ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Stefan Gheorghe Petre
Plaintiff
– and –
Toronto Police Services Board
Defendant
Stefan Gheorghe Petre, on his own behalf
Brennagh Smith, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 16, 2013
Morgan J.
1This one-day trial involves a claim of false arrest. The Plaintiff was arrested by the Toronto police at his home on June 14, 2011.
2The Plaintiff made it clear during his opening and closing submissions and throughout the trial that his entire claim is based on the alleged wrongfulness of the arrest itself. He advanced no claim, and led no evidence, relating to the conditions of his subsequent detention or any other act that followed the arrest. It is the arrest itself that is in issue. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant police had no reasonable grounds for making that arrest.
3The tort of false arrest can be analyzed in two stages. First, the Plaintiff must show that he was detained and that the detention was caused by the Defendant. Then, the onus shifts to the Defendant to establish that the arrest or detention was justified as lawful. Collis v Toronto Police Services Board (2007), 2007 36634 (ON SCDC), 228 OAC 333, at para 28.
4Section 495 of the Criminal Code authorizes a police officer to make an arrest without a warrant, provided certain criteria are met. The most important of these criteria is that the officer must have reasonable and probable grounds. R v Storrey, 1990 125 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241, at 250-251. That is, the officer must subjectively believe there are reasonable grounds for the arrest, and, in addition, the grounds must be objectively justifiable such that a reasonable person in the position of the officer would conclude that there were reasonable grounds. Collis, supra, at para 30.
5In assessing the situation, the officer need not exercise “judicial reflection”. Rather, it is the officer’s duty to “conduct an inquiry which the circumstances reasonably permit.” R v Golub (1997), 1997 6316 (ON CA), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras 18, 21 (Ont CA).
6The Plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon under section 267 of the Criminal Code. This includes “knowingly or recklessly [using] an object without the consent of the victim in circumstances where injury was reasonably foreseeable.” R v Lamy, 2002 SCC 25, at paras 10, 16. It also includes, in the definition of assault contained in s. 265((1)(b), unconsented-to applications of direct or indirect force, as well as attempted or threatened acts or gestures that create an apprehension of force or physical contact.
7A simple recitation of the facts surrounding the Plaintiff’s arrest demonstrates that the police officers who attended at his home most certainly had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. Indeed, given the Plaintiff’s conduct and the general public safety mandate of the police, the officers in question arguably would have been remiss in their duties had they not arrested the Plaintiff and taken him into custody that day.
8On June 14, 2011 two police officers, P.C. Joseph Kovacic and P.C. Adam Chaumont, responded to a 911 emergency call from the Plaintiff’s spouse, Laura Petre. According to the transcript of the call, Laura was in the kitchen and the Plaintiff was enraged and violently smashing glass dishware against the wall. When the 911 operator asked Laura if anyone was hurt, she replied: “Not yet.”
9When Officers Chaumont and Kovacic arrived on the scene, they found Laura had been cowering next to the refrigerator. There was shattered glass on the kitchen floor, which the Plaintiff had started to try to clean up before the police arrived. They also found a frying pan on the kitchen counter that had been smashed so hard against a surface that it had almost bent in half.
10In addition, the officers observed a large steel cabinet in the living room used to store guns. Inside, Officer Kvacic observed an assault rifle and what appeared to be a long sniper’s rifle. In addition, a collection of samurai swords was hanging on the living room wall, as was a cross-bow and a set of arrows.
11The two officers followed standard procedure and separated the Plaintiff from Laura. Officer Chaumont spoke with Laura in the kitchen while Officer Kovacic spoke with the Plaintiff in the living room.
12The Plaintiff testified that he had previously warned his wife that cleaning the kitchen was her responsibility, and if he ever found a dirty glass or dish he would smash it. His explanation for his conduct on the day of the incident in question is that he was simply following through on his previous statement to Laura. He did not seem to recognize that his wife was terrorized as he smashed glassware in a fit of rage. In fact, he attempted to justify his conduct by saying that it did not matter because the shattered glasses and dishes were not expensive and he can always buy new ones.
13Overall, the Plaintiff’s testimony exhibited a distinct disconnect from the reality of his actions. Officer Chaumont testified that during the time he was in the house the Plaintiff was glaring at Laura with a threatening and hateful glare, and that he was baring his teeth at her in anger much like a wolf might do. The Plaintiff’s only response to this was to ask sarcastically if he looked something like Wolverine in the movies.
