ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: FC-09-27511
DATE: 2013/01/29
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL POTTER
Applicant
– and –
VÉRONIQUE DHIEUX
Respondent
Carol A. Crawford and Linsey Sherman, for the Applicant
Caroline E. Kelly, for the Respondent
HEARD: By Written Submissions
ENDORSEMENT AS TO COSTS
KERSHMAN J.
Introduction
[1] Written submissions were requested in relation to the issue of costs. Costs outlines and submissions were provided by both parties.
Position of the Father
[2] At trial, the single issue before the Court was where, the parties’ child, Lili, would go to school. The Court decided in favour of the Father.
[3] The Applicant (“Father”) is seeking costs on a full recovery basis in the amount of $234,100.38, inclusive of disbursements and HST. This amount includes preparation for and attendance at the four-day trial.
[4] The Father argues that, based on Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, he successfully obtained a Court order that was as favourable as the Offer to Settle that he made. Therefore, he argues that he has satisfied the provisions of Rule 18 and is entitled to his costs to the date that the first offer was served and, full recovery of costs from that date.
[5] The Father also argues that he is entitled to full costs of the trial from the date of application to the end of trial, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.
[6] The Father argues that he acted reasonably at all times throughout the proceedings in that he:
attempted to resolve the issue of Lili’s schooling with the Respondent (“Mother”) directly and did not commence the application until it was clear that no mediated or negotiated solution could be reached; he made two Offers to Settle, one before the settlement conference and the second one well in advance of trial;
the Father served a Request to Admit in advance of the trial to narrow the facts in dispute;
the Father was prepared to attend a final settlement conference immediately preceding trial, which the Mother refused to do;
the Father’s counsel, in collaboration with the Mother’s counsel, created a joint Book of Documents to assist the parties and the Court;
the Father gave credible and forthright evidence at trial, which was accepted by the Court, in favour of any contradictory evidence given by the Mother.
[7] The Father set out the factors relevant to this case to support his claim for full recovery of costs.
a) Subrule 24(11)(a) of the Family Law Rules – Importance, Complexity or Difficulty of the Issues
[8] The Father argues that the issues were difficult and required evidence including third party evidence in relation to:
i. incidents of abuse by the Mother against the Father and Lili’s sisters, in Lili’s presence;
ii. the relationship between Lili and her sisters and the importance of strengthening and nurturing the bonds between them;
iii. the maintenance and promotion of Lili’s French culture and French language;
iv. Lili’s academic struggles at Lycée Claudel; and
v. the merits of Elmwood.
b) Subrule 24(11)(b) – Reasonableness or Unreasonableness of Each Party’s Behaviour
[9] The Father argues that the Mother’s behavior was unreasonable, which caused the matter to proceed to trial. The Father further argues that the Mother was not a credible witness in that the Court rejected her evidence that:
she would be marginalized from Lili’s education if Lili attended Elmwood;
Lili would be destabilized if she changed schools;
Lili would lose her culture if she to attended Elmwood;
Lili would not be able to communicate with her mother’s family and friends if she were to go to Elmwood;
Lili was struggling at Lycée Claudel.
c) Subrule 24(11)(c) and (d) – Lawyers’ Rates and Time Properly Spent on the Case
[10] The Father argues that both parties retained senior counsel. It was within a reasonable expectation that senior counsel for both parties would rely on the assistance of junior counsel and law clerks and that the costs of this four‑day trial would be substantial.
[11] The Father’s counsel argues that the time spent was proportionate to the issue in the case and the length of the trial. Significant time was spent in preparing a Request to Admit, responding to a Request to Admit, and preparing a joint Book of Documents. As a result of this, the number of facts and disputes were narrowed and most of the documents produced at trial were admitted by the parties.
[12] The Father presented three witnesses whose evidence was accepted and were relied upon by the Court.
[13] Lastly, the Father argues that he was the successful party and behaved reasonably throughout the litigation. He claims that the costs claimed are proportionate to the issue in the case and the reasonable expectations of the parties.
