
ART WEBER doing business as ART’S AUTO BODY & COLLISION SERVICE
REASONS FOR DECISION ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Conlan J.
Released: January 31, 2013