14Further, the Plaintiff was advised that Laura had given a statement to the police indicating that she was terrified of him. Given his fit of rage and his collection of weapons, this appears to be a natural response by his spouse; nevertheless, the Plaintiff’s response was to say that he had handed her the phone to call 911 himself and so she couldn’t have really been scared of anything.
15The two police officers were advised that this was not the first complaint of domestic violence that Laura had made against the Plaintiff. Given this knowledge and the scenario they encountered, they followed police protocol and phoned to speak to Detective Stephen Laramy, a trained Domestic Violence Investigator and an experienced officer in this field.
16Detective Laramy testified at trial and spoke with impressive authority and credibility on the subject of domestic violence and police procedures. He stated that after hearing the scenario described by Officer Chaumont, and reviewing the Plaintiff’s previous record of arrests for domestic violence, he recommended arresting the Plaintiff and taking him into custody. He explained that the Solicitor General’s Policy and Procedure Manual provides instructive guidance in situations like this. Detective Laramy indicated that the applicable procedures reflect the understandable reluctance, borne of past experience, to leave the victim of domestic abuse in the company of the suspect who is being charged with an offence.
17At trial the Plaintiff exhibits a marked tendency to place the blame for his conduct on those around him. He testified that the entire incident leading to his arrest was actually his wife’s fault, because, as he put it, “she is crazy.” There is, however, no credibility whatsoever to the Plaintiff’s protests that Laura was somehow herself responsible for bringing him to the point where she was showered with shards of glass. His own fit of rage seems to play very little role in his evaluation of the day’s events.
18Blaming his spouse, and conveniently forgetting about his own conduct, has been a consistent refrain for the Plaintiff. The evidence in the record shows that on July 16, 2012 he swore an information under oath to compel Laura to undergo a psychiatric examination. That Order was apparently issued but then rescinded the same afternoon. The Justice of the Peace rescinding the Order wrote: “informant failed to provide full and frank disclosure of details regarding domestic violence, including a record on February 9, 2005 and June 14, 2011.”
19The Plaintiff also indicated that much of the blame for the police lay with the police. He testified that Officer Kvacic asked him where he is originally from, and when the Plaintiff told him that he is from Romania the officer supposedly told him that he should “go back home.” As for Officer Chaumont, the Plaintiff testified that his dog greeted the officer in the house by sniffing the crotch of his pants, which to the Plaintiff supposedly indicated that the officer was aroused and acting out of a surge of male aggression.
20None of the Plaintiff’s attempts to blame others for his arrest are credible. Under the circumstances, the only version of the incident that makes sense is the version reported by the two police officers on the scene. As Officers Kvacic and Chaumont relate it, they responded to a 911 call from a woman under distress, and found a man with clear anger management problems surrounded by weapons and smashing glass in close proximity of his wife. These dangerous actions and threatening gestures clearly formed the basis of the charge of assault with a weapon and were the reason he was taken into custody.
21Several weeks after the arrest, Laura apparently contacted Crown counsel and recanted her statement that she had given to the police. She indicated that she was no longer prepared to voluntarily testify against her husband. Detective Laramy testified that this is, unfortunately, a relatively commonplace occurrence in cases of domestic violence.
22Without Laura’s testimony, the charges against the Plaintiff were ultimately dropped by the Crown. I can only surmise that the Plaintiff perceived this as a form of vindication for his version of events – i.e. that his spouse, or the police officers, or all three of them, were responsible for the incident leading to his arrest on June 14, 2011.
23Needless to say, it was no vindication of the Plaintiff at all. The police encountered what they described as a “very stressful situation” with the Plaintiff threatening his wife and using glassware as a form of weapon. In Officer Chaumont’s words, “[t]here was concern for Laura’s safety, given that there were weapons lying around and a tense situation in the house.”
24The Plaintiff finished his submissions by observing that, “In my point of view this [smashing the glass and the frying pan] is nothing.” It may have amounted to nothing in that Laura was, although terrorized, not physically hurt. But his conduct was definitely something – it was reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest.
25The Plaintiff’s action is dismissed.
26The parties may make written submissions as to costs. I would ask that these submissions be delivered within two weeks of the date of this judgment.
Morgan J.
Released: September 27, 2013