[14] In light of this, the Father argues that, based on the Mother’s unreasonable behaviour in the course of the proceedings and at the trial, the Father is entitled to full recovery of his costs.
[15] The claim for costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, on a total recovery basis, is $289,946.53; on a full recovery basis at 80 percent is $234,100.38; and on a partial recovery basis at 60 percent is $178,234.73.
Position of the Mother
[16] The Mother argues that the sole issue was the best interests of the child, with regard to the choice of first language of education, French or English. She argues that there was no middle ground between the two. In order to avoid a trial, one parent would have had to abandon their view of the child’s best interests relating to a core value and capitulate.
[17] The Mother argues that based on the distinct nature of the case, each party should bear their own costs.
[18] The Mother argues that this was a case involving competing values, not property or money.
[19] The Mother also argues that various courts of appeal in Canada have concluded that costs in proceedings relating to the child’s best interests require special treatment. See Talsky v. Talsky, 1973 53 (ON CA), [1973] 3 O.R. 827 (C.A.), H. (D.J.) v. P. (L.) (1987), 1987 ABCA 200, 10 R.F.L. (3d) 418 (Alta. C.A.), C.A.M. v. D.M. (2003), 2003 18880 (ON CA), 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), Hayden v. Stockwood, 2010 NLCA 68, 91 R.F.L. (6th) 255 (Nfld. C.A.).
[20] The Mother argues that the Father relies on a single custody case, Britt v. Britt, [2000] O.J. No. 5981 (Sup. Ct.), in support of his interpretation of Rule 24. In that case, Mackinnon J., at para. 4, states that the court retains its discretion under Rule 24 of the Family Rules, as: “The Rule does not require that costs always be awarded to a successful party.” In that case, a modest award of costs was made, as the court held that the father’s position on the motion was unreasonable.
[21] The Mother relies upon the case of Hayden, supra, where the Newfoundland Court of Appeal denied the father costs after trial. The issue in that case was the choice of school and related language issues.
[22] The Mother also argues that an adverse costs order in this case would reward the success in a context where the concept of success does not belong. This would, in turn, create potential exacerbated tension between the parents, all of which are not in the best interests of Lili.
[23] The Mother further argues that if costs are awarded in favour of the Father, the amount of $234,100.08 is excessive and that any award should be nominal.
[24] The Mother argues that subrule 24(11)(b) refers to “reasonableness” of a party’s behavior in the case and that she was not acting unreasonably. As to the Father’s Offers to Settle, the Mother argues that there was nothing “reasonable” about them because they did not reflect any compromise.
[25] The Mother argues that she made three offers which, in her view, reflected an attempt to reach a middle ground.
[26] The Mother relies on the case of C.A.M. v. D.M., supra, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal, at paras. 42-43, states that there are special considerations made in determining the quantum of costs in a custody context. The Mother argues that there is a large disparity between the parties’ incomes. For example, the evidence at trial was that the Father’s income in 2009, a year in which he did not work, was $3,200,000. The Mother’s income was not disclosed. She did not obtain a settlement from the Father and receives monthly child support for Lili.
[27] The mother’s counsel provided a Bill of Costs claiming fees of $139,949.94 on a total recovery basis; $111,959.95 on an 80 percent recovery basis; and $83,969.96 on a fifty percent recovery basis. Disbursements and HST on the disbursements of $2,952.62 were in addition to the fees as claimed above.
The Law
[28] The issue of costs in the family law context is dealt with in the following legislation. Subsection 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, reads as follows:
Costs
131.(1) Subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid.
[29] Rules 18 and 24(1), (4)-(8), (10)-(12) of the Family Law Rules read as follows:
RULE 18: OFFERS TO SETTLE
DEFINITION
- (1) In this rule,
“offer” means an offer to settle one or more claims in a case, motion, appeal or enforcement, and includes a counter-offer.
APPLICATION
(2) This rule applies to an offer made at any time, even before the case is started. MAKING AN OFFER
(3) A party may serve an offer on any other party.
OFFER TO BE SIGNED BY PARTY AND LAWYER
(4) An offer shall be signed personally by the party making it and also by the party’s lawyer, if any.
WITHDRAWING AN OFFER
(5) A party who made an offer may withdraw it by serving a notice of withdrawal, at any time before the offer is accepted.
TIME-LIMITED OFFER
(6) An offer that is not accepted within the time set out in the offer is considered to have been withdrawn.
OFFER EXPIRES WHEN COURT BEGINS TO GIVE DECISION
(7) An offer may not be accepted after the court begins to give a decision that disposes of a claim dealt with in the offer.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF OFFER
(8) The terms of an offer,
(a) shall not be mentioned in any document filed in the continuing record; and
(b) shall not be mentioned to the judge hearing the claim dealt with in the offer, until the judge has dealt with all the issues in dispute except costs.
ACCEPTING AN OFFER
(9) The only valid way of accepting an offer is by serving an acceptance on the party who made the offer, at any time before,
(a) the offer is withdrawn; or
(b) the court begins to give a decision that disposes of a claim dealt with in the offer.
OFFER REMAINS OPEN DESPITE REJECTION OR COUNTER-OFFER
(10) A party may accept an offer in accordance with subrule (9) even if the party has previously rejected the offer or made a counter-offer.
COSTS NOT DEALT WITH IN OFFER
(11) If an accepted offer does not deal with costs, either party is entitled to ask the court for costs.
COURT APPROVAL, OFFER INVOLVING SPECIAL PARTY
(12) A special party may make, withdraw and accept an offer, but another party’s acceptance of a special party’s offer and a special party’s acceptance of another party’s offer are not binding on the special party until the court approves.
FAILURE TO CARRY OUT TERMS OF ACCEPTED OFFER
(13) If a party to an accepted offer does not carry out the terms of the offer, the other party may,
(a) make a motion to turn the parts of the offer within the court’s jurisdiction into an order; or
(b) continue the case as if the offer had never been accepted.
COSTS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO ACCEPT OFFER
(14) A party who makes an offer is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date, if the following conditions are met:
If the offer relates to a motion, it is made at least one day before the motion date.
If the offer relates to a trial or the hearing of a step other than a motion, it is made at least seven days before the trial or hearing date.
The offer does not expire and is not withdrawn before the hearing starts.
The offer is not accepted.
The party who made the offer obtains an order that is as favourable as or more favourable than the offer.
COSTS CONSEQUENCES — BURDEN OF PROOF
(15) The burden of proving that the order is as favourable as or more favourable than the offer to settle is on the party who claims the benefit of subrule (14).
COSTS — DISCRETION OF COURT
(16) When the court exercises its discretion over costs, it may take into account any written offer to settle, the date it was made and its terms, even if subrule (14) does not apply.
RULE 24: COSTS
SUCCESSFUL PARTY PRESUMED ENTITLED TO COSTS
- (1) There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion, enforcement, case or appeal.
SUCCESSFUL PARTY WHO HAS BEHAVED UNREASONABLY
(4) Despite subrule (1), a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.
DECISION ON REASONABLENESS
(5) In deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine,
(a) the party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;
(b) the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and
(c) any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.
DIVIDED SUCCESS
(6) If success in a step in a case is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate.
ABSENT OR UNPREPARED PARTY
(7) If a party does not appear at a step in the case, or appears but is not properly prepared to deal with the issues at that step, the court shall award costs against the party unless the court orders otherwise in the interests of justice.
BAD FAITH
(8) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.
COSTS TO BE DECIDED AT EACH STEP
(10) Promptly after each step in the case, the judge or other person who dealt with that step shall decide in a summary manner who, if anyone, is entitled to costs, and set the amount of costs.
FACTORS IN COSTS
(11) A person setting the amount of costs shall consider,
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b) the reasonableness or unreasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the case;
(c) the lawyer’s rates;
(d) the time properly spent on the case, including conversations between the lawyer and the party or witnesses, drafting documents and correspondence, attempts to settle, preparation, hearing, argument, and preparation and signature of the order;
(e) expenses properly paid or payable; and
(f) any other relevant matter.
PAYMENT OF EXPENSES
(12) The court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including a lawyer’s fees.
Analysis
[30] The relief claimed, on the Application Record, by the Father, included a divorce, which was granted on March 21, 2012. The divorce was severed from the corollary relief.
[31] The only issue in the corollary relief argued at the four-day trial was whether Lili should remain at Lycée Claudel for Grade 4 or whether she should be registered and attend Grade 4 at Elmwood.
[32] Much of the evidence was put forward by the Father in relation to incidents of violence by the Mother against him and his other two daughters. The Court found that, while such incidents were unfortunate, they did not have any significant bearing upon the issue of which school Lili should attend in September 2012.
[33] The Court has reviewed the issue of costs, and the parties’ positions in light of Rule 24, and in particular, subrules (1) and (4) through (11).
[34] In relation to subrule 24(1) and (4), the Father was entirely successful at the hearing. As such, he is presumed to be entitled to costs. The Court acknowledges that Britt holds that costs are discretionary. Notwithstanding Britt, the Court is of the view that costs should be awarded to the Applicant.
[35] In relation to subrules 24(4) to (8), in the Court’s view, the Father and Mother behaved reasonably at trial. They had different perspectives on where Lili should go to school and what the primary language of that school should be. They were at polar opposites of the spectrum. Both parties were well prepared for trial. Notwithstanding the issue of violence on the part of the Mother, which the Court found did not have any bearing on the central issue, this Court finds that both parties acted in good faith in relation to the issue before the Court. As such, this factor will not lead the Court to grant costs on a full recovery basis.
[36] The trial was conducted efficiently by both counsel. This is evidenced by the admissions made pursuant to the Request to Admit and the Joint Book of Authorities filed at trial.
[37] Accordingly, none of subrules 24(4)-(8) have any impact on this decision.
[38] Subrule 24(10) requires that costs be decided at each step of the process. A review of the endorsement book indicates that no costs were assessed in this matter prior to trial. Based on Islam v. Rahman, 2007 ONCA 622, 41 R.F.L. (6th) 10 (C.A.), at para. 2, the Court will not go back and award costs for steps taken prior to the trial for which there was an endorsement and for which there was no order as to costs or for which the issue of costs was not addressed. In this case, costs were not awarded at each step of the way.
[39] That leaves subrule 24(11) which deals with the various factors in setting costs.
[40] As to subrule 24(11)(a), the issue at trial was not particularly complex.
[41] In subrule 24(11)(b), as to the issue of reasonableness of each party’s behaviour, from the Court’s perspective, as previously stated, although the parties were at polar opposites of the spectrum, each party acted reasonably.
[42] As to the question of the lawyers’ rates, with respect to subrule 24(11)(c), the Court notes that the father’s counsel has 26 years’ experience at the bar and that two four-year associates assisted her. The Court understands that the associates were used at different timeframes in the litigation.
[43] Power J. in OGT Holdings Ltd. v. Startek Canada Services Ltd., 2010 ONSC 1090 (Sup. Ct.), said at para. 7:
In June of 2005 the Costs Subcommittee of the Civil Rules Committee issued the following INFORMATION FOR THE PROFESSION:
In preparing its report to the Rules Committee that led to the changes in fixing costs to be implemented on July 1, 2005, the Costs Subcommittee gathered substantial information and consulted widely. Based on this, the following may provide some guidance to the profession as these changes are implemented.
It is anticipated that in considering rates, as one of the various relevant factors, courts will normally treat the rates set out below as maximum rates when fixing partial indemnity costs. These rates are the maximums that were available under the costs grid. It is further anticipated that the maximum rates would apply only to the more complicated matters and to the more experienced counsel within each category. The rates used in costs submissions will normally come within the range established by these maximums as appropriate to the particular matter after giving consideration to the factors set out in r. 57.01(1) which now include the amount an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay and the principle of indemnity. Finally, it is the intention that these guidelines will be reviewed periodically so that their currency can be maintained, in light of accumulated experience.
In addition to the hearing itself, these guidelines encompass mediation under r. 24.1, discovery of documents, drawing and settling issues on a special case, setting down for trial, pre-motion conferences, examinations, pre-trial conferences, settlement conferences, notices or offers, preparation for hearing, attendance at assignment court, orders issuing or renewing a writ of execution or notice of garnishment, seizure under writ of execution, seizure and sale under writ of execution, notices or garnishment or any other procedure authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Law Clerks
Student-at-law
Lawyer (less than 10 years)
Lawyer (10 or more but less than 20 years)
Lawyer (20 years and over)
Maximum of $80.00 per hour
Maximum of $60.00 per hour
Maximum of $225.00 per hour
Maximum of $300.00 per hour
Maximum of $350.00 per hour
[44] The Court is not aware that the Civil Rules Committee has issued any follow-up information.
[45] The billing rate charged by Ms. Crawford is $420.00 per hour. Based on OGT Holdings, the maximum that Ms. Crawford could charge is $350.00 per hour. The billing rate charged by the associates is $250.00 per hour. Based on OGT Holdings, the maximum chargeable would be $225.00 for a lawyer with less than 10 years’ experience. The Court acknowledges that articling students were used by the Father’s counsel and no charge was made for their time.
[46] As to the time spent by counsel, the total time claimed by the Father’s counsel is 754 hours, inclusive of a four day trial. In Cawdrey v. Cawdrey, 2011 ONSC 416, 92 R.F.L. (6th) 99 (Sup. Ct.), Shaw J., at para. 7, cited the Ontario Court of Appeal in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), at para. 37, who said that, in assessing costs, the overriding principle is one of reasonableness and that the failure to follow that principle could lead to a result that is contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice. The costs award should reflect more what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by an unsuccessful party, rather than an exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant.
[47] The time spent by the Father’s counsel is as follows:
- Initial investigation, drafting and exchanging pleadings.
Carol Crawford 42 hours
Karen Hogan 46 hours .
Total 88 hours
- Discovery process
Carol Crawford 51.1 hours
Karen Hogan 48.4 hours .
Total 99.5 hours
- Settlement Conference
Carol Crawford 30.3 hours
Linsey Sherman 19.6 hours .
Total 49.9 hours
- Trial Preparation
Carol Crawford 196.6 hours
Karen Hogan 153.2 hours
Linsey Sherman 120.8 hours .
Total 470.6 hours
- Attendance at trial
Carol Crawford 21 hours
Linsey Sherman . 21 hours
Total 42 hours
Total: 750 hours
[48] 750 hours is excessive, considering the single issue before the Court and the length of trial. While 750 hours may have actually been spent, the Court does not accept that this amount of time is what a reasonably unsuccessful litigant would expect to pay.
[49] In this case, the Court is of the view that an unsuccessful client would not consider payment of fees and disbursements, inclusive of HST, of $223,433.77, to be a reasonable amount to pay.
[50] In accordance with Rule 24(10), and the case law in Islam, supra, the Court is not prepared to award costs for the initial investigation, preparation and exchange of pleadings, discovery, or settlement conference, in light of the fact that costs were not assessed at each step of the way. This reduces the costs to the time for preparation for trial and the trial itself.
[51] Analyzing the time spent preparing for trial the Court considers the 407.6 hours spent preparing for trial to be excessive. As a result, the Court reduces the preparation time for trial by 50 percent. The revised figures for fees are as follows: (based on a fee of 350/hr for Ms. Crawford and $150/hr for each law associate.)
Preparation for trial:
Carol Crawford 98.3 x $350 = $34,405
Karen Hogen 76.6 x $150 = $11,490
Law Student 60.4 x $150 = $ 9,060
$54,955
Travel:
Carol Crawford 21 x $350 = $ 7,350
Linsey Sherman 21 x $150 = $ 3,150
$10,500
Total Fees $65,455
HST $ 8,509.15
Total Fees and HST $73,964.15
[52] Regarding subrule 24(11) – regarding other “relevant matter” – the case law has established that this can include taking into account the financial circumstances of both parties: Murray v. Murray (2005), 2005 46626 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 147 (C.A.). Ms. Dhieux has limited resources based on the fact that she is not working, and she received a settlement from the Father, together with receiving child support. As such, the Mother has a limited ability to pay her own costs, let alone any costs claimed by the Father. At the same time, considering the means and needs of both parties, the Mother’s current financial resources do not afford her immunity from a costs order: L.C.M. v. C.A.V. (2003), 2003 1994 (ON SC), 49 R.F. L (5th) 439 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
[53] Having weighed the various factors and the overriding principle that the goal is to fix costs in a way that is fair and reasonable to the parties, in the circumstances, the costs award to the Father for the fees, subject to the Offer to Settle analysis below, is fixed at the sum of, $73,964.15, inclusive of HST.
Non-Taxable Disbursements
[54] The amount claimed for non-taxable disbursements is acceptable save and except the amount of overtime of $137.00 which is not appropriate and is disallowed. Based on the adjustment for overtime, the amount of the non-taxable disbursements is assessed at $619.28.
Taxable Disbursements
[55] As to the taxable disbursements, the amount claimed for photocopying and scanning at $0.25 per page is 19,794 pages or $4,948.50. This is excessive. The amount of copying and scanning is fixed at $1,000.00 plus HST.
[56] The other excessive disbursement is the online searching for WestLaw/Carswell, which is charged at $1,777.50. What was previously done by searching through law books is now done online and such amounts for the searching are now charged to the client. The Court finds that the online searching is acceptable; however, the amount claimed is excessive. Accordingly, the amount payable for the online searching for WestLaw/Carswell is fixed at $400.00 plus HST.
[57] The balance of the disbursements subject to HST is accepted. Based on the adjustments set out above, the amount allowable for taxable disbursements is assessed at $3,444.60.
Offers to Settle
[58] The Father served two Offers to Settle. The first Offer to Settle is dated March 1, 2012. This Offer was the same as the Decision made by the Court after trial. A second Offer to Settle is dated April 26, 2012. This Offer was equal to the Decision rendered by the Court after a trial. Neither Offer to Settle was withdrawn by the Father. Neither Offer to Settle was accepted by the Mother. The Mother served at least one and possibly two formal Offers to Settle. Neither of her Offers were as good as the result achieved at trial.
[59] Subrule 18(14) sets out the costs consequences of the failure by a party to accept an Offer to Settle. It says that unless the Court orders otherwise, the Father is entitled to costs to the date that the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date, if certain conditions are met.
[60] Having reviewed the conditions, the Court is satisfied that those conditions have been met in that:
the Offer to Settle was made at least seven days before trial;
the Offer did not expire;
the Offer was not accepted; and
the Order made was as favourable as the terms contained in the Offer.
[61] Therefore, according to subrule 18(14), the Father should obtain full recovery of costs from either the date of March 1, 2012, or April 26, 2012.
[62] Notwithstanding what the rule states, the phrase at the beginning of subrule 18(14) states: “Unless the Court orders otherwise....” In this case, the Court does order otherwise because the effect of allowing costs on a full recovery basis on the amounts claimed would be inequitable based on the issue involved, the amount of time spent, and the expectation of what an unsuccessful litigant could reasonably expect to pay.
[63] Notwithstanding the Father’s Offers to Settle, the Court is of the view that a fair and reasonable amount that an unsuccessful party, in this case, the Respondent Mother, could expect to pay in these circumstances would be $73,964.15, inclusive of HST. Accordingly, the Court fixes the Father’s costs at $$73,964.15, inclusive of HST, plus taxable and non-taxable disbursements of $4,063.88, inclusive of HST. The total amount of the award, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, is $78,028.03.
[64] The aforesaid costs shall be payable by the Mother at the rate of $7,000.00 per month, commencing April 1, 2013, and monthly thereafter until such time as the amount has been paid in full.
[65] Order accordingly.
Mr. Justice Stanley J. Kershman
Released: January 29, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: FC-09-27511
DATE: 2013/01/29
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL POTTER
Applicant
– and –
VÉRONIQUE DHIEUX
Respondent
ENDORSEMENT AS TO COSTS
Kershman J.
Released: January 29, 2013